The Proof of Emptiness – Bhāviveka’s Jewel in the Hand by FONG, LAI,YAN
Durham E-Theses
The Proof of Emptiness  Bh	aviveka's Jewel in the
Hand
FONG, LAI,YAN
How to cite:
FONG, LAI,YAN (2015) The Proof of Emptiness  Bh	aviveka's Jewel in the Hand, Durham theses,
Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/11319/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Oﬃce, Durham University, University Oﬃce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP
e-mail: e-theses.admin@dur.ac.uk Tel: +44 0191 334 6107
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk
1 

Title: The Proof of Emptiness – Bhāviveka’s Jewel in the Hand 
 
Author: Lai Yan Fong 
 
Abstract: This study seeks to examine the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka proof of 
emptiness in Bhāviveka’s Jewel in the Hand (*Karatalaratna, KR). The proof 
comprises two inferences, the first of which is to the ultimate emptiness of 
conditioned things and the other to the ultimate unreality of unconditioned things. 
However, emptiness and logical reasoning are seemingly mutually-exclusive, in that 
emptiness is non-conceptual and ineffable while logical reasoning is conceptual and 
verbal. How can Bhāviveka prove emptiness by logical reasoning? The thesis 
addresses this theoretical tension in two parts: Part I – an introduction to the proof, 
and Part II – a commentary with the translation of the objections raised by the 
opponents and Bhāviveka’s responses related to the first inference. 
 
Chapter 1 in Part I explains the formation of the two inferences. Chapter 2 clarifies 
Bhāviveka’s notions of the two truths in relation to the proof. The theoretical tension 
is solvable as the ultimate emptiness is understood as the expressible (paryāya) 
ultimate truth, which is conceptual. The proof is further considered as the true 
(tathya) conventional truth, through which the realisation of the inexpressible 
(aparyāya) ultimate truth is facilitated. Chapter 3 examines the two inferences in 
terms of inferences for others. Although they are considered the summary of the 
conclusions of all individual inferences regarding the ultimate emptiness of different 
things, they are unestablished as standalone inferences because their reasons (hetu) 
are fallacious. Thus, they fail to prove the expressible ultimate truth. Chapter 4 
suggests that the proof might be defensible referring to later developments in 
Buddhist logic.          
 
Part II analyses the objections to Bhāviveka’s first inference and his notion of self-
emptiness and Bhāviveka’s defences, based on the translation of the relevant part in 
KR. These objections are refuted by logical reasoning, although not obviously with 
satisfactory results.   
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Chapter 1: Preliminaries  
 
This thesis is an examination of Bhāviveka’s1 proof of emptiness, which consists of 
two inferences (anumāna) respectively regarding the ultimate emptiness of 
conditioned things and of unconditioned things, in his Jewel in the Hand (	
 [Dacheng Zhangzhen Lun],2 *Karatalaratna, hereafter as KR). It seeks to address 
some basic yet overlooked questions: can the ultimate emptiness (śūnyatā) of all 
things be proved by means of logical reasoning? If so, how is this achieved in KR? If 
not, what is the deficiency of the proof? 
 
Bhāviveka is generally considered to be the first to have used the phrase 
Madhyamaka, the school of the Middle Way. His criticism of the methodology of 
Buddhapālita and the subsequent criticism of him by Candrakīrti contributed to the 
demarcation of Prāsa[gika-Madhyamaka and Svātantrika-Madhyamaka by later 
commentators.3 It may also be considered that Bhāviveka’s criticism of Yogācāra’s 
notion of emptiness and the three natures marks the rift between Madhyamaka and 
Yogācāra.4 
 
Bhāviveka’s work, KR, was translated into Chinese by Xuanzang in the seventh 
century; the Sanskrit source is lost and no Tibetan translation has been found. The 
title Jewel in the Hand is translated from Chinese by Poussin in 1933 as Joyau dans 
la Main and is reconstructed into Sanskrit by Sastri in 1949 as *Karatalaratna. To 
be exact, the title of this text should be translated as The Treatise of the Jewel in the 
Hand of the Great Vehicle (*Mahāyāna-Karatalaratna-Śāstra).  
 
Regarding the title of KR, jewels (ratna) represent things that are precious and 
excellent. In Buddhism, jewels are associated with the Buddha and his teachings, as 

1 There are other translations for the name Bhāviveka ( / ) (c. 490-570), e.g. Bhāvaviveka, 
Bhavya; see discussions in Ejima 1990, and also Iida 1980, pp. 5-6, Hsu 2013, pp. 10-12, HE and Van 
der Kuijp 2014a, pp. 338-341. The translation of Bhāviveka will be used throughout this thesis.  
2 CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 268c6-269a12 and 273b28-c20.         
3 See the background of the two schools in Ruegg 2006. 
4 See Hanson 1998, pp. 283-287. For further information on Bhāviveka’s background, works and 
reception, see Iida 1980, pp. 5-26, Eckel 2008, pp. 9-17, Hsu 2013, pp. 10-43, Moro 2004a and 
2004b.; see also HE and Van der Kuijp 2014a, Saito 2005 on the discussions on the chronology of his 
works. 
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in the case of the three jewels (i.e. the Buddha, the Dharma and the Saṃgha) in 
which practitioners take refuge, that illuminate the gateways and practices leading to 
enlightenment. Jewels in this context thus refer to the skilful means with their 
radiance inspiring practitioners to attain the ultimate truth. This can also be 
understood from the Bodhisattvas, whose statues are always adorned with jewels.  
They vow to save all sentient beings from the cycle of death and rebirth by their 
practices in the conventional world. KR is composed due to such a Bodhisattva’s 
vow, therefore it can be considered to be one of the skilful means.5 Hands have a 
special significance in Buddhism. The palm (karatala) is related to the notion of 
quintessence. As depicted in the SN, after the Buddha achieved enlightenment, 
among many things he realised, he told his disciples that the most important things 
he had to teach are like the leaves in his hand, which represent liberation, wisdom 
and enlightenment and the path to nirvā9a.6 Hence, the treatise with the title “Jewel 
in the Hand” can be understood as a quintessential means in the hands of the 
Bodhisattvas to facilitate others’ attainment of the ultimate truth that is the ultimate 
emptiness of all things, in the Mādhyamika context.7 
 
1.1 Dharma, satya, śūnyatā, svabhāva  
First of all, I would like to define the usage of the terms in the notion “the emptiness 
of all things in the ultimate truth”, which is frequently mentioned in the discussion:  
 
Dharma ( [fa]): “Dharmas” will be generally translated as “things” in this thesis. 
While there are several meanings of dharma, including thing, teaching, property, 
etc.,8 dharma will be translated throughout this thesis in the meaning particular to the 
context.  
 

5 See CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 268a29-b20. 
6 Hsu 2013, pp. 44-45, and note 126; Simsapa Sutta, SN 56.31 [PTS: S v 437]. 
7 As Bhāviveka may be familiar with Dignāga’s work Balled Hand Treatise (*Hastavālaprakara9a, 
 in CBETA, T31, no. 1621) and as he holds a critical position towards the latter’s works, HE 
and Van der Kuijp argue that the Sanskrit title of Jewel in the Hand should instead be *Mahāyāna-
Hastaratna-Śāstra, so as to continue the metaphor. It is to signify one opens one’s hand and discovers 
the jewel that is the Mādhyamika point of view, instead of making a fist and holding the Yogācāra 
point of view. (HE and Van der Kuijp 2014a, pp. 301-302) 
A discussion on the appropriate Sanskrit title of Jewel in the Hand is not in the scope of this 
thesis. To my knowledge, the Sanskrit manuscript or any Tibetan commentaries of KR are yet to be 
discovered so that the original Sanskrit title of KR or its exact Tibetan translation remains unknown. 
For this reason, I will refer to the title *Karatalaratna (KR) in the following.
8 See MW, p. 510, 3 and p. 1329, 2. 
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In Abhidharma, dharmas are the building blocks of the universe; they refer to 
categories of things that remain after all other gross objects are analysed to their 
limit. Hence to the Ābhidharmikas, dharmas are the ultimate existents in the 
universe.9 However, the ultimate existence of all things is denied in Madhyamaka.10 
To avoid the implication of ultimate existence, dharmas translated as “things” in this 
thesis only refer to things in general. These things are divided into two categories, 
namely conditioned things (sa>sk.ta-dharma) and unconditioned things (asa>sk.ta-
dharma). The former refers to things that are produced through causes and 
conditions. The latter refers to things that are not produced. Their ultimate existence 
is to be refuted by Bhāviveka’s proof of emptiness.    
 
When dharma is translated as “property”, it is employed as a logical term. It refers to 
the property (dharma) of a certain thing, with this thing being the locus (dharmin) of 
this property. This property is to be inferred (as sādhya-dharma) or functions to infer 
(as sādhana-dharma) in an inference. See further discussion in Section 1.3.  
 
The notion of dharma as “property” is related to the notion of svalakAa9a ( [zi 
xiang]), which refers to the “peculiar characteristic or property”11 of things, which is 
the specific characteristic that identifies a thing as such or distinguishes this thing 
from the others in common conception. In this thesis, svalakAa9a in this sense is 
translated as “distinctive characteristic”. While having a distinctive characteristic in 
certain doctrines may imply having a svabhāva, this thesis does not commit to this 
view. Also, svalakAa9a in Dignaga’s epistemological system is considered the object 
of direct perception (pratyakAa), which is the ineffable particularity.12 In this case, it 
is translated as “particular”.  
 
Truth and reality (satya): Unlike Western philosophy, Indian philosophy does not 
distinguish the notion of truth from that of reality or existence. To be true means to 
be real or existent, and vice versa. This can be understood from the Sanskrit word 

9 See the list of dharmas in Lusthaus 2002, pp. 546-548. 
10 See MMK 13.8. 

See MW, p. 1276, 3.
12 See PSV of PS 1.2c2-1.2d1. (Hattori 1968, p. 24) 
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“sat”, which can mean true, real and existing.13 The same can also be understood 
from “satya”, which is a noun developed from “sat”, meaning truth and reality.14  
 
The distinction of the two truths started in Abhidharma.15 Dharmas (as the building 
blocks of the universe) are considered the ultimate truths (paramārtha-satya), while 
concepts and gross objects are conventional truths (sa>v.ti-satya). Due to 
Madhyamaka’s understanding of the middle way (madhyamā-pratipad) and 
dependent origination (pratītyasa>utpāda), nothing is admitted to exist or be true in 
terms of the ultimate truth. Although the ultimate truth is the emptiness of all things 
to Madhyamaka, this ultimate truth is not taken to be true or to exist ultimately; 
things which are caused are conventional, otherwise they are non-existent or false 
even conventionally. Thus, the ultimate reality of dharmas in Abhidharma is denied. 
The same applies to other Buddhist and non-Buddhist realities.  
 
Emptiness (śūnyatā) or empty (śūnya): This thesis involves the discussion of 
different notions of emptiness in Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools, which are to 
be refuted. E.g. Yogācāra takes emptiness as an ineffable reality and understands it 
as the absence of false concepts in the consciousness, while the consciousness is not 
empty of its own ultimate reality. The non-Buddhist realists equate emptiness with 
absolute non-existence. Other notions of emptiness will be specified when they are 
discussed.  
 
The notion of emptiness that is discussed in relation to all Mādhyamikas, including 
Bhāviveka, in this thesis is clarified here: emptiness is not an ineffable reality. 
Things that have arisen from causes and conditions are considered to be empty, as 
they have to depend on, i.e. be conditioned by, other things’ existence, arising, 
changing and ceasing to exist conventionally.16 As these things are ever-changing 
and impermanent (anitya), they are said to be without inherent existence or inherent 
nature (niGsvabhāva). They are only mistaken to be the ultimate existents in common 
conception. Further, emptiness, as ineffable and non-conceptual or conceptualised to 

13 MW, p. 1134, 2. 
14 MW, p. 1135, 3. In Newland’s words, “conventional truths are not just propositions or facts about 
tables, chairs, and so on; they are also those things themselves. Tables, chairs…are all conventional 
truths. As such, they do exist.” (Newland 2011, p. 57) 
15 See further discussion in Karunadasa 2010, pp. 59-67. 
16 Assutavā Sutta: Uninstructed (1). (SN 12.61; PTS: S ii 94) 
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be effable, is only a concept that is designated dependently (prajñapti),17 i.e. it is 
also conditioned and empty. It is not a reality that is true or exists in the ultimate 
sense. Thus, the Mādhyamika thesis, “all things are empty”, is not ultimately true 
either.18 Based on this clarification, this thesis does not in any way mean to imply 
that emptiness is an ineffable or ultimate reality in Madhyamaka. 
 
Svabhāva ( [zi xing]): Madhyamaka considers things as “having a svabhāva” 
when they have a permanent, substantial existence, or independent, spontaneous 
existence; or when they have an unchanging, inherent nature or identity, an essence; 
and vice versa. These things would be ultimate truths, ultimate realities, or objects of 
determinate cognitions in the Mādhyamika understanding.19 In this thesis, svabhāva 
is translated as “inherent existence” or “inherent nature” to convey its general 
meaning, with its specific implications explained in the discussion if necessary. 
 
Madhyamaka, as has already been clarified, considers all things as empty of 
svabhāva, i.e. being without inherent existence or inherent nature, or ultimate reality. 
As other Buddhist or non-Buddhist schools may have different understandings of 
svabhāva, this term will also be translated to convey other meanings specific to the 
context of discussion.   
 
1.2 The tension between logical reasoning and emptiness 
This section proceeds to explain the background and central question of this thesis. 
The tension between emptiness and a logical proof of it is fundamental, if not readily 
noticeable. While emptiness is considered the ultimate truth in Madhyamaka, logical 
reasoning always pertains to the conventional world. Their natures are generally 
considered mutually exclusive; with emptiness being non-conceptual and ineffable, 
and logical reasoning conceptual and verbal. 
 
To Madhyamaka, what is expressed by speech or thought, as generated due to 
conceptual proliferations (prapañca), is generally considered erroneous views about 
things. To realise emptiness and attain the ultimate truth is to eliminate all these 

17 MMK 24.18. 
18 See VV 29.  
19 Cf. definitions in MW, p. 1276, 1. For a discussion on the ontological and cognitive aspects of 
svabhāva, see Westerhoff 2007. 
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views and stop discrimination (vikalpa) upon things. Nāgārjuna holds that when 
things are realized to be neither arising nor ceasing independently in the ultimate 
truth, one no longer cognizes based upon the domain of her consciousness; when 
emptiness is attained, both conceptualization and language cease to function,20 and 
no speech or thought will arise. Inference and logical reasoning, which deal with 
conceptual objects, therefore cannot fuction to know the ultimate truth or emptiness, 
as the latter is by definition not knowable by any conceptual means of knowledge.21  
 
Nāgārjuna teaches that one has to rely on the conventional truth to attain the ultimate 
truth.22 This thus involves a change in horizon from one state which is conceptual 
and verbal to another which is non-conceptual and ineffable. The different attitudes 
towards the role of the conventional truth have given rise to the Prāsa[gika-
Svātantrika dispute. On the one hand, Candrakīrti holds that the ultimate emptiness, 
which is non-conceptual and ineffable, is achieved after refuting all erroneous views 
that arise from the conceptualization on conventional realities.23 To do this, one 
should only show the contradictory consequences of the erroneous views by reductio 
ad absurdum (prasaHga), instead of committing to any view.24 Bhāviveka, on the 
other hand, accepts the reality of the conventional truth, and holds that one can attain 
the ultimate truth by means of it. In order to explicate the Mādhyamika thesis, “all 
things are empty”, to both Buddhists and non-Buddhists, he admits the legitimacy of 
logical reasoning and treats it as a conceptual tool to inspire one to achieve the 
ultimate emptiness that is non-conceptual and ineffable. This is the motive for 
Bhāviveka’s proof of the Mādhyamika thesis by inferences25 and defence of it by 
logical reasoning in KR. 

20 See MMK 18.7.  
21 Cf. the refutation of the ultimate reality of the various means of knowledge in VV 5-6, 30-51. 
22 MMK 24.10. 
23 In his commentary of MMK 24.8 in PSP, Candrakīrti defines the worldly conventional truth (loka-
sa>v.ti-satya) as concealment, and considers it in relation to social conventions that operate through 
language and are in dual-terms. This worldly conventional truth does not exist in the ultimate truth 
because there will be nothing for language to refer to, when there is no object of cognition. (PSP in 
Sprung et al. 1979, pp. 230-231) 
24 See PSP in Stcherbatsky 1977, pp. 123-124, 143-144, 147. 
25 There are mainly four means of valid knowledge (pramā9a) in Indian philosophy, namely direct 
perception (pratyakAa), inference, analogy (upamā9a) and testimony (śabda). Buddhist logicians 
generally accept direct perception and inference, and consider the rest reducible to these two. 
Bhāviveka is considered as accepting the conventional reality of both direct perception and inference. 
It is pointed out in Iida 1966, pp. 80-85 that Bhāviveka sees the Buddhist scriptures (āgama) (i.e. the 
above-mentioned testimony) as the initial and final authority, and he treats logical reasoning as a 
verifier of the authority of and an indispensable means to the correct understanding of these scriptures; 
see also Ejima 1969 and Tamura 2014.
18 

 
To Candrakīrti, however, Bhāviveka’s acceptance of the conventional reality and 
inference signals his commitment to erroneous views. His position then leads to a 
problem, which is seemingly not faced by the Prāsa[gikas – how something non-
conceptual (the ultimate emptiness) can be proved by something conceptual (logical 
reasoning). That is, how the ultimate can be proved by the conventional, which is 
associated with erroneous views. Candrakīrti has in fact criticized Bhāviveka for 
establishing a proof that is based on conventional existents, because according to the 
Mādhyamika thesis, Bhāviveka will have to refute their existence in the ultimate 
sense. 26  The same criticism is applicable to the conceptual emptiness, which is 
understood in terms of speech and thought, to be inferred by the proof. The proof 
only leads to a detour to the realisation of the ultimate emptiness. It is also futile to 
explicate emptiness to non-Buddhists and ordinary people because they only 
understand things in terms of either ultimate existence or absolute non-existence.27 
In Candrakīrti’s opinion, proving emptiness is infeasible.  
 
This thesis has no intention of taking sides with either Candrakīrti or Bhāviveka 
regarding the issue of whether it is appropriate to prove emptiness, since this is 
outside its focus. Yet parts of their dispute, which concerned the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of inference in Madhyamaka, represent an important phase in the 
development of the school. The mentioned theoretical tension and the effectiveness 
of the proof of emptiness, which possibly are the bases of Candrakīrti’s criticisms 
above, are both tackled in KR. This therefore sufficiently justifies the need for a 
study of the proof. While Candrakīrti’s criticisms are mainly mentioned in footnotes, 
the issue of whether or not they are justified will be evaluated on other occasions. 
 
In this thesis, I do not want to make the claim that Madhyamaka in general has a 
problem in proving emptiness, as Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti have clearly denied the 

26 See PSP in Stcherbatsky 1977, pp. 113, 117, 119. In Candrakīrti’s comments, it is a fallacy to take 
an unreal thing as the subject of an inference, based on Dignāga’s system of logic; cf. Objection 2 in 
Commentary. And as Bhāviveka does not admit the ultimate reality of the reason, Candrakīrti 
comments that no reason should be legitimate to Bhāviveka and logical demonstration should be 
impossible; this issue will be discussed in Section 3.2.    
27 When arguing against Bhāviveka’s introduction of the modifier “in terms of the ultimate truth” (see 
discussion below), Candrakīrit in his PSP explains that the non-Buddhists do not understand the 
difference between the two truths, and the ordinary people do not understand what dependent 
origination is. Hence, conventional realities should be refuted on both the ultimate and conventional 
levels. (PSP in Stcherbatsky 1977, p. 112) 
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ultimate reality of and the use of inference. However, it should be noted that 
although Bhaviveka is the sole person in Madhyamaka in his time to attempt to 
prove it, his influence on the common use of logical reasoning in later Madhyamaka 
should not be overlooked. Thus, the problem in proving emptiness is relevant at least 
to those Mādhyamikas who engage in such a pursuit. To contribute to the discussion 
of this problem, this thesis situates its study on Bhāviveka’s proof of emptiness in 
KR. This thesis will investigate the nature of this proof and the proof’s effectiveness 
in achieving its aim to prove the Mādhyamika thesis, under Bhāviveka’s 
understanding of the Mādhyamika doctrine.  
 
In this thesis, I would rather claim that while Bhāviveka never tries to prove a non-
conceptual emptiness (as he holds that it is realized through meditation), he fails to 
prove the conceptualized emptiness. I will argue that this is because his inferences to 
prove this conceptualized emptiness, as evaluated in relation to Dignāga’s logical 
system, cannot take all conditioned and unconditioned things as their subjects; while 
the Mādhyamika thesis is exactly about the emptiness of all things. In other words, 
“all things are empty”, as a universal claim, is not provable by inference in 
Dignāga’s logical system. Thus, neither the non-conceptual nor the conceptual 
emptiness is proved in KR. Although, as just noted, this thesis does not participate in 
the dispute between Candrakīrti and Bhāviveka, its conclusion indeed supports 
Candrakīrti’s view that proving emptiness is infeasible, although through a different 
charge. And as this thesis is a contextualized study of the proof of emptiness, 
“emptiness is not provable in all cases” is therefore not my claim; I would only claim 
that Bhāviveka fails to prove the Mādhyamika thesis by inference in KR.     
 
1.3 The formation of the two inferences in the proof 
The use of inference, as a means of valid knowledge (pramā9a), developed as a part 
of the culture of debate in India. The rules and practices of inference and debate 
evolved over time due to constant disputes among doctrines. Notably the Nyāya 
Sūtra has recorded a five-membered inferential pattern, 28  lists of fallacies in 

28 This pattern is still observed in Objection 4 in Part II. Apart from the thesis (pratijñā), the reason 
(hetu) and the example (d.A@ānta) (see discussion below), the opponents also include in their 
inference two more members (avayava), namely (1) application (upanaya), i.e. to apply the positive 
concomitance (anvaya) of the property that infers (sādhana-dharma) with the property to be inferred 
(sādhya-dharma) exemplified by the positive example (sādharmya-d.A@ānta) to the subject (pakAa) of 
the inference, being also a locus (dharmin) of the property that infers, and (2) conclusion (nigamana), 
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inferences and faults in debates, which are considered as the generally-accepted 
practice of its time. Before Dignāga, the use of logical reasoning has already been 
observed in, for example, Nāgārjuna’s *Upāyah.daya and Vasubandhu’s Vādavidhi. 
In Dignāga’s time, the pattern of an inference has changed to become three-
membered. His logico-epistemological system (pramā9avāda) has systematized 
again the use of inference and the related fallacies.29 It can be sure that disputes 
among doctrines did not stop in Bhāviveka’s time, thus lending support to his use of 
inference and logical reasoning to demonstrate his views.       
   
Bhāviveka lived in the period between Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. He has no extant 
works specifically on his standpoint of or innovation in logic. HE 2012 demonstrated 
that the logical terms in KR display a strong continuity to Dignāga’s system of logic. 
Although Bhāviveka’s proof of emptiness and explanation in KR can also be 
evaluated by later Buddhist logical systems or logical systems from other doctrines, 
to take a historical and doctrinal point of reference, they will be understood in 
relation to Dignāga’s system of logic here. Dignāga’s PS and NM are the main 
references. As Śa[karasvāmin’s NP is a manual of inference for others (parārtha-
anumāna) and generally considered an accurate introduction to Dignāga’s system, it 
will also be referred to.30 Thus, a standard to analyze KR is set and its limitation can 
be shown. This allows us to pinpoint the differences in Bhāviveka’s proof and views 
in KR from Dignāga’s system.31 While the process of comparing and contrasting on 
a textual basis to locate these differences has already been done by Ejima 1980 and 
HE 2012, this thesis will only discuss these differences to the extent that is relevant 
to the establishment of the proof (see Chapter 3).  

i.e. to affirm that the subject is also the locus of the property to be inferred. Referring to the example 
in the discussion below, the application will be “Jars are also man-made” and the conclusion will be 
“Therefore, jars are impermanent.” 
29 See further discussions on the development of Indian logic in Matilal 2001, Vidyabhusana 1971 
and Tucci 1981, pp. ix-xxx. 
30 The same approach is also employed in Eckel 1980, pp. 365-370, Hsu 2013, pp. 111-132. 
31 While Bhāviveka’s use and understanding of inference and logical terms in KR largely conform to 
Dignāga’s system of logic, it can also be observed that he has adapted components in his inferences to 
the doctrine of emptiness. Dr. Eric Greene suggested in conversation that Bhāviveka’s proof might be 
operating under a different logical system, or that Bhāviveka did not employ any fixed system at all. I 
would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Greene for his suggestions, but I think these suggestions 
require verification by further textual evidences, which are either not yet discovered or outside the 
scope of the present study. Further, if Bhāviveka really did not employ any particular logical system 
in KR, there would be the question on on what basis he regards his inference and defence established 
but his opponents’ fallacious. If this basis is a conventional one, then it also raises the question as to 
what this conventional basis is; whether or not it is a set of logical and debating rules, or even a 
system, commonly practised in that period of time or in that particular doctrine. 
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There are six chapters in PS: (1) direct perception, (2) inference for oneself (svārtha-
anumāna), (3) inference for others, (4) example and the fallacies of example 
(d.A@ānta-d.A@āntābhāsa), (5) exclusion (apoha) of others as the meaning of a word, 
(6) futile rejoinder (jāti), respectively with similar passages found in NM. Below, 
Dignāga’s system of logic will only be introduced in relation to inference for oneself 
(chapter [2]) and inference for others (covering chapters [3], [4]), and with a focus 
on the latter, to provide the guidelines to understand Bhāviveka’s proof of emptiness. 
Although the discussion of inference for others also includes chapter (6), materials 
from chapters (1), (5), (6) will be discussed only when it is appropriate. It should be 
noted that, as the proof is concerned with proving the ultimate emptiness of all things 
to the practitioners and Bhāviveka’s opponents, it will be understood in relation to 
Dignāga’s notion of inference for others.  
 
1.3.1 Dignāga’s logical system 
There are two types of objects of knowledge (prameya), i.e. particulars and 
universals (sāmānya-lakAa9a), in Dignāga’s system. Particulars are ultimately real in 
the system and are cognized by direct perception of the five senses, which is free 
from conceptual construction (i.e. not being associated with names [nāman], genuses 
[jāti], etc.) and inexpressible. Universals, which are concepts constructed by the 
mind from repeated cognitions and generalization of the particulars, are only 
conventionally real. They are cognized by inference, speech and thought.32 Direct 
perception and inference are two valid means of knowledge. Inference, which cannot 
cognize ultimate existents, is still recognised as such because the formation of 
universals is based on the existence of particulars. The speech and thought that 
operate in terms of universals are effective in achieving our daily activities, thus 
demonstrating a connection of the universals (i.e. the conventional) with the 
particulars (i.e. the ultimate).33             

32 See PS/V 1.2-1.5 (Hattori 1968, pp. 24-27) and note 1.14 (ibid., pp. 79-80); Katsura 2007, Chu 
2006 (2008). In the process of conceptual construction, universals are formed by exclusions of others 
(anyāpoha). For example, certain things are designated as “jars” by excluding all individual non-jars. 
Thus, the formation of the universal “jars” is based on the things that are not jars. This universal itself 
is not a real existent. It is only a concept expressing “not non-jar”, which does not correspond to any 
real jars. See Chapter 5 of PS/V.     
33 Dignāga himself did not give a clear explanation on the connection between particulars and 
universals. How such a connection should be understood, however, is outside the scope of this thesis; 
see discussion in Hayes 1988, pp. 185-204.   
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Dignāga holds that there are two types of inference, i.e. the inference for oneself and 
the inference for others. Inference for oneself refers to one’s own inferential process 
and knowledge of an object, based on the examination of this object in accordance 
with the three characteristics of a reason (trairūpya).34 Inference for others is one’s 
communication of one’s knowledge obtained from the inference for oneself to others. 
To help others to generate the same inferential knowledge regarding the same object, 
one expresses one’s knowledge as an inference also in accordance with the three 
characteristics of a reason.35 Inference for others thus serves as a proof (sādhana).  
 
Inference for oneself 
In PS/V 4.6, differences in the process of inference for oneself and inference for 
others are described; regarding inference for oneself, Katsura explains, 
 
“(1) First we ascertain the presence of an inferential mark (liHga, e.g. smoke) in the 
object to be inferred (anumeya, e.g., the top of a mountain); this is the confirmation 
of the first of the three characteristics (trirūpa) of a valid inferential mark, i.e., 
pakAadharmatva. 
(2) Next we recall that we previously experienced elsewhere the presence of the 
inferential mark in what is similar to the object to be inferred (tattulya, e.g., a 
kitchen) and its absence in the absence of the property to be inferred (asat, e.g. a 
lake); this is the confirmation of the second and the third characteristics, viz., 
anvaya (a positive concomitance) and vyatireka (a negative concomitance). 
(3) Then we can have an ascertainment (nicaya) that the property to be inferred 
exists in the object to be inferred, as, e.g., that there must be, even though it is 
imperceptible, a fire at the top of the mountain.”36 
 
Central to the inferential process are the three characteristics of an inferential mark 
or of a reason: 1. pakAadharmatva, 2. tattulye sadbhāva, 3. asati nāstitā, which are 
discussed in PS/V 2.5cd-2.7.37 Hayes formulates the three characteristics as below:  
 
“1. The inferential [mark] must be a property of the subject of the inference [= 
object to be inferred in Katsura’s explanation]. That is, there exists in the subject of 

34 See PS 2.1. (Hayes 1988, p. 231) 
35 See PS/V 3.1ab (Tillemans 2000, pp. 3-4).       
36 Katsura 2004, pp. 136-137 and PS of PSV 4.6 quoted in notes 4 (ibid.); Kitagawa 1965, p. 267. See 
also “svārthānumāna” in Nakamura 1983, pp. 193-194. 
37 Hayes 1988, pp. 239-242.  
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inference [such] a property, which is different from [the property to be inferred] and 
which is furthermore evident to the person drawing the inference…. 
2. The inferential [mark] must be known to occur in at least one locus, other than 
the subject of inference, in which [the property to be inferred] occurs.  
3. The inferential [mark] must not be known to occur in any other loci in which [the 
property to be inferred] is absent.”38     
 
Inferential mark refers to the property that infers (sādhana-dharma), which is a 
property of the the subject of the inference that functions as an evidence to prove that 
this subject is also the locus of the property to be inferred (sādhya-dharma).39 To 
achieve this, it must possess the three characteristics of a reason, which are also 
understood in terms of relations of pervasion (vyāpti) discussed in PS/V 2.20-2.25:40  
 
For the first characteristic, the subject should be pervaded by the property that infers, 
but not vice versa. Thus, the property that infers applies to a wider class of things 
than the subject does; all individual members of the subject possess the property that 
infers.  
 
For the second characteristic, the property that infers should be present in some or all 
things, except the subject, that possess the property to be inferred (sādhya-dharma). 
Things having the property to be inferred are similar (samāna) to the subject, i.e. 
similar instances (sapakAa), as the subject will be inferred to also possess such a 
property.41 Regarding the second characteristic, the property to be inferred pervades 
the property that infers, i.e. the property that infers is a member of the property to be 
inferred, but not of any property that is not the property to be inferred. Thus, all 
things that have the property that infers also have the property to be inferred. These 
two properties may pervade each other, but the pervasion between them is not 
reversible. This relationship is called anvaya, i.e. positive concomitance.  
 
For the third characteristic, the property that infers is absent in all things that do not 
possess the property to be inferred. Things lacking the property to be inferred are 

38 Hayes 1988, pp. 153-154; cf. NP, where the second and the third characteristics are rendered as 
“sapakAe sattvam” (“”) and “vipakAe ’asattvam” (“	
”) (CBETA, T32, no. 
1630, 11b7; Tachikawa 1971, p. 140, Section 2.2).  
39 See also “liHga” in Nakamura 1983, pp. 101-102. 
40 Hayes 1988, pp. 247-249. 
41 PS/V 3.18. (Kitagawa 1965, pp. 177-178; see also Potter 2003, p. 345) 
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dissimilar to the subject, i.e. dissimilar instances (vipakAa),42 as the subject will be 
inferred to possess such a property. Regarding the third characteristic, the absence of 
the property to be inferred is pervaded by the absence of the property that infers, so 
that all things that do not possess the property to be inferred also lack the property 
that infers. The absences of the two properties may pervade each other, but the 
pervasion between them is again not reversible. This relationship is called vyatireka, 
i.e. negative concomitance.43 
 
One will then reach the ascertainment of “jars are impermanent,” i.e. jars are the loci 
of “impermanent”, through this inferential process: first, one ascertains that an 
inferential mark, “man-made”, is present in all members of the subject of inference, 
i.e. all jars (the first characteristic of a reason). Then one recalls that this property is 
also present in some or all similar instances, i.e. things that are impermanent, e.g. 
cloths (the second characteristic), and it is absent in all dissimilar instances, i.e. 
things that are not “impermanent”, e.g. space (the third characteristic). As jars are 
“man-made”, by analogy, one thus ascertains that jars are also “impermanent”. In 
this inference for oneself, “jars” is pervaded by “man-made”. “Man-made” is 
pervaded by the property to be inferred “impermanent”. The absence of 
“impermanent” is pervaded by the absence of “man-made”. 
 

42 In order to reach the inferential knowledge correctly, a dissimilar instance is defined as that which 
is the absence (nāstitā) of the similar instances, and devised with the same purpose as an actual 
negative example to demonstrate the third characteristic of a reason (see Inference for others). A 
dissimilar instance is not (1) that which is other than (anya) the similar instances nor (2) that which is 
contradictory (viruddha) to them. (PS/V 3.19-3.20abc in Kitagawa 1965, pp. 179-181; see also Potter 
2003, p. 345, Katsura 2003, pp. 26-30) For example, in an inference for the impermanence of jars, 
with the reason that they are man-made; while cloths are taken as the similar instances, in terms of (1), 
things other than cloths, e.g. pots, would be taken to be dissimilar instances. This is problematic 
because pots are indeed impermanent and man-made. Further, the third characteristic of a reason 
would be missing. In terms of (2), things that possess the property opposite to the property to be 
inferred would be taken to be the dissimilar instances. Referring to Dignāga’s example, in the 
inference for the presence of heat in this place, with the reason of the presence of fire, a snowy 
mountain (which is both cold and without fire) would be a dissimilar instance that could fulfill the 
third characteristic of a reason. This is still problematic because the possibility that fire is found in 
places which are neither hot nor cold has not been excluded, thus failing to secure the second 
characteristic of a reason.   
43 Katsura suggested that Dignāga takes the second and the third characteristics as logically equivalent 
(Katsura 1983, p. 19), with the positive concomitance understood as “if p, then q” and the negative 
concomitance as “if ~q, then ~p”, or as “whatever is p is q” and “whatever is not q is not p” (p = the 
property that infers; q = the property to be inferred). Due to the subject, which also possesses the 
property that infers, is required to be excluded from the domain of similar instances in Dignāga’s 
inference, this view of Katsura or Dignāga is shown to be untenable; see detailed discussion in 
Tillemans 1999, pp. 114-115, notes 41 and 42. For this reason, the positive concomitance and 
negative concomitance will not be treated as logically equivalent in this thesis.      
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Inference for others 
Inference for others also operates based on the three characteristics of a reason and 
the relations of pervasion explained in relation to inference for oneself. Referring to 
PS/V 4.6 again, Katsura translates: 
  
“…with a desire to produce for others the same ascertainment (nicaya) as we 
ourselves have obtained, we refer to (1) [a reason’s (hetu)] being a property of the 
topic (pakAa) of a proposition (pakAadharmatva), (2) [its inseparable] relation 
(sambandha) [with that which is to be proved] and (3) the [proposition] to be 
proved (sdhya). Other items should be excluded [from the members of a proof].”44   
  
“(1) The statement of a proposition (pakAa-vacana) is made in order to indicate the 
state of affairs to be inferred (anumeya). 
(2) The statement of a reason (hetu-vacana) is made in order to indicate that the 
reason is a property of the topic under discussion (pakAadharmatva).” 
(3) The statement of an example (d.A@ānta-vacana) is made in order to indicate that 
the reason is inseparably related (avinbhva) to the property to be inferred 
(anumeya).”45 
 
In order to produce the same ascertainment that one has obtained from inference for 
oneself for others, three members (avayava): the statement of a proposition or a 
thesis (= pratijñā), the statement of a reason and the statement of an example, are 
devised in an inference for others: 
 
The thesis consists of the topic of the proposition, i.e. the subject of an inference, and 
the property to be inferred in relation to the subject.46 It does not prove anything, but 
only to serve to indicate the state of affairs to be inferred,47 i.e. that the subject being 
the locus (dharmin) of the property to be inferred.  
 

44PS 4.6: svaniścayavad anyeAā> niścayotpādanecchayā | pakAadharmatvasambandhasādhyokter 
anyavarjanam ||.  (Katsura 2004, p. 137 and note 6 = Kitagawa 1965, p. 268, note 576) Cf. NM in 
Section 5.5 of Katsura 1981, pp. 73-76; Tucci 1930, pp. 44-45. See also “parārthānumāna” in 
Nakamura 1983, pp. 118-120. 
45 PSV of PS 4.6: gaH gi phyir phyogs kyi chos ñid bstan pa’i don du gtan tshigs brjod pa daH | yaH 
de’i rjes su dpag par bya ba daH med na mi ’byuH ba’i don du dpe brjod pa daH | rjes su dpag par bya 
ba yin pa’i don du phyogs brjod pa ste rjes su dpag pa’i yan lag gźan yod pa ma yin no || de’i phyir 
gźan dag ni śes pa la sogs pa rnams daH ñe bar sbyor ba daH mjug bsdu ba dag ’dir spaHs pa yin no ||. 
(Katsura 2004, pp. 138-139 and note 7 = Kitagawa 1965, pp. 521-522) 
46 PS/V 3.10. (Kitagawa 1965, pp. 151-152; see also Potter 2003, p. 344) 
47 PS/V 3.1cd. (Tillemans 2000, p. 4) 
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The statement of a reason consists of the subject of the inference and the property 
that infers, which is a property that is known to be present in the subject either by 
perception or inference.48 This refers to the first characteristic of a reason, and the 
reason-statement serves to indicate this. The property that infers here should be 
recognised by both the proponent of the inference and her opponents. The subject 
should also be admitted to be real by both parties.49 
 
The statement of an example, according to PS 4.1, serves to present the second and 
the third characteristics of a reason (i.e. the inseparable relation, being the positive or 
negative concomitance, between the property that infers and the property to be 
inferred), as the reason-statement only presents the first characteristic. 50  As the 
second and the third characteristics should also be recognised by both parties in the 
debate,51 the examples should exemplify them and also be mutually recognized to be 
legitimate. An example statement consists of a statement expressing the positive or 
the negative concomitance and an actual example in our experience.52 There are two 
kinds of example-statement, positive (sādharmya) and negative (vaidharmya). The 
former presents the positive concomitance and an actual positive example, while the 
latter presents the negative concomitance and an actual negative example.53  An 
actual positive example is selected from the domain of similar instances, i.e. things 
that possess the property to be inferred; it is a similar instance that at the same time 
possesses the property that infers, demonstrating the said positive concomitance. An 
actual negative example is selected from the domain of dissimilar instances, i.e. 
things that do not possess the property to be inferred; as it also lacks the property 

48 See PSV of PS 2.5cd. (Hayes 1968, pp. 239-240) 
49 PS 3.11-3.12. (Kitagawa 1965, pp. 153-156; see also Potter 2003, p. 344)  
50 Katsura 2004, p. 140 and PS 4.1 quoted in note 1: trirūpo hetur ity ukta> pakAadharme tu 
sa>sthitaG | rūKhe rūpadvaya> śeAa> d.A@āntena pradarśyate ||. (Ibid. = Kitagawa 1965, p. 239) Cf. 
NM in Section 5.6 of Katsura 1981, pp. 76-78; Tucci 1930, pp. 45-46. 
51 NM in Section 2.2 in Katsura 1977, pp. 122-123; Tucci 1930, p. 13. 
52 Dignāga insists that a statement expressing the positive or the negative concomitance, in the form 
of, e.g., whatever is man-made is impermanent, or whatever is not impermanent is not man-made, 
should be included in an example-statement. According to Katsura, including such a statement in the 
example-statement amounts to meaning that the universal relation which it expresses is observed 
(d.A@a, cf. the word d.A@ānta [i.e. the example]), thus suggesting that this statement “does not 
necessarily imply a universal law but rather assumes a general law derived from our observations or 
experiences.” (Katsura 2004, p. 145 and note 18) In this respect, PS 4.11 holds that this statement is 
required, in addition to an actual example, in an example-statement because further examples and 
hence an infinite regress, will result if a general law of pervasion were not stated. (Kitagawa 1965, p. 
273; see also Potter 2003, p. 349) According to Katsura’s analysis, to Dignāga the purpose of giving 
actual examples is therefore “to indicate some positive support in the external reality”. (Katsura 2004, 
p. 155 and note 28)  
53 PS 4.2. (Katsura 2004, p. 141 and note 11; Kitagawa 1965, p. 240) 
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that infers, it demonstrates the said negative concomitance.54 The actual positive 
example functions to affirm that there are some experiential things, which possess 
the property that infers, also possessing the property to be inferred, while negating 
that they possess the opposite of the property to be inferred. The actual negative 
example only functions to exclude any other things that lack the property to be 
inferred from having the property that infers.55 Dignāga holds that both positive and 
negative example-statements are required to form an inference for others; except 
when one of the examples is already well-known to the opponents, it is sufficient to 
state only the other, or when both examples are well-known to the opponents, it is 
sufficient to state only one of them.56                   
 
The inferential process of an inference for others is similar to that of an inference for 
oneself. In order to produce the same inferential knowledge one has obtained in 

54 Dunne 2004, p. 30.  

NM:  (CBETA, T32, no. 1628, 2c8-c9; Section 5.1 in Katsura 1981, pp. 
63-65); Tucci 1930, p. 37 translates: The first example is negative and affirmative, the second is 
merely exclusive.
56 PSV of PS 4.5 (Katsura 2004, pp. 167-168 and note 51 in ibid., pp. 168-169; Kitagawa 1965, pp. 
266); Cf. NM in Section 5.4 in Katsura 1981, pp. 71-72; see also Tucci 1930, pp. 42-44.  
On the other hand, a question arises as to whether actual examples are indeed irrelevant in 
proving a thesis. On the basis of Katsura’s view that Dignāga takes the second and the third 
characteristics of a reason as logically equivalent, the positive concomitance and the negative 
concomitance can further be understood as premises of a deductive argument, and only one of them is 
required. With the first characteristic also understood as a premise, an inference for others can be 
interpreted as: 
 
(Second characteristic:)  Whatever is man-made is impermanent. 
(First characteristic:)  Jars are man-made. 
(Thesis:)  Jars are impermanent.   
 
As the conclusion, i.e. the thesis, can be deduced by merely considering the logical relationship 
between the terms, actual examples have become irrelevant in the inferential process.   
 However, this view is not taken in this thesis. First, based on the discussion of examples and 
fallacious examples in chapter 4 of PS/V and in NM (see Katsura 1981), Dignāga does hold that the 
positive concomitance and the negative concomitance have to be exemplified by actual examples (see 
footnote 50) to convince the opponents. Also, it should be noted that the second and the third 
characteristics are not logically equivalent, no matter whether or not Dignāga intends them to be so 
(see footnote 43). Inference indeed involves inductive reasoning and analogy. For example (the 
second characteristic:) whatever is man-made is impermanent. The concept of “man-made” does not 
originally imply the concept of “impermanent” (as seen in the situation where the opponents disputing 
the positive concomitance). The general relation of the two concepts is rather established by referring 
to the experiential objects, i.e. the domains of similar instances and dissimilar instances, from which 
this relation is derived. The thesis of an inference is proved analogically with reference to the positive 
concomitance and the negative concomitance exemplified by the actual examples selected from the 
domains of similar instances and dissimilar instances. Thus, I share the view that inference in the 
Buddhist logico-epistemological school is not intended to be deductive argument or formal logic (see 
also Hayes 1988, p. 154, Tillemans 1999, p. 100 and p. 114 note 40, Sidierits 2003, p. 317, Dunne 
2004, p. 31, note 41). While interpreting inference as deductive argument may also yield fruitful 
results (with the difference between inference and deductive argument noted), as this is outside the 
scope of this study, I will leave this approach to my future research.   
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others, instead of inferring in one’s own mind, the inferential process is now 
demonstrated by an inference consisting of a thesis, a reason-statement and example-
statement(s). As mentioned, one (the proponent of the inference) should state a 
reason, in which the reality of the subject and its property (i.e. the property that 
infers) are also recognised by others (the opponents). The proponent then 
demonstrates to the opponents the positive and the negative concomitances between 
the property that infers and the property to be inferred by the actual positive and 
negative examples. In this way, the opponents engage in an inferential process 
similar to that of the proponent’s inference for herself. Except that they may dispute 
the three characteristics of a reason and various components of the inference (see 
Fallacies), and therefore the proponent has to defend her inference (see the 
objections and responses in Part II.) If the opponents also accept the thesis, being the 
conclusion of the inferential process of an inference for others, which is the same as 
the conclusion of the inferential process of an inference for oneself, the thesis is 
considered proved.      
 
Before further discussion, the translation and usage of the aforementioned logical 
terms in this thesis are clarified as follow:  
 
1. PakAa sometimes refers to the object to be inferred (anumeya) or topic (pakAa) of 
the proposition, while sometimes referring to the statement of the proposition or the 
thesis (pakAa-vacana).57 Below, pakAa is restricted to mean the object to be inferred, 
i.e. “the subject” of an inference; the proposition-statement will be referred to as “the 
thesis”.  
2. “Reason” (hetu) sometimes refers to the statement of reason (hetu-vacana), which 
is a member in an inference, while sometimes referring to the inferential mark 
(liHga), which is the property that infers (sādhana-dharma).58 Below, “reason” is 
restricted to mean the reason-statement. The inferential mark will be referred to as 
“the property that infers”.     
3. Trirūpa will still be referred to as “the three characteristics of a reason” as it is 
commonly used. The second characteristic of a reason and the positive concomitance 
of the property that infers with the property to be inferred will be used 

57 See Staal 2001, pp. 158-159. 
58 See Katsura’s comment in Potter 2003, p. 347.  
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interchangeably, with the former emphasizing the characteristic that a reason should 
have to be qualified as legitimate, and the latter emphasizing the relation of 
pervasion between the two properties. The same applies to the third characteristic 
and the negative concomitance of the two properties, and similarly to the first 
characteristic.   
4. “Example” (d.A@ānta) sometimes refers to the statement of example (d.A@ānta-
vacana), which is a member of an inference, while sometimes referring to the actual 
example, which is a component of the example-statement.59 Below, “example” is 
restricted to mean the actual example. It will be specified when it refers to the 
example-statement.   
5. A “similar instance” (sapakAa) is similar to the subject because it possesses the 
property to be inferred, while sometimes it also designates the actual positive 
example. However, a similar instance is not necessarily a positive example. As 
explained, it can be one only when it also possesses the property that infers. Below, 
“similar instances” are restricted to only mean instances that possess the property to 
be inferred. “Positive examples” are restricted to mean similar instances that possess 
both the property to be inferred and the property that infers, and that are used to 
exemplify the said positive concomitance.60 The same applies to negative examples 
and dissimilar instances.  
6. As inference is different from deductive argument in Western logic; it will not be 
described as “valid” or “sound” in the following discussion. When the opponents 
accept the proponent’s thesis, or after the proponent has successfully defended the 
inference from attribution of fallacies by her opponents, the inference is considered 
“established” (siddha) or its thesis proved. Otherwise, it is unestablished (asiddha). 
When components in an inference are found to be fallacious, they are also called 
unestablished in KR.         
 

59 Ibid. 
60 See Katsura 2003, p. 31. Further, the difference between a similar instance and a positive example 
can be clarified with reference to some positive examples, which are fallacious because they do not 
possess the property that infers, although being similar instances, i.e. having the property to be 
inferred. These examples may present the type of reason which is considered indeterminate 
(anaikāntika) and fallacious (see below). Taking similar instances to be the same as positive examples 
would mean that all similar instances possess the property that infers, and therefore the mentioned 
fallacious example and reason would be impossible. Although dissimilar instances are devised with 
the same purpose as negative examples (see also footnote 42), due to the fact that there are fallacious 
negative examples that do not possess the property to be inferred but possessing the property that 
infers, dissimilar instances are also distinguished from negative examples here.  
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Previously, a person has obtained the inferential knowledge regarding “jars are 
impermanent” through an inference for oneself. Now this person attempts to 
convince others (her opponents) to accept the same inferential knowledge in a debate, 
she therefore proposes a three-membered inference: 
 
Thesis:  Jars are impermanent, 
Reason:  because jars are man-made, 
Positive Example: whatever is man-made is impermanent, like cloths, etc.; 
Negative Example: whatever is not impermanent is not man-made, like space.   
 
“Jars are impermanent”, which is the conclusion of the proponent’s inference for 
herself, is taken up as the thesis in her inference for others. In order to prove that jars 
are the loci of the property to be inferred (“impermanent”), the proponent first states 
the reason, “because jars are man-made”, in which the reality of jars is recognised by 
both herself and her opponents. They also agree that the property that infers, i.e. 
“man-made”, is the property of all jars. Thus, the reason possesses the first 
characteristic of a reason. Then, the proponent states the positive example, “cloths”, 
to exemplify the positive concomitance of “man-made” with “impermanent”, and the 
negative example, “space”, to exemplify the negative concomitance of the two 
properties. Thus, the reason also possesses the second and the third characteristics. 
As “cloths, etc.” which are “man-made” are also “impermanent”, so should “jars”. 
“Space” is both “permanent” and “not man-made”, lacking the properties of “cloths”. 
While “jars” are “man-made”, “jars” should not be “permanent”. In this way, the 
proponent attempts to convince her opponents to accept the thesis “jars are 
impermanent”. 
 
Fallacies 
There are fallacies which may be found in various components in an inference. The 
opponents can refute the inference by pointing out any one of them. A list of these 
fallacies in Dignāga’s logical system was discussed in NP.61  
 
A thesis is fallacious in the following situations:  

61 Similar discussions are found in PS/V 3.2cd (Tillemans 2000, pp. 5-6), 3.21-3.22 (Kitagawa 1965, 
pp. 185-192; Potter 2003, pp. 345-346; see also Dignāga’s Hetucakra in HE and Van der Kuijp 
2014b), 4.13-4.14 (Kitagawa 1965, pp. 277-281; Potter 2003, p. 349).  
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(1) the thesis or the property to be inferred in relation to the subject is 
contradicted by perception, inference, scriptures, common knowledge, 
or be self-contradictory;  
(2) the existence of the subject, the property to be inferred, or both are 
not admitted by the opponents;  
(3) the thesis, i.e. the subject being the locus of the property to be 
inferred, is well-established so that a proof for this is not needed.62   
 
As the subject and its properties are often experiential, their relation may be disputed 
by the opponents. While it is impossible for the proponent to cite all examples to the 
opponents to establish necessary relations between the property that infers and the 
property to be inferred, opponents may also give counter-examples to such relations. 
This will demonstrate the fallacies either in the reason or the example, or both.  
 
Regarding the reason, NP lists three kinds of fallacies; (1) is related to the first 
characteristic of a reason, while (2) and (3) are related to the second and the third 
characteristics:  
 
(1) the property that infers is not recognised (asiddha) (a) by either 
the proponent, the opponents, or both; (b) because its existence is in 
doubt; (c) because the existence of its locus is not admitted.        
(2) the property that infers is indeterminate (anaikāntika) when (a) it 
occurs in some or all of both similar instances and dissimilar 
instances; (b) it occurs in neither similar instances nor dissimilar 
instances; (c) a contradictory thesis can be established by another 
legitimate reason.   
(3) the property that infers is contradictory (viruddha) when (a) it 
infers the opposite of the distinctive characteristic (svarūpa) or the 
implied characteristic (viśeAa) of the property to be inferred; (b) it 
infers the opposite of the distinctive characteristic or the implied 
characteristic of the subject.63   

62 CBETA, T32, no. 1630, 11b24-11c9; Tachikawa 1971, pp. 122-123.  
63 CBETA, T32, no. 1630, 11c9-12a28; Tachikawa 1971, pp. 123-126.  
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Regarding the positive example-statement or the positive example, NP lists the 
following fallacies: 
 
(1) the property that infers, the property to be inferred, or both do not 
occur in the positive example. 
(2) the statement expressing the positive concomitance is missing in 
the example-statement, or the pervasion of the property that infers by 
the property to be inferred is expressed in reversed order.64    
   
Fallacies in the negative example-statement or the negative example are committed 
under similar situations.  
 
Sometimes, these fallacies are wrongly attributed to the proponent’s inference and 
should be rejected.65 There are also faults that the proponent or her opponents may 
commit in their debate, thus resulting in the loss of either party. They are called the 
points of defeat (nigrahasthāna).66 As not all these fallacies or points of defeat are 
found in KR, they will be discussed in detail in Part II when they occur. 
 
1.3.2 Bhāviveka’s proof 
The two inferences in the proof of emptiness in KR67 are understood in terms of the 
inference for others discussed above:  
 
First inference   
Thesis:  In terms of the ultimate truth, conditioned things are empty, 
Reason: because they arise from conditions, 
Positive Example: like illusions. 
 

64 CBETA, T32, no. 1630, 12a29-12b25; Tachikawa 1971, pp. 126-128. 
65 See Chapter 6 of PS/V. (Kitagawa 1965, pp. 282-351; see also Potter 2003, pp. 360-362) 
66 See Vidyabhusana 1971, pp. 84-90. 
67 KR 1: |  !"|| (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 
268b21-b22) Poussin has reconstructed the Sanskrit of the two inferences as follows: tattvataG 
sa>sk.tāG śūnyā māyāvat pratyayodbhavāG | asa>sk.tās tv asadbhūtā anutpādāt khapuApavat ||. 
(Poussin 1933, p. 70, note 1) The below introduction on their formation is based on Bhāviveka’s 
explanation in KR in CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 268c6-269a12 and 273c2-c20; see also HE 2012, pp. 6-
12, Hsu 2013, pp. 125-128. 
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Second inference    
Thesis:  In terms of the ultimate truth, unconditioned things have no reality, 
Reason: because they do not arise, 
Positive Example: like a sky-flower. 
 
It is observed that in the example-statements of both inferences, Bhaviveka did not 
provide the statement that expresses the positive concomitance, but considered it 
implicit. This can be understood from Bhāviveka’s explanations of why illusions and 
a sky-flower are employed as the positive examples in KR; these show that he 
formed the third member of his inferences with the second characteristic of a reason 
in mind (see below). Although this shortened form of the third member (with an 
actual example only) constitutes a fallacy in the example-statement in Dignāga’s 
logical system, it is employed in debates in which the proponent and the opponents 
both understand the positive concomitance that is implied by the actual example, and 
is not objected to. Indeed, this shortened form of the third member is not disputed by 
Bhāviveka’s Buddhist and non-Buddhist opponents in KR. It is also used throughout 
the text of KR (see Part II). For this reason, this shortened form will not be evaluated 
as a formal fallacy here.68 
 
Terms used in both inferences are defined below:  
 
In the first inference, to be “arisen from conditions” means to be jointly produced by 
the cause (hetu), i.e. the direct cause, and other conditions (pratyaya), i.e. the 
auxiliary causes, as stated by Bhāviveka. 69  Such an assemblage of cause and 
conditions is generally referred to as “conditions”. “Arisen from conditions” 
therefore refers to all possible circumstances of causation where a thing has arisen 
dependently, and thus also including “arisen by virtue of conditions” and “being 

68 See Dunne 2004, pp. 34-35 and note 45 for a similar approach.  
69 In Abhidharma, there are the doctrines of the six causes and the four conditions. Here, it is possible 
that Bhāviveka is considering the doctrine of four conditions of Abhidharma, namely the condition 
qua cause (hetu-pratyaya) which is the direct cause, the immediately preceding condition 
(samanantara-pratyaya) which is the condition of arising of the immediately succeeding result, the 
object as condition (ālambana-pratyaya) for the cognition, and the dominant condition (adhipati-
pratyaya) which is the efficient cause that directly contributes to the arising of the result or indirectly 
contributes by not hindering it. The six types of causes include the efficient cause (kāra9a-hetu), the 
homogeneous cause (sabhāga-hetu), the universal cause (sarvatraga-hetu), the retribution cause 
(vipāka-hetu), the co-existent cause (sahabhū-hetu) and the conjoined cause (sa>prayuktaka-hetu). 
Since the two doctrines are not significant to the present discussion, I will not explain them further. 
For details, see Chapters 6 and 7 in Dhammajoti 2009, pp. 143-185.   
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manifested by conditions”. Its opposite is “not arising from any cause or condition”, 
which is meant by “not arising” in the second inference.      
 
In relation to whether or not to arise from conditions, there are two categories of 
objects of cognition in the conventional world, namely “conditioned things” and 
“unconditioned things”. In KR, conditioned things are those which are produced by 
the assemblage of conditions, i.e. “arisen from conditions”. They include the twelve 
āyatanas, i.e. the six sense organs (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mind) and their 
respective objects (colour and form, sound, smell, taste, touch, mental object),70 but 
exclude part of the dharma-āyatana which are the four mental objects, i.e. space 
(ākāśa), cessation through deliberation (pratisa>khyā-nirodha), cessation 
independent of deliberation (apratisa>khyā-nirodha) and suchness (tathatā). These 
four objects are considered by some as unconditioned things, i.e. the opposite of 
conditioned things, as they are not produced by conditions, i.e. “not arising”.71 A 
thing can only be “conditioned” (“arisen from conditions”) or “unconditioned” (“not 
arising”), not both nor neither. 
 
Regarding the “ultimate truth” (*tattvata) that modifies both theses, Bhāviveka 
explains that it refers to the ultimate truth itself (see Section 2.3).72 This modifier 
(*viśeAa9a) functions to avoid the contradiction that emptiness may have with what 
is accepted by Bhāviveka himself, i.e. the existence of conventional things, which 
are also the causes and conditions for the arising of ordinary perception, and with the 

70 There are eighteen dhatū in Buddhist philosophy. They are the twelve āyatanas plus the six 
respective consciousnesses, i.e. the visual consciousness, aural consciousness, olfactory 
consciousness, gustatory consciousness, tactile consciousness and mental consciousness. As the six 
consciousnesses also arise from conditions, it is unclear why Bhāviveka did not include them among 
the conditioned things. As the emptiness of the non-discriminating knowledge is discussed in KR 
after that of the conditioned and unconditioned things, it is possible that he intends to establish the 
emptiness of consciousness in general after that of the twelve āyatanas. If this is true, it may be 
assumed that KR is presenting a gradual teaching in relation to the Mādhyamika thesis regarding the 
emptiness of all things; first on the conditioned and unconditioned things as the twelve āyatanas (as 
the objects) and then the consciousnesses (as the subjects of cognition). A similar approach can be 
found in TS/P.      
As a Mādhyamika, Bhāviveka does not hold the view that anything, including consciousness, 
should be real in the ultimate sense. For the sake of illustration, I have included the six 
consciousnesses into the discussion of conditioned things, and thus the scope of application of the 
proof of emptiness, unless there are further sources to indicate otherwise.   
71 The first three are the three unconditioned things in the Sarvāstivādin doctrine, while the last is held 
by Yogācāra in relation to their doctrine of the three natures; see Section 2.4 for a discussion on these 
objects.   
72 It should be noted that Bhāviveka denies the ultimate reality of this ultimate truth or of the ultimate 
emptiness of things that he takes to be established by his proof (see Section 1.1). 
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common knowledge that conditioned things have an inherent existence. Therefore, 
conditioned things are to be inferred to be empty only in the ultimate sense but not in 
the conventional sense. 73  In terms of the ultimate truth, the “emptiness” of 
conditioned things is synonymous to “the lack of an inherent existence”; with both 
emptiness and the lack of an inherent existence of the character of a false appearance 
or an illusion.74 In terms of the same, the “emptiness” of unconditioned things is 
synonymous to “unreality” 75  because these things do not arise even on a 
conventional level and are therefore non-existent on the same level.  
 
There are three members, i.e. a thesis, a reason and a positive example in each 
inference. In the first inference, the thesis, “in terms of the ultimate truth, all 
conditioned things are empty”, is the conclusion to be proved by the inference. 
Bhāviveka attempts to infer the subject “conditioned things” as possessing the 
property “empty”, which is not initially agreed by other parties in the debate, from 
the property that infers, i.e. “arisen from conditions”, which has been commonly 
agreed as being possessed by the conditioned things. The positive example “illusions” 
are the similar instances (being “empty”) that at the same time possess the property 
that infers (“arisen from conditions”), exemplifying the positive concomitance of 
“arisen from conditions” with “empty”. A negative example is absent.76 The second 
inference is understood in a similar way.  
 
Regarding the first characteristic of a reason, the property “arisen from conditions” 
occurs in all members of “conditioned things”, while “not arising” in all 
“unconditioned things”. As “conditioned things” are defined as those which are 
“arisen from conditions”, “conditioned things” and “arisen from conditions” apply to 
the same class of things; the same is true of “unconditioned things” and “not arising”.  
 
Regarding the second characteristic, the property that infers (“arisen from 
conditions”) occurs in some similar instances that possess the property to be inferred 
(“empty”), while “not arising” in some similar instances that possess “unreal” 
(synonymous to “empty”). The positive concomitance of the property that infers 

73 KR: #$%&'(#)* 

KR: +,-+,./012345(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 268c19)
75 KR in CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 273c4, c9, c10. 
76 KR in CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 268c29, 273c13. 
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with the property to be inferred is demonstrated by a positive example in both 
inferences. As “illusions” are commonly recognised as “arisen from conditions” and 
as false appearances that lack an inherent existence but appear as such, i.e. “empty”, 
they are taken as the positive example in the first inference. A “sky-flower” means a 
flower of the sky.77 Since a flower does not arise in the sky, a sky-flower is an 
unconditioned thing and is commonly recognised by ordinary people as not existent 
even conventionally. As it is both “not arising” and “unreal”, it is taken as the 
positive example in the second inference. As “empty” pervades both “arisen from 
conditions” and “not arising”, things that are “arisen from conditions” and “not 
arisen”, i.e. all (conditioned and unconditioned) things, are therefore “empty”.  
 
As there are no dissimilar instances or negative examples in either inference, the 
third characteristic is considered absent (see Section 3.3.2).   
 
Although conditioned things are arisen from conditions, and thus do not have an 
inherent existence in terms of the ultimate truth, they are conceptualised to have one. 
In order to prove this to be an erroneous view, conditioned things are stated as 
“empty in terms of the ultimate truth”, which is supported by the reason “because 
they arise from conditions” and the positive example “illusions”.78 As illusions have 
demonstrated a general observation that things arisen from conditions are also empty 
in the ultimate sense, so should conditioned things, having arisen from conditions, be 
empty in the same sense. And although unconditioned things do not arise at all, and 
thus do not exist at all, they are still conceptualized to be real in terms of the ultimate 
truth. For the same reason, they are stated as “unreal in terms of the ultimate truth”, 
with the reason “because they do not arise” and the positive example “a sky-flower” 
in the second inference. As a sky-flower has demonstrated a general observation that 
things which do not arise are also unreal in the ultimate sense, so should 
unconditioned things, which do not arise, be unreal in the same sense.    
 

77 According to KR, “sky-flower” (kha-puApa) is understood in terms of the sixth type, i.e. the 
genitive type of tatpuruAa, meaning that the first member “sky” (kha) is in the genitive case (MW, p. 
1110, 1); hence, flower of the sky (see CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 274a13). 
78 It is noted in KR that the positive concomitance of the property that infers and the property to be 
inferred in the subject, which is to be established by a positive example, does not require the subject 
possessing all the properties identical with those of the positive example; see KR in CBETA, T30, no. 
1578, 268c22-c25. 
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It can be noticed that similar inferences can be found particularly in Chapter 3 of 
MHK/TJ, in which individual conditioned things and unconditioned things are 
established to be empty by separate inferences.79 As Bhāviveka composes KR to 
help practitioners easily realise the true emptiness and quickly penetrate into the 
nature of things,80 the proof of emptiness in KR is different in the way that it seeks to 
establish the Mādhyamika thesis at one time; it sets out to deal with the whole 
categories of conditioned things and unconditioned things, attempting to establish 
each category as a whole as empty. Individual things are discussed only when it is 
appropriate to cite concrete instance for the discussion to proceed, which ultimately 
serves to establish the two inferences regarding the ultimate emptiness of all things. 
Thus, the proof of emptiness in KR can be understood as establishing the overall 
conclusion of Chapter 3 of MHK. 
 
Further, referring to the fallacies discussed in Section 1.3.1, two basic criteria to 
establish an inference for others are summarized here: (1) only terms whose concepts 
are commonly agreed upon can be used; (2) the reason should be commonly agreed 
as possessing the three characteristics. Due to the emphasis on the mutual agreement 
between the proponent and the opponents on (1) and (2), later Chinese commentators, 
such as Kuiji, consider this type of inference an inference for both oneself (i.e. the 
proponent) and others (i.e. the opponents), i.e. a common inference.81 Inferences in 
KR are considered as inferences of this type.82 Although Bhāviveka did not mention 
the two criteria in KR, as shown in his response, he does often try to refute the 
accusations of his opponents about the fallacies resulting from his alleged violation 
of these criteria. This is done not by denying these criteria, but by clarifying that 
these criteria are not violated or by explaining away the fallacies concerned (see Part 
II).  
 
Also, it should be noted that Bhāviveka’s opponents do not conceive of the truth or 
existence of things in terms of whether they are conventional or ultimate, unlike 
Dignāga and Madhyamaka. To these opponents, everything in their experience or 

79 See Iida 1980, pp. 53-54 for the list of these conditioned things and unconditioned things. 
80 See CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 268b20. 
81 The term “common inference” translates the Chinese term “678”. 
82 See YMRZLLS in CBETA, T44, no. 1840, 115c2-c3 and 116b18-b20; WSFLJ in SAT, T2321, no. 
71, 449b17-b18.   
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whatever is knowable and expressible is true and real in the ultimate sense (in 
Mādhyamika terminology); otherwise these things are false and non-existent in the 
absolute sense. To them, inference, as a valid means to knowledge, is considered to 
generate knowledge (i.e. the thesis) that is ultimately true. Things which are known 
through inference (i.e. the subject and its properties) are also real ultimately. The 
inference, as a knowable thing, is also a real existent. In this way, the inference is 
considered as established in the ultimate sense, in the Mādhyamika understanding. 
By contrast, inference is conceptual to Dignāga and Bhāviveka. Therefore, it can 
only generate conventionally true knowledge. The inference itself and the things it 
refers to are also conventional existents. In the context of the two truths, an inference 
is considered established to the extent that its thesis is true only conventionally, with 
the subject and its properties only conventionally real (i.e. the inference itself and the 
inferential knowledge are neither true nor real ultimately). In this sense, an inference 
is considered established conventionally. The problems from the conventional and 
ultimate establishment of an inference will be further addressed in this thesis.               
 
Finally, from the introduction above, features in Bhāviveka’s inferences, which are 
different from a standard inference by Dignāga, can be observed, namely the use of a 
modifier in the thesis and the lack of negative examples. Together with another 
feature, i.e. the use of non-implicative negation (which will be introduced in Chapter 
3),83 these features will be discussed in relation to the establishment of the proof of 
emptiness in Chapter 3. 
 
1.4 Previous Research 
Bhāviveka’s proof as a conceptual tool in inspiring one to attain the ultimate 
emptiness that is non-conceptual and ineffable raises the questions as to whether the 
Mādhyamika thesis can be proved by the two inferences and under what 
circumstance, if any. The formation and establishment of the proof in turn determine 
the proof’s legitimacy and effectiveness in achieving its aim. However, these issues 
are not sufficiently dealt with, particularly in the first two groups of research 
literature as outlined below.  
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83 See also Ejima 1980, pp. 102-137 and HE 2012. Kajiyama also includes the negation of the 
prasaHga-vākya (the unique method of the Prāsa[gikas) into the list. (Kajiyama 1957, p. 305) 
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The first group is concerned with the discussions on the Prāsa[gika-Svātantrika 
dispute.84 While standpoints from both sides are described and sometimes compared, 
based on Candrakīrti’s PSP and Madhyamakāvatāra, and Bhāviveka’s MHK and PP, 
discussions usually only focus on one side. Bhāviveka’s standpoint in KR and his 
proof of emptiness are seldom examined.  
 
The second group is concerned with the textual studies of Bhāviveka’s MHK, PP 
and KR,85 which are translated and some chapters critically-edited. Arguments are 
summarised in footnotes. Sources of quotations and parallel passages in other texts 
are provided. Other discussions focus on the features of Bhāviveka’s arguments,86 
whose background and functions are explained, drawing textual resources from 
Bhāviveka’s works and their commentaries. This group of literature provides 
important references to the clarification of Bhāviveka’s notion of emptiness, his 
system of the two truths and the formation of the proof of emptiness in KR. 
Poussin’s translation and Ejima’s discussion have especially facilitated the 
understanding of KR. However, these literatures are mainly philological or 
descriptive. As Bhāviveka’s proof of emptiness in KR cannot be understood by 
merely presenting the text itself or its background, a more thorough analysis has 
become necessary. 
 
The third group is concerned with specific studies on KR. HE 2012 explains the 
formation of the two inferences and summarises the objections and responses in KR. 
This paper aims to show the continuity of Dignāga’s system in KR, but not an in-
depth analysis of the proof. While it requires another occasion to fully evaluate HE’s 
paper, when appropriate I have referred to some of her points.  
 
Hoornaert 1993 argues that emptiness is not proven because the use of non-
implicative negation has violated the law of identity, the law of non-contradiction 

84 See, for examples, Nozawa 1956, Mizukawa 1964, Ozumi 1973, Iida 1980, pp. 281-298, Yotsuya 
1999. 
85 For examples, see Ejima 1980 for a translation of Chapter 3 of MHK, and Iida 1980 for a partial 
translation and edition of MHK/TJ for the same chapter; Eckel 2008, Hoornaert 1999, 2000, 2001a, 
2001b, 2002, 2003 for a translation and edition of Chapter 5 of MHK/TJ, and Yamaguchi’s study in 
Yamaguchi 1964; HE 2011 for the translation and edition of Chapter 6 of MHK/TJ; see Ames 1993, 
1994 for the translation of Chapter 1 of PP; see Poussin 1933, Hatani 1976 and Hsu 2013 for a 
translation of KR; Sastri 1949 for the Sanskrit reconstruction of KR.     
86 See a detailed discussion in Ejima 1980, especially pp. 91-144, Kajiyama 1957; see also Chu 2009.   
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and the law of the excluded middle, which he considers as the foundation of coherent 
conventional speech, and made the proof problematic.87 Although I agree with 
Hoornaert that the proof is unestablished, I have given a different reason to this.  
 
Hsu 2013 provides the historical background and a translation of KR; and like HE 
2012, explains the formation of the two inferences and summarises the objections 
and responses. This dissertation introduces the proof of emptiness, with Bhāviveka 
responses to the objections, as the initial step to bridge the conventional truth and the 
ultimate truth, because they can help practitioners acquire the wisdom from 
hearing,88 which in turn facilitates the acquisition of the wisdoms of reflection and 
meditation. Our views differ in the understanding of individual categories in 
Bhāviveka’s system of the two truths; a more detailed investigation in term of the 
two truths is also required to show the soteriological role of logical reasoning. While 
Hsu has brought in MHK’s discussion on universals in explaining the formation of 
the inferences,89 in my thesis I have presented some different understandings on the 
role and significance of universals in Bhāviveka’s system. Our differences in view 
and in the translation of the text, if relevant to the discussion, are also marked in 
footnotes. 
 
1.5 Overview 
To sufficiently address the questions regarding (1) the circumstance where the 
Mādhyamika thesis, i.e. the emptiness of all things, is proved and (2) whether the 
proof of emptiness in KR can be established, this thesis is structured in two parts. 
Part I, consisting of four chapters, is an introduction to examine these questions 
mainly based on KR, particularly on resources from Part II. Part II provides a 
translation of and a detailed commentary on each objection and response regarding 
the first inference on the ultimate emptiness of all conditioned things.  
 
Part I – Introduction    
After the explanation of preliminaries in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 deals with question (1) 
to demonstrate that the proof only applies to prove the expressible ultimate truth 
through the true and false conventional truths. As these three categories of truths are 

87 Hoornaert 1993, p. 11-13. 
88 Hsu 2013, pp. 145-146.  
89 Ibid., pp. 117-120. 
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all conceptual, Bhaviveka has successfully addressed the tension between the 
ultimate and the conventional, i.e. the conceptual and non-conceptual. The proof, as 
logical reasoning, is further shown to be an indispensable part in all practitioners’ 
realisation of the inexpressible truth.  
 
This chapter begins by clarifying Bhāvivaka’s notion of ultimate emptiness to set the 
background for the demarcation of the four categories of truth in his system of the 
two truths. Bhāvivaka holds that a wise person’s realisation of emptiness is a tranquil 
state of mind, which does not hold onto any object, and is therefore free from 
conceptual proliferations. This state of mind is ineffable and non-conceptual and is 
referred to as the non-discriminating wisdom which is beyond the world. The pure 
worldly knowledge that is attained after this wisdom then conceptualizes and 
designates the arising of objects as dependent origination, realizing emptiness as the 
non-discriminating knowledge and emptiness as the object of this knowledge. This 
ultimate emptiness or state of mind, however, is also conditioned and empty 
ultimately. 
 
This chapter then shows how the proof of emptiness functions as the bridge between 
the understanding of the ultimate truth and the conventional truth, each divided into 
two categories. The inexpressible ultimate truth refers to the above-mentioned 
ultimate emptiness that is to be realised through meditation. Although both the 
expressible truth and the two conventional truths are conceptual, the former is 
clarified to be the wise person’s non-discriminating knowledge and emptiness as its 
object. It also refers to the wise person’s teachings on emptiness and the practitioners’ 
wisdom resulting from hearing and reflecting on these teachings, both presented by 
the thesis of the proof of emptiness that is specified by the modifier “in terms of the 
ultimate truth”. The true conventional truth is considered the skilful means, which 
include the wise person’s act of teaching emptiness according to the ultimate truth 
through conventional speech, as the proof of emptiness in KR. It represents the 
correct discernment of things and is therefore a process or an instrument, through 
which the practitioners ascend to attain the ultimate truth. The false conventional 
truth refers to conditioned things, whose conventional existence is mistaken by 
ordinary people and Bhāviveka’s opponents to be ultimate existence. Things which 
do not arise even conventionally, i.e. the unconditioned things and the opponents’ 
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realities, are non-existent to the ordinary people and are merely false 
conventionalities to be refuted by the proof. As the proof is set up under the 
expressible ultimate truth and the two conventional truths, it aims only to establish a 
conceptual emptiness that refers to the non-conceptual emptiness.  
 
On this basis, this chapter further explores the soteriological role of logical reasoning. 
Practitioners investigate the false conventional truth by means of the proof. Some 
gradually eliminate the merely false conventionalities and transform their horizon 
from the conventional to the ultimate. Others discern the ultimate emptiness of all 
things and reflect on it to strengthen their understanding. The functions of such a 
proof, as logical reasoning, and of meditation are therefore complementary in a 
practitioner’s spiritual progress. While the proof is employed both by practitioners 
who have realised the inexpressible ultimate truth and by practitioners who have not, 
it enables the upward-downward directions of spiritual practice along the two truths.       
 
Chapter 3 goes on to deal with question (2) to analyse the two inferences of the proof 
as inferences for others in Dignāga’s system of logic, or as common inferences 
(involving Bhāviveka and his opponents), in terms of the two basic criteria that 
qualify them as such (Section 1.3). It demonstrates that they are established [1] as 
the general result of the whole inferential process consisting of individual inferences 
for the ultimate emptiness of different conditioned and unconditioned things, with 
their formation adapted under the doctrine of emptiness. However, they are 
unestablished [2] as standalone inferences due to their fallacious reasons.    
 
The first criterion requires that only terms, whose concepts are commonly agreed 
upon, can be used (applicable to both [1] and [2]). Bhāviveka requires the generality 
of these terms, which are already universals, be determined by the common 
agreement among all parties involved in the debate. These terms are therefore 
general enough to cover all particular meanings in both Bhāviveka’s and his 
opponents’ doctrines. For the merely false conventionalities that do not exist even 
conventionally cannot be the loci of universals; as long as they are being thought of 
by all parties involved, they can still be designated, discussed and eventually refuted 
on the conventional level. Thus, common agreement among all parties involved is 
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shown to be a more fundamental criterion than being a universal for a term to be 
used in an inference.  
 
The second criterion requires that an inference for others should be commonly 
agreed to possess the three characteristics of a reason. Under [1], this chapter instead 
demonstrates that the two inferences in the proof are established without the third 
characteristic. Along the inferential process to prove the ultimate emptiness of all 
things, the dissimilar instances of the two resultant inferences have all been 
eliminated gradually by individual inferences regarding different conditioned and 
unconditioned things. This elimination is achieved by non-implicative negation, 
which negates without implying the affirmation of the opposite of what is negated. 
As there is no locus for the properties “not empty” and “real” to occur in, the second 
characteristic is secured while the third characteristic has become impossible. To 
avoid the misunderstanding of establishing the unreality of things conventionally 
from Bhāviveka’s opponents, the thesis of both resultant inferences is eventually 
specified by the modifier, “in terms of the ultimate truth”, to satisfy the conventions 
of all parties involved.    
 
However, in terms of the second criterion, the two inferences are unestablished 
under [2]. This is because inference in Dignāga’s logical system cannot take “all 
things” as its subject, which is required to be excluded from the domain of similar 
instances. To be applicable to all parties involved, their subjects have included all 
conditioned things and all unconditioned things. As they are defined as “arisen from 
conditions” and “not arising” respectively, the subject and the property that infers in 
either inference actually apply to the same class of things. No conditioned thing or 
unconditioned thing, including illusions and a sky-flower, can exemplify the second 
characteristic of a reason. The two inferences have committed the fallacy of the 
reason being too specific. While they already lack the third characteristic, they 
cannot establish with only the first characteristic. The Mādhyamika thesis regarding 
the emptiness of all things, which is the expressible ultimate truth, is not proved. 
This shows the problem in Bhāviveka’s attempt to combine the doctrine of 
emptiness with inference.  
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Chapter 4 summarises the discussions in Part I. It reconsiders the proof as only a 
teaching and an instrument for reflection that is presented in the form of two 
inferences, but not established as proper inferences per se. It suggests that the proof 
is worth defending as it only summarises the conclusions of all individual inferences, 
which are established with the same reasons and positive examples. The two 
inferences might further be defensible in consideration of later systems of Buddhist 
logic.    
 
Part II – Translation and Commentary 
Having discussed the formation and establishment of the proof of emptiness in Part I, 
Part II is devoted to a detailed analysis of how the proof is actually criticized and 
subsequently defended by Bhāviveka to prove his thesis. This part consists of a 
translation of the objections and responses regarding the first inference.90 
Commentary is provided below the translation of objections and responses in order 
to examine the arguments of both sides.  
 
This thesis does not aim at producing a critical edition of the text, but only a readable 
translation to enable the understanding and discussion of the text. The translation is 
based on the Chinese text available electronically in CBETA Chinese Electronic 
Tripiṭaka Collection (V5.2) because of its accessibility. Only the corrected version of 
the text will be referred to. Variants of text from other ancient printed editions of the 
Chinese canon, which are found in the footnotes of the CBETA Chinese Electronic 
Tripiṭaka Collection, will not be footnoted again in this thesis. There are occassions 
where further editing of the text is required; such occasions will be explained in the 
footnotes. Poussin’s translation and Zangyao91 are the main references for this 
translation; translations by Hsu and Hatani and the Sanskrit reconstruction by Sastri 

90 CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269a13-273a5. 
91 Some may consider Zangyao as merely a modern reproduction of the Chinese canon. However, 
Zangyao also contains punctuations, indication of quotations, division of sections, objections and 
responses, which are either missing or insufficient in CBETA. While using the corrected text on 
CBETA is sufficient to serve the present purpose to produce a readable translation, the information in 
Zangyao, similar to Poussin and others’ translations, is nevertheless an important reference for 
translation and understanding.  
There are some variants of the text found in Zangyao and other translations but are not 
footnoted in CBETA. (It is duly noted that this may be due to the differences in earlier versions of the 
CBETA Chinese Electronic Tripiṭaka Collection, which are not available to me.) There are also 
occasions when it is necessary to follow Zangyao and/or other translations to edit certain characters in 
the CBETA text back to those from earlier editions. In such cases, I will footnote these variants found 
in Zangyao and/or other translations and explain whether or not further edition of the CBETA text is 
needed.      
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are taken into consideration when punctuation or meaning of the text cannot be 
determined based on the two. Sanskrit equivalents of the Chinese terms are given in 
brackets when it is necessary.92 The Chinese text is then placed in the footnote after 
each section of the translation. 
 
As for the commentary, only the first inference, its objections and responses are 
under examination. As only the conventional existence of conditioned things is 
admitted by Madhyamaka, unconditioned things which do not arise and are taken to 
have an ultimate existence are considered non-existent.93 Hence, the first inference 
regarding the ultimate emptiness of all conditioned things actually presents the 
rationale of the Mādhyamika doctrine and attempts to establish it directly. This is 
also because the objections and responses of the first inference are arranged 
thematically to display the step by step establishment of its thesis. Those regarding 
the second inference are concerned with the refutation of individual unconditioned 
things or realities of different opponents. Further, in their objections Bhāviveka’s 
opponents try to refute the first inference with logical fallacies, and argue against his 
notion of emptiness. These objections, being the criticisms that Bhāviveka faced in 
inferring the ultimate emptiness of all conditioned things, showcase the challenges of 
his attempt to combine the doctrine of emptiness with logical reasoning. Bhāviveka 
is therefore obliged to defend his inference by demonstrating how it is exempt from 
these criticisms.  
 
Part II is arranged into fifteen objections and responses with reference to the 
Zangyao, and then into three sections according to their central ideas.94 Discussions 
in the Commentary are outlined as below:          
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92 I provide Sanskrit equivalents for various Chinese terms: (1) for the logical terms, (2) for doctrinal 
terminologies, (3) for those that are suggested by Poussin. In case of (1), the Sanskrit equivalents are 
provided with reference to the Sanskrit text of NP in Tachikawa 1971, pp. 140-144 and to 
Vidyabhusana 1971. In case of (2), they are provided with reference to the relevant doctrinal texts or 
relevant secondary literature. In case of (3), they are provided with reference to Poussin 1933. 
Sanskrit equivalents provided under cases (1) to (3) are footnoted, indicating the page numbers of the 
references where they are derived from.      
 Sometimes the same Sanskrit word (e.g. rūpa) can be translated into different Chinese (e.g. 
9, :) or English (e.g. colour, matter) terms, and vice versa. Sanskrit equivalents of these terms, 
which are cross-checked with Hirakawa et al. 1977, are also given. They will not be further footnoted 
if they are not under cases (1) to (3).   
93 Cf. MMK 24. 
94 There are alternative arrangements, e.g. Hsu 2013 divides the objections and responses into three 
sections, namely “Response to the critiques of nihilism” (corresponding to Sections A-B.3 in the 
Commentary of this thesis; see outline below), “The critiques on paratantra in Yogācāra School” (to 
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A. Proving the ultimate emptiness of all conditioned things does not present any 
problem to the thesis or the reason in the inference  
A.1 The thesis regarding the ultimate emptiness of conditioned things does not 
contradict direct perception, common knowledge, or Bhāviveka’s own 
doctrine, nor is it self-contradictory   
A.2 Although conditioned things are empty of an inherent existence ultimately, 
it is not fallacious for them to be taken up as the subject of an inference 
A.3 The property that infers, i.e. “arisen from conditions” does not contradict 
the property to be inferred, i.e. “empty” 
A.3.1 It cannot be established logically that whatever is causally efficacious 
has inherent existence 
A.3.2 The inference can be established even it is a conditioned thing and 
empty due to the reflexivity of its thesis  
A.3.2.1 The inference is not deficient, although the reason and the 
example are also conditioned things and included in the 
subject  
A.3.2.2 The reason is not illegitimate, although it is included in the 
subject and proved to be empty, should the thesis be 
established 
A.3.2.3 It is fallacious to take the reason, which is empty of an 
inherent existence, to be absolutely non-existent  
A.3.2.4 The thesis regarding the ultimate emptiness of all conditioned 
things is reflexive but not fallacious 
A.3.2.5 Establishing conditioned things as empty of inherent existence 
is not a nihilistic view  
A.4 The general quality, instead the particularities, of the subject should be 
taken up as the property that infers 
B. Conditioned things themselves are originally empty of an inherent existence  
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Section B.4) and “Response to others” (to Sections B.5-C and passages that are not included in C); 
Poussin 1933 arranges the objections and responses into “Critique de la proposition [thesis]” (broadly 
corresponding to Sections A.1-A.3.1, A.3.2.4-A.3.2.5 in the Commentary of this thesis), “Critique de 
l’argument [reason]” (to Sections A.3.2.1-A.3.2.3, A.4), “Critique de l’exemple” (to Sections B.1-
B.2), “Objection du Sāṃkhya” (to Section B.3), “Objection des Yogācāras” (to Section B.4), 
“Validité de la réfutation Madhyamaka” (to Section B.5) and “Conclusion” (to Section C and 
passages that are not included in C).
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B.1 The view that an illusion is not empty of an inherent existence, but empty 
of the nature of a real thing is erroneous 
B.2 The view that an illusion is not empty of a substantial existence, but empty 
in contrast with a real thing is erroneous 
B.3 The view that everything is not empty of the existence of everything is 
erroneous 
B.4 The view that emptiness is the non-existence of the imagined nature in the 
existent dependent nature is erroneous 
B.5 The view that the inherent existence of conditioned things is emptied by the 
reasonings that refute it is erroneous  
C. Conclusion  
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Chapter 2: Bhāviveka’s Understanding of the Two 
Truths       
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to contextualise the discussion on Bhāviveka’s proof of emptiness 
in KR in relation to his system of the two truths. The discussion below suggests his 
system as a solution to the theoretical tension between emptiness and a logical proof 
of it outlined in Section 1.2. I will show that the proof itself pertains to the real 
conventional truth and it only applies to prove the expressible ultimate truth under 
his system, which is conceptual. While the logical aspect of the proof will be 
discussed in the next chapter, this chapter rather aims to discuss the role of the proof 
of emptiness, as logical reasoning, to show that it forms an indispensable part in a 
practitioner’s spiritual progress, through which the inexpressible ultimate truth is 
realised.  
  
There are two sections in this chapter. Section 2.2 discusses Bhāviveka’s notion of 
the ultimate emptiness of all things in KR. Taking this as background, Section 2.3 
clarifies the four categories of truth in his system of the two truths in relation to the 
proof of emptiness. In terms of the two truths, the role of the proof together with 
spiritual practices will be explored, taking the realisation of this ultimate emptiness 
as their goal.  
 
2.2 What is emptiness in the ultimate sense? 
 
2.2.1 The ultimate emptiness as described by Bhāviveka 
Bhāviveka’s understanding of the relationship of dependent origination, emptiness, 
designation and the middle way basically follows Nāgārjuna’s (Section 1.3),95 but 
his discussions on the ultimate truth and the practice to realise emptiness in KR are 
richer than that in MMK.96 In this section, I would like to first discuss his notion of 
the ultimate truth, the realisation of which is the ultimate goal of the Mādhyamika 
practice, as the background for the discussion in the next sections. 
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95 See his commentary to MMK 24.18 in PP in CBETA, T30, no. 1566, 126a29-b17. 
96 This may be due to the influence of early Yogācāra philosophy, which is out of the scope of this 
discussion. 
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In KR, one’s realisation of emptiness is described as a static state of mind, which is 
calm and tranquil, and is also compared to space (ākāśa), which does not arise and is 
without characteristics. As the calm mind does not intend to know anything by virtue 
of discrimination and conceptualisation, i.e. by movements, neither does it attend to 
or grasp any objects of cognition. Due to the absence of discrimination, that which is 
realised is non-dual, undistinguished and inconceivable. Because it neither arises nor 
ceases and is therefore without an image or a sign, it is not seen in terms of ordinary 
perception. Thus, that which is realised is inexpressible in the sense that it is beyond 
the sphere of application of one’s speech or thought. Only in this way is the real state 
of things known, and this type of knowledge refers to the direct realisation 
(abhisamaya) of things that is designated as the real seeing, which itself is not a 
movement nor is it discriminative.97     
 
Bhāviveka explains the real seeing in relation to the attainment of the non-
discriminating wisdom (nirvikalpa jñāna) and realisation of the suchness (tathatā), 
i.e. the ultimate state of things, emptiness. In KR verse 2, Bhāviveka states that 
 
[Regardless of] the appearance (ābhāsa) of the objects (viAaya) of 
the mind (citta) and of the wisdom (prajñā),98 as the wise person 
does not grasp it, her wisdom practices (carati) [in a] non-
discriminative [manner], and it practices without anything to 
practice.99 

97 KR in CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 278a3-a10. 
98 According to Saito’s analysis of Chapter 5 of MHK, Bhāviveka discusses the perception of objects 
on the conventional level. Bhāviveka considers the aggregation of atoms the objective support 
(ālambana), actual object (gocara), or cause (hetu) of perception, while the object in perception is 
actually the appearance or representation of this aggregation. See further discussion in Saito 2006.  
99 KR 2: ;<=>?1@ABC| >DE5FDGD|| (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 
277b12-b13); cf. Sanskrit reconstruction in Sastri 1949, p. 93: cittadhīviAayābhāsān sarvān 
prājño ’parigrahāt | prajñācārī nivikalpamacaritvā caratyayam || and note 153 in ibid. See also 
MHK/TJ 3.10-3.11. 
 The translation of the verb carati (√car) in the second half of the verse into English is 
difficult. In the Chinese text, carati is rendered as “D” and is explained as “to roam about” (“HI”); 
its opposite is explained as “without cognition or understanding” (“DJ”) and “without arising” 
(“ ”), which are literally not related to walking, but can only be metaphorically understood as 
the discriminative form of cognition, as the movement of roaming about in its object sphere (see KR 
in CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 277c28-c29). According to MW, this verb can also mean to practice, to 
perform, to move, to turn, etc. (MW, p. 389, 1-2) However, whichever meaning the translation takes 
will fail to express the static state of mind, which one attains when directly realising emptiness. It is 
because, as discussed, this direct realisation itself is not a movement; whereas a verb always indicates 
movement. This is exactly the paradoxical sense of what it means to attain the ultimate truth that 
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With the appearance of the objects of cognition, the discriminative mind and wisdom 
hold onto it and generate conceptual knowledge due to discrimination. However, the 
wise person does not: with the non-discriminating wisdom, she does not generate 
any thought, but realises suchness directly. As things no longer appear as any objects 
to the wise person, their arising only means dependent origination and conventional 
existence to her intellect (buddhi), which is the pure worldly knowledge she has 
attained after the realisation of emptiness. Here, mind refers to the collective of 
thoughts. Its object spheres include all conditioned and unconditioned things such as 
the sense faculties, the five aggregates, the various fruitions along the path to 
liberation or enlightenment, the extraordinary qualities of a Buddha, omniscience, 
etc., which are known through discrimination. Wisdom refers to that which is 
excellent. Its object sphere is the emptiness of the conditioned and unconditioned 
things, i.e. the emptiness of the above examples. The wise person does not generate 
any attachment or view as she does not grasp the appearance of any of these objects. 
When there is no more discrimination by the mind concerning the inherent existence 
or the characteristic of that which appears to it, the wisdom of the wise person stops 
practicing. This is the non-discriminating wisdom.100  
 
The direct realisation of suchness by the non-discriminating wisdom of the wise 
person refers to the real seeing discussed above. As the real seeing is static and non-
discriminative, it does not refer to that which sees in the conventional world, nor 
does it refer to seeing something that is not seen. For suchness is realised by the non-
discriminating wisdom, it should also be free from discrimination and 
conceptualisation, and therefore not something which is seen by the real seeing. 
Otherwise, this seeing would involve the subject-object duality, and both suchness 
and the real seeing would cease to be qualified as such. It is in this sense that the 
non-discriminating wisdom or the real seeing actually means non-cognising or non-
seeing; it does not cognise or see any object, and neither is it a subject. The same 

Bhaviveka intends to convey: only through not seeing anything, i.e. not seeing things conventionally 
as objects whose existence is constructed by discrimination and conceptualisation, can one really see, 
i.e. directly realise the ultimate state of things; the same understanding can be drawn from expressions 
such as “knowing without anything to know” and “cognising without anything to cognise”. Since the 
non-discriminating wisdom can be understood solely in terms of its cognitive aspect as well as in 
general in relation to various practical aspects, here I understand carati in a general sense and have 
translated it as “to practice”.          

KR in CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 277b14-c1.
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applies to the direct realisation which is said to realise suchness. In this way, 
cognition, seeing and direct realisation by the non-discriminating wisdom are only 
designations.101  
 
To express her understanding of what the real seeing is like, the wise person 
designates her non-discriminating wisdom in terms of conventional speech to be a 
knowledge that is non-discriminating, i.e. the non-discriminating knowledge that 
directly realises its object, suchness. While this wisdom in fact refers to the mind-
stream of the wise person, it is called non-discriminating also by means of 
designation, like others’ discriminating wisdom is called discriminating.102 Hence, 
what is known as the non-discriminating knowledge in conventional speech in fact 
refers to the mind-stream of the wise person which does not know as a subject in the 
ultimate sense; neither can it be known as an object in the same sense.  
  
From the above discussion, it can be seen that there is a demarcation of the 
knowledge which takes emptiness or suchness as its object and of the wisdom which 
is completely non-discriminative, i.e. does not take any object at all. In the next 
section, the former will be understood as the expressible ultimate truth, and the latter 
as the inexpressible ultimate truth. For Madhyamaka holds that ultimate existence is 
not possible; the former being a discriminative knowledge of emptiness, both itself 
and its object are also refuted as real ultimately. As for the latter, Bhaviveka also 
denies its ultimate existence. This view on the latter can be confirmed when he 
refutes the Yogācāra opponents in KR, who hold that the consciousness, i.e. the 
discussed non-discriminating wisdom or the mind-stream of the wise, and suchness 
are ultimately real.  
 
Under the discussion on emptiness in Objection 14 in Part II, the Yogācāras have 
quoted the Buddha’s teaching on emptiness in YB – “[this] is empty of that, because 
that does not exist; [this] is empty, because this does exist”103 – to argue for the 
ultimate reality of things that are dependently-arisen and of their dependent nature, 
and hence the ultimate reality of consciousness. Consciousness is dependently-arisen 


KR in CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 277c8-278a2.
102 KR in CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 277c2-c7.  
103 From the Tattvārtha Section of the Bodhisattvabhūmi in YB: yena hi śūnya> tadasadbhāvāt yac 
ca śūnya> tatsadbhāvāc chūnyatā yujyeta || (Takahashi 2005, p. 101); see footnote 376. 
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and is in a dependent nature (paratantra-svabhāva). It has attained a perfected nature 
or realised suchness when it has become non-discriminative due to it is empty of 
false concepts or the imagined nature. Bhaviveka refutes this understanding and 
clarifies that conditioned things are empty of an inherent existence because inherent 
existence does not exist when they arise. They are empty as they only exist 
conventionally. Consequently, consciousness, which is dependently-arisen, is also 
empty of an inherent existence and only existent conventionally to Bhaviveka.104  
 
Later on Bhaviveka has also refuted the ultimate reality of an ineffable suchness, as 
taken by the Yogācāras as an unconditioned thing, and as the object of the non-
discriminating wisdom which is beyond the world and of the pure worldly 
knowledge which is attained after the realisation of emptiness. In Bhaviveka’s 
comparison of emptiness with space, the latter is only a concept designating the mere 
absence of resistant bodies. Since space itself, i.e. the mere absence of resistant 
bodies, does not arise, as an unconditioned thing it does not exist even 
conventionally.105 Likewise, suchness or emptiness is also a concept, which is not 
real ultimately. For this reason, Bhaviveka points out the Buddha has taught that that 
which is called the seeing of the truth actually means there is nothing to be seen;106 
neither conditioned things, i.e. perceptual objects, nor unconditioned things like 
suchness, are seen in the ultimate truth. If the non-discriminating wisdom or 
knowledge mentioned by the Yogācāras could cognise or directly realise suchness, it 
would cease to be non-discriminating because it would have an object of cognition, 
which always involves discrimination, and would have become conditioned, like 
other conventional knowledge.107  
 
As discussed above, both the non-discriminating wisdom, which actually refers to 
the mind-stream of the wise, and the non-discriminating knowledge, which is 
designated according to this, are conditioned and not existent ultimately. The 
suchness they are said to realise is also a designation by the wise person as an 
understanding of what the ultimate truth is like. Hence, Bhaviveka concludes that “in 

104 See Commentary for details. 
105 KR in CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 273c7-c13, 273c23-c29. 
106 KR in T30, no. 1578, 274c11. Poussin 1933, p. 113, note 6 suggests referring to 
ĀryadhyāyitamuA@i-sūtra, which is quoted in Tsongkhapa’s commentary to MMK 24.40 in Ngawang 
Samten and Garfield 2006, pp. 512-513. 
107 KR in CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 274b28-c14; see also 276c17-277a4. 
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terms of the ultimate truth, this non-discriminating knowledge which is beyond the 
world is not a real existent either, because it arises from conditions, like an illusory 
man.”108  
 
2.2.2 The epistemological interpretation of emptiness 
There have been different interpretations of the emptiness explicated by 
Madhyamaka. The ontological interpretation concerns whether anything exists 
ultimately if all things are empty of an inherent existence. In Abhidharma, as the 
various categories of dharmas refer to the building blocks of the universe, to hold 
that the dharmas are also empty amounts to saying that they do not exist ultimately 
and hence no longer qualify as the building blocks. For this reason, the nihilistic 
interpretation of emptiness is that ultimately, nothing whatsoever exists. By contrast, 
the absolutist interpretation understands emptiness itself as the sole ultimate reality. 
While Madhyamaka is against both ultimate existence and absolute non-existence, 
some interpret emptiness as merely anti-realist and reject both nihilistic and 
absolutist interpretations. According to the non-conceptual interpretation, the 
ultimate state in which the conventional existents exist is ineffable. The semantic 
interpretation of emptiness, on the other hand, does not consider the ontological 
implications of emptiness, but only concerns the semantic implication of things 
being empty of an inherent existence in the ultimate sense. This interpretation 
generally holds that the truth and falsity of things, which is known in terms of their 
inherent nature, can only be coherently talked about conventionally instead of 
ultimately. Since to be liberated is to realise this, the ultimate truth, as expressed 
conventionally, is therefore that there is no ultimate truth.109  
 
Bhāviveka’s understanding of emptiness as discussed above does not support the 
nihilistic or the absolutist interpretation, while being more in line with the anti-realist 
interpretation. This is because it admits dependent origination and the conventional 
existence of things while it denies the ultimate reality of suchness. It also holds the 

108 KR: #$%&K)E5@L(MNO (CBETA, T30, no. 
1578, 277a2) 
109 For details, see discussions in Ferraro 2013, 2014, and Siderits and Garfield 2013. With a similar 
conclusion, Priest and Garfield considers Nāgārjuna’s attempt to express the inexpressible ultimate 
truth, emptiness or the natureless reality shows a paradox of expressibility, and such a paradox is 
nevertheless grounded in the contradictory nature of reality; see discussion in Priest and Garfield 
2002.  
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ineffability of the ultimate truth. Although Bhāviveka would agree with the semantic 
implication of the emptiness of inherent existence of things, he does not stop at 
merely delimiting the scope of application of speech and thought. This can be 
understood from his discussion on meditation and spiritual practices after the 
establishment of the proof of emptiness in KR.110     
 
Apart from these interpretations, it should be noted that KR also presents an 
epistemological understanding of emptiness, which is concerned with how things 
and emptiness are known, along one’s spiritual progress.111 The different ways of 
knowing, such as direct perception, logical reasoning, meditation and direct 
realisation, take objects in different manners. On the conventional level, emptiness is 
not known to people who know things as if these things were ultimate existents, in 
terms of common knowledge and direct perception. The conceptualisation and 
discrimination of things are compared to eye disease, which generates false 
perceptual objects. As people proceed to discern the nature of things, they take the 
same conventional things as the objects of logical and meditative investigations, in 
which emptiness is understood conceptually. Ultimately, when they no longer 
cognise, neither is there anything for them to cognise. Emptiness or the suchness of 
the conventional things also ceases to be an object, until it is designated conceptually 
again for the sake of teaching and understanding.            
 
When the same objects are cognised in decreasingly discriminative manners, 
changes in a practitioner’s horizon occur. When a practitioner progresses from the 
conceptualisation of conventional things to the realisation of emptiness, she changes 
from seeing a definite object to seeing no object, i.e. not seeing at all. This is shown 
in the proof of emptiness, conditioned things which are perceived conventionally are 
shown to be empty like illusions that cannot be perceived ultimately; unconditioned 
things which cannot be perceived even conventionally are shown to be unreal like a 
sky-flower that does not exist at all, and hence cannot be known in any way. It is 
parallel with meditation in which a practitioner starts from the seeing of a 

110 See CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 276a5ff. 
111 Cf. Westerhoff 2007, pp. 34-38, where Westerhoff points out the cognitive dimension of the 
svabhāva in the understanding of emptiness. He holds that the ultimate aim of the Madhyamaka 
project is to achieve a cognitive shift which consists of the elimination of the svabhāva as a substance, 
which the mind naturally superimposes onto things when it conceptualises the world, in our cognition 
through specific practices. 
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conceptualised object to seeing only a sign (nimitta) and eventually seeing nothing. 
This can also be understood from what it means to attain the real seeing as discussed 
above. In KR, an epistemological understanding of emptiness is emphasized in 
relation to logical reasoning and different natures of perception. Logical reasoning 
and perception are indeed the two fundamental means to knowledge in the 
conventional world. Along a practitioner’s spiritual progress, the change in the 
natures of perception – from direct perception to abstract perception in meditation, 
and eventually to no perception – is complemented by logical reasoning. While 
logical reasoning and perception are interdependent in their roles in realising 
emptiness, the importance of the former is stressed by Bhāviveka.      
 
With the above clarification, this thesis concentrates on the discussion on emptiness 
as a conceptualised object, i.e. on how the ultimate truth is understood by the wise 
person and on how the notion “all things are empty of an inherent existence” is 
inferred by logical reasoning, which is what concerns the proof of emptiness in KR, 
in terms of concepts and conventional speech.  
 
2.3 Bhāviveka’s system of the two truths 
Although KR itself is a treatise on emptiness, the system of the two truths is not 
discussed systematically by Bhāviveka in KR, unlike in PP or MHK. As KR aims to 
provide guidance to practitioners, instead of ordinary people, to their spiritual 
progress, 112  Bhāviveka may have assumed that his readers already have some 

112 KR’s aim to provide guidance to practitioners along their spiritual progress can be seen in its 
introduction, where Bhāviveka declares his mission to help practitioners easily realise the true 
emptiness and quickly penetrate into the nature of things so he composes KR. There are two types of 
practitioners to whom the KR provides guidance. Practitioners of the first type have already known 
about the doctrine of emptiness based on teachings and instructions. They have been practicing 
diligently according to this doctrine and have attained certain progress along the path to 
enlightenment. However, they have become exhausted due to their doubts in understanding or 
difficulties in practicing. Practitioners of the second type have not yet understood the emptiness of all 
things. However, they have sharp faculties so they can correctly discern and understand the doctrine 
of emptiness easily, thus attaining enlightenment. (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 268b17-b20) Under this 
circumstance, both types of practitioners require some succinct and pertinent guidance to help them 
correctly understand and realise the genuine emptiness. The fact that the treatise is called The Jewel in 
the Hand is because it aims to be the essence of the teachings and instructions on emptiness, like a 
manual, to solve the various problems which a practitioner encounters during her spiritual progress; 
once she has obtained this jewel in her hand, she has understood the essence of the teachings and 
instructions on emptiness. Hence, it can be understood that the targeted readers of KR are not 
ordinary people or in Bhāviveka’s words, the dull-witted, in the conventional world. In the discussion 
below, I will further show that the discernment and the practice of the doctrine of emptiness by the 
practitioners mentioned here are to be understood in terms of, what Bhāviveka calls, the true 
conventional truth, in contrast to the false conventional truth as related to the ordinary people. 
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knowledge about this system. Here, I consider the understanding of this system an 
important background to the understanding of Bhāviveka’s proof of emptiness to the 
extent that he has established the proof based on this system. Having indicated this, 
this section aims to define the four categories of truths in this system, namely the 
inexpressible (aparyāya) and the expressible (paryāya) ultimate truths, and the true 
(tathya) and the false (mithyā) conventional truths and to discuss their 
interrelationship in spiritual practice, in order to set the scope of application of the 
proof of emptiness, for the clarity of later discussion.113   
 
2.3.1 Nāgārjuna’s explication of the two truths 
The Madhyamaka understanding of the two truths is explicated by Nāgārjuna in 
MMK 24.8-24.10: 
 
The teaching of the Buddha is based on two truths, i.e. the 
conventional truth and the ultimate truth. [24.8] 
Those who do not understand the difference between the two 
truths do not understand the reality in accordance with the 
profound teachings of the Buddha. [24.9]  
The ultimate truth is not taught independently of customs and 
conventions. Not having attained the ultimate truth, nirvana is not 
attained. [24.10]114  
 
In MMK 24.8-24.9, Nāgārjuna states that the Buddha’s teachings are based on two 
truths, and that practitioners have to understand the conventional truth in order to 

113 This section is not going to inspect the historical background of Bhāviveka’s system of the two 
truths but only attempts to define the four categories of truth in this system. This system has already 
been discussed extensively in earlier works, such as in Iida 1973 and 1980, Katz 1976, Lopez 1987, 
Tsau 1996 and 2000; also in Ejima 1980, pp. 102-105, Nasu 1999, Hsu 2011, pp. 66-72, Kumagai 
2011. However, it seems that explanations given in these works differ when they try to give a 
definition of each category. The obvious reason is that Bhāviveka himself did not define it 
systematically in his works, so that the understanding of the categories of truth has to refer to later 
commentators’ works. It is not my aim to evaluate how one definition develops into another in a 
historical or philological context. It is, however, my concern to work out a clear conceptual 
demarcation of each category; the linguistic aspect of the definitions will be discussed only when it is 
necessary. While some other texts such as Jñānagarbha’s Commentary on the Distinction Between the 
Two Truths (Bden gnyis rnam ’byed ’grel pa), Kamalaśīla’s Illumination of the Middle Way 
(Madhyamakāloka) and Jang-gya’s Presentation of Tenets (Grub pa’i mtha’i rnam par bzhag pa, GN) 
have also discussed Bhāviveka’s system of the two truths, due to limited space, below I will only 
discuss passages, which are mainly from Bhāviveka’s MHK/TJ and from GN, that are directly related 
to the definition of the categories of truths.   
114 MMK 24.8-24.10: dve satye samupāśritya  buddhānā> dharmadeśanā | lokasa>v.tisatya> 
ca  satya> ca paramārthataG || ye ’nayor na vijānanti vibhāga> satyayor dvayoG | te tattva> na 
vijānanti  gambhīre buddhaśāsane || vyavahāram anāśritya  paramārtho na deśyate | paramārtham 
anāgamya  nirvā9a> nādhigamyate || (Ye 2011, p. 420). A similar verse is found in MHK 5.110. 
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understand the ultimate truth. The conventional truth refers to things which are 
considered ultimately existent, while they actually exist dependently. They are 
customs and conventions in the world and are objects of conceptual knowledge by 
means of speech and thought. The ultimate truth refers to the realisation regarding 
the empty nature of these dependently existent things. It is free from conceptual 
proliferations and is ineffable.  
 
In MMK 24.10, Nāgārjuna further states that the two truths are interdependent in the 
way that one has to realise the ultimate truth by means of the conventional truth. As 
the ultimate truth is free from conceptual proliferation, it is beyond speech and 
thought. However without speech or thought, the ultimate truth can never be taught, 
not to mention be realised; neither can nirvana be attained. According to Nāgārjuna, 
emptiness is taught conventionally along one’s spiritual progress by means of speech 
and thought, through which they are led to eliminate their conceptual proliferation on 
things. As conceptual proliferation is eliminated, one is inspired to realise the 
ultimate truth and eventually attains nirvana. The function of the conventional truth, 
like a ladder for one to reach the top, is also fulfilled.115     
 
Despite these differences between the two truths, the boundary between what should 
be taken as conventional and as ultimate is not clear. The conventional truth is 
supposed to encompass everything that we know through speech and thought, such 
as a jar and a sky-flower, as well as their cessation. However, by common sense, we 
know that there are degrees of reality regarding these things. For example, 
conventionally, while we take a jar as existent ultimately, we take a sky-flower as 
non-existent absolutely. If something is non-existent absolutely, it is nonsensical to 
take it as a conventional truth. And by comparison, the knowledge that a jar will 
cease to exist seems to be truer than that of the jar which is mistaken as permanently 
existent. A similar situation occurs with respect to the ultimate truth. While we hold 
that it is non-conceptual and ineffable, we do not immediately take the Buddha’s 
teachings about it as merely conventional. This is because they are more a 
presentation of the ultimate reality than of the worldly knowledge, although being 
taught or known by means of speech and thought. Thus, degrees of conventionality 

115 See also commentary of MMK 24.8-24.10 in Siderits and Katsura 2013, pp. 272-274 and Garfield 
1995, pp. 296-299. 
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can also be distinguished regarding whether the ultimate truth is expressed 
conventionally, and whether the content of what is expressed is about the ultimate 
truth or only an uninterpreted (neyārtha) teaching. This shows an ambiguity as to 
whether they should be treated as conventional as other worldly knowledge or as 
ultimate as the emptiness of things.  
 
Bhāviveka’s system of the two truths developed Nāgārjuna’s explication of the two 
truths in two aspects. First, in relation to MMK 24.8-24.9 where the difference 
between the two truths is concerned, he has divided each of the two truths into two in 
order to clarify the ambiguity discussed above. Second, in relation to MMK 24.10, 
where spiritual progress by means of the two truths is discussed, and the four 
categories of truth, he has given more importance to the role of general spiritual 
practices that lead practitioners to the realisation of emptiness. The two aspects are 
discussed below.     
 
2.3.2 Bhāviveka’s four categories of truth 
Bhāviveka’s system distinguishes the two truths respectively into two categories – 
the inexpressible ultimate truth, the expressible ultimate truth, the true conventional 
truth and the false conventional truth – to clarify the mentioned ambiguity in the 
difference between the two truths in MMK 24.8-24.9. The mentioned tension 
between emptiness itself, i.e. the ultimate truth, being non-conceptual and ineffable, 
and Bhāviveka’s proof of emptiness, i.e. the conventional truth, consisting of 
conventional speech and concepts, that can be understood from Nāgārjuna’s 
explication can also be solved through clarifying this ambiguity. I will define each 
category of truth in the following. 
 
The inexpressible and expressible ultimate truths 
Bhāviveka explains the ultimate truth in the TJ of MHK 3.26: 
 
…the ultimate truth is of two kinds. In this regard, the first kind is 
without volitional action (anabhisa>skāra), beyond the world 
(lokottara), without outflows (anāsrava) and free from conceptual 
proliferation (aprapañca). The second kind engages in volitional 
action. It is in accordance with the accumulation of merit and 
wisdom (pu9ya-jñāna-sa>bhāra); it refers to the pure worldly 
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knowledge (viśuddha-laukika-jñāna) and is accompanied by 
conceptual proliferation. In this case, [i.e. in terms of the second 
kind of ultimate truth,] we have no fault in holding such a 
specification of our thesis (pratijña).116   
 
In the first kind of ultimate truth, “without volitional action” means that the one who 
has realised this kind of truth, i.e. an ārya,117 which is also referred to as the wise 
person in the last section, does not apply herself or intend any action. “Beyond the 
world” means that this kind of truth is not worldly and is transcendent. “Without 
outflow” means the ārya is uncontaminated in the sense that she is no longer 
motivated by her desire, the action due to which will lead to further rebirth. Free 
from conceptual proliferation means the absence of conceptualisation, i.e. the 
opposite of the multiplication of conceptualisations on the inherent existence of 
things. In Buddhist philosophy, actions are always driven by desire due to one’s 
ignorance. Bodily, verbal and mental actions, whether good or bad, have a karmic 
significance that leads to rebirth. One who has already realised the ultimate truth has 
eliminated her desire so that she does not act physically or mentally in terms of her 
desire, and in such a sense she will not be reborn after she has received the 
consequences from her previous actions. Such a pure and static state of this kind of 
ultimate truth, which is without action and without conceptualisation, corresponds to 
the nature of things, i.e. emptiness, which is explicated by Nāgārjuna and Bhāviveka 
in previous discussions. As it is opposite to the activities in the conventional world, 
it is considered beyond the world. And as it is free from conceptual proliferation, this 
kind of ultimate truth is non-conceptual and cannot be expressed through speech 
which operates in terms of concepts. Hence, this is the inexpressible ultimate truth. It 
corresponds to the ultimate truth in Nāgārjuna’s explication.  
 
The second kind of ultimate truth refers to the expressible ultimate truth, i.e. the 
inexpressible ultimate truth that is known in terms of conventional speech and 

116 TJ of MHK 3.26:…don dam pa ni rnam pa gnyis te / de la gcig ni mngon par ’du byed pa med 
par ’jug pa ’jig rten las ’das pa zag pa med pa spros pa med pa’o / gnyis pa ni mngon par ’du byed 
pa dang bcas par ’jug pa bsod nams dang ye shes kyi tshogs kyi rjes su mthun pa dag pa ’jig rten pa’i 
ye shes zhes bya ba spros pa dang bcas pa ste / ’dir de dam bcas pa’i khyad par nyid bzung bas nyes 
pa med do. (Iida 1980, pp. 86-87) 
117 An ārya refers to a practitioner who has realised emptiness, i.e. who has entered the path of seeing 
(darśana-mārga) on the Bodhisattva Path, or attained the śrāvaka equivalent, the seeing of the truth 
(satya-darśana), both of which are defined as not seeing any object. An ārya is understood in relation 
to p.thagjana, i.e. a practitioner who has not yet entered the path of seeing.   
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conceptions by an ārya who has already realised it. It is not considered a 
conventional truth because it is correct knowledge of the inexpressible ultimate truth. 
However, it constitutes various volitional actions because the originally ineffable 
ultimate truth is now taken as an object which is understood and elaborated 
conceptually by means of speech and thought. In this sense, the expressible ultimate 
truth is the conceptual knowledge of the emptiness of all things, while also being a 
pure worldly knowledge. It is so considered also because such a conceptual 
knowledge of the inexpressible ultimate truth is in accordance with the accumulation 
of the two good qualities, i.e. merit and wisdom, which are necessary for one to 
attain the Buddhahood. 118  In terms of the expressible ultimate truth, merit is 
accumulated by teaching on the inexpressible ultimate truth and practicing that 
benefit other sentient beings. In terms of the same, wisdom is accumulated by 
investigating and meditating on the ultimate truth that enhances one’s conviction to 
the understanding of the emptiness of things.       
 
In an early passage in the TJ of MHK 3.26,119 Bhāviveka explains the expressible 
ultimate truth in linguistic terms; “parama” refers to “the most excellent”, while 
“artha” refers to the object to be known (jñatavya) and therefore to be investigated 
(parīkAa9īya) and understood (pratipādya). Accordingly, there are three 
interpretations of the ultimate truth, which is understood as: 
 
1. “the most excellent object”120 because it is an object as well as the most excellent; 
2. “the object of the most excellent”121 because it is the object of the most excellent 
non-discriminating knowledge (parama-nirvikalpa-jñāna) as discussed in the 
previous section. A similar passage in PP adds that this knowledge does not have any 
other things as its object, apart from the ultimate truth.122 

118 Merit refers to the merits and good actions it derives; it corresponds to the first five perfections 
(pāramitā). Wisdom refers to the acuity of the mind that sees things in their true nature, and is free 
from delusion and harmful habituation; it corresponds to the sixth perfection; for details, see the 
entries of “PQR”, “ST” and “@>” in DDB. See also the list of the six perfections discussed in 
KR in CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 278a25-b5.     
119 Iida 1980, pp. 82-83. 
120 This is understood as a karma-dhāraya compound, in which each member stands in the same case; 
see MW, p. 259, 1. 
121 This is understood as a tat-puruAa compound, in which the last member is qualified by the first 
without losing its grammatical independence; see MW, p. 433, 2.  
122 See the PP of MMK 24.8 in CBETA, T30, 1566, 125a10-a12. 
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3. something which is “in accordance with the ultimate truth”,123 referring to the 
conceptualised knowledge of the ultimate truth (kalpanā-anulomika-paramārtha-
jñāna). PP explains that this includes the teachings on non-arising etc. that are said 
to negate those views regarding the arising of things, etc. This also includes the three 
kinds of wisdom that is attained from hearing (śrutamayī) and from reflecting on 
(cintāmayī) the Buddha’s teachings, and from meditation (bhāvanāmayi).124 
According to this interpretation, the expressible ultimate truth therefore includes the 
Buddha’s teachings and the wisdom attained in relation to these teachings.125  
 
On the basis of the distinctions of the two categories of ultimate truth, it can be 
understood that the inexpressible ultimate truth, i.e. “the emptiness of all things”, is 
taken as an object to be discerned in the proof of emptiness, corresponding to the 
expressible ultimate truth in the first interpretation, and subsequently being realised 

123 This is understood as a bahu-vrīhi compound, i.e. an adjective compound, in which both members 
together qualify a noun; see MW, p. 726, 1.  
124 The PP of MMK 24.8: U VWXFY VZ[=\=]>^_`%(CBETA, 
T30, no. 1566, 125a12-a13) 
125 In GN, the inexpressible ultimate truth is analyzed as the actual ultimate while the expressible 
ultimate truth as the concordant ultimate. Each of them is then analyzed as an object and as a subject. 
As an object, the ultimate truth itself is free from the conceptual elaborations of dualistic appearance 
and ultimate existence. When it is an object of a reasoning consciousness, it is free from the 
conceptual elaboration of ultimate existence but not that of dualistic appearance. The former case is 
the actual ultimate while the latter is the concordant ultimate. As a subject, the non-discriminating 
wisdom which has realised the emptiness of things is free from both conceptual elaborations of 
dualistic appearance and ultimate existence. As a reasoning consciousness, it takes the ultimate truth 
as an object and therefore not free from the conceptual elaboration of dualistic appearance. The 
former case is the actual ultimate while the latter is the concordant ultimate. The teachings on the 
ultimate truth are the concordant ultimate because it conforms to the ultimate truth. (Lopez 1987, pp. 
326-327) In Jang-gya’s analysis, there are both possibilities of being actual (inexpressible) and 
concordant (expressible) for the ultimate truth when it is taken as the object and the subject. Although 
he did not mention the quotation from TJ discussed above, it can be understood that he also has the 
three interpretations in mind and understands the first interpretation as the objective aspect of the 
ultimate truth and the second interpretation as the subjective aspect. 
 While TJ has stated that paramārtha is considered the most excellent object which should be 
investigated and understood, in this context I take all three interpretations as pertaining to the 
expressible ultimate truth because they all involve conceptual elaborations on the ultimate truth as an 
object. This does not mean that I disagree that the ultimate truth itself, i.e. that which is referred to by 
and analyzed in terms of “the most excellent” “object”, is inexpressible.  
 This view and Jang-gya’s view are different from other understandings on the inexpressible 
and expressible truths, in relation to the three interpretations. For example, Ejima takes the first and 
second interpretations as pertaining to the inexpressible ultimate truth while the third to the 
expressible ultimate truth (Ejima 1980, p. 105); Kumagai considers the distinction of being 
inexpressible and expressible as only found in the third interpretation (Kumagai 2011, pp. 1187-1188). 
Since they all agree that the teachings on the ultimate truth pertain to the expressible ultimate truth, 
for the sake of simplicity of the discussion, I will not further investigate these differences. I would 
only note that the difference in understanding of the first and second interpretations contributes to the 
distinction of Bhāviveka’s view on emptiness from the Yogācāra’s; the latter holds that both 
emptiness (as an object) and the non-discriminating knowledge (as the subject) pertain to the 
inexpressible ultimate truth. 
62 

by the non-discriminating knowledge, corresponding to the expressible ultimate truth 
in the second interpretation. Further, the commentary in TJ following the second 
passage quoted above states that the modifier “in terms of the ultimate truth” in the 
theses of the two inferences in the proof should be understood in terms of the third 
interpretation.126 The emptiness of all things is therefore the wisdom or the correct 
knowledge of the inexpressible truth that is conceptualised by an ārya after she has 
realised such truth; and it is in terms of the expressible ultimate truth understood by 
this wisdom that she teaches the emptiness of all things to the p.thagjana, i.e. those 
who have not yet realised it. Also, according to the first passage quoted from the TJ 
of MHK 3.26, the theses “in terms of the ultimate truth, conditioned things are empty 
of inherent existence” and “in terms of the ultimate truth, unconditioned things do 
not have a reality” in the proof are stated in terms of the expressible ultimate truth. 
Due to the fact that the two theses are the conclusions of the inferences in the proof, 
the emptiness of all things is also understood as the resultant wisdom that one has 
attained from hearing, reflecting or meditating on “the emptiness of all things” as an 
object.    
 
The true conventional truth 
The various aspects of the true conventional truth explained in the TJ of MHK 3.8 
and 3.9 are mainly concerned with a Bodhisattva’s training for the attainment of the 
Buddhahood. They include the fulfilment of the six perfections (pāramitā)127 and the 
accumulation of wisdom and merit. The accumulation of wisdom is concerned with 
the discernments (vibhāga) of causation and of the objects of cognition. The former 
refers to the relationship between cause (hetu) and effect (phala). The latter deals 
with objects such as the universal characteristics (sāmānya-lakAa9a, or universals) 
that are cognised by inference and the particulars (svalakAa9a) that are cognised by 
direct perception, as well as other conventional symbols (sa>keta), concepts 
(prajñapti), marks (nimitta), etc. The accumulation of merit is concerned with the 

126 Iida 1980, p. 83.  
127 The six perfections include the perfection of giving (dāna-pāramitā), the perfection of precepts 
(śīla-pāramitā), the perfection of forbearance (kAānti-pāramitā), the perfection of vigour (vīrya-
pāramitā), the perfection of meditation (dhyāna-pāramitā) and the perfection of wisdom (prajñā-
pāramitā); see also KR in CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 278a25-b5. They are the main aspects of the 
Buddha’s practice before he attains the Buddhahood. 
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knowing of the four unlimited (apramā9a) virtues and the four means of conversion 
(sa>graha-vastu).128 
 
It should be noted that both the expressible ultimate truth and the true conventional 
truth are pure worldly knowledge. They differ since the former is conceptual 
knowledge of the inexpressible ultimate truth and is in accordance with the 
accumulation of merit and wisdom, while the latter refers to the actual acts of 
accumulating merit and wisdom, as outlined above, based on the former.129 In other 
words, the true conventional truth is about how an ārya who has realised the 
inexpressible ultimate truth practices in the conventional world.130 This is also 
confirmed by the TJ of MHK 3.13 where it is pointed out that the true conventional 
truth is the sphere (gocara) of investigation of the pure worldly knowledge which is 
attained after one has realised the inexpressible ultimate truth,131 i.e. of the 
expressible ultimate truth.   
 
Various components in the proof of emptiness are considered in relation to the 
accumulation of wisdom. In terms of objects of cognition, terms such as 
“conditioned things”, “empty”, “arising from conditions” and “illusions” in the first 
inference are universals, which are concepts constructed based on the direct 
perceptions of the particulars; likewise, “unconditioned things”, “unreality”, “not 
arising” and “sky-flowers” in the second inference.132 They form the thesis, reason 
and the example in the inferences. Their logical relation is then discerned in the two 
inferences. The speech and concepts that constitute the proof are conventional 
designations. In terms of causation, the proof itself is a conditioned thing that arises 
from conditions. It is also to discern the emptiness of conditioned and unconditioned 
things in relation to causation, i.e. to prove in terms of the ultimate truth that 
conditioned things, which exist through dependent origination, are empty of an 

128 The four unlimited virtues include friendliness (maitrī), compassion (karu9ā), sympathetic joy 
(muditā) and even-mindedness (upekAā); the four means of conversion include giving (dāna), kind 
words (priya-vāditā), helpfulness (artha-caryā) and consistency between words and deeds (samāna-
arthatā); see Iida 1973, pp. 69-70; see also MHK/TJ 3.8-3.9 in Iida 1980, pp. 62-65. I only listed four 
out of the five points that are explained in Iida 1973. This is because point 5 is not an aspect of the 
true conventional truth to my understanding. It is concerned with some conventional knowledge, 
which will be explained as the false conventional truth below.   
129 As the true ultimate truth and the expressible ultimate truth complement each other, Kajiyama 
1957 pp. 302-303 considers the two as the same.  
130 See also Iida’s comment quoted in Katz 1976, p. 257. 
131 Iida 1980, pp. 68-69. 
132 See a list of universal characteristics and particulars in the TJ of MHK 3.13 in ibid. 
64 

inherent existence; unconditioned things, which are not caused, are unreal. These 
show that while the conceptual knowledge of the inexpressible truth is the 
expressible ultimate truth, the discernment of this knowledge in terms of 
conventional speech and conceptions is considered the true conventional truth. The 
former is the resultant wisdom, i.e. the fruit of the proof when it is established, and 
the latter is the instrument or the action, which is the inference itself that consists of 
a thesis, reason and example, and the whole process of logical reasoning, to attain 
the former.         
 
The false conventional truth 
Bhāviveka himself did not offer a definition of the false conventional truth. Like 
MMK 24.10, MHK/TJ 3.12 and 3.13 explains that the true conventional truth is like 
a staircase. One has to ascend it to reach the top, i.e. the ultimate truth, and this 
ascension takes seven infinite kalpas, i.e. an infinitely long period of practice. For 
this reason a practitioner should discern “the conventional truth”, understood as the 
false conventional truth in this discussion, by intelligence first, before she proceeds 
to investigate thoroughly the particulars and the universals of things,133 being aspects 
of the true conventional truth. Although Bhāviveka did not mention the false 
conventional truth in MHK/TJ 3.12 and 3.13, it shows that he has two levels of 
conventional truth in mind. “The conventional truth” concerned, which is considered 
as different from and at a lower level than the true conventional truth, is then 
considered as false comparatively.134  
 
According to the TJ of MHK 3.13, the “sa>v.ti” in “conventional truth” (sa>v.ti-
satya) refers to the discernment of all things in the world. It is a genuinely mundane 
activity, in contrast to the true conventional truth, which is a pure worldly knowledge. 
It is a truth, “satya”, because it is a valid means of knowledge that establishes all 
things in the conventional world.135 The conventional truth includes the thorough 

133 Iida 1980, pp. 67-68. 
134 A similar rationale can be understood from MMK 18.8, which states that the Buddha presents 
different teachings to people with different capacities. While teachings which are closer to the 
ultimate truth are taught to people who have attained a higher capacity, the more conventional 
teachings which they previously received are refuted.  
135 Cf. Candrakīrti who particularly understands “sa>v.ti” as “covered up” or “concealed”, in addition 
to the common understandings of “that which is dependently-originated” and “custom and 
convention”. He then understands “sa>v.ti-satya” as the worldly concealed truth (loka-sa>v.ti-satya). 
See PSP of MMK 24.8 in Sprung et al. 1979, pp. 230-231. 
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study of well-known subjects in the conventional world, e.g. grammar and medical 
science.136 PP states that the conventional truth refers to what is expressed by speech 
in the conventional world,137 and also to things that are empty of an inherent 
existence but mistakenly taken to be existent ultimately.138 With this understanding, 
Bhāviveka states that these things which are commonly accepted as existent in the 
world are also admitted by him as conventional existence.139 This conventional 
existence is not disputed by his proof.140    
 
The distinction between the true conventional truth and the false conventional truth 
is discussed in GN in a clearer manner. Jang-gya states that what distinguishes the 
true from the false conventional truth is that the former refers to those objects which 
can perform a function in accordance with how they appear to a conventional valid 
cogniser who perceives them, while the latter refers to those which cannot.141 In this 

136 Iida 1980, pp. 68-69, i.e. point 5 in Iida 1973, p. 70. 
137 See the PP of MMK 24.8 in CBETA, T30, no. 1566, 125a5-a8.  
138 See the the PP of MMK 24.10 in CBETA, T30, no. 1566, 125b8-b9. 
139 KR: ab)cdAeLd)*(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 268c8) Although also 
taking whatever is agreed upon by the world as existent conventionally (PSP of MMK 18.8 in Sprung 
et al. 1979, p. 181), Candrakīrti considers all conventional existents erroneous, and the ultimate truth 
is realised by eliminating them. As he thinks the world has no idea of the two truths (PSP of MMK 
1.1 in Stcherbatsky 1977, p. 112), he may therefore find Bhāviveka’s demarcation of the conventional 
truth as true and false problematic; the same also applies to the latter’s demarcation of the ultimate 
truth. While some conventional truths are indeed better than the others, Tillemans criticizes 
Candrakīrti’s treatment of the conventional truth that takes all things as thoroughly erroneous, and 
comments that such a truth would become a “dumbed-down truth”. He points out the level of 
sophistication of the world’s epistemic procedures, and suggests understanding the two truths as a 
rung on a ladder to reach to know better a unitary world; see discussion in Tillemans 2011. Newland 
points out that Tsongkhapa follows Candrakīrti’s distinction between conventions that are real to the 
world, i.e. cognised by unimpaired sense faculties, and those that are unreal, i.e. cognised by impaired 
faculties, and holds that conventional truths are taken as true because their existence cannot be 
falsified by the former. In his analysis, the conventional consciousness is the bridge between the two 
truths as it provides reliable information to understand the argument against the reality of inherent 
existence. Conventional claims about things are thus falsified through a process of elimination; see 
discussion in Newland 2011. Tsongkhapa’s treatment of conventional truth is similar to Bhāviveka’s. 
However, there is also ambiguity in Bhāviveka’s treatment of the false conventional truth; see 
discussion below. 
140 KR: )*fgh(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269a29) 
141 Lopez 1987, pp. 333-334. Although a clear distinction between the true conventional truth and the 
false conventional truth is explained in GN, it should be noted that Jang-gya’s understanding of it is in 
part based on Jñānagarbha and Kamalaśīla, who are in turn influenced by Dharmakīrti, who is known 
to define ultimate existents as causally efficacious (see PV II 3: arthakriyāsamartha> yat tad atra 
paramārthasat, in Miyasaka 1971/72, p. 42). The criterion, “causal efficacy” is found in 
Madhyamaka-artha-sa>graha, but this work is not commonly recognised as Bhāviveka’s own (see 
Potter 2003, pp. 442-443). Iida has quoted a passage from PP’s commentary of MMK 18.8 to explain 
causal function as the criterion to distinguish the true conventional truth, e.g. the drinkable water, 
from the false conventional truth, e.g. the water of a mirage. He translates this passage as follows, 
“the sense organs like the eye, etc., and their objects, like rūpa, exist without contradicting 
conventional truth. Therefore, it is declared, ‘Everything is real.’ [However], from the ultimate point 
of view, their own-beings cannot be established like a mirage which arises dependently on [other 
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sense, for example, a jar taken as ultimately real would be a false conventional truth 
to this cogniser, but a true conventional truth if it is understood as a conventional 
object that arises dependently. Although a jar in general is known by conventional 
speech, with reference to Jang-gya’s definition a jar as an ultimate reality is a false 
conventional truth because this so-called ultimately existent jar in fact does not have 
an all-pervading existence as it is mistaken to have, and therefore it cannot fulfill its 
function to contain water in all places and in all times;142 a jar as a dependently-
arisen conventional existent is a true conventional truth because it can contain water 
as long as it appears as a jar. The same applies to illusions, the example in the first 
inference of the proof of emptiness; an illusory man, taken as a real man, is a false 
conventional truth because it cannot function like a real man. However, this illusory 
man is a true conventional truth when he is taken as a dependently-arisen thing 
because it can fulfill its function, in this context, as an object exemplifying the 
positive concomitance of the properties “arisen from conditions” and “empty” in 
conditioned things. Likewise, the illusory monks, who were conjured by the Buddha 
as a skilful means (upāya) to inspire other monks to follow the Buddhist practice.143 
From this, it can be understood that there is no clear boundary between a jar, a 
concrete object, and an illusion to the Mādhyamikas, as these things all arise 
dependently. Their truth or falsity in the conventional sense is determined by 
whether they can fulfill their functions, which are largely determined by the 
cogniser’s interest or desire, in terms of their being ultimate existents or 
conventional existents. Therefore, it should be noted that it is only the inherent 
existence of illusion and other conditioned things to be refuted in the proof of 
emptiness, but not the conditioned things per se.  
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entities]. Thus, since it does not exist as it appears, when we consider it from the point of view of two 
truths, ‘Everything is both real and unreal.’” (Iida 1973, p. 68; see also CBETA, T30, no. 1566, 
108a8-a11) However, it should be noted that the concern of this passage is not to distinguish the two 
conventional truths but to distinguish the ultimate truth from the conventional truth. This passage 
means that things, which are regarded as existent in the conventional world, are not existent in the 
ultimate sense because the existence of these things, like that of a mirage, is dependent on other things. 
Although it does mention that conventional things do not exist as it appears, it does not explain this in 
terms of their lack of causal function; see also the TJ of MHK 3.7, where the true conventional truth 
is only explained as in accordance with the discernment of the real objects (bhūta-artha). (Iida 1980, 
pp. 61-62) Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that the criterion of causal efficacy is merely an 
interpretation, although a feasible one, to clarify Bhāviveka’s thought by later commentators.       
142 This can also be understood in general terms with the jar as an object of perception. As an object 
of perception, the jar should be able to cause perception to a valid cogniser. If it is ultimately existent, 
then it should be perceivable to this cogniser in all places and all times. However, it is not. As this so-
called ultimately existent jar in fact cannot fulfill its function as an object of perception, the 
understanding of it as an ultimate existent is a false conventional truth. 
143 Mahāratnakū@a-sūtra in CBETA, T11, no. 310, 637b14-c26. 
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As for the example “sky-flower” in the second inference, it is commonly recognised 
as non-existent even conventionally. Although it is also known through conventional 
speech, it is not reasonable for it to be taken as either true or false conventional truth. 
Bhāviveka did not offer any explanation on the status of objects like sky-flower in 
his system of the two truths. In GN, these objects are identified as merely false 
conventionalities, outside the two conventional truths. They are not taken as a truth 
because they are not a valid basis for cognition, meaning that they cannot be 
cognised at all in the conventional world.144 Therefore, there is no way to determine 
whether they can fulfill their function as they appear. They include objects like  
 
(1) double moon, hair and other objects, which appear due to the deficiencies 
or illnesses in one’s perceptual or cognitive system, and  
(2) a permanent Self, prak.ti, the inherent existence of things and other 
realities in Bhaviveka’s opponents’ doctrines.  
 
Likewise, these objects also include  
 
(3) logically impossible objects, such as a circular square, as they can neither 
be cognised by perception nor established by inference.  
 

144 Lopez 1987, pp. 333-334; see also ibid., pp. 207-209. In GN, false conventionalities cover both 
false conventional truths and those which are not existent even conventionally as bases of cognition, 
such as double moon, the self of persons (pudgalātman), the self of things (dharmātman), etc.; the 
latter are merely false conventionalities but not false conventional truths. The distinction of false 
conventionality is not used by Bhāviveka in KR. In Madhyamaka-artha-sa>graha, a work that has 
yet to be proved as Bhāviveka’s own, the merely false conventionalities as understood in GN seem to 
be included in the false conventional truth, under the categories of the false conventional truth with 
conceptualisation and false conventional truth without conceptualisation (Potter 2003, p. 443; see also 
Katz 1976, p. 259). Thus, double moon, etc. are categorized under the false conventional truth without 
conceptualisation, while taking a rope for a snake, etc. are under the false conventional truth with 
conceptualisation, together with the conventional things that are mistaken as ultimate existents. The 
idea may be that the double moon, etc. are not cognised due to conceptualisation, but deficiencies; a 
rope for a snake, etc. and the ultimately existent conventional things are cognised due to 
conceptualisation. However, this distinction is problematic in the sense that no matter whether double 
moon and others are cognised due to conceptualisation or not, they do not arise in the conventional 
sense and therefore do not exist even conventionally; hence, they cannot be regarded as a 
conventional truth to be further discerned as either true or false. Also, it is clear that Bhāviveka treats 
conventional existents differently from the false conventionalities, as he does not deny the 
conventional existents that are commonly recognised by common people, but he refutes the merely 
false conventionalities in the conventional sense. This shows that it is untenable to lump all these 
objects together into the category of false conventional truth. 
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In other words, these merely false conventionalities, which cannot be cognised 
through conventional knowledge, include things that are falsely perceived, i.e. (1), 
and things that are unperceivable and are erroneous concepts, i.e. (2) and (3). 
Although all these things, as represented by thoughts or concepts, arise mentally and 
to a certain extent physically, they never arise as the things as such that would be 
commonly recognised as existent in the conventional world. In this sense, they are 
categorized as merely false conventionalities.  
 
In KR, the unreal perceptual objects in (1) are excluded from the scope of the proof 
because these objects are not produced due to one’s conceptual proliferation but 
deficiencies or illnesses that one cannot control; they can only be dispelled by 
medicine instead of reasoning. Bhaviveka categorizes the unperceivable things and 
erroneous concepts in (2) and (3), which cannot be perceived or validly 
conceptualised, as unconditioned things that do not arise, in relation to the second 
inference of his proof. He has generally taken the conventional approach discussed 
above therefore all these unconditioned things are to be refuted as merely false 
conventionalities and not existent even conventionally.  
 
However, GN’s interpretation is not completely true to KR. It is because Bhaviveka 
did not refute the conventional existence of inherent existence, which he considers 
non-arisen from conditions and should therefore be non-existent even conventionally, 
unlike his treatment of other merely false conventionalities. The false conventional 
truth is false because conditioned things, which are empty of inherent existence, are 
now mistaken as having such existence. By not refuting these things which are 
commonly accepted as existent in the world, Bhāviveka has also accepted the 
conventional reality of inherent existence; if he had refuted the conventional reality 
of inherent existence, then conditioned things would also be stated as empty, without 
such inherent existence, in terms of the true conventional truth.145 However, this is 
not what Bhaviveka himself has stated in the theses of his proof (Section 1.3.2). In 
order to prove these things as empty only in terms of the ultimate truth (see also 
Section 3.4), these theses are indeed specified by the modifier “in terms of the 
ultimate truth”. Thus, it can be understood that Bhāviveka treats the inherent 

145 This might be another reason why some scholars consider the expressible ultimate truth the same 
as the true conventional truth (cf. footnote 129), but this has not yet been discussed in any literature to 
my knowledge.   
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existence of things differently from other merely false conventionalities. It may be 
that they are deliberately kept in the false conventional truth first due to the need of 
discussion. Still, they are different from other false conventional truths as they do not 
arise. A similar explanation is however given by Bhāviveka for his inclusion of the 
other merely false conventionalities in his discussion: they are explained to be 
provisionally-established as concepts or inferential objects in order to be refuted later 
by his second inference regarding unconditioned things.146 This shows that perhaps 
Bhāviveka allows degrees of flexibility about what is included in the false 
conventional truth, and this probably depends on the need of teaching or reflection.         
 
The discussions above have clarified the four categories of truth in Bhāviveka’s 
system of the two truths. The inexpressible ultimate truth is a non-conceptual and 
ineffable state which is the ultimate goal in the system. The expressible ultimate 
truth is the conceptual knowledge of the inexpressible ultimate truth, i.e. the wisdom 
that all things are empty. It is also the wisdom resulting from the correct discernment 
of false conventional truth in terms of the true conventional truth i.e. from the proof 
of emptiness in the present context. The true conventional truth is the correct 
discernment of the false conventional truth, in which the merely false 
conventionalities and the mistaken ultimate existence of things are refuted by the 
proof of emptiness. The false conventional truth is the truth established by 
conventional knowledge which takes conditioned things as having an inherent 
existence, i.e. as either ultimately existent or absolutely non-existent. The merely 
false conventionalities refer to the unconditioned things, including the ultimate 
existents in the opponents’ doctrines and absolute non-existents that cannot be 
established conventionally by direct perception or by inference. The four categories 
of truth are summarized as below: 
 
The 
two 
truths 
The ultimate 
truth 
The inexpressible ultimate 
truth 
Emptiness itself 
The expressible ultimate 
truth 
Emptiness as an object realised by the non-
discriminating knowledge  
Teachings on emptiness and the resultant 
wisdoms 

146 See also discussion in Section 3.2.2. 
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- The conclusion of the proof of emptiness 
The 
conventional 
truth 
The true conventional 
truth 
The acts of teaching, reflecting, meditating, 
practicing, etc. in terms of the emptiness of 
all things 
- The proof of emptiness 
The false conventional 
truth 
Conditioned things that are taken as having 
an inherent existence 
Unconditioned things, i.e. the merely false 
conventionalities(?), including the 
opponents’ ultimate realities and things that 
are absolutely non-existent 
 
In KR, cognisable objects are divided into either conditioned things or unconditioned 
things, which include all realities of Bhāviveka opponents. Things that are 
commonly recognised as existent are those that arise in a conventional sense, i.e. the 
conditioned things. Things that are not commonly recognised as existent are those 
that do not arise even conventionally, i.e. the unconditioned things. Bhāviveka’s 
opponents either take the latter to be absolutely non-existent or as their ultimate 
realities, both of which are merely false conventionalities to be refuted by the proof 
of emptiness. If these so-called unconditioned things are indeed conditioned but only 
mistaken as unconditioned, according to their conditioned nature, they are 
considered as existent in terms of conventional knowledge and as false conventional 
truths. On this basis, the inherent existence of the conventional existents is to be 
refuted in terms of the expressible ultimate truth. Unconditioned things are 
established as ultimately unreal in terms of the same. In this way, Bhaviveka has 
established that no unconditioned things exist, and whatever exists is arisen from 
conditions, i.e. conventional. 
 
2.3.3 Spiritual practice in terms of the two truths 
Bhāviveka has developed Nāgārjuna’s explication of the two truths: secondly, by 
giving more importance to the role of practice in general in a practitioner’s spiritual 
progress, which can be seen from his establishment of the expressible ultimate truth 
and the true conventional truth.147 Katz comments that the Prāsaṇgikas concentrate 

147 It is generally agreed that Bhāviveka puts more emphasis on or leaves more room for teaching, 
logical reasoning, meditation and practice in his system of two truths; see for example in Katz 1976, p. 
257, Tsau 2000, pp. 42-43, Hsu 2011, pp. 72-73. 
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on MMK 24.8-24.9, i.e. the difference between the two truths, in the sense that they 
negate the conventional in order to attain the ultimate, while the Svātantrikas, 
represented by Bhāviveka, concentrate on MMK 24.10, i.e. the equal importance of 
the two truths in spiritual progress.148 However, discussions above and this section 
show that Bhāviveka gives equal emphasis to both; he clarifies the ambiguity of the 
two truths in order to show their differences, and he emphasises the role of Buddhist 
practices in general, and logical reasoning in particular, for one to attain the ultimate 
truth. This is based on the understanding that the two truths are interdependent and 
that although they are different, they can relate to each other. In this light, it is more 
accurate to consider that the Prāsaṇgikas have overlooked the importance in the role 
of conventional truth in spiritual progress. This can be seen in the Prāsaṇgika 
representative, Candrakīrti’s negative attitude towards inference, which aims at 
directly establishing emptiness, while he only accepts the use reductio ad absurdum 
(prasaHga).  
 
Spiritual progress along the two truths 
In KR, Bhāviveka holds that the erroneous views regarding the inherent existence of 
things are necessarily to be refuted by the discernment of emptiness, which includes 
logical reasoning and meditation; just like the unreal perceptual objects which appear 
due to eye disease can only be dispelled by medicine.149 Bhāviveka compares the 
illness of the eyes with one’s conceptual proliferation, the eye medication with the 
unperverted discernment of emptiness, false perceptual objects with objects cognised 
as having an inherent existence, i.e. the erroneous views. The analogy works like this: 
Supposing that a person did not know that she had eye disease, she took all objects 
that appeared due to this illness as real. After someone pointed out her illness to her, 
she knew that those objects were false and she applied the eye medication. While she 
kept applying the medication, her eyes became better gradually and the false 
perceptual objects appeared less often. Eventually, her eyes are cured completely. 
She can see things clearly, and according to reality, she no longer sees the false 
objects. The same for a person who had erroneous views and believed in the inherent 
existence of things; after she heard the wisdom concerning the emptiness all things, 

148 Katz 1976, pp. 256-257. 
149 Cf. MHK/TJ 3.1-3.4, where Bhāviveka states that the eye that penetrates into the reality of things 
is only possessed by the person who has knowledge, but not the person who only has flesh eyes. 
Therefore, the wise person should pursue this eye of wisdom, i.e. the knowledge of the ultimate 
reality. 
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she then actively practiced the unperverted discernment of emptiness, and eliminated 
the erroneous views gradually. At last, she has attained the non-discriminating 
wisdom that realises the emptiness of things.150 
 
Here, what distinguishes a person with eye disease from another person with healthy 
eyes is the fact that the latter can see according to the reality; a person who knows 
that she has eye disease is also different from another person who does not in the 
sense that the former treats the false perceptual objects she sees as false, while the 
latter takes them as real. Similarly, what distinguishes an ordinary person, who has 
no knowledge about the ultimate truth, from an ārya, who has already realised it, is 
that the former only has a conventional conception of things as either ultimately 
existent or absolutely non-existent; the latter no longer takes them as either 
ultimately existent or absolutely non-existent after she has realised the inexpressible 
ultimate truth. Although she can still see these things conventionally, she has a 
correct understanding on the inexpressible ultimate truth and therefore a right view 
on the conventional things; she only treats them as empty and existent 
dependently.151  
 
The in-between situation of the person who is taking medication to cure her eye 
disease can be compared to that of a p.thagjana, a practitioner who has not yet 
realised the inexpressible ultimate truth. While the latter understands that things are 
empty of inherent existence, she still takes some as ultimately existent or absolutely 
non-existent. The things that are empty and non-empty can be different to different 
practitioners. This shows a scale of levels of spiritual progress. As Bhāviveka stated, 
the true conventional truth is like a staircase ascending to the ultimate truth, where a 
practitioner accumulates wisdom and merit. It therefore can be understood that one’s 

150 KR: ijK)E5@klmnop`qrstu=vwxyz{mnv
wxyz{k|o}`qFe[>(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 268b14-b16); cf. MHK 
3.251-3.252. 
151 A similar analogy is found in KR, where an ignorant painter is compared to a fool. The fool does 
not correctly understand the reasoning regarding the ultimate truth therefore she attaches herself to the 
false inherent natures and differences of things due to conceptual proliferation. This painter takes the 
horrible images she has painted as real and becomes afraid of them. By contrast, a painter with 
wisdom is compared to one who can correctly understand the reasoning regarding the ultimate truth. 
Also facing the images she has painted, this painter knows that they are not real therefore she does not 
conceptualise on them and generate fear. (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 268b26-c5) In other versions of 
this analogy, the painter with wisdom is replaced by a magician who produces illusions. Not only 
does this magician know the false nature of the illusions that she has produced, she also uses them to 
achieve certain purposes. This magician can be compared to as an ārya in the present context. 
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ascent of this staircase is taken as a truth because it presents one’s correct pursuit of 
the ultimate reality, in terms of the emptiness of all things. In this light, the true 
conventional truth is considered a process; through a long period of time, a 
practitioner investigates the false conventional truth and refutes the merely false 
conventionalities. This marks the gradual transformation of one’s horizon from 
conventional to the ultimate, which is discussed in the following.       
 
While the merely false conventionalities are distinguished from the false 
conventional truth, Bhāviveka holds that one should study thoroughly the latter by 
intelligence before proceeding to discern the true conventional truth. One can discern 
correctly the characteristics of things only if one has a thorough knowledge of them. 
Although the false conventional truth concerns mere conventional knowledge, it is 
the object or the basis of investigation for one who proceeds to discern the 
particulars and the universals of conventional things in terms of the true 
conventional truth. Through the correct discernment of these things, and with the 
help from the wisdom attained from hearing the Buddhist teachings and instructions, 
one by one the conventional things are found to be dependently-arisen and not 
existent ultimately; one by one the merely false conventionalities, such as a 
permanent Self and the inherent existence of things, are refuted. This method of 
elimination is reflected in the non-implicative negation (prasajya-pratiAedha) 
Bhāviveka employs in KR; in terms of the expressible ultimate truth, the ultimate 
existence, the absolute non-existence, both, and eventually all objects of cognition 
are negated without implying the affirmation of the opposite of what is negated.152 
The same rationale is also reflected in analytical meditation (vicāra-bhāvanā) 
through which a practitioner systematically investigates individual objects under the 
topics of, for example, impermanence, and subsequently resolves that the permanent 
existence of none of these objects is attainable. In this sense, the practices regarding 
logical reasoning and meditation complement each other.153     

152 CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270c16-c19. The non-implicative negation is understood in relation to the 
implicative negation (paryudāsa-pratiAedha), which implies the opposite of what is negated. For 
details, see discussion in Section 3.3.3 and Commentary on Objection 9 in Part II.  
153 Iida considers logical reasoning as playing a major role in facilitating the wisdom attained from 
reflection, instead of the wisdom attained from hearing the Buddhist teachings (Iida 1966, pp. 93-95). 
Based on his analysis of the alogicality of Bhāviveka’s proof of emptiness, Hoornaert instead regards 
the proof as only applicable in the translogical stage of meditation. (Hoornaert 1993, p. 23) 
Nevertheless, in the present discussion based on KR, it seems that Bhāviveka does not give a clear-cut 
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After one has refuted the inherent existence of all things through logical reasoning, 
in other words, after one has ascended the staircase of the true conventional truth, 
one attains the pure worldly knowledge of the expressible ultimate truth, i.e. the 
resultant wisdom that all things are empty. In KR, Bhāviveka holds that after one has 
attained this wisdom, which is the understanding of the ultimate emptiness of all 
conditioned things and the ultimate unreality of all unconditioned things, through 
logical reasoning, one should also meditate to completely eliminate all conceptual 
proliferation. 154  With the help from analytical meditation and the wisdom from 
reflection that all things are empty, he advises the practitioners of the concentration 
of mind (samādhi) on the practice of insight meditation (vipaśyanā). Through this 
meditation, they eliminate all the dualities such as subject and object, existence and 
non-existence in their mind. Eventually when all objects, including emptiness itself, 
are eliminated, they realise the inexpressible truth, which is a moment of insight. 
This is Bhāviveka’s understanding of the meaning of MMK 24.10, which states that 
one cannot attain the ultimate truth without relying on the conventional truth. 
 
From the above analysis, there are two directions of spiritual practice, upward and 
downward, which can be understood in relation to the proof of emptiness, based on 
the system of the two truths. The upward direction is concerned with the p.thagjanas. 
As discussed above, with the thorough knowledge of the false conventional truth 
they investigate the dependent origination and emptiness of conventional things in 
terms of the true conventional truth. With the reflection of the conventional things in 
terms of the true conventional truth, they attain the expressible ultimate truth, which 
is the emptiness of all things. Hence, the establishment of the proof of emptiness, to 
the p.thagjanas, presents an upward direction of spiritual progress from the false 
conventional truth to the more transcendent expressible ultimate truth. The 
downward direction is concerned with the āryas. After they have realised the 
inexpressible ultimate truth, they develop a conceptual knowledge of it, i.e. the 
wisdom that all things are empty, in terms of the expressible ultimate truth. They 
further teach and reflect on this knowledge, by means of the proof of emptiness, in 
terms of conventional speech and conceptions pertaining to the true conventional 
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division of labour between logical reasoning, or particularly the proof of emptiness, and meditation in 
relation to the three kinds of wisdom.     
154 CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 273a22-a24, 276a5-a8.   
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truth. On the one hand, they strengthen their understanding of the emptiness of all 
things, which in turn enhances their meditation and practices. On the other hand, the 
proof of emptiness, as a teaching, causes the wisdoms attained from hearing and 
from reflection for the p.thagjanas to further investigate the nature of conventional 
things; in other words, it is the cause of their later realisation of the emptiness of all 
things.  
 
Hence, in Bhāviveka’s system of the two truths, the expressible ultimate truth and 
the true conventional truth play an important role in one’s spiritual progress. While 
the expressible ultimate truth, i.e. all things are empty, is the conceptual knowledge 
of the inexpressible ultimate truth, it is taught by the āryas to the p.thagjanas based 
on the true conventional truth; at the same time the p.thagjanas refine their 
knowledge on the nature of conventional things also based on the true conventional 
truth. In this respect, all practitioners, regardless of whether they have already 
realised the ultimate truth, reflect on the nature of conventional things in terms of the 
true conventional truth, by means of the proof of emptiness. Through the proof of 
emptiness, the expressible ultimate truth is therefore the resultant wisdom of all 
practitioners. This also involves a change in the practitioners’ horizon progressing 
from the knowledge of the conventional truth, which is conceptual, to the attainment 
of the inexpressible ultimate truth, which is non-conceptual. As shown in the above 
discussion, a gradual change is possible through continuous practices that are in 
terms of the true conventional truth, taking the inexpressible ultimate truth as their 
goal. The proof of emptiness, which is one of the practices in the true conventional 
truth, is the instrument for one to attain the resultant wisdom of the emptiness of all 
things. Thus, the categories of the true conventional truth and the expressible 
ultimate truth, both being conceptual, in Bhāviveka’s system of the two truths act as 
the mediator, or the bridge, between the mere worldly knowledge and the realisation 
of the inexpressible ultimate truth.155  
 
In the beginning of the chapter, I mentioned the tension between the non-conceptual 
emptiness and the attempt to prove it conceptually by logical reasoning. In my 
opinion, Bhāviveka attempts to solve this tension by dividing the two truths into four 
categories. Thus, emptiness itself, which is non-conceptual, remains as the 
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155 Kajiyama 1957, pp. 301-303, Tsau 2000, pp. 40-41, Hsu 2011, pp. 86-87. 
76 

inexpressible ultimate truth that can only be attained through meditation. The scope 
of the application of the proof of emptiness is now confined in the other three 
categories, i.e. the expressible ultimate truth, the true conventional truth and the false 
conventional truth, all of which are understood to be conceptual. This has 
successfully addressed the tension in the sense that emptiness is taken up as a 
conceptualised object that can be talked or thought about; the underlying purpose to 
teach and reflect upon it is therefore fulfilled. In Bhāviveka’s system of the two 
truths, the proof of emptiness therefore serves as a skilful means to facilitate one’s 
spiritual progress to the realisation of the inexpressible ultimate truth.    
  
77 

Chapter 3: The Establishment of the Proof 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 2, the proof of emptiness was interpreted as the true conventional truth. 
Bhāviveka believes that it represents the wise person’s attempt to convey her 
conceptual knowledge of the inexpressible ultimate truth to other practitioners as 
well as to the Buddhist and non-Buddhist opponents. Thus, the proof is expected to 
be applicable universally among these groups of people. Bhāviveka holds that he has 
succeeded in proving that all things are empty in general, instead of being empty 
only to some people.  
 
This chapter is concerned with the adaptations in the formation of the two inferences 
in the proof of emptiness as inference for others, or as common inference for these 
groups of people, under the influence of Bhāvivaka’s position on emptiness. These 
adaptations will be evaluated in terms of the two basic criteria for establishing an 
inference for others (Section 1.3.2): first, only terms whose concepts are commonly 
agreed upon can be used; second, the reason should be commonly agreed as 
possessing the three characteristics. Based on this, the two inferences are considered 
under Bhaviveka’s claim that they are established either [1] as the general result of 
the whole inferential process regarding the emptiness of all things, or [2] as 
standalone inferences. I will show that [2] is untenable due to their universal nature, 
i.e. to prove the ultimate emptiness of all conditioned things and all unconditioned 
things, constituting a fallacy in Dignaga’s logical system.       
 
There are five sections in this chapter. Section 3.2 considers how Bhāviveka fulfills 
the first criterion in both [1] and [2]. Section 3.3 and 3.4 then evaluate how the 
second criterion is addressed in [1]. Issues regarding the proof being established 
without the third characteristic of a reason, with the use of non-implicative negation, 
and the employment of the modifier as the final step to establish the proof as 
common inferences will be discussed. Section 3.5 argues that Bhaviveka has 
nevertheless failed to filfill the second criterion in [2]. The fallacious reason 
resulting from the universal nature of the inferences is investigated. Section 3.6 
concludes that the expressible ultimate truth is not proved in KR.  
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3.2 On the common agreement on the concept of a term 
The first criterion for the establishment of an inference for others requires that only 
terms whose concepts are commonly agreed upon can be used (applying to both [1] 
and [2]). 
 
In Objection 10 regarding the first inference in the proof, the opponents objected to 
“arisen from conditions” as the property that infers in the reason because it can mean 
something different to Bhāviveka than to other parties.156 It can mean, for example, 
that things are produced by some substances, thus implying that they are ultimately 
real, or that they are produced by other dependently-originated things, thus implying 
that they are empty of an inherent existence. As a result, a certain party in the debate 
may be favoured when a particular meaning is taken into account. For different 
parties derive different understandings from “arisen from conditions”; if the reason 
were to be understood in terms of some of its various meanings, an inference for 
others (or a common inference) would be impossible.157 This problem does not only 
apply to the reason. It can also apply to “conditioned things”, as in cases where they 
imply ultimate existence to the opponents,158 and to “illusion”, as in cases where its 
illusory inherent nature is implied.159 For this reason, Bhāviveka generally holds that 
the terms used in inferences should be understood in terms of their general quality.  
 
3.2.1 Terms as general qualities 
In response to the objection above, Bhāviveka states that the property that infers 
(“arisen from conditions”) should be understood as a general quality (sāmānya) that 
is accepted by both parties in the debate, including all particular instances possessing 
this quality. It should not be understood in terms of any of its particularities or 
implications (viśeAa). Such a property is generally accepted by the logicians as the 
reason.160 As long as all parties agree on the general sense of the reason, the reason 
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156 CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270c28-c29. 
157 A similar debate between Bhāviveka and his opponents on this issue is recorded in PSP, where 
Bhāviveka’s explanation, as also discussed below, is rejected by Candrakīrti (Stcherbatsky 1977, pp. 
115-117 ); see also footnote 319 in Part II.   

See, for example, Objections 1 and 3 in Part II.
159 See Objections 11 and 12. 
160 KR: P~6d045:2Ad… (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270c29-
271a1) 
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is sufficient to be established. This position applies to all other terms in both 
inferences.  
 
A general quality may be conceived of as a universal. This is discussed by 
Bhāviveka in MHK 5.61, where he states that the referent of a word is an entity 
(vastu) possessing a universal (sāmānya), because this entity causes the cognition of 
the image of itself. This entity exists, therefore it can be referred to by a word.161 The 
TJ of MHK 5.59 explains that this entity is the form-and-colour that exists 
conventionally, and its image is the sense object that appears in direct perception and 
is inexpressible.162 These form-and-colours are particulars that arise from conditions 
and are conventional existents. One may not attempt to grasp them, as in the case in 
the realisation of the inexpressible ultimate truth; but when one does, one has already 
conceptualised these originally inexpressible sense objects and formed a concept 
about them. Hence, when these particulars are referred to by words, they are already 
conceived of as gross objects, in terms of the concept of themselves. This concept is 
a universal.163 Alternatively put, words always refer to the universals of the 
particulars. Therefore, MHK 5.63 states that the universal is necessarily cognised 
together with any particular entity that is its locus.164 Due to continuous 
conceptualising activities, various universals are formed and are possessed by 
common loci, so that the conceptual knowledge of, for example a “blue” “lotus” and 
a “blue” “pot”, is possible.165 In this light, the terms in the two inferences in the 
proof of emptiness are considered universals. For example, the particulars that have 
arisen from conditions can be generally referred to by and subsequently discussed in 
terms of the universals “conditioned things”, “arisen from conditions”, “illusion” and 
“empty”. 
 

161 Eckel 2008, p. 266; see also Saito 2004, p. 25 and Hoornaert 2001b, pp. 30-31. 
162 Eckel 2008, pp. 264-265; see also Saito 2004, p. 28 and Hoornaert 2001b, pp. 29-30.  
163 See Hsu 2013, pp. 111-120 for the discussion on the relation between direct perception, inference 
and the formation of universal. 
164 Eckel 2008, p. 268; see also Saito 2004, p. 25 and Hoornaert 2001b, p. 32. Bhāviveka’s 
understanding of universal should be contrasted with Dignāga’s. Bhāviveka holds that universals are 
formed by the cogniser’s conceptualisation on the particulars as entities. They are possessed by these 
entities and necessarily cognised together with them. Dignāga’s universals are understood by virtue of 
exclusion of others (anyāpoha). A property of a thing is established by negating anything that 
possesses the opposite property of this property (~p). Thus, this thing, which possesses this property, 
is understood as having the property “~~p” (Hayes 1988, pp. 183-184); see also Saito 2004.        
165 MHK 5.64 and 5.65. (Eckel 2008, pp. 269-270) 
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However, understanding a term as a universal is not sufficient to solve the problem 
described under Objection 10. This is due to different degrees of generality. For 
example, “arisen from conditions” is a universal. Opponents’ conception of 
“produced by substances” is another universal, although one that is more specific 
than the former. What determines a term in an inference to be understood in terms of 
the former, in a more general manner? Or, how is one to assess this degree of 
generality? Bhāviveka’s explanation on this point is not clear. Thus, to try to 
understand his view, I shall consider the nature of an inference for others. Different 
from an inference for oneself, which only aims to achieve inferential knowledge for 
oneself, an inference for others rather aims at convincing others to accept the same 
conclusion one has reached in one’s own inferential process. For this reason, no 
common knowledge between two parties could be achieved if the inference was set 
up only based on the conceptions of the proponent or the party whom the proponent 
wishes to convince. Under this circumstance, the proponent has to look for a 
common ground. When deciding the terms to use in an inference, the proponent has 
to take up their general qualities, whose senses are general enough for both parties to 
accept. Thus, the inferential knowledge common to both parties is possible.   
 
While the property that infers of an inference is the basis for both parties to infer the 
conclusion, it must be general enough to be commonly recognised by both parties. 
Only in this way can it act as the medium through which the common inferential 
knowledge can be established through the concomitance between the property that 
infers and the property to be inferred. This is why a reason is fallacious if it is not 
accepted by all parties in the debate.166 In his response to Objection 10, Bhaviveka 
has taken a property which is commonly possessed by all particular instances of the 
subject of the inference to be the property that infers in the reason.167 As already 
defined in Section 1.3.2, “conditioned things” include everything that is arisen from 
conditions; the property that infers, i.e. “arisen from conditions”, is possessed by all 
conditioned things. Being “arisen from conditions” means to be “jointly produced by 
conditions”, “arisen by virtue of conditions” or being “manifested by conditions”. 
This definition includes all particular causal activities whose results are caused by 

166 See, for example, Bhaviveka’s response to Objection 7 in Part II.   
167 See Commentary in Part II for the detailed discussion on Bhāviveka’s response.   
81 

the assemblage of causes and conditions. Thus, “production by substances”, which is 
the interpretation favoured by Bhaviveka’s opponents, is also included.  
 
The same rationale also applies to other terms in an inference for others. In his 
response to Objection 12, Bhāviveka states that one should not object to an inference 
based on the particularities of the property that infers and of the property to be 
inferred. Take the inference “sound is impermanent, because it is produced” as an 
example. It should not be refuted based on the fact that the positive example “jar” is 
“produced by lumps of clay” or “destructible by a stick”, which is unlike the subject 
“sound”, as sound is produced and destroyed under different circumstances. This is 
because as long as both the jar and sound possess the general qualities, i.e. 
“impermanent” and “produced”, then the jar is sufficient to be a positive example to 
establish the impermanence of sound.168 
 
As terms understood in their general qualities are used to infer the knowledge 
applicable to all parties involved, they do not already imply the conclusion 
Bhāviveka favours. The principle of impartiality can be maintained. Neither do they 
imply the opposite of the conclusion that his opponents favour. This therefore has 
avoided the fallacy of establishing what has already been established to the 
opponents, as inferring what is not originally agreed upon by the opponents is one of 
the basic rules of conducting a debate.  
 
3.2.2 The discussion of the merely false conventionalities 
While universals are understood as general qualities, there may be a further problem 
regarding the nature of the terms used in the second inference. As universals are 
always cognised together with the loci, i.e. the conventional existents, unconditioned 
things that do not arise are to be proved by Bhāviveka to be merely false 
conventionalities, which are non-existent even conventionally. And as they do not 
exist, they cannot be the loci of the universals. Thus, there is a question as to how to 
conceive of “unconditioned things” such as “space”, “sky-flower”169 and their “not 

168 See Commentary in Part II for detailed discussion.
169 It should be noted that the ontological status of, e.g. sky-flower, is different from that of 
unconditioned things, such as space, etc. that are introduced in Section 1.3.2. The former is 
commonly considered as absolutely non-existent. However, space, cessation through deliberation and 
cessation independent of deliberation are regarded as ultimate realities in Vaibhāṣika; see KR in 
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arising” in the second inference. In KR, the logicians indeed have objected: since 
Bhāviveka himself holds that unconditioned things are non-existent absolutely, it is 
illegitimate for him to set up an inference to infer any property of these things.170 
 
Bhāviveka tries to explain away this problem in his response in KR:171 He argues 
that all parties involved in the debate do establish “space” based on the mere absence 
of resistant bodies, by virtue of the power of designation of our thought. Similarly, 
they establish “cessation through deliberation” based on the mere non-arising of 
defilements resulting from the discernment of our wisdom. They also establish 
“cessation independent of deliberation” based on the mere non-arising of things and 
“suchness” based on the mere absence of all attachments, both resulting from the 
absence of conditions. It is because of the power of designation of our thought that 
we are allowed to provisionally establish these unconditioned things.  
 
Thus, unconditioned things are created by our mind as imaginary existents on a 
conventional level and therefore we are able to talk about them by conventional 
speech. From this, we are also able to form an inference about them. At this point, 
Bhāviveka would be able to respond to the problem of universals by saying that just 
as these unconditioned things can be established provisionally as concepts in our 
mind, so too can the relevant universals be established. Provisionally, they both take 
the mental organ that consists of form-and-colours as locus, while eventually being 
negated altogether. This seems to be the solution Bhāviveka takes. 
 
Bhāviveka continues to explain that as the unconditioned things are established by 
the power of designation of our thought, they can be taken to be the subject of the 
thesis through the power of common agreement of the parties involved.172 While he 
regards them as merely false conventionalities and his opponents take them as 
ultimate existents, the implications of being unconditioned, i.e. as being absolutely 

CBETA, T30, no. 1758, 273c21-c23, 274a17-a20 and 274b16-b17. Suchness is taken as ultimate 
reality by Yogācāra; see KR in CBETA, T30, no. 1758, 274b28-c3.   
170 See CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 274b4-b6. A similar criticism by Candrakīrti is found in Chapter 1 of 
PSP. (Stcherbatsky 1977, p. 117) 
171 KR: '.B> 'B
; '(`qF'd'.V
 (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 274b7-b11) 
172 KR: d'.V045B6d'(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 
274b11) 
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non-existent or ultimately existent, are not taken into consideration when forming an 
inference. Although the existence of unconditioned things is conceived of differently 
by different parties, the point that they are thought of and are agreed upon as such by 
all parties involved is not deniable.173 Therefore, even merely as concepts, they are 
sufficient to be taken up as the subject of the thesis. The same applies to individual 
unconditioned things, i.e. space, etc.; they can be taken as the subject of the 
inference as long as they are thought of and are agreed upon as such by all parties 
involved.   
 
Nevertheless, the refutation or the proof of the implication that unconditioned things 
are ultimately existent is not commonly recognised. As long as the parties involved 
can conceive of such a dispute, “do not have reality” can be stated as the property to 
be inferred in relation to the subject. As the fact that unconditioned things do not 
arise is commonly recognised, “not arising” is stated as the property that infers. And 
although there is no such thing as “sky-flower” in reality, as an imaginary existent it 
is generally thought to have the properties “unconditioned”, “does not arise” and 
“unreal”.174 Therefore, Bhāviveka can still set up his second inference for the 
ultimate unreality of unconditioned things.  
 
Universals are employed in inference in Dignāga’s system of logic. The above, 
however, shows that in an inference for others, being a universal is not the 
fundamental criterion for a concept to be considered the term used in such an 
inference. In the discussion of conditioned things as conventional existents and 
unconditioned things as merely false conventionalities, the universals of the former 
are considered more real than those of the latter. If we had strictly adhered to the 
definition of “universal” given in MHK, the concepts or the universals of 
unconditioned things would be unacceptable because they do not have any 
conventionally existent locus. While they are considered to have been established 
taking the mind as their locus, the same can be said about the universals of 
conditioned things. The criterion that allows both types of universals to take the 
mind as their locus is in fact the power of designation of our thought and the power 

173 ZZLS: 045B6d''30:45
Ua%')*$%A*%	
(CBETA, X46, no. 788, 717b6-b9) 
174 See KR in CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 274b11-b15. 
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of common agreement by the parties involved in the debate. Through these powers, 
Bhāviveka can make sure that there is common agreement on both content and 
concept-generality for the terms used in both inferences. Hence, no matter whether 
all or a particular conditioned thing or unconditioned thing is taken up as the subject, 
as long as its concept is commonly agreed upon, the inferences can qualify as 
inferences for others.175      
     
This discussion of the commonly-agreed nature of concepts can be further applied to 
our conception of an inherent nature, which should also be regarded as a merely false 
conventionality as it does not arise from conditions.176 To Bhāviveka, a quality, as a 
universal, of a thing becomes an inherent nature because of our false 
conceptualisation. The fact that we can talk about a thing or “its inherent nature” as 
if it were ultimately real is also due to the powers of designation and common 
agreement. When one reflects on the false conventional existents in terms of the 
expressible ultimate truth, one then establishes them as empty. The inherent 
existence of these things, which was once established by these powers, is also 
negated.        
 
3.3 The general result of the whole inferential process 
The second criterion for the establishment of an inference for others requires that the 
reason be commonly recognised by all parties as possessing all three characteristics 
of a reason. This is evaluated in terms of [1] in this section. 
 
In Objection 5, the opponents make the criticism that the act of inference is deficient 
in the first inference. In the first part of his response ([1]), Bhāviveka explains that 
the proof of emptiness presents the general result of the valid means of knowledge 
(i.e. inference)177 and that individual conditioned things (in both Buddhist and non-

175 Yao 2009, p. 392 points out that Tsongkhapa solves the problem from discussing empty subject 
terms, which are understood as the merely false conventionalities in the present context, by the use of 
non-implicative negation. This is because non-implicative negation does not imply the affirmation of 
anything while it negates the existence of these empty subject terms. Although Bhāviveka employs 
non-implicative negation, he did not offer any similar explanation in KR (see discussion below). 
Nevertheless, Tsongkhapa does refer to Bhāviveka’s works and is influenced by him in his use of 
non-implicative negation; see discussion in Chu 2009, Sections 3.1-4.4.    
176 Bhaviveka’s treatment of inherent existence is different from that of the merely false 
conventionalities; see discussion under “the false conventional truth” in Section 2.3.2. 
177 Cf. Hayes’s commentary on PS 2.1, in which inference is explained to be (1) the process of 
inferring, and (2) the resultant cognition from this process. (Hayes 1988, pp. 231-232)   
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Buddhist doctrines) are taken up as the subject during examination and in the 
formation of individual inferences. Hence, the proof did not commit the said 
problem.178 In this section, I will consider how the theses of the two inferences in the 
proof are established as the general result of all individual inferences concerning 
conditioned and unconditioned things, i.e. as the conclusion of the whole inferential 
process concerning the ultimate emptiness and ultimate unreality of these things, i.e. 
the expressible ultimate truth. Below, the two inferences in the proof will be called 
the resultant inferences, in order to differentiate them from the individual inferences 
in the inferential process. Further, I will show that the former are established without 
the third characteristics of a reason,179 with the use of non-implicative negation in 
this inferential process. 
 
3.3.1 Inference as a process 
The process of cognition generally involves a subject with an instrument. Through 
an action or a process, the subject acts on the object, to finally obtain the result, i.e. 
the knowledge on the object. Research on Bhaviveka’s view on causation in relation 
to inference is rare. Referring to what has been discussed in Chapter 2, the proof of 
emptiness, as the true conventional truth, is like an ascending staircase. Through this 
staircase, one takes a long period of time to accumulate the wisdom and merit in 
order to attain the conceptual knowledge of the inexpressible ultimate truth. In this 
sense, the proof is considered the process or the instrument which one uses to 
understand the ultimate emptiness of all conditioned things and the ultimate unreality 
of all unconditioned things.180 This understanding matches the general notion that 
inference is both a valid means of knowledge and a causal process, like direct 
perception. During the inferential process embodied in the proof, the subjects who 
engage in the act of inference include the wise person, the practitioners, as well as 
the opponents. By means of this process or the instrument, various false 
conventional existents and merely false conventionalities, as inferential objects, are 
revealed to be either empty or unreal ultimately. Refer to the diagram below:181    
 

178 KR: a bY8¡w¢£Z'8£tV``5'~a¤(CBETA, T30, 
no. 1578, 269c9-c11) 
179 On the first characteristic of a reason (i.e. conditioned things are arisen from conditions and 
unconditioned things do not arise) in both resultant inferences, see Section 1.3.2. 
180 See Section 2.3.3. 
181 Cf. individual inferences for different conditioned and unconditioned things in Chapter 3 of MHK. 
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Inferences regarding conditioned things Inferences regarding unconditioned things 
 
T1: In terms of the ultimate truth, jars are empty, 
 because they arise from conditions,      
 like illusions; unlike space.      
T2:         In terms of the ultimate truth, space has no 
reality, 
because it does not arise, 
like a sky-flower; unlike sound. 
T3: In terms of the ultimate truth, sound is empty, 
 because it arises from conditions, 
 like illusions; unlike cessation through  
deliberation. 
T4: In terms of the ultimate truth, cessation 
through deliberation has no reality, 
because it does not arise, 
like a sky-flower; unlike eyes. 
T5: In terms of the ultimate truth, eyes are empty,   
 because they arise from conditions,     
like illusions; unlike cessation independent     
of deliberation.        
           
         
     
Tn: In terms of the ultimate truth,       Tn:        In terms of the ultimate truth,  
 all conditioned things are empty.         all unconditioned things have no reality, 
 because they arise from conditions,         because they do not arise, 
 like illusions.           like a sky-flower. 
 
Suppose there are infinitely many moments on the timeline. Although there is an 
interval of time between each point (T), for demonstrative purpose they are 
designated in sequence as T1 up to Tn.
182 During a debate on the nature of 

182 As discussed in Section 2.3.2, according to MHK/TJ 3.12-3.13, one has to ascend the staircase of 
the true conventional truth to attain the expressible ultimate truth, i.e. the ultimate emptiness of all 
conditioned things and the ultimate unreality of all unconditioned things. This ascension will take 
seven infinite kalpas, i.e. an infinitely long period of practice (Tn) to complete. This leads to the 
questions on the possibility of attaining enlightenment and when. While the attempt to respond to 
these questions is out of the scope of this thesis, one of Bhāviveka’s quotations in KR may be 
considered as a possible answer. This quotation is about Mañjuśrī’s response to a Brahmin’s question 
on what is called enlightenment to a Bodhisattva. Mañjuśrī’s answer is that it is neither the past, 
future nor present; a Bodhisattva should therefore discern the purity of the three dimensions of time to 
attain the purity of the three realms in order to achieve enlightenment. (CBETA, T30, no, 1578, 
273b12-b20)       
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conditioned things, all parties involved have decided to examine the existence of jars, 
a particular type of conditioned thing. Therefore, jars are taken up as the subject in 
the thesis of an inference. Based on the commonly agreed reason “they arise from 
conditions” and positive example “illusions”, and with a provisional negative 
example “space” that is considered “not arising” and “not empty”, they conclude that 
the jars are empty of inherent existence. Hence, at T1, the thesis “all jars are empty of 
an inherent existence”, which is the conclusion of the inference, is proved. On 
another occasion, say, T2, all parties involved have decided to examine the existence 
of space, a particular unconditioned thing. Therefore, space is taken up as the subject 
in the thesis of an inference. Based on the commonly agreed reason “it does not arise” 
and positive example “a sky-flower”, and with a provisional negative example 
“sound” that is considered “arisen” and “real”, they conclude that space is unreal. 
Hence, at T2, the thesis “space has no reality”, which is the conclusion of the 
inference, is proved. Subsequently, the inherent existence of sound is refuted at, say, 
T3, taking “illusions” as the positive example and “cessation through deliberation” as 
a provisional negative example. The reality of cessation through deliberation is then 
refuted at, say, T4, and so on.    
 
Up to Tn, adding together all these individual conclusions of the inferences regarding 
conditioned things and unconditioned things, i.e. individual inferential processes as a 
whole, the general result is that all conditioned things are empty and all 
unconditioned things are unreal, as stated in the theses of the two resultant inferences 
in the proof of emptiness. This general result obtained through the proof of 
emptiness is the attainment of the expressible ultimate truth.  
 
3.3.2 The absence of a negative example and the third characteristic of a reason 
In the demonstration above, provisional dissimilar instances are present and 
provisional negative examples can be given to inferences regarding individual 
conditioned things and unconditioned things; and hence showing the third 
characteristic of a reason. When the general result of all the conclusions of these 
inferences is obtained, no negative example is given and the two resultant inferences 
in the proof of emptiness are established without the third characteristic.183  
 

183 Cf. discussion in Ejima 1980, pp. 126-135. 
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The similar instances of the resultant inferences are objects which are empty and 
unreal in the ultimate sense, and they all qualify as positive examples. When the two 
resultant inferences are established, all conditioned things that are arisen from 
conditions are also proved to be empty and all unconditioned things that do not arise 
are also proved to be unreal. There would be no instances which arise from 
conditions but not empty, or which do not arise but are real. Any such instances (for 
example a dependently-arisen jar that has an inherent existence ultimately, the non-
arisen suchness that is ultimately real – realities in the opponents’ doctrines) are 
refuted in individual inferences regarding different conditioned things and 
unconditioned things.  
 
Further, the dissimilar instances of the individual inferences on conditioned things 
are objects which are not empty and do not arise, and those of the individual 
inferences on unconditioned things are objects which are real and arisen from 
conditions. “Unreality” in the second inference is synonymous to “emptiness” 
(Section 1.3.2); to be “real” means being “not empty”. Hence, these dissimilar 
instances are in fact the aforementioned realities in the opponents’ doctrines to be 
refuted by individual inferences. For example, “space”, which is the dissimilar 
instance of the inference regarding “jars” at T1, is taken up as the subject and its 
reality is to be refuted for the inference regarding unconditioned things at T2 to be 
established. “Sound”, which is the dissimilar instance of the inference regarding 
“space” at T2, is in turn taken up as the subject and its inherent existence is to be 
refuted for the inference regarding the conditioned thing at T3 to be established. This 
happens because individual inferences regarding unconditioned things are set up to 
negate the dissimilar instances of the individual inferences regarding conditioned 
things, and vice versa.   
 
As both theses “all conditioned things are empty” and “all unconditioned things have 
no reality” in the proof are universal statements, for the proof to establish there 
should be no conditioned thing which is not empty or unconditioned thing which is 
real in the ultimate sense. Hence, when all individual inferences regarding 
conditioned and unconditioned things are established, realities in the opponents’ 
doctrines have already been eliminated. As a result, both inferences are established 
without a dissimilar instance or a negative example. For this reason, in KR, 
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Bhāviveka states that a negative example is only provided to negate the dissimilar 
instance. It is not fallacious to establish an inference with a provisionally-established 
negative example at the time of explanation. But when the purpose of negating 
dissimilar instances has already been achieved, there is no more dissimilar instance, 
and therefore there is no negative example.184  
 
To Dignāga, the purpose of negative examples are to indicate the dissimilar instances, 
which neither possess the property to be inferred in relation to the subject nor the 
property that infers, to exclude them from the domain of positive instances, which 
instead may possess the property that infers. Through this exclusion of the dissimilar 
instances, the subject is proved to possess the property to be inferred.185 Having 
accepted the use of inference in his system, it can be assumed that Bhāviveka also 
agrees on the general function of the various components of an inference. However, 
it can be observed that the notion of the negating or excluding dissimilar instances 
has acquired some additional content in Bhāviveka’s proof of emptiness. Referring 
to the inferential process discussed in Section 3.3.1, all dissimilar instances are also 
eliminated – there is no dissimilar instance for either resultant inference, after the 
general result of all the conclusions of individual inferences is obtained. In this sense, 
a negative example is no longer needed.  
 
The circumstance in KR is therefore different from the explanation in PSV (Section 
1.3.1), where the negative example is considered omissible when it is already well-
established to all parties involved. This is possible also because the negative 
concomitance between the property to be inferred and the property that infers is 
presumed (arthāpatti) by the positive concomitance, which has already been 
established by the positive example.186 The situation in KR is also different from the 

184 KR: 	'	¥	%¦§ Y¨£Y	©'
78L¤(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 268c29-269a1); Y	'¥ª
«(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 273c13) 
185 NM 5.1 and Katsura’s explanatory note in Katsura 1981, pp. 63-65; Tucci 1930, p. 37. See also 
discussion on negative examples in relation to non-implicative negation in Chu 2009, Sections 1.1-1.3.  
186 NM in Section 5.4 in Katsura 1981, pp. 71-72; see also Tucci 1930, pp. 42-44. Apart from the 
suggestion that the second and the third characteristics of a reason in Dignāga’s system of logic are 
logically equivalent (see footnote 43), the establishment of the second characteristic can presume the 
presence of the third characteristic may also be due to Dignāga’s theory of the exclusion of others that 
is understood in relation to the positive and negative examples. The positive example, which possess 
the property to be inferred, is rather understood as that which does not possess the opposite of the 
property to be inferred (~p, i.e. as ~~p). This exclusion of others is understood in terms of implicative 
negation, which does not imply the affirmation of what is negated (see also discussion in Section 
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explanation in NM, where the third characteristic is considered present in cases when 
dissimilar instances are absent. This is acceptable because, to Dignāga, dissimilar 
instances are to be excluded by negative examples, which are understood in terms of 
non-implicative negation (see Section 3.3.3); Dignāga does not commit to affirm the 
reality of any negative example or its property in the first place. Also, as the property 
that infers cannot occur in any dissimilar instance,187 the reason of an inference 
which already possesses the second characteristic of a reason would not become 
illegitimate. On this basis, HE considers the third characteristic of a reason being 
guaranteed by the absence of a dissimilar instance as one of the justifications for the 
absence of negative examples in the two resultant inferences.188  
 
However, the discussion above shows that the two resultant inferences in the proof 
are established without the third characteristic of a reason. This is not because the 
presence of this characteristic is guaranteed by the presence of the second 
characteristic or the absence of dissimilar instances, but simply because the presence 
of this characteristic is impossible. This is true that dissimilar instances are absent, as 
the proof is the general result of the whole inferential process. But according to what 
has already been explained in Section 3.2.1, to Bhāviveka universals have to be 
cognised together with the entities that possess them. Without a dissimilar instance, 
the opposites of the property to be inferred in both resultant inferences, i.e. “not 
empty” and “real”, as universals, cannot occur in any locus. As they are not 
possessed by any entity, they cannot be cognised at all. The negative concomitance 
between the property that infers and the property to be inferred is therefore not 
exemplified by any object. As it is not argued, here, that the second and third 
characteristics of a reason are logically equivalent (see footnote 43), it is more 
reasonable to consider the third characteristic absent, instead of established under 
presumption.   
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3.3.3), thus implying the affirmation of the property “~~p” in relation to the subject of the inference. 
The negative example, which possesses the opposite of the property to be inferred (~p), is instead 
understood in terms of non-implicative negation. (See also discussion in Chu 2009, Sections 1.2-1.3.) 
Since the positive examples, which exemplify the second characteristic, is established dependently on 
the negative examples, which exemplify the third characteristic, the establishment of the second 
characteristic thereby presumes the presence of the third characteristic.  
187 See NM in Section 3.4 in Katsura 1978, pp. 128-130 and Section 5.1 in Katsura 1981, pp. 63-65; 
Tucci 1930, pp. 27, 37. It should be noted that Dignāga’s standpoints from PSV, and particularly from 
NM, just outlined here could be considered inconsistencies in his logical system, as he also holds that 
it is necessary to exemplify the third characteristic of a reason to prove a thesis (Section 1.3.1). 
188 HE 2012, pp. 10-11. 
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HE also gives other reasons for the absence of a negative example: (1) the theses are 
understood as universal statements, and “emptiness” is understood in terms of the 
non-implicative negation; (2) the theses are specified by the modifier, i.e. “in terms 
of the ultimate truth”.189 The above discussion is compatible with (1) because the 
theses are understood as universal statements as they present the general result of the 
whole inferential process, which consists of individual inferences regarding 
conditioned and unconditioned things. Dissimilar instances are all eliminated in this 
process. Section 3.3.3 will show how this is achieved with the use of non-implicative 
negation. However, the absence of a negative example is not due to (2); Section 3.4 
will show that the modifier functions in a different way.  
 
3.3.3 Non-implicative negation 
The elimination of all dissimilar instances in KR is possible due to the use of non-
implicative negation, and it is linked to the possession of the second characteristic by 
the reason. Bhāviveka holds that a thesis of an inference cannot be established by 
merely negating dissimilar instances,190 i.e. by the presence of the third characteristic 
of a reason. As the possession of this characteristic is shown to be impossible if the 
resultant inferences are established, Bhāviveka has to establish the positive 
concomitance between the property that infers and the property to be inferred, i.e. 
the second characteristic, to establish his proof. For this purpose, Bhāviveka sets out 
to eliminate all the opponents’ realities, which would violate the said positive 
concomitance. Thus, non-implicative negation is employed in individual inferences 
regarding different conditioned and unconditioned things.  
 
The Indian Grammarians consider that a negation can be construed in two ways to be 
what Bhāviveka calls an implicative negation (paryudāsa-pratiAedha) or a non-
implicative negation. An implicative negation is formed by adding a negative 
indicator “a(n)” to the descriptive (karma-dhāraya) or possessive (bahu-vrīhi) 
compound that follows, as in the case of “not-white” in English. Hence, with the 
sentence “The cloth is not-white”, the term “not-white” is implicitly affirmed in 
relation to the cloth, while the other properties that are “not-not-white” are negated. 

189 Ibid.
190 KR: 	F¬%§ª­(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269c3-c4); see also discussion 
on Objection 4 in Commentary.  
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A non-implicative negation is formed by adding the negative particle “na” to the 
verbal phrase in a sentence, as in the case of “is not white”. Hence, with the sentence 
“The cloth is not white”, the verbal phrase “is white” is negated without implying an 
affirmation of any other property in relation to the cloth.191 In Bhāviveka’s words, 
after “the cloth is white” is negated, the negative sentence “the cloth is not white” 
has already fulfilled its function and it no longer has the efficacy to further express 
other meanings, such as “the cloth is black” or “the cloth is red”.192 For this reason, 
Bhāviveka considers that the function of affirmation is dominant in the implicative 
negation, while the function of negation is dominant in the non-implication 
negation.193   
 
Distinction between the two types of negation was already observed in Dignāga’s 
NM.194 It was Bhāviveka who first discussed their difference and usage in 
Madhyamaka. Based on his analysis of the negative tetralemmas (catuAko@i) and the 
eight negations in the dedicatory verse in MMK, Ruegg points out that Nāgārjuna 
does not distinguish between the two types of negation, and negation, to Nāgārjuna, 
regardless of whether it is regarding a compound or a verbal phrase, is always meant 
to negate without implying the affirmation of the opposite; the same is also true to 
Candrakīrti.195 This is, in Bhāviveka’s terms, non-implicative negation. Due to the 
doctrine of emptiness, Madhyamaka generally holds that everything is empty of 
inherent existence, and hence to affirm anything whatsoever of a certain thing would 
amount to admitting the inherent existence of this thing. Therefore, Bhāviveka states 
that all objects of cognition, which are taken as either ultimately existent or 
absolutely non-existent by the opponents, should be negated in terms of the ultimate 
truth until there is no attachment or discrimination remaining in our mind.196 By non-
implicative negation, these objects, as false conventional existents or merely false 

191 This understanding of implicative negation and non-implicative negation is based on Ruegg 1977, 
p. 3 and Yao 2009, pp. 391-392; see further discussions in Ejima 1980, pp. 113-125, Chu 2009. 
192 KR: +(®¯,°+®¯,±o²³´µ¶+·¯,=+¸¯,=+¹
¯,(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270c14-c15) 
193 KR: a°¶º$Ya°$(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270c11) 
194 NM: (CBETA, T32, no. 1628, 2c8-c9; Section 5.1 in Katsura 1981, pp. 
63-65; Tucci 1930, p. 37), with “” refers to implicative negation and “” to non-implicative 
negation; see Yao 2009, p. 391 and note 18, Chu 2009, Sections 1.1-1.3. 
195 Ruegg 1977, pp. 4-5. Candrakīrti has admitted the use of non-implicative negation in PSP; see 
Stcherbatsky 1977, pp. 142-147. 
196 KR: »Fµ/¤¼½¾`q<3FD¿^FDÀ<W(CBETA, 
T30, no. 1578, 270c18-c19) 
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conventionalities, are negated one by one and are inferred to be either empty or 
unreal ultimately. 
 
The second characteristic of a reason is met by virtue of the use of non-implicative 
negation: firstly in the way that the opponents’ realities are eliminated without 
remainder, and secondly since they are negated without further implying their 
opposites, which are some other inherent natures or ultimate realities. The positive 
concomitance between the property that infers and the property to be inferred of 
either resultant inference will fail to establish if there is at least one thing which 
possesses the property that infers but not at the same time possessing the property to 
be inferred. Referring to diagram in Section 3.3.1, for example, if the inherent 
existence of “sound”, as a provisional dissimilar instance in an inference regarding 
unconditioned things, were not refuted, then there would be at least one conditioned 
thing, i.e. “sound”, that is arisen from conditions but not empty. The thesis regarding 
the emptiness of all conditioned things would fail to establish. The thesis regarding 
the unreality of all unconditioned things would also fail to establish under a similar 
circumstance.  
 
In terms of non-implicative negation, the negations “sound is empty” and “space has 
no reality” only negate the ultimate existence of sound and space. Their opposites, 
i.e. the natureless sound and the unreal space, as ultimate realities, are not thereby 
affirmed by implication. By contrast, in the case of implicative negation, sound, 
which is “arisen from conditions”, would become not empty of “no-nature”. Space 
that “does not arise” would become, in an ultimately real sense, “unreal”. 
Bhāviveka’s position on non-implicative negation can be seen from Objection 12, 
where he denies the illusory nature of illusions in relation to the negation “illusory 
men are not real men”.197 This negation does not imply the affirmation of the “not-
real-men”, i.e. illusory as an inherent nature. He also denies the absolute non-
existence of space, as another ultimate reality, when he negates the ultimate reality 
of space.198 For the same reason, neither does he accept the existence of suchness in 
relation to the negation “all things are empty”.  
 

197 See Commentary in Part II for detailed discussions.  
198 KR: F'~°+,a°}LÁÂ}(CBETA, T30, no. 
1578, 274b22-b23) 
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Having eliminated all dissimilar instances, the reasons of both resultant inferences in 
the proof are agreed upon by all parties involved as also possessing the second 
characteristics. The resultant inferences in the proof of the emptiness of all 
conditioned and unconditioned things are now established with the first two 
characteristics of a reason.       
 
3.4 The modifier “in terms of the ultimate truth” 
Nāgārjuna states that whatever is arisen from cause and conditions is empty, 
including emptiness itself, and whatever is empty is also a designation. The middle 
way, which is understood in relation to dependent origination, emptiness and 
designation, involves the denial of both ultimate existence and absolute non-
existence, and the acceptance of conventional existence as the bridge through which 
the practitioners attain the ultimate truths.199 Under Bhāviveka’s interpretation, this 
middle way is understood as conditioned things being empty of an inherent existence 
only ultimately but not conventionally.  
 
Although Bhāviveka understands the emptiness in his proof in terms of the 
expressible ultimate truth and the middle way that do not deny conventional 
existence, from the perspectives of ordinary people and his opponents, who did not 
understand the notion of emptiness, the emptiness of all conditioned things and the 
unreality of all unconditioned things indeed amount to the non-existence of all things 
even on the conventional level. This is in fact the basis of Objection 1 that: the thesis 
of the first resultant inference is considered as incompatible with the common 
knowledge of ordinary people, direct perception and Bhāviveka’s own doctrine of 
the middle way.  
 
Further, inference in Dignāga’s system of logic is a valid means of knowledge for 
one to know the occurrence of a property in a locus, in which both the locus and its 
property are conceptualised based on ultimately existent particulars (Section 1.3.1). 
The point of Bhāviveka’s inference is rather to prove that all ultimate existents 
(including these particulars), as well as anything that is conceptualised upon them, 
are not knowable in terms of their inherent nature, i.e. not existent, in the ultimate 
sense under the doctrine of emptiness. In Dignāga’s system of logic, however, any 

199 Chapter 24 of MMK. 
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object that lacks a basis of existence, i.e. the real particulars in the present context, 
may be considered an empty term and so cannot unproblematically be taken as the 
subject of an inference.200 This is even more problematic when the subject is 
required to be existent ultimately in the opponents’ realist doctrines. Thus, by 
combining the doctrine of emptiness with Dignāga’s system of logic, Bhāviveka’s 
use of inference seems to have contradicted the various established means of 
conventional knowledge, including inference.    
 
For this reason, the modifier “in terms of the ultimate truth” is employed by 
Bhāviveka to specify the theses, which are the conclusions of all individual 
inferences and of the two resultant inferences.201 These inferences are clarified to be 
only concerned with proving the emptiness of all things on the ultimate level. The 
emptiness that is understood in terms of the expressible ultimate truth is therefore 
distinguished from the non-existence that is understood in terms of the two 
conventional truths. By this modifier, Bhāviveka aims to avoid the misunderstanding 
of establishing the conventional unreality of things, hence solving the conflicts that 
his proof seems to have with conventional knowledge (i.e. common knowledge, 
direct perception and inference) and the middle way.202 This employment of the 

200 This is indeed the basis of several objections in Part II; see, for example, discussion under 
Objection 2. See further discussion on the methods to deal with the issue of empty terms in Buddhist 
logic in Yao 2009. 
201 Inferences regarding individual conditioned and unconditioned things in Chapter 3 of MHK are 
also specified by this modifier. The use of this modifier is certainly objected by Candrakīrti (Section 
1.2). However, Tsongkhapa, being also a Prāsa[gika, supports the use of it in his LRCM. He holds 
that it is impossible to distinguish the two truths without it. (LRCM, p. 219) If the object, which is 
conventionally posited by the Mādhyamikas, were not negated with this modifier, then the negation 
itself would become fallacious. (Ibid., p. 216) Thus, in relation to the present discussion, “in terms of 
the ultimate truth” should be added to, e.g., “conditioned things do not exist”. For the same reason, 
Tsongkhapa points out that although Candrakīrti himself disapproves Bhāviveka’s use of “in terms of 
the ultimate truth” in his PSP (see Stcherbatsky 1977, pp. 112-114), Candrakīrti does add 
“intrinsically” when he refutes the false production. (LRCM, pp. 218-219) As for the objects that are 
imaginary constructs proposed by the Buddhist or non-Buddhist essentialists, i.e. objects that are 
regarded by the Mādhyamikas as non-existent even conventionally, modifiers such as “essentially” or 
“intrinsically” are used only when these opponents’ perspectives are taken into account. (Ibid., p. 215) 
Therefore, Tsongkhapa clarifies that what distinguishes the Prāsa[gikas from the Svātantrikas is not 
the use of modifiers, but that they refute ultimate existence conventionally. Thus, it is unnecessary for 
the Prāsa[gikas to add a modifier to refute the ultimate existence of conditioned things. However, a 
modifier is needed by the Svātantrikas (ibid., p. 220), and hence rendering the negation as “in terms of 
the ultimate truth, the ultimate existence of conditioned things does not exist.” 
202 See KR: ab)cdAeLd)*)*18 LdtV
)*&ÃÄÅÆV^6Ç«tVÈge~Fd=18=6«
+,5'~…#$%&'+,(#)*(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 268c8-c13); 
ab5'~°ÉÊË+,l5Ìª«#+,'+,(#
)*(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 273c3-c4); Cf. Kuiji’s YMRZLLS: À678V$%°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modifier, “in terms of the ultimate truth”, thus satisfies the customs and conventions 
of all parties involved, and therefore marks the final step for Bhāviveka to establish 
his inferences as inferences for others, or as common inferences.203 In this way, the 
common knowledge, i.e. “whatever is arisen from cause and conditions is empty of 
an inherent existence in terms of the ultimate truth”, which is the wisdom 
accumulated through the practice of logical reasoning in relation to the proof, is 
obtained.       
 
3.5 On taking all conditioned things or all unconditioned things as the subject  
In the proof of emptiness, under [1], the two resultant inferences respectively take all 
conditioned things and all unconditioned things as their subjects as they present the 
general result of many inferences. Each of these inferences establishes the 
conclusion that a particular class of things is empty or unreal, in terms of the 
expressible ultimate truth. Eventually, all conditioned things and all unconditioned 
things have become the subjects of the resultant inferences, as the two theses have 
included the conclusions of all individual inferences.  
 
Although these two resultant inferences fulfill the two criteria of being the inferences 
for others in [1], I would like to show, below, that they fail to fulfill the second 
criterion concerning the three characteristics of a reason in [2], i.e. when they are 
examined as standalone inferences. This is because, with reference to the formal 
requirement of an inference in Dignāga’s system of logic, this kind of subject (“all 
conditioned things” and “all unconditioned things”) leads to the fallacy of 
indeterminate reason and the lack of a positive example. For this reason, the two 
inferences are unestablished.  
 
3.5.1 The fallacy of the reason being too specific (asādhāra#ānaikāntika-hetu) 

g)c=eÍV¼WÎFªÏÐa78bF5;¤°
Ñ$%Ñ)*g(Ò)c(CBETA, T44, no. 1840, 115c2-6); ÓÀ~Ð$%
ÔÕ°Ö+ !×,LgeÍ=)c
V¤¼(CBETA, T44, no. 1840, 116b18-20). In the record of PSP, Bhāviveka explains that the 
modifier is introduced in consideration of the standpoints of the opponents. (Stcherbatsky 1977, p. 
112) 
203 Cf. discussion in Ejima 1980, pp. 55-60, 102-113.  
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In PS/V 3.21-3.22, there are nine possibilities regarding the full or partial presence 
and absence of the property that infers in the similar and dissimilar instances.204 The 
fifth one concerns an indeterminate reason, in which the property that infers is absent 
in both the similar and dissimilar instances. It is too specific in relation to the subject, 
resulting in no positive example can be provided. Thus, this reason cannot prove the 
property to be inferred in relation to the subject. Consider the following inference: 
 
Thesis:  Sound is permanent, 
Reason:  because it is audible. 
 
Its reason is fallacious because audibility is the distinctive characteristic of sound, i.e. 
nothing else is audible apart from sound. Since audibility applies to the same class of 
things as sound, there are no other positive instances which can possess both 
“permanent” and “audible” at the same time. Hence, the proponent of this inference 
is unable to provide a positive example.  
 
Although dissimilar instances or negative examples are available, they are in fact all 
things apart from sound. It might be considered that the negative concomitance 
between the property that infers and the property to be inferred, which is exemplified 
by these negative examples, is contrapositive to the positive concomitance of these 
two properties.205 However in Dignāga’s system of logic, the presence of negative 
concomitance does not presume the positive concomitance concerned.206 Bhāviveka 
also holds that negative examples alone are not sufficient to establish an inference, 
as they cannot exemplify the positive concomitance.207 Also, universals are 
necessarily cognised together with the entities that possess them (Section 3.2.1). 
Thus, although the dissimilar instances of the above inference possess the properties 
“impermanent” and “inaudible”, they cannot serve as the evidence for sound to be 
the locus of the opposite of “impermanent”, i.e. “permanent”. The property that 
infers neither occurs in the similar instances nor in the dissimilar instances in the 

204 Kitagawa 1965, pp. 185-192; see also Potter 2003, pp. 345-346. See Dignāga’s Hetucakra in HE 
and Van der Kuijp 2014b. 
205 Cf. footnote 43. 
206 See footnote 186. 
207
 See further discussion under Objection 4 in Part II.  
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inference above.208 The second characteristic of a reason not demonstrated and the 
inference is unestablished. 
 
From this example of indeterminate reason, it is generally considered that Dignāga 
excludes the subject from the domain of positive instances because the property to be 
inferred has yet to be affirmed or denied in relation to it. Thus, the subject cannot 
become one of the positive examples. The problems at hand cannot simply be solved 
by taking a particular kind of sound, e.g. a person’s voice, as the positive example, 
which would otherwise have been mentioned by Dignāga. This is perhaps because a 
person’s voice has already been included in the subject, which refers to the whole 
class of sounds. Since the permanence of sound, in general, is currently under 
examination and has not been proved, a particular kind of sound, under the class of 
sounds, cannot serve as evidence to support the permanence of the whole class of 
sounds; even though this particular kind of sound is commonly recognised as 
permanent.209  
 
3.5.2 With “arisen from conditions” as the distinctive characteristic of “all 
conditioned things” 
The same problems can also be found in the two resultant inferences in the proof of 
emptiness. Take the first inference as an example:       
 
Thesis:  In terms of the ultimate truth, [all] conditioned things are empty, 
Reason: because they arise from conditions, 
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208
 NP: °6AY+ØÙF[,Ù=Ù^Úa(CBETA, T32, no. 1630, 
11c22-c23). Tachikawa 1971 p. 124 translates: An instance of a mark uncommon [to both the sapakṣa 
and the vipakṣa] is: “[Sound is] permanent because it is audible”, for the mark [i.e. audibility] is a 
cause of doubt, because it is excluded from both permanent and impermanent things [other than 
sound]. See also Tillemans 1999, p. 90. 
209
 One cannot deny the situation in which a particular kind of sound is already known to be audible 
and permanent. This particular kind of sound might be a qualified positive example. The same may be 
applicable to the positive example “illusions” in the proof of emptiness. However, if the thesis about 
the whole class of things were to be established with just some of the members as examples, then this 
may result in the problem of over-generalization. It is also possible that some other members of the 
same class possess the property that infers “audible” and the opposite of the property to be inferred, 
i.e. “impermanent”, resulting in the fallacy of indeterminate reason.  
Even if the whole class of things, i.e. the subject, were not required to be excluded from the 
domain of positive instances, neither would the proponent of the inference be able to cite all members 
of this class as examples; not to mention that this is virtually impossible. This may be the reason why 
Dignāga did not cite a particular member within the class of the subject as a positive example. It is not 
the problem in the example itself, but in taking the whole class of things as the subject, and in the 
reason that is too specific.     
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Positive Example: like illusions. 
 
As has been discussed, “arisen from conditions” is the distinctive characteristic of 
“conditioned things”; nothing else would arise from conditions apart from 
conditioned things. Therefore, “conditioned things” and “arisen from conditions” 
apply to the same class of things. However, the subject, which in this case is the 
whole class of conditioned things, should be excluded from the domain of positive 
instances and thus cannot become one of the positive examples. Consequently, 
“illusions” cannot serve as a positive example because it has already been included 
in the class of conditioned things, whose emptiness has not been proved. Thus, no 
positive examples would be available. This problem might be solved if illusions 
were considered outside the class of conditioned things, but this would be 
unacceptable to Bhāviveka. As “arisen from conditions” is absent in both similar 
instances (i.e. in this case, no positive instance at all) and dissimilar instances (i.e. 
anything that is not empty), there is the fallacy of the reason being too specific. 
         
From this, we may also interpret Objection 5, which is concerned with the deficient 
reasoning in the inference, as the lack of the act of inference. This is because what is 
referred to by the reason and what is referred to by the example have already been 
included in the subject of the thesis, i.e. “conditioned things”:  
 
Thesis:  In terms of the ultimate truth, [all] conditioned things are empty, 
Reason: because they are conditioned things, 
Positive Example: like some conditioned things. 
 
In the second half of his response to Objection 5, Bhāviveka explains that there is no 
such fallacy even when all conditioned things are taken as the subject. I take that he 
means the inference is established even when it is examined as it is (i.e. as an 
inference), without taking its nature as the general result of individual inferences into 
consideration. According to Bhāviveka, the inference is established because “arisen 
from conditions”, which is mutually recognised, instead of “empty”, which is still 
disputed, is taken as the property that infers. It is also because illusions, instead of 
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the subject itself, are taken as the positive example.210 Bhāviveka seems to 
understand the fallacy as circular reasoning, where a person supports her argument 
with something which should be proved by her argument in the first place.  
 
With reference to what has just been discussed, however, Bhāviveka’s response 
appears to have overlooked part of the thrust of the objection. His inference actually 
attempts to establish the emptiness of all conditioned things with the reason “because 
conditioned things are conditioned things”. Although this reason possesses the first 
characteristic, it is shown to be fallacious under Dignāga’s system of logic because it 
is too specific in relation to the subject. Hence, agreeing with the opponents’ 
objection in this regard, the property that infers is indeed included in the subject, in 
the sense that they both are referring to the same class of things. As all possible 
positive examples, i.e. particular conditioned things, have already been included in 
the subject, which cannot be one of the similar instances, no positive examples are 
available. From this, both the reason and the example are indeed included in the 
subject. As both the second and the third characteristics of a reason are missing, 
inference cannot take place. 
 
These problems are not addressed by Bhāviveka’s claim that the reason is mutually 
recognised by all parties in the debate. As shown by the fallacy of the reason being 
indeterminate, this “mutually-recognised” reason cannot qualify as such. In the 
present inference, Bhāviveka intends the reason to be recognised universally, in 
order to be applicable to all conditioned things in all Buddhist and non-Buddhist 
doctrines. Therefore, he takes up the general sense of causation, i.e. “arisen from 
conditions”, which is at the same the distinctive characteristic of “all conditioned 
things”, to be the property that infers. This makes the “universally-recognised” 
reason nonetheless fallacious since the second and the third characteristics of a 
reason are not exemplified by any example. Neither can Bhāviveka explain the 
problem away by stating that he did not take “empty” as the property that infers, 
with his response to Objection 5. This is because the problem concerned is not about 

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circular reasoning, but about “arisen from conditions” being the distinctive 
characteristic of “all conditioned things”.  

It could be argued that the inference for the emptiness of all conditioned things is 
different from that for the permanence of sound, because illusions, according to 
Bhāviveka, are indeed commonly recognised as arisen from conditions and empty of 
an inherent existence, but the permanence of a particular kind of sound, e.g. a 
person’s voice, is in fact not commonly recognised. However, even if “illusions” 
were accepted to be a legitimate example, and the emptiness of all conditioned 
things were hence concluded based on the evidence of the emptiness of one 
particular kind of conditioned thing, i.e. illusions, the inference would still be 
problematic. This is because it would have the problem of over-generalisation. 

It might also be argued that the inference would be free from the aforementioned 
problems if the nature of its conclusion as the general result of the whole inferential 
process of individual inferences for the emptiness of different conditioned things, i.e. 
as the expressible ultimate truth, was taken into account.211 From this, the inference 
should take “all conditioned things” as the subject, to which the property that infers, 
i.e. “arisen from conditions”, applies. Besides, the thesis has already been specified 
by the modifier, i.e. “in terms of the ultimate truth”. However, as discussed in 
Section 3.4, this modifier only functions to avoid the misunderstanding from the 
opponents that things are proved to be non-existent even conventionally by the thesis. 
It only applies to the conclusion of the inference, but not to the reason or the 
examples that actually involve in inferring this conclusion. As Bhāviveka holds that 
this resultant inference is a standalone inference, whose establishment can be 
evaluated on its own, this inference has to follow the formal requirements of an 
inference. As traditional inference emphasises the experiential aspect of knowledge, 
it relies on analogical reasoning to establish the positive and negative concomitances 
between the property that infers and the property to be inferred, which are the second 
and the third characteristics of a reason. The minimum requirement for Bhāviveka to 
set up an inference is the presence of the thesis, the reason and an example. Since 
“all conditioned things” and “all unconditioned things” are taken as the subjects in 

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the two inferences, both positive and negative examples are absent.212 Neither can 
the positive concomitance nor the negative concomitance be established. As these 
fundamental problems cannot be solved, the inference is considered unestablished. 
The same problems are also found in the second inference.  
 
3.6 Is the expressible ultimate truth provable by inference? 
The two inferences in the proof of emptiness are set up as inferences for others or 
common inferences, and so are thought to have force for both Buddhists and non-
Buddhists. Bhaviveka claims that they can be understood [1] as the general result of 
the whole inferential process regarding the emptiness of all things, and [2] as 
standalone inferences, and that they are established either in terms of [1] or [2].  In 
the above discussion, I have argued that they are only established under [1], but not 
[2].  
 
While Bhāviveka requires the terms used in these inferences be understood in their 
general qualities so that they are recognised by all parties involved, the theses have 
taken up all “conditioned things” and all “unconditioned things” as their subjects. 
These subjects apply to the same classes of things as the properties that infer, i.e. 
“arisen from conditions” and “not arising”, in the reasons. Due to the limitation of 
inference for others in Dignāga’s logical system, in which the property of the subject 
is inferred based on examples, from which the subject is excluded, there are no 
positive examples in these inferences. Bhaviveka is unable to demonstrate the 
second characteristic. Although the first characteristic is guaranteed, with also the 
lack of the third characteristic, his inferences are unestablished. The failure of his 
proof of emptiness is due to the fact that inference for others in Dignāga’s logical 
system cannot prove a type of thesis with its subject applying to the same class of 
things as the property that infers.213  
 
Bhāviveka cannot prove the Mādhyamika thesis, “all things are empty”, as a 
universal claim about all conditioned and unconditioned things, in terms of 
Dignāga’s logical system. For this reason, the expressible ultimate truth, i.e. the 

212
 See Section 3.3.2 for the discussion on the absence of a negative example. 
213 This can be understood in comparison with another type of thesis, e.g. “all jars are empty” which is 
also universal in nature, but provable with the same reason “because they arise from conditions”; the 
property that infers can occur in similar instances, e.g. cloths, to exemplify the second characteristic. 
103 

emptiness of all things, is beyond inferential knowledge with reference to Dignāga’s 
system of logic. Bhāviveka has failed to combine inference, understood in relation to 
Dignāga’s logical system, with his doctrine of emptiness.214 

214 Cf. Vaidalyaprakara9a, where Nāgārjuna holds that the Mādhyamikas do not accept the sixteen 
logical categories, which are regarded as ultimate realities in Nyāya’s theory of inference, because the 
Mādhyamikas do not hold onto anything, based on the doctrine of emptiness. (Tola and Dragonetti 
1995, p. 57) These categories are then shown to be problematic logically as a result of their being 
established independently; see, for example, Sections XXXIII-XLIX. (Ibid., pp. 74-81)   
104 

Chapter 4: Closing Remarks  
 
Bhāviveka attempts to prove the theses that all conditioned things are empty and all 
unconditioned things are unreal through his proof of emptiness in KR. As he only 
aims to prove the lack of an inherent existence in all things in the ultimate sense, not 
denying their inherent existence affirmed in conventional knowledge, the two theses 
are specified by the modifier “in terms of the ultimate truth”. The reasons which 
serve to prove these theses are recognized by all parties in the debate as possessing 
the first characteristic of a reason (i.e. “conditioned things” being pervaded by 
“arisen from conditions”, and “unconditioned things” by “not arising”) and the 
second characteristic (i.e. “arisen from conditions” being positively concomitant 
with “empty”, and “not arising” with “unreal” in the ultimate sense). As there are no 
dissimilar instances, which are not empty and not arising or real and arisen, both the 
negative example and the third characteristic of a reason are not available in both 
inferences. Concerning the positive examples, “illusions” are commonly known as 
arisen from conditions and empty of an inherent existence, and “a sky-flower” as not 
arising and absolutely non-existent. Since the reasons and the positive examples are 
well-established, Bhāviveka considers both inferences, and therefore the proof of 
emptiness, established. 
 
The central discussion 
Since the objections to the first inference and Bhāviveka’s responses to them will be 
discussed in detail in my commentary in Part II, in Part I I have rather focused on 
investigating some fundamental issues regarding the formation of the inferences. The 
ultimate emptiness of things is generally considered ineffable and non-conceptual by 
Madhyamaka, while inference is in nature verbal and conceptual. Along this line, I 
asked the following question: is Bhāviveka’s proof of emptiness in KR, consisting of 
two inferences, established? I developed this inquiry in two ways:  
 
In Chapter 2, I examined the circumstance, under which the proof of emptiness is 
established. To achieve this, I analysed Bhāviveka’s understanding of emptiness and 
the four categories of truths. I considered the demarcation of the two truths into four 
categories as the result of Bhāviveka’s equal emphasis on the knowledge of the 
105 

difference between the two truths, and the dependence on the conventional truth to 
attain the ultimate truth. The inexpressible ultimate truth refers to the ultimate 
emptiness, which is not an ineffable reality, but only a state of mind of the wise 
person that is without objects of cognition and beyond the application of speech or 
thought. The expressible ultimate truth is the wise person’s conceptual elaboration of 
this inexpressible ultimate truth or emptiness to be an object, which is then referred 
to by the modifier “in terms of the ultimate truth” in the proof of emptiness. The 
proof, as an instrument or a process, belongs to the true conventional truth, which is 
the sphere of practice to accumulate merit and wisdom. Through it, the wise person 
teaches the expressible ultimate truth to practitioners who reflect upon it and 
eventually, attain it. The false conventional truth refers to things in conventional 
knowledge, in which they are accepted as having an inherent existence. The proof is 
therefore set up to only operate in terms of the expressible ultimate truth and the two 
conventional truths, which are also conceptual and expressed through speech. By 
refuting the things that do not arise even conventionally, such as the absolute non-
existents and the permanent realities in the opponents’ doctrines, and the ultimate 
existence of the conventional existents, the proof fulfills its function to assist 
practitioners to understand the expressible ultimate truth. As a skilful means, along 
with meditation and general practices, it facilitates one’s spiritual progress to the 
realisation of the inexpressible ultimate truth.    
 
This seems to have solved the theoretical tension between emptiness itself and a 
proof of it, but the two inferences in the proof should also be free from logical 
fallacies to be established. In Chapter 3, I analysed them in terms of inferences for 
others. [1] The two inferences are the general result of the whole inferential process, 
consisting of all individual inferences regarding the ultimate emptiness of different 
conditioned and unconditioned things in both Buddhist and non-Buddhist doctrines, 
representing the expressible ultimate truth. In this regard, Bhāviveka requires the 
content and generality of the terms they use to be determined by the power of 
common agreement by all parties involved in the debate. Hence, things whose reality 
is ultimately to be refuted can also be taken up as the subjects of inference as long as 
they are thought of. Further, due to the use of non-implicative negation, individual 
inferences for the ultimate emptiness of individual conditioned things and the 
ultimate unreality of individual unconditioned things eliminate each other’s 
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dissimilar instances. The two inferences are established without negative example 
and the third characteristic of a reason, but only the first and the second 
characteristics. As conventional existence is not refuted in Bhāviveka’s system of the 
two truths, the modifier “in terms of the ultimate truth” is employed to indicate both 
inferences as the general result of the whole inferential process. Therefore, the proof 
can be accepted even by his opponents. 
 
However, I argue that [2] the two inferences are fallacious as standalone inferences 
and unable to prove the expressible ultimate truth due to the fallacy of the reason’s 
being too specific. As they take all things as the subjects, the property that infers of 
either inference is also the distinctive characteristic of the subject so that they apply 
to the same class of things. Since Dignāga requires all members of the subject to be 
excluded from the domain of positive instances, no positive example can be provided 
in either inference. As they lack both positive and negative examples, the second and 
the third characteristics of a reason are missing. Inference cannot take place with 
only the first characteristic. Bhāviveka has failed to combine inference with his 
doctrine of emptiness.  
 
The role of the proof reconsidered 
Although Bhāviveka fails to establish his inferences as [2] standalone inferences, it 
is still tenable to consider these inferences in terms of [1], i.e. the general result of 
the whole inferential process (Sections 3.2 to 3.4). This gives us an opportunity to 
reconsider the role of Bhāviveka’s proof of emptiness. As discussed in Chapter 2, the 
ultimate truth expressed in the theses of the two resultant inferences refers to the 
wise person’s experience of the inexpressible ultimate truth. The reason for 
presenting the teaching in the form of two inferences is to inspire and enable 
practitioners to ascend the staircase of the true conventional truth, i.e. to attain the 
expressible ultimate truth, through logical reasoning. Refusing this expressible 
ultimate truth would means the falsification of the teaching of the wise person, and 
even her experience, which is not intended by any Buddhist doctrine. Under [1], 
assuming that the individual inferences that add up to form the two resultant 
inferences in the proof are logically-established, the inferential process shown in 
Section 3.3.1 might nevertheless serve as an effective tool for the practitioners’ 
reflection on the emptiness of all things. As they keep analyzing, they might 
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gradually come to understand the ultimate emptiness of all individual conditioned 
things and unconditioned things. Also in the course of defending his proof (see Part 
II of this thesis), Bhaviveka has (he thinks) refuted various erroneous views 
concerning the emptiness and non-emptiness of things, and clarified his notions of 
the ultimate emptiness and the ultimate truth. This might in turn assist to dispel the 
doubts and misunderstandings of the practitioners on their path of spiritual progress. 
In this aspect, the proof of emptiness could be useful pedagogically.215 
 
Further, a charitable understanding of the proof in terms of [1] can be offered. While 
emptiness itself is not provable, the proof only aims to prove a conceptualized 
ultimate emptiness. The idea is that when the practitioners reach the conclusion of 
the inferential process, they also come to understand that there is nothing which is 
not empty or is real ultimately. In this sense, the proof might therefore be able to 
fulfill its function as a staircase, which leads practitioners to the right knowledge of 
the reality, i.e. the ultimate emptiness of all things. When this ultimate emptiness is 
also revealed as not exemplifiable to the practitioners under the fallacy of the reason 
being too specific, the proof that affirms this ultimate emptiness can then be 
abandoned. To put this alternatively, while the ultimate emptiness of all things is 
understood through conventional speech and thought, ultimately even this emptiness 
is revealed to be an erroneous view. It is exactly in this paradoxical sense that one is 
said to realise emptiness. 
 
Possible justifications for the proof 
While the reasons in [2] are fallacious in Dignāga’s system of logic, Bhāviveka’s 
inferences could be defended as follows.  
   
First, the theses of the two resultant inferences are respectively the summary of the 
conclusions of individually established inferences regarding the ultimate emptiness 
of different conditioned things and the ultimate unreality of different unconditioned 
things. As long as the conclusions of these individual inferences are admitted as 
established, it is reasonable to also take the theses of the resultant inferences as 
established. These resultant inferences, as discussed, fail to be established only due 

215 This takes us back to Candrakīrti’s criticism (Section 1.3) that such a teaching or conceptual tool 
only leads to a detour to the realization of the ultimate emptiness, which cannot be further examined 
here.  
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to the limitations of inference under Dignāga’s system – i.e. that the second and the 
third characteristic of a reason can only be established through examples.  
 
If the terms of an inference could be evaluated solely in terms of their logical 
relationship and without any existential implications, even when there are no 
positive and negative examples, these inferences would still be deemed valid 
arguments. For example, when they are interpreted in terms of western logic as: 
 
Premise 1: All conditioned things are arisen from conditions. (All p is q.) 
Premise 2: All that are arisen from conditions are empty of an inherent existence. 
(All q is r.) 
Conclusion: All conditioned things are empty of an inherent existence. (All p is r.) 
 
Or as: 
 
Premise 1: If things are conditioned things, then things are arisen from conditions. 
(If p, then q.)  
Premise 2: If things are arisen from conditions, then things are empty of an 
inherent existence. (If q, then r.) 
Premise 3: Things are conditioned things. (p) 
Conclusion: Things are empty of an inherent existence. (r)  
 
While it is insufficient to claim that Bhāviveka’s proof of emptiness is intended to be 
understood like these examples,216 Bhāviveka’s responses to the objections may be 
considered as maintaining the three characteristics of a reason interpreted as the 
logical relationships beween the property that infers with the subject, the similar and 
dissimilar instances. In discussing Objection 13, he maintains that all conditioned 
things are arisen from conditions by refuting Sāṃkhya’s doctrine that manifested 
things, which are conditioned things in his understanding, are pre-existent in their 
causes. Under several objections, he refutes the ultimate reality, i.e. non-emptiness, 
of particular conditioned things, e.g. eyes. By means of non-implicative negation, he 

216 Understanding inferences in terms of western logic, as inductive arguments or deductive 
arguments, is fairly common; see for example Vidyabhusana 1971, Chi 1984, Katsura 1983 and Hsu 
2013, p 122ff. The details and the problems of which are outside the scope of this thesis; for 
discussions, see, for example, Siderits 2003.  
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also negates all dissimilar instances, which would otherwise show that some 
members that are “arisen from conditions” are not “empty”. This may lend support 
to establish the inferences even when they take all conditioned things or all 
unconditioned things as subject. 
 
It may also be worth considering the developments Dharmakīrti. In his system of 
logic, the second characteristic of a reason is understood as the property that infers 
implying the property to be inferred. The relation of these two properties in the third 
characteristic is understood as contrapositive to that of the second characteristic.217 
The third characteristic, understood in relation to the proof of emptiness, i.e. 
“whatever is not empty of an inherent existence is not arisen from conditions”, is 
generally considered to be logically equivalent to the second characteristic, i.e. 
“whatever is arisen from conditions is empty of an inherent existence”. Also, it is not 
necessary to state the thesis. As it is the conclusion of an inference, it does not 
function to infer at all, and therefore can be excluded from the proof.218 As long as 
the reason possesses the first characteristic and the second or the third characteristic, 
the conclusion, which was once stated as the thesis, will be eventually reached. Thus, 
the two inferences in the proof of emptiness may be re-formulated as follows: 
 
First inference: 
(Thesis: In terms of the ultimate truth, all conditioned things are empty of an 
inherent existence.) 
Reason: Because all conditioned things are arisen from conditions; 
Positive example: whatever is arisen from conditions is empty of an inherent 
existence, like illusions. 
 
Second inference: 
(Thesis: In terms of the ultimate truth, all unconditioned things are unreal.) 
Reason: Because all unconditioned things do not arise; 
Positive example: whatever is not arisen is unreal, like a sky-flower. 
 

217 See Dunne 2004, pp. 28-30. The logical equivalence between the second and the third 
characteristics is disputed in Tillemans 1999, pp. 114-115, notes 41 and 42; see Tillemans’ solution 
discussed in relation Gelug-pa’s view on asādhāra9ānaikāntika-hetu in ibid., p. 115, note 42.   
218
 See ibid., pp. 71-77. 
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To ensure that the universal statements, which express the second or the third 
characteristic, are established, reasons such as svabhāva-hetu (lit. the essential 
property of the reason) are developed in Dharmakīrti’s system. When an inference is 
established by means of svabhāva-hetu, the essential property of the property that 
infers is taken up to be the property to be inferred; as this essential property pervades 
the property that infers, whenever there is the presence of the latter, there is also the 
presence of the former.219 In his later works, Dharmakīrti instead understands the 
property that infers as the essential property of the property to be inferred. This 
suggests that the property to be inferred and the property that infers may be 
commutable, as they are the essential property of each other in an inference.220 In 
Madhyamaka, emptiness is indeed a concept designated on things that are 
dependently-arisen. To Bhāviveka, being “arisen from conditions” is necessarily 
“empty of an inherent existence in the ultimate sense”, and being “non-arising” is 
necessarily “unreal”. His inferences may be established, with the reasons “because 
they arise from conditions” and “because they do not arise” being considered in 
terms of svabhāva-hetu under Dharmakīrti’s system.221  
 
As for the problem regarding the reason being too specific, which is discussed in 
relation to the inference of sound-audibility-[im]permanence, Ratnākaraśānti argues 
that there is no such a fallacy.222 The impermanence of sound is proved based on the 

219
 See the explanation of svabhāva-hetu in the second verse of the Svārthānumāna chapter of PV: An 
entity (bhāva) is evidence (hetu) for an essential property (svabhāva) that is causally dependent upon 
only [the entity’s] existence (bhāvamātrānurodhini). (Hayes 1987, p. 323) According to Hayes, this 
essential property is understood as the property to be inferred, while the entity is perhaps a property 
that determines a subclass of the class that is determined by the essential property. (Ibid.) See further 
discussions in Hayes 1987, Iwata 2003, Fukuda 2014. 
220 This is perhaps due to Dharmakīrti’s ontology that these two properties are arisen from the same 
cause; see discussion in Iwata 2003.
221
 This may be the reason why similar inferences are still employed in later Buddhist works; see, for 
example, verses 392-395 of TS, where all permanent things are inferred to be non-existent with the 
reason that they lack causal efficacy, which is understood in relation to momentariness below: 
(Thesis: Permanent things are non-existent.) 
Reason: Because permanent things cannot have any fruitful activity, either successively or 
simultaneously;   
Positive example: whatever things are devoid of momentariness can never have an existence, 
like permanent things, e.g. space; 
Negative example: whatever things are existent are all in a state of perpetual flux, like all 
created things. 
222 See Tillemans 1999, pp. 96-97. This is, however, rejected by the Gelug-pa. Although they also 
consider that there is no such a fallacy in the sound-audible-permanent inference, they hold that an 
example is necessary. While they do not exclude the subject from the similar instances, this inference 
is considered as a case, in which the property that infers being only present in the subject, which is the 
only similar instance. As the opponents of this inference cannot know this without a positive example, 
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internal concomitance (antarvyāpti) between audibility and impermanence, which is 
observed in the subject (“sound”) itself. Any example that is external to the subject is 
not needed. In an inference established by means of internal concomitance, the 
opponents’ view is taken up provisionally in one of the premises, while a conclusion 
that is undesirable to these opponents is derived. Therefore, such an inference can be 
considered as a form of reductio ad absurdum.223 This shows that, in establishing of 
an inference, the focus is rather put on the positive concomitance between the 
property that infers and the property to be inferred, but not on the role of examples 
that would relate to the issue of whether or not the subject is excluded from the 
similar instances. While the internal concomitance is usually employed in the proofs 
of momentariness (kAa9abhaHga), further discussion of its application in relation to 
the proof of emptiness is required.   
  
Although some of the above-mentioned issues concerning developments in logic 
after Dignāga are outside the scope of this thesis, they have provided possible 
justifications for the proof of emptiness, and may therefore support its establishment. 
These suggest that the proof may also be defensible in later logical systems.  
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the second characteristic of a reason is not established. Thus, there is instead the fallacy of the reason 
being indeterminate. (Ibid., pp. 92-100)       
223 See Kajiyama 1999, pp. 34-38. 
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PART II – TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY 
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The text of KR regarding the first inference for the ultimate emptiness of all 
conditioned things224 is arranged into three sections, consisting of fifteen objections 
to this inference and Bhāviveka’s responses. Objections 1 to 10 (Section A) is 
concerned with Bhāviveka’s use of logical reasoning to prove the ultimate emptiness 
of all conditioned things. He denies that his reasoning is fallacious because the 
ultimate emptiness of all conditioned things is not incompatible with their 
conventional existence. The thesis and reason, as conditioned things, are 
nevertheless able to fulfill their functions conventionally. In his response to 
Objections 11 to 15 (Section B), Bhāviveka further refutes various notions of other-
emptiness and non-emptiness, and clarifies that conditioned things are originally 
empty of inherent existence or inherent nature. The inference, which lacks an 
inherent existence, cannot destroy the inherent existence of conditioned things, but 
can only function to explicate the lack of inherent existence in these things in a 
conventional sense. Section C is the conclusion.       
 
A. Proving the ultimate emptiness of all conditioned things does not present any 
problem to the thesis or the reason in the inference  
The inference to establish the ultimate emptiness of all conditioned things 
immediately conflicts with the common conception of these things. To some, the 
ultimate existence of these things is directly confirmed by our sense faculties, such 
as matter is known when it is perceived by our eyes, sound is known when it is heard 
by our ears, and so on. Since the objects of cognition exist, eyes and other sense 
faculties that cognise these objects, as well as the perception and other kinds of 
cognition through which these objects are known, should also be existent. Therefore, 
objects of cognition, sense faculties and cognitions have to be taken to exist or be 
real ultimately so as to guarantee the validity of the everyday knowledge. In KR, 
Bhāviveka often refers to the holders of this commonsensical notion of the ultimate 
existence of things as ordinary people such as cowherds and fools.  
 
The ultimate emptiness of all conditioned things also conflicts with the doctrines of 
other non-Buddhist opponents in KR, who take a realist stand for the ultimate 
existence of conditioned things. For example, the logicians generally hold that the 

224 See Section 1.3 in Part I for the discussion on how the inference is considered an inference for 
others. 
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subject in an inference must be a real existent. In Nyāya, whatever is knowable or 
expressible is taken as existent ultimately, and vice versa; as the ultimate existents 
are known as determinate objects of cognition, the knowledge of them is also true 
ultimately. The Sāṃkhyas, who hold that things presently perceived and manifested 
are inhered in by the existence of all other things, and therefore nothing is empty. 
The opponents may further include the general Ābhidharmikas, who take categories 
of conditioned things as the building blocks of the universe. The Sarvāstivādins in 
particular hold that conditioned things have a substantial existence in the three 
dimensions of time.  
 
In KR, Bhāviveka refers to the holders of the above commonsensical notion of 
existence and the Buddhist and non-Buddhist opponents collectively as the 
proponents of non-emptiness. To them, conditioned things must not be empty. To 
exist is to exist substantially or ultimately, and being empty amounts to being non-
existent absolutely, like a sky-flower or a hare’s horn. Their epistemology is 
therefore realist, with the subjects, objects, causes and results of cognitions being 
ultimately real. 
 
In this Section, the proponents of non-emptiness attack Bhāviveka’s inference by 
claiming that its thesis and reason are fallacious. They object on four grounds: first, 
the thesis is against conventional knowledge (Objection 1); second, conditioned 
things which do not exist ultimately should not be taken as the subject of the 
inference (Objection 2); third, conditioned things cannot be “arisen from conditions” 
while at the same time be “empty of an inherent existence” (Objections 3 to 9); 
fourth, the reason is not commonly recognised because the property that infers is 
understood differently in different doctrines (Objection 10).      
 
A.1 The thesis regarding the ultimate emptiness of conditioned things does not 
contradict direct perception, common knowledge, or Bhāviveka’s own doctrine, 
nor is it self-contradictory    
The proponents of non-emptiness object as follows: 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269a13-a18) 
115 

[Objection 1:] To this [inference], all proponents of non-
emptiness make the objection, “if all conditioned things are 
established as empty, then there would be no matter (rūpa), 
etc. Just like it is unreasonable that the knowledge from direct 
perception could arise from cognising a hare’s horn, the direct 
perceptions of other objects of cognition similar to matter 
should not arise either. However, the reality of [matter and 
similar objects] is directly known by everyone. Therefore, 
[what is stated by] your thesis has violated the nature of things. 
Your thesis thus has committed the fallacies of contradicting 
our direct perception (pratyakAa-viruddha)225 and of 
contradicting common knowledge (loka-viruddha).226 This is 
because it has denied the substantial existence of eyes, etc., 
which are generally recognised by the cowherds and 
others.”227  
 
The proponents of non-emptiness hold that if conditioned things are empty of 
inherent existence, then they will be non-existent absolutely. The same applies to 
matter; the direct perception of it and other kinds of objects of perception will be 
impossible. This amounts to also denying the existence of eyes and other sense 
organs. But the ultimate existence of conditioned things is affirmed by direct 
perception and well-established in common knowledge. It is therefore absurd to the 
proponents of non-emptiness that these things are empty, like a hare’s horn which 
does not exist in reality, yet still known through perception. For this reason, they 

225 The fallacy of contradicting direct perception (pratyakAa-viruddha) is a fallacy committed by the 
thesis of an inference. It is committed when the property to be inferred, or what is implied by this 
property, in relation to the subject is not compatible with what is known by direct perception. NP 
gives the example “sound is inaudible” to illustrate this fallacy. (CBETA, T32, no. 1630, 11b28; 
Section 3.1 [1] in Tachikawa 1971, pp. 122, 141) It has contradicted direct perception because sound 
is audible with audio perception.  
226 The fallacy of contradicting common knowledge (loka-viruddha) is a fallacy committed by the 
thesis of an inference. It is committed when the property to be inferred, or what is implied by this 
property, in relation to the subject is not compatible with what is known in common knowledge. NP 
gives the example of “a human skull is pure” (CBETA, T32, no. 1630, 11c1; Section 3.4 in 
Tachikawa 1971, pp. 122, 141). It contradicts common knowledge because a human skull is generally 
considered impure.   
227 KR: ab`qÞA^ß°Ö+À'`q^Ü9Vàá18@
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regard Bhāviveka’s thesis “conditioned things are empty” as contradictory to the 
existent nature of things.        
      
However, the inherent existence of conventional existents (including the subjects, 
objects, causes and results of any valid cognition) is admitted under the false 
conventional truth. Bhāviveka’s inference only aims to prove the emptiness of them 
in terms of the expressible ultimate truth. Their inherent existence is the objects that 
the inference intends to refute, but not themselves per se, or the direct perception and 
common knowledge of them. Objects like a hare’s horn are merely false 
conventionalities, which are non-existent even conventionally and only falsely 
perceived (see Section 2.3.2 in Part I).  
 
The dispute at issue is the incompatibility between the ultimate emptiness of 
conditioned things and the conventional knowledge of them, which arises from the 
proponents of non-emptiness’s misunderstandings of the implications of emptiness 
in relation to existence and non-existence.228 Bhāviveka’s response to this objection 
is in twofold: [1] on direct perception and [2] on common knowledge. In the 
response below the incompatibility is analysed and clarified, in Bhāviveka’s term, by 
the wisdom of the middle, understood as the middle way, in terms of his system of 
the two truths:  
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269a18-a29) 
[Response:] The wise persons should now eliminate the 
poison, i.e. the attachment to one’s own sect, and abide in the 
wisdom of the middle229. Together we should consider [1] 
whether the thesis I stated contradicts the direct perception 

228 The issue of whether a conditioned thing, which is arisen from conditions, should necessarily be 
taken as an ultimate existent will be discussed in Objections 2 and 3. The issue of whether this 
conditioned thing, which is empty of inherent existence, is necessarily causally inefficacious will be 
discussed in Objection 4. 
229 “Middle” (“b”) (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269a19) is understood as “impartial”, while it is 
translated to describe the wise person in Poussin 1933, p. 75. Taking Poussin’s translation into 
consideration, apart from referring to “the wisdom of the middle way”, “the wisdom of the middle” 
may also refer to “the wisdom of impartiality”.   
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arisen from the mind-streams of ourselves (sva-sa>tāna) or of 
the others (para-sa>tāna)?230  
 
Regarding [1], suppose that the ultimate emptiness of conditioned things is 
incompatible with perceptual knowledge. There are only three possibilities: [1a] it 
has contradicted one’s own perception, [1b] it has contradicted others’ perception 
and [1c] it has contradicted the perception of the fools (see below). In terms of the 
expressible ultimate truth, Bhāviveka denies [1a], and in terms of the false 
conventional truth, he denies [1b] and [1c]. Bhāviveka’s denial of [1a] is as follows:   
 
[1a] If it is said that [my thesis] contradicts the direct 
perception arisen from the mind-streams of ourselves; [we 
respond that] direct perceptions are all empty of inherent 
existence in terms of the ultimate truth, because they arise 
from conditions, just like the direct perceptions in dreams are 
not real direct perceptions. For this reason, my thesis does not 
even contradict the direct perception arisen from the mind-
streams of ourselves.231  
 
Here, the direct perception of the proponents of the thesis, i.e. Bhāviveka, the wise 
persons and anyone who agree with his reasoning is referred to. In terms of the 
expressible ultimate truth, Bhāviveka denies that his thesis “in terms of the ultimate 
truth, conditioned things are empty” has contradicted his own perception. It is 
because he also perceives in terms of the same truth. His direct perception is 
consistent with what is stated in his thesis.  
 
What does it mean for direct perception to be empty in the ultimate sense? As a 
determinate cognition, direct perception cognises conditioned things as independent 
existents as if they have a determinate inherent nature. But as their existence depends 
on conditions, e.g. the presence of a perceiver, ultimately, they lack the independent 
existence or determinate inherent nature which they seemed to have on the 

230 KR: ;@Aç}èéêëìíb>ª6\îF'~çghe:ïbF1
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18ð 
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conventional level. Such direct perception should therefore have nothing to cognise 
in the ultimate sense. It ceases to be a determinate perception. Thus, conditioned 
things perceived by direct perception on the conventional level are not perceived as 
such on the ultimate level; like an illusion that was produced due to causes and 
conditions and perceived as if it was a real existent is no longer perceived as such 
after it is realised to be illusory. As both direct perception and its objects belong to 
the classes of “conditioned things” and “arisen from conditions”, they are proved to 
be empty by Bhāviveka’s proof.  
 
Bhāviveka gives an inference to illustrate the ultimate emptiness of direct perception: 
 
Thesis: In terms of the ultimate truth, direct perceptions are all empty of 
inherent existence [i.e. not real], 
Reason: because they arise from conditions,  
Positive Example: like the direct perceptions in dreams. 
 
Direct perceptions in dreams, which take past or imaginary events as objects, are 
arisen from conditions. Although we do perceive objects in dreams, it is commonly 
agreed that dream perceptions are not real perceptions even in the conventional sense. 
This is because objects perceived in dreams do not exist as such in reality, or will no 
longer be perceived after the dreamer has woken up. In this way, direct perceptions 
in dreams are empty, in the sense of being not real, in the ultimate sense. As the 
direct perception in the objection is also arisen from conditions, they should also be 
empty and not real in the ultimate sense.  
 
To demonstrate that the ultimate emptiness of direct perception does not contradict 
people’s direct perception in their conventional experience, Bhāviveka moves on to 
deny [1b]:  
 
[1b] If it is said that [my thesis] contradicts the direct 
perception arisen from the mind-streams of the others; [we 
respond that] it should be reasonable that the many unreal 
hairs, flies, moons, etc., which are seen by people with eye 
floaters (taimirika), and which are not manifested in people 
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with clear eyes, are false appearances that have contradicted 
the direct perception.232 Therefore, neither does my thesis 
contradict the direct perception arisen from the mind-streams 
of the others.233 
 
Here, the direct perception of people other than Bhāviveka and anyone who agrees 
with his reasoning is referred to. With clear, healthy eyes, these people perceive the 
conditioned things and take them to have an inherent existence. The unreal things 
falsely perceived by people with eye floaters are the merely false conventionalities; 
as they contradict the direct perceptions of the people with healthy eyes, they are not 
considered to be real even on the conventional level. To Bhāviveka, the everyday 
truth of the people with healthy eyes - namely, that conditioned things are real 
existents - is the false conventional truth in his system of the two truths. He therefore 
also denies the reality of the unreal things conventionally. Thus, both his thesis and 
others’ direct perception deny the false perception of unreal things. In this way, he 
clarifies that his thesis on the ultimate emptiness of conditioned things does not 
contradict the direct perception of these people.234  
 

232 Hsu 2013, p. 179 understands this clause as “the extra appearances perceived by the one who has 
impure eyes, an unreal hair, fly, a moon perceived by the one who has a eye-disease…” (“(õtA
0Uöt÷øAFsù=ú=ûV…”) (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269a25-a26), which 
may be deemed problematic. Notwithstanding the differences in punctuation, the translation of “ö” 
to “extra appearances” is questionable because “ö” is usually used as an adjective meaning 
“many”, but seldom as a pronoun referring to “appearances”.  
233 KR: À°ghñ:ïbF18(õtA0Uöt÷øAFsù=ú=ûV
./1gh18ª­~Lghñ:ïbF18 
234 Alternatively, the text can be read as: “the unreal things, which are seen by people with eye 
floaters but not by people with clear eyes, are false appearances that have contradicted direct 
perception and should be corrected by reasoning.” The implication is that in terms of the expressible 
ultimate truth, Bhāviveka takes others’ direct perception, which is believed to be able to see ultimate 
existents by ordinary people, to be like the false perception, which sees unreal things as real, and 
holds that they both should be corrected.  
 This can be understood with an analogy in KR, where Bhāviveka compares the perception of 
people having eye floaters with erroneous views, and eye medication with the unperverted 
discernment of things that is facilitated by logical reasoning. (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 268b14-b16; 
see discussion under Section 2.3.3 in Part I) In this analogy, erroneous views are generated due to 
people not realising their false conceptions of things, regardless of whether they are based on false 
perception or direct perception. Hence, Bhāviveka likens the wise persons who understand the 
ultimate emptiness of conditioned things to people having clear eyes, and the ultimate existence of 
these things to the unreal things falsely perceived as real. Like the unreal things, the ultimate 
existence of these things is denied. Therefore, the direct perception that sees things as ultimate 
existents, just like the erroneous views and false perception, contradicts the direct perception that 
should only see things as dependently-arisen things. In terms of the expressible ultimate truth, the 
latter is the right nature of direct perception; the former is erroneous and should be corrected by 
reasoning, i.e. by Bhāviveka’s inference.   
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Bhāviveka’s denial of [1c] is as follows: 
 
[1c] If it generally refers to the direct perceptions produced in 
the conventional [world] by the fools and others, then they are 
not negated here because they exist conventionally and must 
not be contradicted.235   
 
Here, the perceptions of everyone, including those in [1a] and [1b], are referred to. 
This kind of perception, and the conditioned things it cognises, are recognised by 
everyone and are admitted by Bhāviveka under the false conventional truth. As 
Bhāviveka only argues for their emptiness in terms of the ultimate truth, he denies 
that his thesis has contradicted everyone’s direct perception.     
 
Bhāviveka continues to analyse the contradictions that the thesis “in terms of the 
ultimate truth, conditioned things are empty” may have with common knowledge in 
[2]. Supposing what is stated by this thesis is incompatible with common knowledge, 
there are only three possibilities: [2a] it has contradicted its proponents’ own 
knowledge, [2b] it has contradicted others’ common knowledge and [2c] it has 
contradicted the common knowledge of the cowherds. Bhāviveka denies all these 
charges. 
 
The denial of [2a] is as follows: 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269b1-b11) 
[2] If it is said that [my thesis] has committed the fallacy of 
contradicting common knowledge, then this is not true either. 
[2a] If it is said that [my thesis] contradicts the common 
knowledge of my own doctrine, then this is not reasonable 
because [this thesis] is allowed by our doctrine. Had our own 
doctrine been contradicted, then there would be the fallacy of 

235 KR: À:YüýV`q)*F18a)*fgh 
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contradicting one’s own thesis (svapratijñā-virodha)236 rather 
than the fallacy of contradicting common knowledge.237    
 
Bhāviveka denies that what he has stated in the thesis has contradicted the common 
knowledge in his own doctrine because his thesis is stated in accordance with the 
Mādhyamika doctrine, i.e. this common knowledge.238 Thus, the question would 
rather be whether his thesis has (i.) committed the fallacy of contradicting his own 
doctrine (āgama-viruddha),239 or even (ii.) is self-contradictory.  
 
To contradict one’s own doctrine is to propose a thesis that affirms or implies 
something contradictory to what is held by this doctrine. If Bhāviveka had proposed 
a thesis which states that “in terms of the ultimate truth, some conditioned things are 
not empty of an inherent existence” or “conditioned things do not exist even 
conventionally”, then this thesis, which affirms the ultimate existence or absolute 
non-existence of conditioned things, would contradict his own doctrine. But he only 
states that all conditioned things are empty in terms of the ultimate truth, without 
denying their inherent existence in the conventional sense. As he considers this the 
middle way, i.e. the rationale of his doctrine (see Chapter 2), if his thesis had 
contradicted his doctrine, he takes that it would also have contradicted itself.         
 

236 Poussin 1933, p. 76 suggests the Sanskrit equivalent “svapratijñā-virodha” for “ge~” 
(“contradicting one’s own thesis”). This fallacy is committed by the thesis of an inference when the 
property to be inferred, or what is implied by this property, is contradictory to the subject, or what is 
implied by the subject. Hence, the thesis is self-contradictory (svavacana-viruddha). NP gives the 
example “my mother is a barren woman” (CBETA, T32, no. 1630, 11c3; Section 3.1 [5] in 
Tachikawa 1971, pp. 122, 141) to illustrate this. If a woman is barren, then she would not be able to 
give birth and become a mother; if she is a mother, then she would not be barren.  
237 KR: °gh6«¤¼aLiÀ°gheÞ6«ª­eÞdgeÞ
ge~(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238 This may be disputed by Candrakīrti who holds that the ultimate truth is non-conceptual and 
ineffable. Emptiness, in order not to be mistaken as an inherent nature of things, should also 
ultimately be empty and ineffable. It is therefore erroneous, Candrakīrti might argue, for Bhāviveka to 
conceptualise on emptiness and affirm it in his thesis. Bhāviveka indeed considers his inference and 
what is stated in its thesis as conditioned things. They are also empty in the ultimate sense, and this is 
allowed by the Mādhyamika doctrine. See discussion in Objection 8 for the problem of reflexivity of 
the thesis. The dispute between Candrakīrti and Bhāviveka on the understanding of the two truths in 
Madhyamaka, however, is outside the scope of the present discussion.  
239 The fallacy of contradicting one’s own doctrine (āgama-viruddha) is a fallacy committed by the 
thesis of an inference. It is committed when the property to be inferred, or what is implied by this 
property, in relation to the subject is not compatible with what is stated or implied by the doctrine of 
the proponent of this thesis. NP gives the example of a Vaiśeṣika who has proposed a thesis “sound is 
permanent” (CBETA, T32, no. 1630, 11b29; Section 3.1 [3] in Tachikawa 1971, pp. 122, 141), as 
sound is impermanent in her doctrine.   
122 

Bhāviveka then goes on to deny [2b]: 
 
[2b] If it is said that [my thesis] contradicts the common 
knowledge of other doctrines, then this is not reasonable 
because all doctrines are developed to refute what is 
commonly known by others.240 
 
Bhāviveka denies that it is fallacies for his thesis to contradict the proponents of non-
emptiness’s doctrines. Different schools hold different doctrines on the ultimate 
reality of things; Bhāviveka holds that all conditioned things are empty in the 
ultimate sense, while his opponents – for example, the logicians – hold that these 
things are existent ultimately. In a debate, the parties involved are not allowed to 
propose a thesis which is mutually agreed; to begin with: they are required to debate 
on what they do not agree. If Bhāviveka had proposed a thesis in which the property 
to be inferred in relation to the subject was already agreed by the logicians, i.e. such 
a relation is already well-established (prasiddha-sa>bandha), he would have 
committed the fallacy of establishing what has already been established.241 For this 
reason, Bhāviveka responds that he means to propose the thesis regarding the 
ultimate emptiness of all conditioned things, which is allowed by his own doctrine, 
to refute other doctrines on the ultimate existence of these things, which is the 
common knowledge of his opponents. This should not lead to the fallacy of 
contradicting common knowledge in a debate.   
 
Bhāviveka moves on to deny [2c]:     
 
[2c] If it is said that [my thesis] contradicts the common 
knowledge of the cowherds and others, then this is not 
reasonable. The disciples of the Buddha hold that all 
compounded phenomena (sa>skāra) cease within a moment, 
all things have no self, and there are no sentient beings (sattva) 

240 KR: À°ghñÞ6«Lª`qÞþ^}ñ6« 
241 NP gives the example “sound is audible” (CBETA, T32, no. 1630, 11c7; Section 3.1 [9] in 
Tachikawa 1971, pp. 122-123, 141) to illustrate this fallacy because the fact that sound is audible is 
well-established so that it does not require further inference to establish it.  
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either.242 The Vaiśeṣikas claim, “in reality, various [qualities 
such as] colour (rūpa) and others are possessed by various 
substances (dravya) and others.”243 The Sāṃkhyas claim, “the 
intellect (buddhi) itself is not the pure consciousness 
(cetanā),244 and things exist regardless of whether they have 
already destructed or are yet to exist.”245 These kinds [of 
proponents] explicate at length their own theses. All their 
reasonings should be explained to be contradicting common 
knowledge; however this is not accepted. For they examine 
things in terms of the ultimate truth with these reasonings, 
they are not concerned with the common knowledge of the 
cowherds or others.246 
 
Bhāviveka does not dispute the conventional existence of what is known in common 
knowledge because it is recognised by ordinary people. His thesis, which is stated in 
terms of the ultimate truth, is only concerned with the ultimate state of conditioned 
things. If the proponents of non-emptiness claim that the ultimate emptiness of these 
things has contradicted their conventional existence known in common knowledge, 
then their claim is not applicable to Bhāviveka’s thesis.  
 

242 The textual source of this sentence about the doctrine of the disciples of the Buddha is not found at 
the moment. However, it seems probable that “all compounded phenomena cease within a moment,” 
“all things have no self” and “there are no sentient beings” can be respectively understood in relation 
to the three Dharma Seals, i.e. all things are impermanent, all things are no-self, and nirvana is 
tranquil. 
243 The meaning and translation of this sentence “	9V	V” in the text (CBETA, T30, no. 
1578, 269b7) are uncertain. Poussin 1933, p. 76 translates it as “les rūpas etc., sont des espèces de 
dravya; les dravyas, etc., sont des espèces de bhāva.” Although substance (dravya), being inhered in 
by the universal “existence” (bhāva) might be understood as a species of it, colours (rūpas), as 
qualities possessed by substance, cannot be understood as a species of substance. Sastri 1949, p. 41 
reconstructs it as “dravyabhinno rūpādiG bhāvabhedo dravyādiriti”. The present translation is with 
reference to Potter 1977, p. 86; cf. Hatani 1976, p. 104 and Hsu 2013, p. 180.  
244 In Sāṃkhya, everything in the universe is transformed or manifested by two substances, namely 
puruAa and prak.ti. PuruAa is the pure consciousness, while prak.ti is completely material. As puruAa 
wishes to see the three constituents in prak.ti, prak.ti transforms into intellect and all other things in 
the universe under puruAa’s desire. See further details under Objection 13.   
245
This will be discussed in details in relation to the Sāṃkhya doctrine on the pre-existence of effects 
in their causes in Objection 13.
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In comparison, if the Buddhist or non-Buddhist doctrines mentioned in Bhāviveka’s 
response were established as conventional truths, then they would have also 
contradicted some aspects of common knowledge. For example, the Buddhist 
doctrine of momentariness would have contradicted the common knowledge that the 
same things can exist for a long period of time; the doctrine of no-self would have 
contradicted the common knowledge about sentient beings having a permanent soul; 
the doctrine of nirvana would have contradicted the common knowledge concerning 
the rebirth of sentient things. Vaiśeṣikas’ doctrine of substance and quality would 
have contradicted the perception of ordinary people that can only affirm the 
existence of gross objects in terms of their qualities such as colour and others; the 
existence of substances, which constitutes the gross objects and possess these 
qualities, are not recognised in common knowledge. Sāṃkhyas’ doctrine of the pure 
consciousness: that it causes prak.ti to transform into the intellect, but is completely 
different from this intellect, is inconceivable in common knowledge; their doctrine 
on effects already existing in their causes before they arise would have also 
contradicted the common knowledge that things are not existent before they arise.  
 
On the other hand, if these Buddhist and non-Buddhist doctrines are also to deal with 
the ultimate reality, then they are actually standing on the same ground as 
Bhāviveka’s Mādhyamika doctrine of emptiness. They are also describing 
conditioned things from the point of view of the ultimate truth. If the proponents of 
non-emptiness’s criticism were legitimate, it would then be equally applicable to 
their own doctrines. Theses proposed under their doctrines would have also 
committed the fallacy of contradicting common knowledge. However, admitting that 
their doctrines are concerned with the conventional world is not a choice, because 
they would have to admit the contradictions their theses have with common 
knowledge, as pointed out above.  
 
To conclude, Bhāviveka states that his thesis cannot have committed the fallacy of 
contradicting direct perception or common knowledge because of his employment of 
a modifier, “in terms of the ultimate truth”:  
     
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269b12) 
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And the thesis is stated with the application of the modifier 
“[in terms of] the ultimate truth”. So there is absolutely no 
way to attribute to it the said contradictions. For this reason, 
neither has it committed the fallacy of contradicting one’s own 
thesis.247  
 
See discussion in Section 3.4 in Part I.   
 
A.2 Although conditioned things are empty of an inherent existence ultimately, 
it is not fallacious for them to be taken up as the subject of an inference 
Under Objection 1, Bhāviveka has clarified the misunderstanding of the proponents 
of non-emptiness that the ultimate emptiness of conditioned things means the 
absolute non-existence of objects of cognition even in the conventional sense. In 
Objection 2, these proponents of non-emptiness aim further to establish that things 
which have arisen from conditions are necessarily ultimate existents. To do this, they 
attribute logical fallacies to the subject of Bhāviveka’s thesis, which will also be 
revealed to be empty should his inference be established.  
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269b13-b14) 
[Objection 2:] Again, the other [opponents] say, “[as] the 
proponents of the emptiness of inherent existence [hold that] 
the eye and other sense faculties are empty in terms of the 
ultimate truth, their thesis has then committed the fallacy of its 
subject being unestablished248 and their reason has committed 
the fallacy of its support [i.e. the subject of the thesis] being 
unestablished (āśraya-asiddha).249”250 

247 KR: '~b$%&5F'fYghBaLge~¤ 
248 The fallacy of its subject being unestablished is committed in the thesis when the subject of an 
inference is not admitted to exist by either party in the debate. NP calls this fallacy “that which is 
qualified being unestablished” (“F5§” [aprasiddha-viśeAya]) and gives the example of “a 
Sāṃkhya telling a Buddhist that puruAa is the pure consciousness” (CBETA, T32, no. 1630, 11c4-c5; 
Section 3.1 [7] in Tachikawa 1971, pp. 122, 141) because Buddhists generally do not admit the 
existence of puruAa.   
249 The fallacy of the support being unestablished (āśraya-asiddha) is committed in the reason when 
the locus of the property that infers, i.e. the subject of the inference, is not admitted to exist. NP gives 
the example of “a person giving the reason ‘because space is a substratum of qualities’ to prove the 
reality of space to another person who denies the reality of space.” (CBETA, T32, no. 1630, 11c16; 
Section 3.2.1 [4] in Tachikawa 1971, pp. 123, 141-142) The fallacy is committed because space is not 
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As conditioned things, such as eyes and other sense faculties, are empty in the 
ultimate sense, the subject “conditioned things” of the inference, as a universal that 
is conceptualised based on the direct perception of conditioned things, should also be 
empty in the same sense. To be empty means to be non-existent absolutely therefore 
the proponents of non-emptiness, Bhāviveka’s opponents, counter-argue that this 
subject should become non-existent even conventionally and unestablished. The 
property that infers, i.e. “arisen from conditions”, which takes this subject as locus 
therefore loses its support and also becomes unestablished. Hence, if all conditioned 
things were proved to be empty ultimately, the subject would be non-existent 
absolutely, with both the thesis and the reason unestablished.  
 
The opponents go further in this objection in the sense that they hold that the subject 
of an inference should be established and real in an ultimate sense for the thesis to be 
provable. If it is empty and thus unestablished in this sense, then the inference 
cannot have the ability to establish the thesis that it is supposed to have. While 
Bhāviveka can otherwise accept the ultimate reality of the subject for his thesis to be 
proved, his thesis for the ultimate emptiness of all conditioned things would then be 
contradicted. This is because the subject, which is a conditioned thing, is not empty 
ultimately.251 Bhāviveka’s inference is unestablished, regardless of whether the 
subject is empty in the ultimate sense or not. 
 
The dilemma here leads one to question (1) whether the subject of a thesis, or even 
all terms in an inference, must necessarily be an ultimate existent for an inference to 
be established; (2) if not, whether such an inference, which consists of merely 
conventionally-established terms, i.e. terms that are empty of an inherent existence 
in the ultimate sense, can function like an inference, which consists of all ultimately 
real terms that the opponents have in mind. In other words, the dilemma raises the 

admitted to exist by the other person, and thus cannot be the locus for the property that infers, i.e. “a 
substratum of qualities”.  
250 KR: µÁ°Ö+ÞA#$%&tVíÜ§~¤LFÑ§
¤, 
251 This can also be understood to be an epistemological issue: if sense faculties are empty in the 
ultimate sense, then, to these opponents, there would be no way to know whether they are empty in 
the same sense. But if these sense faculties are excluded from the subject, then at least they are not 
empty in the same sense. This then contradicts the thesis which states that all conditioned things are 
empty in this sense.  
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question of whether such a conventionally-established inference also has the efficacy 
to prove the ultimate emptiness of things; further, whether an inference, which is 
empty in the ultimate sense, can prove the ultimate emptiness of itself. Bhāviveka 
did not give a straightforward answer to question (2). However, the problem 
regarding the compatibility between the efficacy of an inference and conventional 
existence is indeed discussed in Objection 4, and the reflexivity of the inference in 
Objection 8. Regarding question (1), Bhāviveka responds as follows: 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269b15-b17) 
[Response:] This is not reasonable. The well-established eyes, 
etc. in general, which are commonly recognised by the 
cowherds and others, are taken as the subject of our thesis; 
that is to say, our reason is stated in regards to those [well-
established eyes, etc.] Therefore, this [case merely] appears to 
have the fallacies of the subject being unestablished in the 
thesis and of the support being unestablished in the reason.252 
 
Bhāviveka holds that an inference can also be set up with merely conventionally-
established terms. This is because eyes and other sense faculties, which are taken as 
the subject of the thesis and the support of the reason, are well-established in 
common knowledge. This can be understood from the requirement for the setting up 
of an inference for others: it is not about whether the terms or the referents of the 
terms are ultimately real, but whether all parties in the debate agree upon the same 
concept of the terms used in the thesis, reason and example of an inference (see 
Section 3.2 in Part I). For this reason, Bhāviveka’s inference is set up on a 
conventional level, where conventional existence is not disputed. To Bhāviveka, 
sense faculties are conditioned things, which are arisen from conditions and also 
have an inherent existence according to direct perception and common knowledge. 
As long as this is recognised by the opponents, Bhāviveka’s thesis and reason are 
neither fallacious nor unestablished. As the opponents do not merely require 
conditioned things to be existent conventionally, but also existent ultimately, the 
property to be inferred in relation to the sense faculties in Bhāviveka’s inference, i.e. 

252 KR: aªÄÅÆV6FÇ«§tV~ÊYUa!§
~¤L!FÑ§¤
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“empty”, is not well-established. The issue of whether all conditioned things are 
empty in the ultimate sense has then become the issue to debate.  
 
A.3 The property that infers, i.e. “arisen from conditions” does not contradict 
the property to be inferred, i.e. “empty” 
Bhāviveka’s response to Objection 2 thus anticipates Objection 3 in which the 
opponents, being the logicians this time, reveal the underlying reason why they 
consider conditioned things to be ultimately existent. They object as follows: 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269b18-269b21) 
[Objection 3:] There are some unskilful logicians who make 
the following objection, “if [you say that] ‘in terms of the 
ultimate truth, eyes, etc. are all empty, because they arise from 
conditions’; since eyes, etc. are ‘empty’, why are they said to 
be ‘arisen from conditions’? If they have ‘arisen from 
conditions’, then why are they said to be ‘empty of substantial 
existence’? As there is also a contradiction between the thesis 
and the reason, [the reason] therefore has the fault of 
contradicting the thesis (pratijñā-virodha).253”254 
 
The logicians hold that a thing being arisen from conditions, i.e. being conditioned, 
entails that it is also existent ultimately, i.e. not empty. As the property that infers 
(“arisen from conditions”) should instead prove the non-emptiness of things, it has 
contradicted the property to be inferred (“empty”). Thus, Bhāviveka fails to prove 
his thesis. 
 

253 The reason being contradictory to the thesis (pratijñā-virodha) is a point of defeat (nigrahasthāna) 
in Nyāya. (Vidyabhusana 1971, p. 85) Any party in the debate which has committed to a point of 
defeat is considered having lost the debate. (Ibid., p. 84) It is concerned with the fallacy regarding 
contradictory reasons (viruddha-hetu) in NP, in which it is called the fallacy of inferring the opposite 
of the property to be inferred (dharma-svarūpa-viparīta-sadhāna). NP gives the example of “proving 
‘sound is permanent’ with the reason ‘because it is produced’” to illustrate this. The property that 
infers, i.e. “produced”, is only possessed by the dissimilar instances, i.e. things that are impermanent, 
but not by any similar instances, i.e. things that are permanent. The reason is fallacious because it has 
instead proved the impermanence of sound. (CBETA, T32, no. 1630, 12a17-a19; Section 3.2.3 [1] in 
Tachikawa 1971, pp. 125, 142)  
254 KR: ;ÞAß°Ö+À#tV^tV
ðÀAð~=´:gÜ§-~:g¤¼, 
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With this objection, it is worth further considering, based on the definition of a 
conditioned thing as “that which has arisen from causes and conditions”, whether the 
concept of a “conditioned thing” also entails that any such thing is empty ultimately, 
existent ultimately, or non-existent absolutely. First, being a conditioned thing does 
not entail that it is empty ultimately. All parties in the debate agree that “emptiness” 
is the property to be inferred, while Bhāviveka’s opponents usually take conditioned 
things as either existent ultimately or non-existent absolutely. Then, although these 
opponents seem to affirm the ultimate existence of conditioned things, they do grant 
some exceptions, for example an illusion. From this, it follows that there must be a 
more basic criterion for them to determine whether a conditioned thing is ultimately 
existent or not, such as whether it has causal efficacy, whether it is inhered in by 
certain substances or universals, etc., which is not addressed in their objection. Thus, 
being conditioned does not entail ultimate existence either. And while these 
opponents generally do not consider conditioned things as non-existent absolutely, it 
is also questionable as to whether they will take conditioned things such as illusions 
as absolutely non-existent in a straightforward manner, without considering other 
criteria such as those in the case of ultimate existence. In this light, the opponents’ 
association of a conditioned thing with either ultimate existence or absolute 
existence shows that they have surreptitiously introduced additional concepts to the 
terms or additional premises into the argument in their objection. This may indeed 
constitute a point of defeat called shifting the reason (hetvantara) in classical Indian 
logic: when the property that infers, i.e. “arisen from conditions”, has failed to 
establish the ultimate existence or absolute non-existence of the conditioned things, 
the opponents add a specific character to this property, such as “being causally 
efficacious or not”, “being inhered by certain substances or universals or not” – and 
thereby lose the debate.255 This remains a recurring issue in the following objections.  
 
In his response to Objection 3, Bhāviveka does not directly deny the accusation of 
the logicians. But by explaining his own understanding of the circumstance that 
constitutes the illegitimacy of a reason, he clarifies that he did not commit the said 
fault. Since both the reason and the example are well-established, his inference is 
established. His response is as follows: 
 

255 See Vidyabhusana 1971, p. 86. 
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(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269b21-b27) 
[Response:] [Although] this [objection] seems to arrogate 
faults to the thesis we stated, [the following] example shows 
that the fallacy of the reason being without any positive 
example or being unestablished [is what actually constitutes 
the fallacy of contradicting the thesis]. For example it is said 
that “sound is permanent, because all things are impermanent”; 
as this example shows [that “sound”] is not [included in] “all 
things”, this unintelligible reason has committed the fallacy of 
being unestablished because “sound” is [in fact] included in 
“all things”. [This reason] also lacks a positive example, for 
how could [there be anything] “permanent” while not 
[included in] “all things”? [Therefore,] this [inference] is not 
reasonable. [In our inference,] the reason “because they arise 
from conditions” and the example “like illusions” are both 
commonly recognised. Hence, both the reason and the 
example are established. For this reason, your objection 
eventually fails to satisfy the wise persons.256 
 
Due to their ontological commitments, the logicians think that the property that 
infers (“arisen from conditions”) contradicts the property to be inferred (“empty of 
substantial existence”) in Bhāviveka’s inference. As Bhāviveka distinguishes the 
ultimate truth from the conventional truth, the logicians’ standpoint should not 
present a real contradiction to him.  
 
Such a contradiction would occur rather when the proponent of an inference cannot 
give a positive example in relation to the reason one has given, and when this reason 
has become unestablished. To illustrate this, he examines an inference: 
 
Thesis:  Sound is permanent, 
Reason: because all things are impermanent. 

256 KR: aÀ'~¤¼Ü0¥§¤Y+ØÙ`qÙ,a
Ü0(+`q,Ç§¤+Ø,Ã+`q,bL¥
+Ù,G(+`q,ðaª+,Z+,¥^6«=¥§
ßo@AÌ 
131 

 
The property that infers, i.e. “impermanent” indeed contradicts the property to be 
inferred, i.e. “permanent”. This is true as the subject of the reason is “all things”, 
which refers to everything including “sound”, being the subject in the thesis; the 
same would also be true even if it was only “sound” being taken up as the subject in 
the reason. The proponents of the permanence of sound intend to prove the 
permanence of sound by excluding it from all things, which are impermanent; but 
sound is indeed some “thing” therefore it cannot be both permanent and 
impermanent at the same time.257 The fallacy of a contradictory reason is further 
illustrated by a lack of a positive example as there is no similar instance which can 
be both permanent and impermanent at the same time, meaning that anything in the 
category of “all things” that is both “impermanent” and “permanent” is impossible. 
This would be the case unless there were something which was “permanent” but not 
included in “all things”, but this possibility has already been excluded by the subject 
“all things”, as it indeed includes everything. Thus, this inference demonstrates a 
contradiction between a thesis and a reason.  
 
In short, if there is a contradiction between a reason and a thesis, it must show itself 
in the reason, where a property possessed by the subject would infer the opposite of 
this property to be possessed by the whole class of things that the subject represents; 
it would also show itself by a lack of positive example because the property that 
infers is absent in all similar instances. However, Bhāviveka can give a positive 
example of illusions, being similar instances – and all parties in the debate agree that 
illusions are both arisen from conditions and empty of inherent existence. The reason 
“because conditioned things arise from conditions” is also accepted by the logicians. 
Hence, his reason and example are both well-established. He does not commit the 
fallacy of having a contradictory reason, and therefore his thesis is not unestablished.        
 
This objection can also be analysed in terms of the difference in understandings 
between the logicians and Bhāviveka regarding the cause to the contradiction 

257 The proponents of the permanence of sound may in fact want to say that sound is permanent, 
because all other things are impermanent. However, this does not help to establish the inference 
because the subject of the inference is changed and the impermanence of non-sound does not entail 
the permanence of sound, just as all things other than a chair in this room are not white does not entail 
that this chair should be white; it could be white, as well as any colour which is non-white.    
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concerned.258 To the logicians, this fallacy is committed when the thesis, which is 
the conclusion of an inference, has contradicted the reason, as the reason is 
established before the thesis is. This shows the purpose of an inference to the 
logicians, i.e. as an instrument to infer the unknown from the known phenomena. In 
this sense, the reason, which functions as the inferential mark, is always a 
commonly-recognised phenomenon. The thesis, which states what was originally 
unknown to them, is the conclusion of an inference supported by the evidence that is 
the reason. Hence, whenever there is a contradiction between a thesis and a reason, 
the problem always lies in the thesis; for it is fallacious to infer a contradictory thesis 
based on a well-established reason. That is why Bhāviveka thinks that the logicians 
try to refute his thesis by attributing the fallacy of a contradictory reason to it. To 
Bhāviveka, the inference’s purpose, as an inference for others, is to demonstrate the 
ultimate emptiness of all conditioned things. Therefore, the thesis, the reason and the 
example seems to be taken altogether as an argument. While the thesis, which is 
what he intends to argue for, is already established to him, what is required, then, is 
to give an appropriate reason and example to support this thesis. Hence, if there is 
contradiction between the thesis and the reason, the fallacy is in the reason.  
 
The thesis is always something to be proved, and it is understandable that a different 
conclusion, i.e. thesis, can be drawn, therefore debates are always required to start 
from a common ground, i.e. a mutually agreed reason. In consideration of this, 
Bhāviveka in fact did not give a satisfactory response by merely explaining his 
understanding of the fallacy concerned. In the present context, the logicians do not 
agree on the conclusion, even though they recognise the reason and the example. As 
an inference for others, although Bhāviveka’s inference can reach a conclusion 
acceptable to himself, it cannot achieve the purpose of reaching a common 
conclusion.  
 
Hence, it should be asked: having accepted the same reason “because they arise from 
conditions”, why Bhāviveka would reach a conclusion (i.e. all conditioned things are 
empty ultimately) that is opposite to the logicians’ (i.e. all conditioned things are 

258 HE points out that before Dignāga, the logicians understand the fallacy of contradicting the thesis 
as being committed by the thesis of an inference. Since Dignāga, this fallacy has been understood as 
being committed by the reason. Bhāviveka’s understanding follows Dignāga’s. He uses the same 
example “sound is permanent, because all things are impermanent” in his response, as in NM, to 
illustrate this. (HE 2012, p. 18; see also CBETA, T32, no. 1628, 1a25-a29, Tucci 1930, p. 8) 
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existent ultimately). This then leads us back to the discussion on whether being 
arisen from conditions entails empty or existent ultimately. The answer to this 
question, however, is shown to be that: it is unreasonable for the logicians to 
presuppose ultimate emptiness as contradictory to being arisen from conditions. 
Thus, the logicians’ objection is unfounded.  
 
In Bhāviveka’s responses to the objections below, he further shows the compatibility 
of the ultimate emptiness of conditioned things with them being arisen from 
conditions, and the problems in understanding these things as either existent 
ultimately or non-existent absolutely. Objection 4 examines these in relation to the 
causal efficacy of conditioned things, while Objections 5 to 9 in relation to the 
reflexivity of Bhāviveka’s inference, particularly on how its own emptiness and 
coherence are understood.    
 
A.3.1 It cannot be established logically that whatever is causally efficacious has 
inherent existence 
In his response to Objection 3, Bhaviveka has already clarified that a conditioned 
thing is empty ultimately does not contradict the fact that it is arisen from conditions. 
In this objection, the proponents of inherent existence, the opponents, argue in terms 
of causal efficacy – which is one of the criteria that marks a thing out as existent – to 
prove that conditioned things are causally efficacious only if they have inherent 
existence. In other words, they intend to show that the ultimate emptiness of these 
things is not compatible with their possession of causal efficacy. Their objection is 
as follows: 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269b27-269c1) 
[Objection 4:] Again, the proponents of inherent existence say, 
“you should be convinced that the visual organ (cakAur-
indriya) has an inherent existence, because it can produce an 
effect. Those which do not have an inherent existence cannot 
produce any effect, like the son of a barren woman. Eyes can 
produce an effect, that is, they can produce the visual 
consciousness (cakAur-vijñāna). According to the said reason, 
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because [eyes] have causal efficacy,259 therefore eyes must 
have an inherent existence.”260 
 
This implies the following inference:261  
 
Thesis: Eyes have an inherent existence, 
Reason:  because they can produce an effect, 
Negative Example: unlike the son of a barren woman;  
Application:  as eyes can produce the visual consciousness, [which is an 
effect,]  
Conclusion:   they should have an inherent existence.  
 
The opponents wish to prove that eyes have an inherent existence, with the support 
of a negative example, “the son of a barren woman”, demonstrating the negative 
concomitance between “having an inherent existence” and “able to produce an 
effect”. They consider their inference established with the first characteristic of a 
reason (i.e. “eyes” being pervaded by “able to produce an effect”) and the third 
characteristic (i.e. the above negative concomitance). Applying this conclusion to all 
other conditioned things, the implication is that whatever can produce an effect 
should have an inherent existence; anything that does not have an inherent existence 
is unable to produce an effect. Hence, only ultimate existents can have causal 
efficacy, and the conventional existents in Bhaviveka’s understanding are all non-
existent absolutely and inefficacious like the son of a barren woman.     
 
The issue of whether or not objects of cognition should be ultimate existents has 
been discussed under Objections 2 and 3. The epistemological issue that occurs since 
Objection 1, which is regarding the contradiction between the ultimate emptiness of 
conditioned things and direct perception, continues here with a focus on the ultimate 
emptiness of the instrumental aspect of cognition. The sense organs, which are 

259 Poussin 1933, p. 78 gives the translation “Cet argument est irrésistible” for “FY ” 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269b29). However “ ” here should be understood in relation to the 
reason (“FY”), i.e. “because it can produce an effect” (“F”), and thus be translated as 
“causal efficacy”.   
260 KR: ÞAÁ°Ö+ª!"t#F;A(F$%
&tFt'FY t, 
261 See footnote 25.  
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empty ultimately, is criticised for lacking the efficacy to produce consciousness in a 
conventional sense. In the same manner, Bhāviveka’s inference, which is a 
conditioned thing and empty ultimately, is criticised for lacking the efficacy to 
establish the inferential knowledge which is the result of this inference, i.e. the 
ultimate emptiness of all conditioned things, in a conventional sense. 
 
Bhāviveka points out four fallacies which the opponents have committed in their 
inference:  
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269c1-c7) 
[Response:] If this [i.e. the visual organ] were like that [i.e. 
having an inherent existence in the ultimate sense], [then the 
knowledge of this] is not attained from [careful] study. [1] The 
inherent existence that is known by the intellect of the 
cowherds and others is in terms of conventional speech. [If the 
opponents were to] establish eyes and other conditioned things 
as having an inherent existence [in terms of the conventional 
truth], they are [merely] establishing what has already been 
established. [2] If [eyes, etc. were established as having an 
inherent existence] in terms of the ultimate [truth], then the 
opponents would be unable to give a positive example. [3] It 
is unreasonable that [the opponents] establish the thesis262 
they prefer by merely excluding the dissimilar instances 
(vipakAa-pratiAedha)263. Just like the proponents of 
permanence, who conceptualise on sound and say, “sound is 
permanent, because of its nature of audibility. Jars, etc. are 
impermanent and in the nature of inaudibility. As sound is 
heard, its nature is therefore permanent.” [4] Also, based on 
the positive examples that are commonly known by the world, 
[your reason] “because it can produce an effect” has become a 
contradictory reason; for “eyes and other [sense organs]” that 

262 While “artha” (“%”) can mean purpose, object or meaning (MW, p. 90, 3), it refers to the object 
“thesis” and therefore translated as such in the present context (“F¬%§” in CBETA, T30, no. 
1578, 269c3). Artha will be translated throughout this thesis in the meaning particular to the context. 
263 Poussin 1933, p. 78 suggests the Sanskrit equivalent “vipakAa-pratiAedha” for “	”.  
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it [i.e. the reason] can establish are included in the 
conventional speech and have an inherent existence.264 
 
In terms of [1], Bhāviveka clarifies that he also admits the inherent existence of eyes, 
visual consciousness and other conditioned things, as the conventional truths are not 
disputed. This has already been discussed under previous objections. Hence, if the 
opponents were to prove the inherent existence of these things based on the reason 
that these things can produce an effect in the conventional sense that is commonly 
recognised by everyone, then the opponents would have committed the fallacy of 
establishing what has already been established.  
 
However, the opponents are in fact arguing for the ultimate existence of conditioned 
things, in addition to their conventional existence; things must be ultimately existent 
in order to be able to produce an effect. On the contrary, Bhāviveka considers 
conditioned things, which are empty in the ultimate sense, to be causally efficacious 
conventionally.265 He demonstrates by [2] and [3] that the ultimate existence of 
conditioned things that has causal efficacy cannot be established ultimately. While 
by [4], he points out that the reason given by the opponent actually leads to the same 
conclusion as his standpoint, i.e. that conditioned things that are not existent 
ultimately are also causally efficacious.  
  
As Bhāviveka holds that conditioned things no longer exist as determinate objects of 
cognition in the ultimate sense, [2] he states that no positive example could be 
provided by the opponents if their inference were to establish the inherent existence 
of conditioned things in the ultimate sense. But as ultimate emptiness has yet to be 
proved, Bhāviveka’s criticism would be unfounded if it was merely based on his 
doctrine. Thus, we may try to understand his criticism by considering some possible 
responses from the opponents:  
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265 See discussion regarding the false conventional truth in Section 2.3.2 in Part I.   
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Facing [1], the charge of the fallacy of establishing what has already been 
established, the opponents may respond that Bhāviveka’s conventional truth is 
indeed their ultimate truth, meaning there is no other truth above and beyond the 
conventional existence of conditioned things. In this case, then, these opponents and 
Bhāviveka are actually not debating on the same ground, i.e. the emptiness or non-
emptiness of things “in terms of an ultimate truth”. Unless the opponents have 
already proved that there is no such ultimate truth, their argument is not applicable to 
Bhāviveka’s inference for emptiness in terms of the ultimate truth.  
 
An alternative strategy for the opponents would be to contend that they and 
Bhāviveka are arguing on the same ground, i.e. in terms of an ultimate truth, and that 
the conditioned things established in the conventional sense also have an inherent 
existence ultimately. In this case, however, the subject, “eyes”, of their inference and 
the possible positive examples, such as jars, etc., they can give are established 
conventionally, as they are established in terms of conventional speech that 
constitutes their knowledge. As the ultimate existence of conditioned things, i.e. 
having an inherent existence, is still something to be proved, these opponents cannot 
claim that things existent in a conventional sense can in any way exemplify anything 
existent in the ultimate sense. In this way, they are not able to give a positive 
example to exemplify the ultimate existence of eyes. The ultimate existence of 
conditioned things cannot be established.         
 
The problem of [2] is also found in [3], where Bhāviveka further argues that the 
opponents cannot establish an inference by merely negating the dissimilar instances. 
He illustrates this by an inference similar to the opponents’: 
 
Thesis:   Sound is permanent, 
Reason:  because it is audible, 
Negative Example: unlike jars, etc.; 
Application:  as sound is audible, 
Conclusion:  sound is therefore permanent.  
 
In order to prove the permanence of sound, the proponent of this inference makes 
“audible”, which is the distinctive characteristic of sound and shares the same class 
138 

of things, the property that infers. As a result, there is no similar instance that can 
possess “permanent” or “audible” to serve as a positive example to exemplify the 
positive concomitance between the two properties. All things other than sound have 
been made dissimilar instances, i.e. being “impermanent”, and are “inaudible”. As 
all dissimilar instances (i.e. things that are impermanent) are inaudible, sound, which 
is audible, should be permanent. But because the property that infers does not occur 
in any similar or negative instance, the reason has become too specific 
(asādhāra9ānaikāntika-hetu) and indeterminate, and is therefore unable to prove that 
sound is permanent.266  
 
The opponents’ inference has similar flaws. If they had taken causal efficacy as the 
distinctive characteristic of conditioned things, then a positive example would be 
impossible, their reason would be too specific and indeterminate, and their thesis 
would be unestablished. If they have not, they still cannot prove their thesis because 
[2] they cannot exemplify the positive concomitance between the properties “having 
an inherent existence” and “able to produce an effect” due to the lack of a positive 
example. The negative example, “the son of a barren woman”, alone cannot establish 
the inherent existence of eyes, etc. This is because the fact that the son of a barren 
woman is absolutely non-existent and causally inefficacious does not entail that eyes, 
etc., as non-absolute non-existents, are causally efficacious and therefore not empty 
of an inherent existence. In addition to this, these opponents are under the 
circumstance that they have to at least admit the conventional existence of eyes, etc. 
as discussed above.        
 
While the opponents might actually take causal efficacy as the distinctive 
characteristic of conditioned things, they might give jars and other conditioned 
things as positive examples to support their thesis. However, their inference is still 
unestablished. This is because, while the ultimate existence of conditioned things, i.e. 
their possession of an inherent existence ultimately, has not yet been proved (due to 
the fallacies discussed above), these opponents have to at least admit that their 
subject and their positive examples, which are established in common knowledge, as 
conventional. Thus, [4] their reason regarding causal efficacy can only infer the 

266 NP provides the same example to illustrate the fallacy concerned.  (CBETA, T32, no. 1630, 11c21-
c24; Section 3.2.2 [2] in Tachikawa 1971, p. 124, 142) This fallacy is further discussed in relation to 
Bhāviveka’s response to Objection 5 in defense of his proof of emptiness in Section 3.5 in Part I.  
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property that is conventionally possessed by eyes, etc. This means that, under the 
opponents’ inference, the reason “because they can produce an effect” has inferred 
that eyes, etc. have an inherent existence conventionally. This amounts to saying that 
these things are proved to be only existent conventionally. Thus, the opponents’ 
thesis should become “eyes have an inherent existence [conventionally]” or “eyes[, 
as conventional existents,] have an inherent existence”, which is consistent with 
Bhāviveka’s understanding of the conventional truth of the ordinary people. This 
still commits the fallacy of establishing what has already been established. In their 
original inference, the opponents actually intended to prove that “eyes[, as ultimate 
existents,] have an inherent existence” or “eyes have an inherent existence 
ultimately”, with the reason “because they can produce an effect”. However, the 
property that infers, i.e. “able to produce an effect”, is not possessed by the similar 
instances of the subject “the ultimately existent eyes”, such as “the ultimately 
existent jars, etc.”, but by the dissimilar instances, such as “the non-ultimately 
existent jars, etc.” In this light, Bhāviveka criticises that the opponents’ reason 
(“because they can produce an effect”) has proved the contrary of their thesis.267  
 
The opponents’ inference has failed to prove the ultimate existence of conditioned 
things due to the fallacies concerned. Since the opponents will not deny the causal 
efficacy of conditioned things even on the conventional level, Bhāviveka has 
demonstrated that it is not necessary to be ultimately existent to possess causal 
efficacy. The ultimate emptiness of all conditioned things does not contradict the 
possession of causal efficacy by these things conventionally.  
 
A.3.2 The inference can be established even it is a conditioned thing and empty 
due to the reflexivity of its thesis 

267 In addition to Bhāviveka’s response, the reason regarding causal efficacy is also contradictory in 
the sense that it proves the emptiness of things in the ultimate sense according to Bhāviveka’s 
understanding of emptiness. Conditioned things with causal efficacy pass their conditions to their 
effects through causation. If they were unconditioned, i.e., if they were ultimately existent or 
absolutely non-existent, then they would not be able to limit their effects spatio-temporally. Hence, if 
things were unconditioned, things as causes or effects that have an inherent existence could not be 
produced. For these reasons, unconditioned things do not have causal efficacy. While conventional 
existents are causally efficacious, they are subject to destruction, in this sense they are empty of an 
inherent existence. Therefore, causal efficacy is compatible with emptiness but not with ultimate 
existence. 
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Objection 4 shows that common knowledge based on direct perception and inference 
is attainable, as both sense organs – from eyes to the mind – and objects of 
cognitions are efficacious to generate consciousness, even though they are empty of 
an inherent existence in the ultimate sense. This implies that even though 
Bhāviveka’s thesis is, like all conditioned things, empty of inherent existence in the 
ultimate sense, it is nonetheless able to express its meaning, i.e. “all conditioned 
things are empty in the ultimate sense” by conventional speech. Even though the 
other components in the inference, the reason and the example, are empty in the 
ultimate sense, they can still function to prove what they are supposed to prove, i.e. 
what is stated by the thesis. Hence, it shows that whether or not an inference is 
established is not related to its ultimate emptiness. 
 
To this, the opponents may counter-argue that this inference is only causally 
efficacious in the conventional sense: although it is meant to establish the ultimate 
emptiness of these things, the inference itself is not established ultimately. That is to 
say, the opponents could argue that, ultimately, this inference cannot establish the 
inferential knowledge of ultimate emptiness. Hence, the opponents may insist that, 
granted that all other conditioned things are empty, Bhāviveka’s inference itself, 
which is also a conditioned thing, cannot be empty. But this would lead to a fallacy 
in his thesis for being self-contradictory, because his thesis indeed states that all 
conditioned things are empty ultimately. The obvious response expected from 
Bhāviveka is admitting that his thesis is reflexive, i.e. it also applies to the inference 
itself; the thesis, reason and example are empty of inherent existence and the said 
fallacy is avoided. To the opponents, Bhāviveka’s inference will have committed 
other fallacies should the reflexive thesis regarding the ultimate emptiness of all 
conditioned things be established.  
 
A.3.2.1 The inference is not deficient, although the reason and the example are 
also conditioned things and included in the subject 
In this objection, the opponents argue that Bhāviveka’s inference is deficient in its 
reasoning. They contend that as Bhāviveka also has a problematic reason and 
example in his inference, he is not better off than the opponents he criticised in his 
response to Objection 4. Their objection is as follows: 
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(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269c8-269c9) 
[Objection 5:] Others object again, “both the reason and the 
example are included in [the thesis] “conditioned things are 
empty”. As [the reason and the example] are of the same class 
[of things], there is the fault of deficient inference (anumāna-
nyūnatā).268”269 
 
Bhāviveka intends to prove the ultimate emptiness of all conditioned things in his 
inference. The subject “conditioned things” is a universal that refers to everything 
that is arisen from causes and conditions. Thus, Bhāviveka’s inference and its 
components – such as the thesis, the reason, the example, etc. – and the objects they 
refer to are all included as members of “conditioned things”.  
 
It is, however, not clear how the above involves the fault of deficient inference. 
From Bhaviveka’s following response, it can be reckoned that these opponents may 
be criticizing the reason and the example on the basis that as they both are 
“conditioned things”, they cannot prove the ultimate emptiness of the whole class of 
conditioned things, including themselves. Hence, there are the problems of over-
generalization and reflexivity. As the reason and the example cannot function to 
prove the thesis as they were expected to, in this sense they both are considered 
missing. Therefore, we have an instance of the fault of deficient inference.  
 
Bhāviveka interprets this as a problem similar to circular reasoning in his response. 
In the response below, he only deals with the problems of over-generalization and 
circular reasoning:  
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269c9-c15) 
[Response:] The result of valid knowledge is generally 
explained in this verse. When we examine and set up our 
inference, eyes, etc. are taken up to be the subject one by one. 

268 Poussin 1933, p. 79 suggests the Sanskrit equivalent “anumāna-nyūnatā” for “78¤”. The 
fault of deficient inference (anumāna-nyūnatā) may refer to a point of defeat called saying too little 
(nyūnatā). It is committed when any member (e.g. the thesis, the reason, or an example) in an 
inference is missing. (Vidyabhusana 1971, p. 88) As a result, the act of inferring is deficient or not 
able to take place.  
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Therefore, the inference did not commit this fault. Neither will 
it commit this fault even if all conditioned things are taken up 
as the subject. It is because the reason “because they arise from 
conditions” is recognised by both parties [in the debate]; it is 
not unestablished. If [the inference] had stated that “eyes are 
empty, because they are empty of inherent existence”, then the 
reason it has given would indeed be fallacious. Neither does 
[the inference] lack an example, as there are illusions, etc. [as 
examples]; for if we had taken illusions, etc. in the said 
examples as the subject, then we would have committed the 
fallacy of establishing what has already been established.270 
 
Bhāviveka denies the problem of over-generalization because the inference in fact 
presents the result of valid knowledge, i.e. the conclusion of the whole inferential 
process, which consists of all individually established inferences; see discussion in 
Section 3.3.1. 
 
Bhāviveka further holds that his inference is established even if all conditioned 
things are taken up as the subject, without considering this thesis as such a summary. 
It is true that both his reason and example are conditioned things, but a conditioned 
thing does have different properties. His inference is only concerned with the 
relations of pervasion among “arisen from conditions”, “conditioned things” and 
“empty”, to decide whether or not the conditioned things, apart from being 
“conditioned” and “arisen from conditions”, also possess another property, i.e. 
“empty”. According to Bhāviveka, all parties involved recognise his reason (i.e. that 
conditioned things are arisen from conditions) and example (i.e. illusions, which are 
arisen from conditions, are also empty). Thus, his inference is not an example of 
circular reasoning; unlike the example he has given:  
 
Thesis:  Eyes are empty,  
Reason: because they are empty of inherent existence. 

270 KR: a bY8¡w¢£Z'8£tV``5'~a¤'`q
~La¤+,P~^d(§ÀY+tÎ,aFY
Û¤L(¥VÀ'FY¥bV~AÜÝ'¦§¤ 
143 

 
This example literally means “a thing is empty because it is empty”, where the 
property that infers is identical with the property to be inferred. As the reason is the 
same as the thesis, there is no inference at all for this reason to reach such a self-
same conclusion. But this is not true of Bhāviveka’s inference as it is not recognised 
by all parties in the debate that “arisen from conditions” is identical with “empty”. 
The positive concomitance between these two properties in relation to conditioned 
things is under dispute therefore his reason is not missing. See another example:  
 
Thesis:  Illusions are empty, 
Reason:  because they arise from conditions, 
Positive example: like illusions. 
 
While the subject “illusions”, which are arisen from conditions, are proved to be 
empty of an inherent existence with the example “illusions”, this example is 
illegitimate and can be considered missing. This also amounts to saying that illusions 
are arisen from conditions and empty because they are empty and arisen from 
conditions. The reasoning is indeed circular. Further, the emptiness of illusions is 
well-established that does not require further proving. Bhāviveka considers that these 
are not true of his inference as it aims to prove the emptiness of conditioned things 
instead.  
 
Bhāviveka’s response, however, cannot completely explain away the fault of 
deficient inference; see discussion in Section 3.5. He goes on to deal with the 
problem of reflexivity in his response to the following objections. 
 
A.3.2.2 The reason is not illegitimate, although it is included in the subject and 
proved to be empty, should the thesis be established 
In his response to the last objection, Bhāviveka clarified that his inference is not 
deficient even though his reason and example are conditioned things. As his thesis is 
reflexive, if the inference is established, the inference itself and all its components, 
as conditioned things, will also be empty. Opponents in Objection 6 further argue 
that the reason, which is empty in the ultimate sense, is illegitimate. They object as 
follows: 
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(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269c15-c16) 
 [Objection 6:] There are some dull-witted people who make 
this objection, “if you establish [the thesis] ‘all conditioned 
things are empty of an inherent existence’; as your reason is 
also conditioned, its nature is also empty. This reason then has 
the fault of being unestablished.”271272 
 
The assumption here may be that components in an inference, including the reason, 
should be existent ultimately for the inference to be established; or it may be that 
only ultimate existents have the efficacy to produce an effect, which is to establish 
the thesis regarding the ultimate emptiness of all conditioned things in the present 
context. The former has already been refuted in relation to Objection 2 and the latter 
in relation to Objection 4 (and will be further discussed in Objection 7). Also, 
following the logic of Objection 5, opponents may also wish to claim that 
Bhāviveka’s inference has the problem of circular reasoning. As this has already 
been refuted in Bhāviveka’s response to the last objection, his response below 
directly addresses the issue of reflexivity:   
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269c17-c26) 
[Response:] This [reason merely] appears to be unestablished, 
it is not really unestablished. For example, the disciples of the 
Buddha hold that “all compounded phenomena do not have a 
self, because they have causes.” Some object that “as this 
reason is included among the compounded phenomena, 
neither does it have a self, and therefore it has committed the 
fault of being unestablished.” And the Sāṃkhyas hold that 
“the manifested things (vyakta) take suffering (duGkha), 
pleasure (sukha) and confusion (moha) as their inherent 
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272 The unestablished reason here should be distinguished from the fallacious reasons that are called 
unestablished reasons. These fallacious reasons are unestablished because (1) their properties to infer 
are either not recognised by the proponent of the inference, the opponents, or both; (2) the existence 
of that which they refer to is in doubt; or (3) the support of the property that infers, i.e. the subject, is 
not admitted to exist. The reason unestablished here is rather due to it being empty of an inherent 
existence ultimately; that is to say, the existence of the reason itself is in doubt. 
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natures,273 because they are different from the pure 
consciousness.” Some object that “as this reason is included 
among the manifested things, it also takes pleasure, etc. as its 
inherent natures, and therefore has committed the fault of 
being unestablished.” And the Vaiśeṣikas hold that “sound is 
impermanent, because it has the nature of being produced.” 
Some object that “as this reason[, which is uttered,] is itself 
sound, it is also impermanent, and therefore has committed the 
fault of being unestablished.” Although these kinds of 
opponents go to great lengths to find faults in the proponents, 
the reasonings they have said can never overturn others’ [i.e. 
the proponents’] doctrines. If there were such reasonings [that 
could overturn others’ doctrines], who and where could 
anyone establish any inference to overturn the reasoning (yukti) 
that I preferred or said?274 
 
Bhāviveka gives some examples of inferences to show that the reflexivity of a thesis 
should not contribute to the unestablishment of these inferences. The reason to prove 
the absence of a self in compounded phenomena is itself a compounded phenomenon 
and therefore should also be no-self; the reason to prove the inherent natures of 
pleasure, etc. of manifested things is itself a manifested thing and therefore should 
also have the inherent natures of pleasure, etc.; the reason to prove the 
impermanence of sound is itself sound as it is uttered and therefore should also be 
impermanent. All these examples are common in the way that the reason will also 
possess the property to be inferred, should the thesis be established. From this, 
opponents of these inferences criticise that these reasons are all unestablished.   
 
On the contary, Bhāviveka considers these inferences obviously established 
(assuming that legitimate examples are provided), therefore he did not even explain 
why they are so. Apart from the second and the third characteristics of a reason (i.e. 
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273 SS in CBETA, T54, no. 2137, 1247c15-c19; see further discussion under Objection 13. 
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the positive and the negative concomitances between the property that infers and the 
property to be inferred) which should be exemplified respectively by the positive and 
negative examples (not mentioned here), it can be observed that these inferences all 
possess the first characteristic – i.e., the subject being pervaded by the property that 
infers – which is a basic requirement for a reason to qualify as legitimate. Under this 
circumstance, even the reason itself is a member of the class of things that the 
subject refers to; it is legitimate as long as it is also pervaded by the property that 
infers. After all, the purpose of an inference is to convince other parties of the debate 
that the subject of an inference also possesses the property to be inferred, on the 
basis of the subject’s possession of the property that infers.    
 
If the reason were not pervaded by the property that infers, it would be indeterminate. 
There would be at least one member (i.e. the reason itself) of the “conditioned things” 
that is not pervaded by “arisen from conditions”. Granted that the second 
characteristic is present; as the subject were not wholly pervaded by the property that 
infers, the positive concomitance between the property that infers and the property to 
be inferred would be not applicable to this subject. It cannot be determined whether 
or not the members which do not possess the property that infers, including the 
reason itself, also possess the property to be inferred. Such a reason therefore cannot 
infer the property to be inferred in relation to the subject.  
 
In the objection from the Vaiśeṣikas’ opponents, the Vaiśeṣikas’ reason (“because it 
has the nature of being produced”) for the impermanence of sound is criticised for 
being unestablished because it itself is also sound and will be proved to be 
impermanent. The above discussion shows that this reason would have committed 
the fallacy of being indeterminate, if it were not “having the nature of being 
produced”. While it does possess the property that infers, however, no fallacy is 
being committed, provided that the concepts of the terms used are agreed upon and 
the second characteristic of a reason is also present. Further, the argument of the 
Vaiśeṣikas’ opponents will lead to an absurd consequence: that the property of sound 
can never be openly examined because such examinations all involve the production 
of sound. While these opponents may object only due to the underlying reason that 
sound is not impermanent in their doctrine, following their logic, however, their 
objection should also be refuted because it is also produced sound.          
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Applying this discussion to Bhāviveka’s inference, it can be seen that its reason 
(“because they arise from conditions”), which is also “arisen from conditions”, does 
not commit any fallacy. But if this reason were not also “arisen from conditions”, it 
would be an indeterminate reason. Bhāviveka’s opponents may object due to their 
doctrine that the reason in an inference cannot be empty of inherent existence 
(should Bhāviveka’s inference be established). Discussion of this issue will continue 
under the next objections. The consequence, i.e. their objection refuting itself, will 
be further discussed under Objection 15.      
 
Bhāviveka has shown that the reasonings of his opponents and of the opponents of 
the Buddhists, the Sāṃkhyas and the Vaiśeṣikas in his examples are problematic, 
and therefore unable to refute the inferences they object. Thus, Bhāviveka ends his 
response by commenting that if these problematic reasonings were accepted and able 
to refute any inferences at all, then his reasoning, which is actually free from faults, 
should be uncontestable. This means that although his inference is objected to by his 
opponents’ reasonings, the latter can in no way harm his inference.    
 
A.3.2.3 It is fallacious to take the reason, which is empty of an inherent 
existence, to be absolutely non-existent 
On the basis of the negative concomitance between the properties “able to produce 
an effect” and “having an inherent existence” in things that are non-existent 
absolutely in Objection 4, the opponents cannot establish that conditioned things 
have to be existent ultimately to be causally efficacious. They cannot provide a 
positive example and their reason have become fallacious for being contradictory. 
This objection echoes Objection 4 as it also claims that the reason in Bhāviveka’s 
inference cannot establish the thesis because it is empty of inherent existence. It 
seems that another group of opponents are attempting to prove the failure of 
Bhāviveka’s reason in establishing the thesis, based on the positive concomitance 
between the properties “being not able to produce an effect” and “not having an 
inherent existence”. They exemplify this positive concomitance by taking an 
absolute non-existent as the positive example. The objection is as follows: 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269c27-c28) 
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[Objection 7:] Again, some object, “after all, the reason 
‘because they arise from conditions’ cannot establish [the 
thesis] that it should establish, because [the reason] is empty 
of an inherent existence, like the voice emitted by the son of a 
barren woman.”275 
 
This is in form of an inference:  
 
Thesis: The reason “because they arise from conditions” cannot establish the 
thesis that it should establish,  
Reason: because this reason is empty of an inherent existence,  
Positive Example: like the voice emitted by the son of a barren woman.  
 
As has already been discussed under Objection 4, the son of a barren woman is 
absolutely non-existent in reality. As this voice is emitted by something absolutely 
non-existent, it itself is also non-existent absolutely and cannot achieve anything. To 
the opponents, the reason of Bhāviveka’s inference is empty because it is a 
conditioned thing. Like the voice of the son of a barren woman which is absolutely 
non-existent, it does not have efficacy to prove the thesis.  
 
Following this logic, Bhāviveka’s thesis, being a conditioned thing, is also empty in 
the sense of absolutely non-existent. Hence, it cannot state what it intends to state; 
and neither can it be proved. This will be discussed in Objection 8.  
 
Equating the ultimate emptiness of conditioned things with the lack of causal 
efficacy in the conventional sense and with absolute non-existence, however, is the 
common underlying reason for the opponents’ objections. Unlike Objection 4, 
Bhāviveka directly refutes this underlying reason in his response to this objection. 
He points out that the reason in the opponents’ inference is unestablished either to 
themselves or to others:   
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269c29-270a12) 
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[Response:] This reason [given by the opponents] has 
committed the fallacy of being unestablished to [the 
opponents] themselves. Neither is it reasonable if their reason 
is said to be accepted by the other doctrines;276 for the 
meaning of [their reason] “because [the reason in Bhāviveka’s 
inference] is empty of an inherent existence” is unclear 
(avijñāta-artha)277 if it is said to the other doctrines. If 
[“empty”] means “not existent”; according to this meaning of 
the reason, this reason is unestablished because it does not 
mean “non-existent” [in my doctrine]. If [“empty”] means 
“existing [in the form of] a false appearance”; according to 
this meaning of the reason, the example “the voice emitted by 
the son of a barren woman” would be unable to establish 
anything because it is non-existent absolutely. Also, referring 
to [the example of] produced voice, [the reason] has 
committed the fallacy of being indeterminate (anaikāntika)278 
because that [i.e. the voice produced by the Buddha] is able to 
benefit and give joy to infinite sentient beings.279   
 

276 If the opponents’ reason were not recognized by both the opponents themselves and other 
doctrines, this reason would then commit the fallacy of being unestablished to both parties in the 
debate (ubhaya-asiddha). NP gives the example of “a person proving the impermanent of sound with 
the reason ‘because it is visible’”. (CBETA, T32, no. 1630, 11c13; Section 3.2.1 [1] in Tachikawa 
1971, pp. 123, 141) This reason is fallacious because visibility is not related to sound, and thus 
neither the proponents nor the opponents of this inference would accept taking it as the property that 
infers.  
277 Poussin 1933, p. 81 suggests the Sanskrit equivalent “avijñāta-artha” (i.e. “the intelligible”) for 
“Î%Ç”. It is a point of defeat committed by a person, who can no longer defend herself in a 
debate, tries to hide her inability by ambigious words, or words that are not in ordinary use or uttered 
very quickly. Although the person has repeated three times, her words cannot be understood by her 
opponents or audience. (Vidhyabhusana 1971, p. 87)  
278 According to NP, the fallacy of being indeterminate (anaikāntika) is committed when the property 
that infers in the reason is present in (1) all similar and dissimilar instances, (2) some similar instances 
and all dissimilar instances, (3) vice versa, and (4) some similar and dissimilar instances. The 
example of the Buddha’s voice seems to show this fallacy in the opponents’ reason, because the voice 
of the Buddha is causally efficacious and is also “empty of an inherent existence”. At least one 
dissimilar instance possesses the property that infers. See also discussion in NP in CBETA, T32, no. 
1630, 11c17-c22, 11c25-12a12; Section 3.2.2 in Tachikawa 1971, pp. 124-125, 142. 
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In his response, Bhāviveka first objects that it is unclear whether the opponents take 
“empty of inherent existence” to mean “being non-existent” in an absolute sense or 
“existing in form of a false appearance”. Bhāviveka does not recognise their reason 
in the former case. As they provide the positive example “the voice emitted by the 
son of a barren woman” to support their thesis, this shows that they have 
presupposed that “empty ultimately” means “absolutely non-existent”. However, 
being empty of an inherent existence, to Bhāviveka, is like an illusion or a false 
appearance, which is neither ultimately existent nor absolutely non-existent, but 
existent conventionally and able to fulfill its functions. Hence, the opponents’ reason 
“because Bhāviveka’s reason is empty of an inherent existence” is not recognised by 
the other party in the debate, i.e. Bhāviveka himself. It has committed the fallacy of 
being unestablished to either party in the debate (anyatara-asiddha).280  
 
In case of the latter – i.e. if “empty of an inherent existence” means “existing in the 
form of a false appearance” to the opponents – then the opponents’ reason has 
become indeterminate. This is because the property “empty of an inherent existence” 
can also infer the opposite of “not being able to establish the thesis it should 
establish” (or generally as “not being able to fulfill its function” or “being causally 
inefficacious”). This is like the Buddha’s voice, which is empty of an inherent 
existence, but can achieve the salvation, etc. of the sentient beings. As the property 
that infers (“empty of an inherent existence”) also occurs in the dissimilar instances 
– i.e. things that are “causally efficacious” – the opponents’ reason can also prove 
the contrary of their thesis and has failed to be a legitimate reason. Further, the 
opponents’ example “the voice emitted by the son of a barren woman” has also 
become illegitimate because it is non-existent absolutely; it is not “empty” in the 
sense of “existing in the form of a false appearance”. However, the opponents 
actually take “empty” to mean “absolutely non-existent”. If they did take “empty” to 
mean “existing in the form of a false appearance”, their reason would have also 
committed the fallacy of being unestablished to either party (i.e. their own party) in 
the debate.  
 

280 NP gives the example of “a person proving the impermanence of sound with the reason ‘because it 
is produced’ to another person who only admits the manifestation of sound”. (CBETA, T32, no. 1630, 
11c14; Section 3.2.1 [2] in Tachikawa 1971, pp. 123, 141) The other person does not recognise the 
reason because she holds that sound is eternal and is only manifested to become heard under certain 
conditions.  
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Bhāviveka goes on to refute the opponents’ inference because it is not established 
based on a commonly recognised reason:  
 
Neither is it the case that a reason being accepted only by the 
other party can establish what it is supposed to establish, 
because [a reason that is only accepted by] one party [in the 
debate] is unestablished, like a reason which is unestablished 
to the other party; because it can be repudiated by another 
inference [that has a] contradictory [thesis]; because it is 
followed by great errors (atiprasaHga).281 For example, it is 
stated that “understanding (prajñā), etc. are not associated 
with thought (citta-sa>prayukta), because they are included in 
the aggregate of volition (sa>skāra-skandha), like the word-
group (nāma-kāya),282 etc.”; that “space, etc. are all 
impermanent, because they are the locus of qualities (gu9a), 
like earth, etc.”; that “puruAa is not the pure consciousness, 
because it is not a manifested thing, like the first cause 
(pradhāna)”;283 these kinds [of reasons] destroy all theses and 
they are followed by faults. Therefore, it should be admitted 
that the reason is so called only when it is accepted by both 

281 In the translations of Hatani and of Hsu, Bhāviveka’s response only starts after this sentence; see 
Hatani 1976, p. 106-107 and Hsu 2013, pp. 187-189. My translation does not agree with their 
understanding because it seems to me that Bhāviveka’s response, starting with the discussion on the 
fallacy in the opponents’ reason being unestablished both to themselves and others, is criticizing the 
inference proposed by his opponents; see Commentary below.  
 “Great errors” is a literal translation for “<¤¼” (“atiprasaHga”), which was not a 
technical term in Indian logic. Later, it was employed by Dignāga in his critique of Nyāya in Chapter 
1 of PS. In general, this term refers to the property that infers being also present in dissimilar 
instances or being inefficacious. (Harada 1988) However, it cannot be certain whether Bhāviveka 
used it here with the technical meaning in mind. 
282 Poussin 1933, p. 81 renders the term as “=” (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270a9) as “nāmarūpa”, 
which means “name and form”. However, “factors that are not associated with thought” is a 
Sarvāstivadin terminology. Thus, “=” should instead be rendered as “nāma-kāya” (“word-group”) 
under the Sarvāstivadin context. “Name and form”, as the fourth of the twelve limbs of dependent 
origination, refer to the psycho-physical complex of a sentient being. “Name” includes the first four 
aggregates, namely matter, sensation, conception, and volition, while “form” includes the last 
aggregate, namely consciousness. Hence, “name and form” includes both factors associated and not 
associated with thought. “Name and form” cannot be a positive example because it is not entirely 
“included in the aggregate of volition”, and hence it cannot establish the positive concomitance 
between “included in the aggregate of volition” and “not associated with thought”. 
283 See Objection 13. 
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parties. From this reasoning, we cannot have committed the 
said faults.284 
 
His refutation is in the form of an inference: 
 
Thesis: A reason which is only accepted by the other party cannot establish 
what it is supposed to establish, 
Reason: because a reason that is only accepted by one party in the debate is 
unestablished, 
Positive Example: like a reason which is unestablished to the other party. 
 
The opponents also understand that a reason of an inference is required to be 
recognised by all parties in the debate for the thesis to be proved. Therefore, the 
reason “because [a reason that is only accepted by one party in the debate is 
unestablished” in Bhāviveka’s inference above is not contested. And Bhāviveka’s 
inference is established.   
 
Bhāviveka holds that a reason which is only accepted by the other party in the debate 
cannot establish what it is supposed to establish further because such a reason can be 
repudiated by another inference that has a contradictory thesis. This is also because 
an inference with such a reason is followed by great errors, e.g. the fallacies of the 
reason being indeterminate or contradictory and of the example being illegitimate. 
These can be understood from the examples he has given in his response: 
 
If the thesis “understanding is not associated with thought” were said to the 
Sarvāstivādins, then the reason “because it is included in the aggregate of volition” 
would be denied as it is contradictory. This is because the Sarvāstivādins consider 
whatever is “included in the aggregate of volition” to be “associated with thought”, 
and this includes “understanding”. Although the Sarvāstivādins agree that the 
example “word-group” is not associated with thought, it seems that they do not have 
common consensus as to whether word-group should be included in the aggregate of 

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volition, the aggregate of matter, or both.285 If the thesis were said to the 
Sarvāstivādins who consider word-group as not included in the aggregate of volition, 
then it would not be a legitimate example. The positive concomitance of the 
properties “being included in the aggregate of volition” and “being not associated 
with thought” would be unestablished. The thesis would be unestablished.  
 
If the thesis “space, as one of the elements, is impermanent” were said to the 
Vaiśeṣikas, then the reason “because it is the locus of qualities” would be denied as 
it is indeterminate. This is because the Vaiśeṣikas consider space to be impermanent, 
but a locus of qualities can either be permanent or impermanent. Although the 
example “earth” is the locus of solidity, it is considered permanent to the Vaiśeṣikas. 
Therefore, it would not be a legitimate example. As a result, the positive 
concomitance of the properties “being the locus of qualities” and “impermanent” 
would be unestablished. The thesis would also be unestablished.  
 
If the thesis “puruAa is not the pure consciousness” were said to the Sāṃkhyas, then 
the reason “because it is not a manifested thing” would be denied as it is 
indeterminate. Sāṃkhya holds that puruAa (purely conscious) and “the first cause” 
(purely material) are the only two substances that are responsible for things 
manifested in the universe. While they are both unmanifested, the manifested things 
are purely material. Although the example “the first cause” is neither a manifested 
thing nor the pure consciousness, the Sāṃkhyas disagree that whatever is not a 
manifested thing is not the pure consciousness. They also disagree that whatever is 
the pure consciousness is a manifested thing. As a result, the positive and negative 
concomitances between the properties “not a manifested thing” and “not the pure 
consciousness” are not commonly recognised. The thesis is also unestablished.    
 
Thus, Bhāviveka’s opponents have failed to establish the positive concomitance of 
the properties “being not able to produce an effect” and “not having an inherent 
existence” because it is not commonly recognised. They have failed to prove that 
Bhāviveka’s reason cannot establish the thesis it should establish. The underlying 
reason for the opponents’ objection – i.e. that the ultimate emptiness of conditioned 
things amounts to their absolute non-existence – is refuted.  

285 See Dhammajoti 2009, p. 309-310. 
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A.3.2.4 The thesis regarding the ultimate emptiness of all conditioned things is 
reflexive but not fallacious 
In Objection 7, the opponents claim that because Bhāviveka’s reason is empty of an 
inherent existence in the ultimate sense, it cannot establish the thesis. Following the 
same logic, the logicians in this objection also claim that the property that infers 
“arisen from conditions” in the reason and the property to be inferred “empty” in the 
thesis are both included in “conditioned things”, which is the subject of the inference, 
and empty in the ultimate sense. Therefore, the property that infers cannot establish 
the property to be inferred; neither does the latter exist for the former to establish. 
Their objection is as follows:   
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270a13-a17) 
[Objection 8:] Some other unskilful logicians want to show 
the fallacies of our thesis by saying again, “if [conditioned 
things are] empty of an inherent existence, then that which is 
to be inferred and that which infers are both unestablished, 
like the voice emitted by the son of a barren woman. [This is 
because] that which infers is included in the ‘conditioned 
things’, therefore it is the same as that which is to be inferred 
by them [i.e. Bhāviveka, etc.], and its nature is also empty. As 
they are both empty, neither that which is to be inferred nor 
that which infers are established. They refute the existence of 
the property to be inferred and of the property that infers. This 
amounts to refuting the subject itself, [and hence] they shows 
the fault in establishing their thesis.”286 
 
This objection is in the form of an inference,  
 
Thesis: That which is inferred and that which infers are both unestablished,  
Reason: because they are empty of an inherent existence,  

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Positive example: like the voice emitted by the son of a barren woman.  
 
As in Objection 7, the logicians here regard the property that infers and the property 
to be inferred in Bhāviveka’s inference (which are empty) as absolutely non-existent 
like the son of a barren woman, and therefore causally inefficacious like the son’s 
voice. Thus, they cannot establish anything and cannot be established. 
 
Further, the logicians claim that Bhāviveka has committed the fault of refuting the 
subject of their own inference. Refuting the property that infers, which is a property 
generally possessed by all members of the class that the subject refers to, can be 
considered as refuting the distinctive characteristic of the subject (dharmi-svarūpa). 
Refuting the property to be inferred in relation to the subject, which is established 
based on the positive concomitance between it and the property that infers, can be 
considered as refuting the implication of the subject (dharmi-viśeAa). In the case of 
Bhāviveka’s inference, although conditioned things are defined as “arisen from 
conditions”, they no longer qualify as such as this property does not exist. For the 
property to be inferred (“empty”) is already non-existent absolutely; if the inference 
could be established at all, the subject would be proved to be “absolutely non-
existent”, being unable to possess any property.287 Thus, the subject is devoid of all 
characteristics, with its distinctive characteristic and implied characteristic refuted, 
and the subject itself will also be refuted. The inference, which was set up regarding 
this subject, has now failed to be established in relation to this subject and has 
become unestablished.288  
 
Bhāviveka thus responds: 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270a18-a20) 

287 Cf. the discussion in Objection 2 about the fallacy of the thesis with its subject being unestablished 
and the fallacy of the reason with its support being unestablished. The difference between Objections 
2 and 8 is that the opponents in Objection 2 object to the subject of the inference, while the logicians 
here object to the property that infers and the property to be inferred, which are related to the second 
characteristic of the reason. To the opponents in Objection 2, the subject of the inference is fallacious 
because it is empty and hence absolutely non-existent. As a result, the property that infers has lost its 
support, i.e. the subject. To the logicians in this objection, the inference is fallacious because it proves 
the emptiness and hence absolute non-existence of its components, including the subject, the property 
that infers and the property to be inferred; the inference thus has refuted itself.  
288 The logicians will have the same problem in their inference, since the ultimate existence of 
conditioned things has already been refuted and they still insist on understanding emptiness as 
absolute non-existence; see Bhāviveka’s response to Objection 15.   
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[Response:] As their reason is neither established to 
themselves nor to others, as it is indeterminate, and as their 
example is fallacious in itself; with reference to what has been 
just discussed, neither is this objection reasonable.289 
Although the opponents have set up a different objection290 [to 
show the fallacy committed in our inference], eventually they 
cannot conceal the fallacies committed in their own thesis.291 
 
As the logicians’ reason is not mutually agreed by both parties in the debate, they 
have committed the same fallacies as the opponents did in Objection 7. (1) Their 
reason is unestablished to the other party, i.e. to Bhāviveka, in the debate, as they 
understand “empty” as “absolutely non-existent”. Bhāviveka’s notion of “being 
empty of an inherent existence” is like an illusion or a false appearance, which is 
existent conventionally instead and able to produce an effect. (2) Their reason is 
indeterminate because according to Bhāviveka’s understanding, empty things can 
also be causally efficacious. Thus, the property that infers (“empty”) also occurs in 
dissimilar instances, i.e. things that are established. (3) Their example, “the voice 
emitted by the son of a barren woman”, becomes illegitimate because its property 
“empty” understood in the sense of “absolutely non-existent” is disputed, thus failing 
to exemplify the positive concomitance between “empty” and “unestablished”. As 
conditioned things which are empty are existent conventionally in Bhāviveka’s 
understanding, he does not deny the existence of the property that infers and the 
property to be inferred. Therefore, the the fault of refuting the subject is not 
committed in his inference.  
 
The above objection is about inference-reflexivity – whether, that is, the proponents 
of an inference can accept the conclusion of their own inference to be applied to their 

289 Hatani 1976, p. 107 understands the first part of this sentence – “As their reason…fallacious in 
itself” – as part of the objection, but this translation considers the three fallacies mentioned there as 
the reasons why the present objection should be refuted. The three fallacies have already been 
discussed by Bhāviveka under Objection 7. In his response, he is referring his readers to that 
objection to help them to understand that what is objected here is also unfounded.  
290 “Different objection” translates the term “	F” (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270a20), the meaning of 
which is not clear. I have compared Poussin’s suggestion “tentatives ingénieuses” (Poussin 1933, 
p.82), and rendered this translation; cf. Hsu 2013, p. 190, where it is rendered as “accusations”. 
291 KR: UeñG§H¥¤I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own inference. Below, the logicians in turn question Bhāviveka on his notion of 
emptiness and his thesis, if what is expressed by his thesis is also empty: 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270a20-a28) 
[Objection 8 cont.:] Again, other [unskilful logicians] set up 
another reasoning to conceal the fallacies [they have 
committed] in their own thesis. They say, “that which is stated 
by the thesis, which says that ‘in terms of the ultimate truth, 
the conditioned things are empty’ is unclear. [1] If ‘in terms of 
the ultimate truth, all conditioned things have no reality’ is the 
meaning stated by the thesis, this which is said [in the thesis] 
is also included in the conditioned things, therefore it is the 
same as the conditioned things and should also be unreal. 
[Alternatively,] if what is said [in the thesis] is not unreal, 
neither should all conditioned things be unreal. As this, which 
is said [in the thesis], refutes the very meaning it has 
established, it is called the self-contradiction in one’s own 
speech, which is a fallacy committed in the thesis, like when it 
is established that everything [that is expressed in] speech is 
false. [2] If ‘in terms of the ultimate truth, all conditioned 
things do not exist at all’ is the meaning stated by the thesis, 
then the thesis is denying the existence of everything. If this is 
what is established [by your thesis], then you have fallen into 
the erroneous view.”292   
 
The logicians counter-argue that the meaning of Bhāviveka’s thesis “in terms of the 
ultimate truth, conditioned things are empty” is not clear. There are two possible 
meanings of the property to be inferred, “empty”, understood in terms of “a false 
appearance”; either it means [1] “unreal” or [2] “absolutely non-existent”.  
 

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In terms of [1], “in terms of the ultimate truth, all conditioned things have no reality” 
will be the meaning of the thesis. “The ultimate unreality of all conditioned things,” 
which is meant by the thesis, is also a conditioned thing. Therefore, this will also be 
unreal in the ultimate sense. If Bhāviveka holds that what is stated in his thesis is 
exempt from the reflexivity of itself, and is real, then he will have refuted what he 
aimed to prove in his thesis. This is similar to a person, who says that, “I am telling a 
lie”. The content of the lie itself is of course false to the reality. But if this person is 
really telling a lie, her statement that “I am telling a lie” is then true. And if this 
statement is true, then this person is not telling a lie at all. Thus, this person has 
denied what she has affirmed at the same time – her statement and what is expressed 
by her statement cannot be true at the same time. In other words, her speech is self-
contradictory. Hence, if Bhāviveka’s thesis can be proved, then it should be reflexive 
and be applicable to itself, proving the unreality of what it aims to establish.  
 
In the translation of “if what is said by the thesis is not unreal, neither should all 
conditioned things be unreal,” it should be noted that there can be two readings of 
the second clause: (1) as “” (jie fei wu shi),293 which means “all 
[conditioned things] are not unreal”, and (2) as “” (fei jie wu shi), which 
means “[conditioned things] are not all unreal”. Indeed, (2) is sufficient for the 
logicians to establish their criticism. If there are some conditioned things (i.e. that 
which is expressed in Bhāviveka’s thesis) that are not unreal, then his thesis, which 
claims that “all conditioned things are unreal”, will become false.  
 
For [2], if “empty” means “absolutely non-existent”, then the thesis will actually 
mean “all conditioned things are absolutely non-existent”. It has then committed the 
fault of nihilism, which should be avoided by all Mādhyamikas. In this way, the 
logicians argue, Bhāviveka has also contradicted his own doctrine of the middle way. 
Bhāviveka understands the ultimate emptiness of conditioned things as their lack of 
inherent existence, with both ultimate emptiness and lack of inherent existence being 
likened to a false appearance or an illusion.294 Hence, what is stated by his thesis is 
not established in terms of [2].  
 

293 CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270a24. 
294 KR: +,-+,./012345'~(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 268c19-c20) 
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Regarding [1], in his response Bhāviveka denies that his inference is unestablished 
even though what is stated in his thesis is reflexive. He also discusses the 
circumstances where the reflexivity of the thesis will lead to self-contradiction in 
one’s own speech. Regarding [2], he denies that the ultimate emptiness of 
conditioned things means their absolute non-existence. He also restates his notion of 
emptiness.  
 
Bhāviveka’s response regarding [1] is in two parts. In [1a], he clarifies that the 
reflexivity of his thesis will not generate problems for his inference because the 
inference is established in terms of the ultimate truth:    
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270a28-b3) 
[Response:] [1a] Here, as it says, “one is the protector of 
oneself. Who says that there is another protector? The wise 
persons are skilful in taming their Selves, therefore they 
obtain the happiness of the deities.”295 In terms of the 
conventional truth, they say that the mind is the Self; while in 
terms of the ultimate truth, they establish that it is no-self. 
[Therefore,] they did not commit the fallacy of self-
contradiction in one’s own speech in their thesis. The same 
applies to [our thesis] here. It is said, in terms of the 
conventional nature, that there are eyes, etc.; in terms of the 
ultimate truth, these things are all established as empty. 
Therefore, no fallacy is being committed.296 
 
In Bhāviveka’s understanding, the reflexivity of his thesis is problematic to the 
logicians because they have mistakenly supposed that the ultimate emptiness of all 
conditioned things is stated in the thesis in terms of the conventional truth, i.e. the 
level of truth where Bhāviveka admits these things as having an inherent existence. 
Only on this same level of conventional truth would it be self-contradictory for 

295 Dhammapada XII, no. 160. It is also quoted by Candrakīrti in his PSP for MMK 18.5cd (Sprung et 
al. 1979, p. 174) for the same purpose as Bhāviveka. 
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Bhāviveka’s thesis to affirm the emptiness of conditioned things, given that the 
subject “conditioned things” of this thesis includes the thesis itself, and the property 
“empty” is opposite to the property “having an inherent existence”. Since what is 
stated in the thesis is intended to be established in terms of a different level of truth, 
i.e. the ultimate truth, what is stated in the thesis will not be self-contradictory even 
if it has an opposite property in another level of truth, i.e. the conventional truth. 
Hence, the contradiction of conditioned things having mutually-exclusive properties 
is avoided in Bhāviveka’s system of the two truths.    
 
Although what is stated in the thesis “in terms of the ultimate truth, conditioned 
things are empty” is established by virtue of conventional speech, it is describing the 
ultimate state of these things. This is also specified by the modifier “in terms of the 
ultimate truth”. In other words, it is established conventionally in order to convey the 
meaning that concerns the ultimate truth of things. This is indeed the way that the 
Buddha teaches the Self to ordinary people, although he does not admit its existence 
in the ultimate sense. As there is a Self, these people would be guided to act morally 
in order to have a better rebirth. But after they have understood the dependent nature 
of all things, the notion of Self will be discarded as well and no-self will be taught. 
The same is also true of the existence of conditioned things, eyes, etc. in 
Bhāviveka’s thesis. They are provisionally established with an inherent existence in 
terms of the conventional truth so that the inferential knowledge on their emptiness 
in the ultimate sense can be conveyed.  
 
Thus, what is stated in Bhāviveka’s thesis is a conditioned thing, but it is not 
established to be unreal or false in the conventional sense. This is because Bhāviveka 
admits conditioned things as having an inherent existence on the conventional level. 
Their inherent existence is denied only on the ultimate level, and they are only 
established as empty, unreal or false on this level. Under the system of the two truths, 
there is no contradiction between the emptiness and the non-emptiness of inherent 
existence in conditioned things in relation to what is stated in Bhāviveka’s thesis. 
 
In [1b], Bhāviveka further explains the circumstances where a reflexive thesis 
actually leads to the fallacy of self-contradiction and how this fallacy is not 
committed by his thesis under the system of the two truths:  
161 

 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270b3-b25) 
[1b] Again, there is a saying that, “all things that have arisen 
are eventually to die.”297 [As] that which is said by Muni [i.e. 
the Buddha] must not be false, the Buddha himself, being 
arisen, must die eventually, because he is not apart from [the 
things that have arisen]. Although the thesis which is 
established by him can prove that he will die eventually, this 
is accepted [by his own thesis]; therefore there is no fallacy of 
self-contradiction in one’s own speech [committed in his 
thesis]. The same applies to [our thesis] here. It is said, in 
terms of the ultimate truth, that all conditioned things are 
empty, because they arise from numerous conditions. Since 
the saying itself, which is established by the thesis, also arises 
from numerous conditions, it should also be empty of an 
inherent existence because it is not apart from [the conditioned 
things]. Although this saying, which is established by the 
thesis, can prove that what it says is empty of inherent 
existence, as this is accepted [by this thesis itself], [this thesis] 
does not have the fault of  refuting the very meaning which it 
itself has established.    
 
Just as a Brahmin says, “The Blessed One, I do not forbear 
anything.” The Buddha says, “Brahmin, do you not forbear this 
very thing?” The Brahmin of course forbears this very thing 
[that she does not forbear anything], while saying “I do not 
forbear anything.”298 As what she has just said contradicts what 
she admits, she has indeed committed the fallacy of 
contradicting what she said herself, [albeit] such a fallacy is not 
found everywhere. 

297 The source of this quotation has not yet been identified. I followed Poussin 1933, p. 83 and Hatani 
1976, p. 108 to end the quotation here, but not Zangyao, p. 5, which ends it after “…must not be false.” 
Hsu 2013, pp. 192-193 translates the phrase “:Ú” (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270b5) as “life and 
death are not separated”, instead of “he is not apart from [the things that have arisen]” in the present 
translation, and ends the quotation there. 
298 See Dīghanakha Sutta in MN 74 (PTS: M i 497). 
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Elsewhere, the Blessed One says, “all compounded 
phenomena are without a self.” Again, he says somewhere 
else, “the compounded phenomena are impermanent [as] they 
are subject to arising and ceasing.” If it is not like [what has 
just been explained], having said the compounded phenomena 
are no-self and impermanent, the Buddha should have also 
committed the said fallacy [of self-contradiction]. However, it 
is not the case. This is because, just like when [his theses] 
negate the inherent existence and permanence of compounded 
phenomena, what is said in his theses are also allowed to be 
no-self and impermanent like the others.299 The same applies 
to [our thesis] here. [Our thesis] says that “conditioned things 
are empty”; this which is stated by our thesis is also allowed 
to be empty of an inherent existence. [Such a thesis] then 
follows and establishes the meaning that is admitted by itself. 
This is why the reason “because this [thesis] refutes the very 
meaning that it has established” given by you is not 
established.   
 
Also taking the Sāṃkhyas as example; they regard pleasure, 
etc. as the natures of the manifested things. Although there is 
the objection that, “if manifested things take pleasure, etc. as 
natures, then that which is stated by their thesis should also 
take pleasure, etc. as its natures. If that which is stated by their 
thesis is not of these natures, neither should the manifested 
things take these as their natures.” However, this stated thesis 
did not commit this fallacy [of self-contradiction]. If 
conditioned things are established as impermanent and no-self, 

299 In Hsu 2013, pp. 193-194, the second clause of this sentence is translated as “The thesis intends 
[the principle] of ‘no-self’ to be permanent” (“a'~°LdU+,Ù”) (see CBETA, 
T30, no. 1578, 270b17). Although Hsu’s translation also explains why the Buddha does not commit 
the fallacy of self-contradiction in his sayings, the understanding of the basic teaching of no-self as 
permanent seems untenable. If it means that “except the teaching of no-self, all other compounded 
phenomena are no-self or impermanent,” then this means not all compounded phenomena are no-self 
or impermanent, and this is exactly what constitutes the fallacy concerned.        
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neither will the thesis commit the fallacy as attributed by those 
[opponents]. The same applies to [our thesis] here. It did not 
commit the fallacy attributed [by the opponents] because we 
intend it [to be empty ultimately].300 
 
Recalling the example of “I am telling a lie”, it would be helpful to begin by 
examining whether or not the fallacy of self-contradiction can be solved. This 
statement is self-contradictory because the person who says this statement cannot be 
telling a lie and not telling a lie at the same time. Either this person is telling the truth 
that she is telling a lie, or she is telling a lie that she is telling a lie, meaning that she 
is telling the truth. This problem may be solved through distinguishing two orders of 
the sense of the statement. On a lower order, the statement “I am telling a lie” is 
affirmed, while on a higher order, this statement may be affirmed as in “it is true that 
‘I am telling a lie’”, or denied as in “it is false that ‘I am telling a lie’”. Thus, the 
truth value of the statement “I am telling a lie” is determined on a higher order 
instead of the same order. Hence, it will not be self-contradictory even one affirms a 
statement which one eventually denies. This is similar to Bhāviveka’s reasoning, for 
he admits the inherent existence of conditioned things on the conventional level but 
denies it on the ultimate level.  
 
However, regardless of whether the person who says that “I am telling a lie” would 
affirm that that statement is true on a higher order, this person is still telling the truth 
on this higher order, unless there is another higher order. If what the person really 
meant to convey is “I always lie”, meaning that she is lying in all places and all 
times, then what she really intended to establish is the meaning of her statement 

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instead of the statement itself. In this case, it would seem more reasonable to admit 
that the meaning of the statement “I always lie” applies to the statement itself even 
on a higher order. Then it will result an infinite regress of levels of truth, which 
should be an acceptable consequence to her. 
   
In his response to the objection, Bhāviveka gives an example of a Brahmin to 
illustrate what constitutes the fallacy of self-contradiction due to a reflexive thesis. 
The Brahmin says that she does not forbear anything. In terms of two orders of sense 
of the statement, just like Bhāviveka’s two levels of truth, it may be said that on a 
lower order the Brahmin does not forbear anything. Applying the same statement on 
a higher order, this Brahmin should also not forbear anything. But then, she would 
be not forbearing that “she does not forbear anything”, in which case she would have 
falsified her own statement. Or if she forbears that “she does not forbear anything”, 
then she would at least forbear this very statement and have also falsified her own 
statement. She would therefore have contradicted herself. This Brahmin might as 
well accept an infinite regress of levels of truth of her statement; however, infinite 
regress is undesirable in Indian philosophy. By contrast, this problem does not 
happen in other examples, such as the Buddha’s saying that “all things that have 
arisen are eventually to die” and his teachings on impermanence and no-self. Such 
claims would be self-contradictory if they denied the permanence of all things, 
including themselves, but established themselves in the ultimate sense to be absolute 
truths. To fulfill the meaning of the Buddha’s saying and teachings, their meanings 
are affirmed in terms of the conventional truth, while all things, including 
themselves, are also said to die or disappear in terms of the ultimate truth. This is 
consistent with the meaning of the Buddha’s saying and teachings and is exactly 
what they aim to achieve. The same applies to the example regarding the Sāṃkhyas. 
Their opponents claim that the Sāṃkhyas’ thesis, which states that all manifested 
things have the natures of pleasure, etc., itself should also be a manifested thing and 
have the same natures. It would also be fallacious if the Sāṃkhyas denied that their 
thesis is a manifested thing and have such natures. However, the fact that the 
Sāṃkhyas’ thesis is a manifested thing and has such natures does not contradict what 
is stated in it.  
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The same is also true of Bhāviveka’s inference. The thesis “in terms of the ultimate 
truth, conditioned things are empty” is a conventional description of the state of the 
conditioned things in the expressible ultimate truth.301 In order to convey the 
meaning of the thesis regarding their ultimate emptiness, conditioned things, 
including the thesis itself, are first established in terms of the false conventional truth 
with an inherent existence, i.e. not empty, and then established as “empty” in terms 
of the expressible ultimate truth. After the inference has conveyed the meaning in 
terms of the expressible ultimate truth, its nature of emptiness is also to be discarded, 
so that they are also empty ultimately.  
 
Although Bhaviveka seeks to establish the emptiness of all things, there is no infinite 
regress of emptiness in his system, unlike the case of “I always lie”. This is because 
this emptiness, which is established in terms of the expressible ultimate truth,302 is 
further realised to be empty, not by inference, but through meditation. To be empty 
in terms of the inexpressible ultimate truth is not to affirm anything as empty, but 
rather to eliminate all conceptual distinctions, including true or false, real or unreal 
and empty or non-empty. Therefore, the issue of reflexivity no longer applies. As 
emptiness is not established as the absolute truth, Bhāviveka need not postulate 
another emptiness over and above the ultimate emptiness of all things, in the form of 
“this ultimate emptiness itself is also empty”, and so on.   
 
Based on Bhāviveka’s response in the above, the logicians accuse Bhāviveka’s thesis 
of committing the same fallacy of self-contradiction as themselves: 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270b25-b27) 
[Objection 8 cont.:] Again, those logicians do not seek to save 
what they have established. They instead respond with another 

301 While “empty” is established to be the property of conditioned things, this may be compared to the 
conclusion of the semantic interpretation of emptiness, which states that the ultimate truth, as 
expressed conventionally, is that there is no ultimate truth (Siderits 2007, pp. 200-204); or in other 
words that, the emptiness of an inherent nature in all things, as expressed conventionally, is the 
inherent nature of these things. (Priest and Garfield 2002, pp. 269-270) It considers that ultimately 
there are contradictions in the truth and falsity of these things, and their ultimate truth is established 
exactly based on these contradictions. Bhāviveka, however, considers that such contradictions do not 
exist ultimately as they are eventually eliminated by meditative practices; see also discussion in 
Section 2.2.2 in Part I.     
302 This will be criticised in Objection 9, where the opponents claim that Bhāviveka is establishing his 
thesis as an absolute truth, by affirming the emptiness or non-existence of things in the ultimate sense.  
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objection, “if ‘in terms of the ultimate truth, [all] conditioned 
things have no reality,’ then neither should this which is stated 
[in this thesis] ‘[in terms of the ultimate truth, all] conditioned 
things have no reality’ be real.”303  
 
As Bhāviveka’s original thesis states that “in terms of the ultimate truth, conditioned 
things are empty”, it means that these things are not real in the ultimate sense. The 
logicians thus claim that according to his thesis all conditioned things are not real 
ultimately – that what is stated in his thesis, as a conditioned thing, should also be 
unreal ultimately. Thus, Bhāviveka’s thesis is unestablished ultimately. However, if 
Bhāviveka’s thesis is not unreal ultimately, then what is stated in it – “all 
conditioned things are unreal ultimately” – will become unestablished. To this, 
Bhāviveka responds:      
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270b27-c1) 
[Response:] This objection cannot exempt [the logicians] from 
the fallacies they have committed in their own thesis.304 They 
falsely claim that others’ theses have committed the same 
faults as they have. Just like a foolish thief in the world, who 
has got caught but is not able to prove his innocence, 
establishes a reasoning by accusing others, “you are also 
thieves.” This is not said with close examination [of the issue 
concerned].305 
 
As already discussed, Bhāviveka’s reflexive thesis does not lead to the fallacy of 
self-contradiction. The logicians’ objections are unfounded. While they attempt to 
attribute the same fault to Bhāviveka, this only leads to a point of defeat called 
admission of an opinion (matānujñā) in Indian logic.306 Therefore, they have lost the 
debate.  
 

303 KR: UÞA[F'G\ß°Ö+À#FY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, 
304 Refer to Bhāviveka’s first response to Objection 8.  
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306 Vidyabhusana 1971, p. 89. 
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Lastly, Bhāviveka refutes the logicians’ claim that [2] his notion of “empty” means 
“absolutely non-existent”, and is a nihilistic view: 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270c1-c5) 
[2] And as what is said by them, “if ‘in terms of the ultimate 
truth, all conditioned things do not exist at all’ is the meaning 
stated by the thesis, then the thesis is denying the existence of 
everything. If this is what is established by this [your thesis], 
then [you] have fallen into the erroneous view”;307 here the 
meaning of this thesis, as explained at length before, is to state 
that “empty” and “without inherent existence” are of the 
character of a false appearance instead of claiming the non-
existence of all kinds [of conditioned things]. Therefore, you 
should not make such an objection [against us].308   
 
Bhāviveka points out again that the logicians have mistaken what is stated in the 
thesis – i.e. the ultimate emptiness of conditioned things in the ultimate sense – as 
absolute non-existence. This is due to their misunderstanding of emptiness and the 
system of the two truths. As has already been explained, this ultimate emptiness of 
conditioned things only means their lack of inherent existence, where both ultimate 
emptiness and the lack of inherent existence are likened to a false appearance. False 
appearances are mistaken as existent with an inherent existence, and commonly 
recognised as without an inherent existence, i.e. empty, ultimately. The conventional 
existence of false appearances and other conditioned things is not denied as they 
have indeed arisen. For this reason, to say that conditioned things are empty in the 
ultimate sense does not mean that they are empty in the sense of being non-existent 
even conventionally. Thus, Bhāviveka’s inference does not constitute a nihilistic 
view, and therefore it does not commit the fallacy of contradicting his own doctrine 
of the middle way; [2] is also unfounded. 
 

307 Unlike Hsu 2013, p. 195, this translation does not consider this quotation to be a new objection 
from the opponents, but understands it as Bhāviveka’s quoting of the opponents’ objection from the 
first part of Objection 8 to be the basis of his following response.   
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A.3.2.5 Establishing conditioned things as empty of inherent existence is not a 
nihilistic view 
In Objection 8, Bhāviveka has explained away the fallacy of self-contradiction 
leading from his reflexive thesis by clarifying that what is stated in this thesis is also 
allowed to be empty in terms of the ultimate truth. As the ultimate emptiness of 
conditioned things is proved in his thesis, opponents in this objection consider these 
things, which should have an inherent existence, to be non-existent in the absolute 
sense. Thus, they criticise Bhāviveka for affirming the ultimate emptiness of 
conditioned things or reifying the non-existence of these things with his reflexive 
thesis. They object as follows: 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270c6-c8) 
[Objection 9:] Again, there are other opponents, who are 
arrogant about their intelligence and make the following 
objection, “if the conditioned things are, in terms of the 
ultimate truth, like illusions, etc., which are empty and 
without an inherent existence, then they are non-existent. As 
[you] attach to [the notion that these things are] non-existent, 
[your view is] the view of non-existence.”309 
 
The characteristic of illusions is that they are taken as real as long as people do not 
realise that they are merely false appearances; but after people have realised this, 
they will no longer be taken as real. In Bhāviveka’s inference, conditioned things are 
likened to illusions. Although they are determinate objects of cognition 
conventionally, after being realised to be empty, they are no longer cognised as they 
were to be the objects of our conceptual knowledge. In other words, as determinate 
objects of cognition, conditioned things are non-existent in the ultimate sense. “In 
terms of the ultimate truth, conditioned things, as determinate objects of cognition, 
are non-existent” is therefore exactly what is stated by Bhāviveka’s thesis. 
 
To the opponents, Bhāviveka is too eager to refute the ultimate existence of thing. 
Consequently, he has affirmed the non-existence of things in the absolute sense. In 

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Bhāviveka’s terms, this means that he has falsely attached himself to the notion of 
absolute non-existence, and hence the nihilistic view which is one of the extremes 
his doctrine of middle way is meant to avoid. This would mean that he has 
contradicted his own doctrine. Bhāviveka denies this in his response:     
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270c8-c23) 
[Response:] They [the opponents] want to conceal the faults of 
their own thesis by slandering us deliberately. They would 
rather see both sides committing faults than letting the 
inference of the proponents of emptiness be established, 
because [they think that] it would deny the ultimate truth, 
which is a great fault. [However,] this which is stated [in my 
thesis] regarding “non-existent” is [only] to express the 
meaning of negation. You insist that this saying is mainly for 
affirmation [but] I would say that it is mainly for negation. 
This which is stated [in my thesis] regarding “non-existent” is 
only to negate “existence” (sattā). Then its capacity is 
exhausted and no longer has the efficacy to further express 
other meanings. Like when it is said in a worldly convention 
that “it is not a white silk cloth”, one cannot thereby assert that 
this saying is expressing “[the silk cloth is] black” and 
attribute the fallacy in establishing the thesis to the speaker. 
The saying of “it is not a white silk cloth” is only to negate “a 
white silk cloth”. Then its capacity is exhausted and no longer 
has the efficacy to further express that “it is a black silk cloth”, 
“it is a red silk cloth”, or “it is a yellow silk cloth”.     
 
In this treatise, in terms of the ultimate truth, [in order to] 
avoid the extreme view of eternalism in the sphere of 
cognition (gocara) of the conditioned things, “existence” is 
even negated. Thus, in remaining places, [in order to] avoid 
the extreme view of nihilism, “non-existence” (asattā) is 
negated. [In order to] avoid the two extremes [of eternalism 
and of nihilism], “existence” and “non-existence” are negated. 
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In order to avoid all remaining faults resulting from the false 
attachments, [we go as far as] to negate everything that our 
mind may cognise. As these objects of cognition cease, our 
[discriminative] mind follows them and ceases.  
 
And elsewhere, [the Buddha] says, “Ānanda, if one attaches 
oneself to existence, one then falls into the extreme of 
eternalism. If one attaches oneself to non-existence, one then 
falls into the extreme of nihilism.”310 Similarly, in another 
place, he says, “Kāśyapa, existence is one extreme, non-
existence is another.”311      
 
Due to these scriptures (āgama) and due to the reasonings we 
have explained, the thesis established by us is not anywhere 
near the dung-like fault [that is] the view of non-existence.312 
 
In his response, Bhāviveka quotes the sayings of the Buddha on the doctrine of the 
middle way, i.e., to avoid both extremes of eternalism and nihilism. The extreme of 
eternalism refers to the erroneous view concerning the ultimate existence of 
conditioned things, while the extreme of nihilism refers to the erroneous view 
concerning the absolute non-existence of these things. According to the Buddha, one 
should take the middle way by holding onto neither view. Bhāviveka sees the 
achievement of this middle way as the realisation of the ultimate emptiness of all 
things. It is to eliminate the conceptual proliferation of our discriminating mind, i.e. 
to stop cognising and discriminating things based on their false permanent, inherent 

310 See SN 44.10 (PTS: S iv 400); SN, vol. 34, no. 961 in CBETA, T2, no. 99, 245b18-b24. See also 
MMK 15.10-15.11.  
311 Staël-Holstein 1926, p. 90; see also Poussin 1933, p. 86, note 2. 
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natures.313 This applies to all dualistic terms including object and subject, non-
existence and existence, impermanence and permanence, non-emptiness and 
emptiness, etc. They are all to be refuted.  
 
To Bhāviveka’s opponents, if a thing is not ultimately existent, then it is absolutely 
non-existent; if it is not empty, then it is non-empty. To avoid affirming any of these 
dualistic terms, Bhāviveka clarifies that his negations are always non-implicative, i.e. 
they are supposed to negate the ultimate existence of conditioned things without 
implying the affirmation of the opposite of what is negated, i.e. their absolute non-
existence; see discussion in Section 3.3.3 in Part I. After all inherent natures of 
conditioned things are negated without remainder (i.e. after existence and non-
existence,314 non-emptiness and emptiness are also negated), the ultimate emptiness 
which is the middle way is achieved.     
 
Thus, Bhāviveka’s understanding of the ultimate emptiness is not a nihilistic view.  
His opponents take their own ultimate realities as absolute. They did not expect that 
Bhāviveka could go so far to admit the emptiness of the ultimate emptiness of 
conditioned things, hence accusing him of the said fault. Through this clarification, 
Bhāviveka has demonstrated that these problems are not applicable to his reasoning, 
but only to the opponents’.    
 
To this, the opponents counter-argue: 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270c25-c27) 
[Objection 9 cont.:] Some cannot bear to see the faults and 
objections accumulated towards the reasoning of their own 
thesis.  In order to hide [their faults], again, they say, 
“although the proponents of emptiness of inherent existence 
always delight in pursuing the non-discriminating wisdom, 
they often distinguish the emptiness of all conditioned things 
and unconditioned things. Thus, they have developed false 
discriminations, which are attachments generated from 

313 MMK 18.7-18.9.  
314 By the same token, the inherent natures of both existence and non-existence and of neither 
existence nor non-existence of things are to be negated as well; the same applies to other concepts.  
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pervasive conceptualisations (parikalpita)315, and [thereby] 
abandoned the thesis they delight in.”316   
 
The opponents claim that the ultimate emptiness of conditioned things is indeed 
discriminative in nature. This is because to establish his thesis, Bhāviveka has to 
distinguish conditioned and unconditioned things, emptiness and non-emptiness, 
which are precisely the kinds of conceptual proliferation his Mādhyamika doctrine 
aims to eliminate. In other words, the opponents argue that Bhāviveka has 
participated in the very conceptualisation of things that he himself claims to have 
eliminated. He has contradicted himself and given up his own doctrine. Thus, he 
cannot attain the non-discriminating wisdom. 
 
Here, Bhāviveka simply replies that he did not commit this fault: 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270c27) 
[Response:] We also negate these, therefore we do not commit 
this fault.317 
 
While he did not give any explanation of what are also negated, from the discussion 
above it can be understood that he means the negation of all inherent existence or 
natures, including those related to conditioned and unconditioned things, emptiness 
and non-emptiness, etc. When all inherent existence or natures are negated without 
remainder, the conceptualisation of them has also ceased. Thus, the non-
discriminating wisdom is achieved.  
 
A.4 The general quality, instead the particularities, of the subject should be 
taken up as the property that infers 
In the above objections, Bhāviveka has already refuted the opponents’ notion that 
things that are arisen are ultimately existent, and things that are empty of an inherent 
existence ultimately are absolutely non-existent. He has already demonstrated that 

315 Poussin 1933, p. 87 suggests “parikalpita” for “
(F”, which is a Yogācāra terminology; see 
objection 14. 
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the subject of his inference, the reason, the example and what is stated in the thesis 
can also be empty. Also, the ultimate emptiness of conditioned things is compatible 
with the conventional existence of these things. As the related objections have 
already been refuted, the opponents turn to object Bhāviveka’s reason, “because they 
arise from conditions”. They object as below: 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270c28-c29) 
[Objection 10:] Again, some other [opponents] say, “as to the 
reason for emptiness as given [by you], regardless of whether 
it is in the conventional sense or in the ultimate sense, [and 
whether] it is regarding oneself [i.e. your doctrine] or the 
others [i.e. your opponents’ doctrines], what is meant by this 
reason is not established.”318 
 
The opponents have mentioned two circumstances where that which is meant by 
Bhāviveka’s reason is unestablished. First, it is unestablished either conventionally 
or ultimately. Second, it is unestablished either in terms of one’s own doctrine or of 
other doctrines. The reason has therefore committed the fallacy of being 
unestablished to either one or both parties in the debate.  
 
Regarding the first circumstance, Bhāviveka’s opponents may consider the property 
that infers “arisen from conditions” unestablished ultimately because it is empty of 
an inherent existence in the ultimate sense. Thus, it is no longer real and able to 
function to prove the thesis. As already discussed, Bhāviveka does not aim to 
establish anything as absolute truth. Components in his inference are allowed to be 
empty in the ultimate sense. Therefore, the fact that what is stated by the reason is 
not established ultimately does not present a problem for Bhāviveka’s inference. As 
to whether Bhāviveka’s reason is unestablished conventionally, then this is related to 
the second circumstance, i.e. whether or not what is stated by this reason, which is 
by virtue of conventional speech, is commonly recognized.319    

318 KR: µÁ°Ö+FYÀ#)*#$%e=ñ%§, 
319  The source of this objection has not yet been identified. Nevertheless, in the record of Chapter 1 
of PSP, similar criticism in relation to the first circumstance and similar response from Bhāviveka 
which understands the criticism in terms of the second circumstance (see following discussion), are 
found; see also Poussin 1933, p. 87, note 2. In PSP, Bhāviveka also holds that only the relation of the 
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The opponents did not explain the second circumstance in their objection, and it is 
unclear why Bhāviveka’s reason is thought to be unestablished due to the said 
fallacy. I shall refer to Bhāviveka’s response to understand this objection:   
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270c29-271a9) 
[Response:] [As long as] the general quality [of the subject] is 
admitted by both parties [in the debate], the particularity 
(viśeAa) [of this property that is understood differently in 
individual parties] is not specified; as this is clearly accepted 
by the logicians as the reason, in the objection that you have 
raised, [our reason] only appears to have committed the 
fallacy of being unestablished instead of really being 
unestablished. For example, the Vaiśeṣikas hold that “sound is 
impermanent, because it has the nature of being produced.”320 
The proponents of the permanence of sound point out their 
faults by saying, “their reason can have different meanings321 
[as it can mean that] sound is produced by the throat, etc. or 
[that] sound is produced by a stick, etc.322 [Due to] this 

property that infers to its locus, in general terms, should be taken into account. (Stcherbatsky 1977, p. 
114-115)  
Candrakīrti, however, thinks that there is no such a problem in different understandings of 
the meaning of the reason by different parties in the debate (i.e. the second circumstance). There is 
rather the problem in different understandings of what the subject in general is, i.e. whether it is 
existent or not conventionally and ultimately, in different doctrines (i.e. the first circumstance). (Ibid., 
pp. 115-117) In PSP, he criticises [1] Bhāviveka’s use of logical reasoning, which is facilitated by his 
admittance of things’ inherent existence conventionally, in proving the ultimate emptiness of things. 
As Nāgārjuna has taught that one should not attempt to explain everyday ideas metaphysically, and 
the fact that the opponents and ordinary people do not understand dependent origination of the two 
truths, the ultimate reality or the inherent existence of things should be refuted both conventionally 
and ultimately. (Ibid., p. 112) Hence, “arisen from conditions”, being the property of conditioned 
things, should be unestablished both conventionally and ultimately. [2] As conditioned things do not 
exist in the ultimate sense, it is logically fallacious for Bhāviveka to take non-existent things as the 
subject – i.e. the locus of the property to be inferred and property that infers – in an inference. His 
reason is also unreal ultimately (ibid., pp. 113, 117, 119); cf. Bhāviveka’s discussion of the merely 
false conventionalities as inferential objects in Section 3.2.2 in Part I. 
320 VaiśeAika Sūtra, Book II, Chapter 2, 21-32. (Radhakrishnan and Moore 1989, pp. 390-391) 
321 Unlike the present translation, Poussin 1933, p. 87 does not understand “their reason can have 
different meanings” as part of the objection by the opponents of the Vaiśeṣikas’. The present 
translation rather agrees with the understanding in Hatani 1976, p. 110. 
322 The translation in Hsu 2013, p. 199 gives: [They] discriminate the reasoning [for their thesis] by 
asserting that [sounds] are produced by a throat or sticks, etc., for the sentence “E5%V
V” in the text (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271a3-a4). As the speakers here are the 
opponents of the Vaiśeṣikas’ who support the permanence of sound, according to Hsu’s translation, 
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difference323 [in the meanings of the reason], what is meant by 
[the Vaiśeṣikas’] reason is not established.” [And] for example, 
the Sāṃkhyas hold that “the five sense organs, including ears 
and others, are not derived matter (upādāya-rūpa), because 
they have the nature of the organs, like the mental organ 
(mana-indriya).”324 Proponents of the five sense organs, 
including eyes and others, as derived matter point out their 
faults by saying, “the reason ‘because they have the nature of 
the organs’ [has different meanings as it can mean that the 
organs] have the nature of being produced by the elements or 
[that] they take pleasure, etc. as their natures;325 [and whether] 
it is regarding oneself [i.e. the Sāṃkhyas’ doctrine] or the 
others [i.e. the doctrines of the Sāṃkhyas’ opponents], [due to] 
this difference [in the meanings of the reason], what is meant 
by [the Sāṃkhyas’] reason is not established.” [The reasons] 
in those two inferences [by the Vaiśeṣikas and by the 
Sāṃkhyas] appear to have committed the fallacy of being 
unestablished, but they are not really unestablished. Therefore, 
[the objections against them] are not reasonable. The same 
applies to [the opponents’ objection against us] here.326 
 

these opponents are attributing the fault of differentiating the particularities of the reason to the 
Vaiśeṣikas. However, the present translation instead attributes this fault to the Vaiśeṣikas’ opponents. 
This is because Bhāviveka states in his response that these particularities should not be specified and 
that all parties involved should agree on recognising a reason which is understood in terms of the 
general quality of the subject; and hence, the Vaiśeṣikas’ inference is not fallacious. See Commentary.   
323 “[Due to] this difference” is employed to translate the phrase “E5” (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 
271a4) in the present translation  due to the reason explained in footnote 322 above; unlike Poussin 
1933, p. 87 which understands it as “ainsi analysé”, and Hsu 2013, p. 199 as “thus”.  
324 In the Sāṃkhya doctrine of transformation, sense organs manifest before the elements, and the 
derived matter here is manifested after the elements; see also footnote 341 under Objection 13. 
325 Hsu 2013, p. 200 gives: The reason that those faculties can be the reason is because they are basic 
faculties like the five great elements or sattva, etc., for the sentence “#Ào0V
” in the text (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271a6-a7). This seems to be a mistranslation; see 
Commentary. 
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From Bhāviveka’s response, it can be understood that the opponents are objecting in 
terms of the generality of the property that infers, which is one of the properties of 
the subject of the inference. The opponents think that as the parties involved have 
individual understandings of the concept of this property, it is not legitimate to take 
up this property to be the reason. Yet, Bhāviveka holds that as long as all parties in 
the debate agree on the general quality of the subject and this quality is taken up as 
the property that infers, then this reason is legitimate; see discussion under Section 
3.2.1 in Part I. Bhāviveka also gives the examples of the inferences by the Sāṃkhyas 
and the Vaiśeṣikas to illustrate this: 
 
The Sāṃkhyas intend to establish the thesis “the five sense organs, including ears 
and others, are not derived matter” with the reason “because they have the natures of 
the organs”. Their opponents criticise the property that infers in their reason for 
having different meanings, as it can mean “having the nature of being produced by 
the elements” and the sense organs “taking pleasure, etc. as their natures”. If this 
property is understood in the sense of “having the nature of being produced by the 
elements”, then it is unestablished to the Sāṃkhyas, i.e. the proponents’ own 
doctrine, because they hold that elements are transformed from the organs. But if the 
reason is understood in the sense of “the organs taking pleasure, etc. as their natures”, 
then it is unestablished to the Sāṃkhyas’ opponents, i.e. other doctrines. This is 
because these opponents, who hold that the sense organs are derived matter, 
probably consider these organs as being produced from the elements, instead of 
being manifested from prak.ti to have the natures of pleasure, etc. Thus, the 
Sāṃkhyas’ reason is unestablished to their opponents because it has committed the 
fallacy of being unestablished to either oneself or the others.  
 
However, Bhāviveka considers the objection by the Sāṃkhyas’ opponents 
unfounded. Different doctrines have different understandings of the subject of an 
inference, and they attach particular meanings to it. Although the sense organs are 
“having the natures of the organs” to the Sāṃkhyas, some take this means the sense 
organs “having the nature of being produced by the elements” and others take this 
means the sense organs “taking pleasure, etc. as their natures”. These particular 
meanings, however, should not be taken up as the property that infers in the reason. 
This is because the purpose of an inference is to achieve common knowledge 
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between the proponents and the opponents of this inference. To facilitate this, all 
parties involved must recognise a property that infers, whose concept is common to 
them, to be the common ground for the inference to proceed. Hence, “having the 
natures of the organs” should remain as the property that infers, as long as all parties 
involved agree that the sense organs in their doctrines also possess this property.  
 
It is similar in the example of the Vaiśeṣikas, who intend to establish the thesis 
“sound is impermanent” with the reason “because it has the nature of being 
produced”. Their opponents criticise the property that infers in their reason for 
having different meanings, as it can mean “being produced by the throat, etc.” and 
“being produced by a stick, etc.” Thus, the Vaiśeṣikas’ inference is unestablished to 
the opponents. However, this objection is unfounded to Bhāviveka. This is because if 
all parties involved agree that sound in their doctrines possess the property “having 
the nature of being produced”, then this property is general enough to be taken up in 
the reason for an inference to take place. Hence, Bhāviveka holds that his reason 
only appears as unestablished, but in fact it is not. 
 
B. Conditioned things themselves are originally empty of an inherent existence 
Having solved the possible problems in the thesis and reason due to his proving of 
the emptiness of all conditioned things, in this section Bhāviveka starts to discuss 
different notions of emptiness and non-emptiness. Through the dispute on the nature 
of Bhāviveka’s example “illusions”, the following objections show that his 
opponents consider conditioned things as empty or not empty of something other 
than themselves. In Objection 11, they hold that these things are empty of the nature 
of other real things but not empty of an inherent existence. Similarly in Objection 12, 
they further hold that illusions are empty only in contrast to real things, but not 
empty of a substantial existence. In Objection 13, the Sāṃkhyas hold that nothing is 
empty because everything possesses the existence of everything. In Objection 14, the 
Yogācāras hold that things are empty when there is the existence of the dependent 
nature and the non-existence of the imagined nature in these things. Lastly in 
Objection 15, the opponents have mistaken that conditioned things are empty 
because their inherent existence is emptied by Bhāviveka’s logical reasoning. 
Bhāviveka refutes all these erroneous notions of other-emptiness and non-emptiness, 
and demonstrates that things are originally empty of a nature in themselves.      
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B.1 The view that an illusion is not empty of an inherent existence, but empty of 
the nature of a real thing is erroneous 
The opponents object as follows: 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271a9-a16) 
[Objection 11:] There are other opponents, whose eyes of 
wisdom are blinded and confused by their arrogance about 
their intelligence and by the attachment to their preferred 
doctrine. They are not able to examine the difference in the 
merits and demerits between the jewel of skilful explanation 
and the dirt of their own doctrines. They falsely show the fault 
in the example we stated by saying, “the power of mantras and 
herbs are added onto the flower, fruit, brick and other things to 
make various appearances of elephant, horse, rabbit, etc. 
manifest.327 [1] Our doctrine does not admit that they [i.e. the 
illusory appearances of elephant, etc.] are empty of an 
inherent existence. [Your inference] thus lacks a positive 
example, as [the property] to be inferred [i.e. empty] does not 
exist [in illusions]. [2] If you respond that ‘like the illusory 
appearances of elephant, horse, etc., which do not have the 
natures of other real elephants, horses, etc. and are designated 
as empty; eyes, etc. are the same [as these illusory 
appearances], and are established as empty because they do 
not have the natures of other things,’ then your thesis is 
fallacious because it [merely] establishes what has already 
been established.”328 
 

327 Poussin, p. 88, note 2 points out that the example of mantra and illusory elephant here is used in 
the Yogācāras’ definition of the three natures, for example in Vasubandhu’s Trisvabhāvanirdeśa, 
verses 27-30 in Anacker 2005, p. 294. The Yogācāra doctrine of the three natures will be treated by 
Bhāviveka in relation to Objection 14.  
328 KR: Áµfhje~¬>ow¢YÕ=eÞD¼45
/0F'¥¤°Ö+={_"=¡=VÎ++==àV9:01
~dUe¥ÜF'À°=V:ñ=V
YtVLZñ'AÜ~¤'¦§, 
179 

In [1], Bhāviveka’s opponents state that illusory appearances, i.e. illusions, are not 
empty. Bhāviveka thought that “illusions” (his example) were commonly recognised 
to be “arisen from conditions” and “empty” to be the common ground for his 
inference. As the emptiness of illusions is disuputed, they can no longer exemplify 
the positive concomitance between “arisen from conditions” and “empty” to his 
opponents. As these opponents probably also dispute the emptiness of all other 
conditioned things, they thus claim that Bhāviveka cannot provide any positive 
example to prove his thesis.       
 
In [2], the opponents’ discussion of the fallacy of establishing what has already been 
established has revealed they admit that conditioned things are empty under the 
circumstances where they are empty of the nature of other things. While they accept 
the illusory appearances as empty because they are empty of the nature of the real 
things they appear as, these very real things, which the arising of illusory 
appearances depend on, are not empty. This also applies to other conditioned things 
that are ultimately real. Thus, things are considered as empty not because they are 
empty of their inherent existence but because they lack the natures of other real 
things. Eyes, etc. are therefore similar to the illusory appearances of elephant, etc. in 
the sense that they are empty of the nature of other real things. If Bhāviveka intended 
to prove the same notion of emptiness, then he would be merely establishing what 
has already been established by his opponents.        
 
This objection shows that conditioned things can, to the opponents, be either empty 
of the nature of other things or not empty of an inherent existence. The difference 
between illusory appearances and real things has become unclear. On the one hand, 
the opponents seem to admit that the illusory appearances are less real than the real 
things, because the former do not possess the nature of the latter. On the other hand, 
they admit that both illusory appearances and real things have an inherent existence. 
Aiming at these points, Bhāviveka responds as follows:    
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271a16-a26) 
[Response:] Their objection is unfounded. [1] The 
appearances of elephant, horse, etc. produced from numerous 
conditions, which are the power of mantras and herbs added 
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onto the flower, fruit, brick and other things, are empty of the 
inherent existence of an elephant, [horse,] etc. As they are 
stated as the examples, [the thesis] to be established by them 
is established. 
 
[2] If you object again that “although the elephant, horse, etc. 
that are produced by magic do not have the natures of the 
other real elephants, horses, etc., it cannot be said that because 
they are empty of the nature of those [real things] therefore 
they are also empty of this nature [of being illusory]”; is it not 
whenever those [illusory things’] forms manifest, then there is 
the inherent existence of the very things manifested, just like 
the flower, fruit and other things that are admitted by you?329 
If so, then the elephant, horse, etc. that are produced by magic 
should in fact have the nature of the very elephants, horses, etc. 
[they appear as]; yet they do not. Therefore, one should know 
that everything produced by magic, including elephant, horse, 
etc., is empty of an inherent existence. For this reason, there is 
in fact such an example [i.e. illusion] as given [by us], and the 
thesis to be established by it is established. And because eyes 
and other conditioned things are established as empty in terms 
of the emptiness of a nature in themselves, neither do we 
commit the fault of establishing what has already been 
established.330 
 

329 Hsu 2013, pp. 201-202 and Hatani 1976, p. 111 take this question as part of the possible response 
from the opponents. Hsu 2013 translates it as “Don’t [you see] that if something appears as a certain 
figure, the nature of this certain figure must exist. The example will be the flowers and fruit that you 
accept” (“(U:01Ê;eFd"¡V”). This translation agrees 
with the translation in Poussin 1933, p. 89 and summary in Sastri 1949, p. 13, and considers it as 
Bhāviveka’s response; see discussion in Commentary.    
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The notion of emptiness which Bhāviveka holds is that conditioned things are 
originally empty of an inherent existence in themselves. They are not only empty of 
the nature of other things, as in the case of a jar, which is empty when it is empty of 
water. Regarding [1], Bhāviveka has denied that his positive example is illegitimate. 
The opponents’ notion of the emptiness of the nature of a real thing in illusory 
appearances is compatible with his notion of the emptiness of an inherent existence 
in these appearances. 
 
Emptiness to Bhāviveka is the lack of an inherent existence and of the nature of a 
false appearance, an illusion. When there is no more mantra, herb, flower or fruit, 
then the illusion will cease to exist. And people will understand that the illusion 
merely appeared as real but is in fact not. The same applies to the flower and fruit, 
which are the conditions for the arising and ceasing of the illusion; they may falsely 
appear as ultimate existents, though they lack unchanging, permanent existence. If 
there were no soil, water or sunshine, they would not exist at all. By the same token, 
the conditions for the arising and ceasing of soil, etc. are also conditioned by other 
conditions. They also lack inherent existence, and only falsely appear as ultimate 
existents. With further analysis, it can be understood that all conditioned things are 
the same – i.e. lacking an inherent existence. They are of the nature of a false 
appearance, and thus empty.  
 
The claim that some conditioned things are more real than others is untenable. This 
is not because these things all have an inherent existence. It is rather because they all 
lack an inherent existence. In the opponents’ words, they all lack the nature of a real 
thing, which is real because of its possession of an inherent nature or an ultimate 
existence. Thus, conditioned things are not different from an illusion. The opponents 
indeed admit that illusory appearances are empty of the nature of the real things in 
their objection. This is therefore compatible with Bhāviveka’s understanding of 
emptiness. Hence, it can be concluded that whatever has “arisen from conditions” is 
“empty” of an inherent existence. This positive concomitance is exemplified by the 
positive example, “illusions”. “Illusions” is an appropriate example because it can 
establish what it is expected to establish.  
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With his response to [1], Bhāviveka has expected the opponents will counter-argue 
that even though illusory appearances are empty of the nature of real things, they are 
not empty of the nature of themselves. Regarding [2], Bhāviveka points out that this 
standpoint, which holds all conditioned things have an inherent existence while the 
real things are more real than the illusory appearances, will only lead the opponents 
to an absurd consequence that they cannot accept. What makes an illusory 
appearance different from a real thing, for example, is that the latter has got a 
definite form, even perhaps a tangible body. For this reason, the real things, such as 
the flowers, fruit, etc. in the beginning of the objection, are taken as ultimately real, 
i.e. as having an inherent existence. In contrast, illusory appearances that lack such a 
definite form or tangible body remain as illusory, even though they appear like that 
the real things. Now the opponents claim that illusory appearances, e.g. an illusory 
elephant, like the real elephant, also have an inherent existence. They are then 
obliged to explain why an illusory elephant, which does not have a definite form, 
also has an inherent existence, like the ultimately real elephant.  
 
Before we see the defence from other opponents in Objection 12, Bhāviveka 
suggests that there are two possible responses which the opponents can take. The 
first is to admit the illusory elephant as real, and having the same inherent existence 
as the real elephant does. In Bhāviveka’s words, the illusory elephant then has the 
nature of the very elephant it appears to be. This amounts to admitting that the 
illusory elephant also has an ultimate existence like the real elephant, and is 
therefore a real elephant. Second, the opponents may give up their position and 
admit that illusory appearances are without an inherent existence. As the 
consequence in the first alternative is absurd and is not acceptable to the opponents, 
the opponents have to take the second alternative. From this, Bhāviveka has 
demonstrated that illusory appearances are also empty of an inherent existence. 
Therefore, his positive example, “illusions”, is legitimate. It exemplifies the positive 
concomitance of the properties “arisen from conditions” and “empty of an inherent 
existence”, and is able to establish the thesis it is expected to establish. And as 
Bhāviveka does not hold the notion of other-emptiness, his inference for the ultimate 
emptiness of an inherent existence of all conditioned things does not establish what 
has already been established between his opponents and him.  
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B.2 The view that an illusion is not empty of a substantial existence, but empty 
in contrast with a real thing is erroneous 
In defence of the view that illusory appearances also have an inherent existence, the 
opponents in this objection claim that illusions are empty only when compared with 
the real things. Their objection is as follows: 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271a27-271b1) 
[Objection 12:] Again, there are some other opponents, who 
have a different kind of wisdom to emptiness.331 They [make] 
another [objection] to point out the fault in our example, 
“although the illusory men are not real men therefore they are 
designated as empty, they are not empty of an inherent 
existence because there is the substantial existence of their 
appearances as falsely manifested men.332 Based on this 
reason, the meaning of the thesis [i.e. the ultimate emptiness 
of all conditioned things] is unestablished, like what has 
already been established in the previous [objection], because 
the example is not established.”333 
 
These opponents claim that an illusory man is empty because it is not a real man. 
Although it is arisen from conditions, its manifestation as a false appearance does 
have a substantial existence, i.e. it is not empty of an inherent existence in the 
ultimate sense. For this reason, the property to be inferred (“empty of an inherent 
existence”) in Bhāviveka’s inference is not present in all illusions, including his 
positive example. Therefore, the positive concomitance between the properties 

331 Poussin 1933, p. 89 seems to understand the opponents, “who has a different kind of wisdom to 
emptiness” in the present translation as “bien habiles” (“vidagdha”), as a variant of “	” of the 
Chinese term “	>” in the text (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271a27). Hsu 2013, p. 203 gives the 
translation: some others who possess the knowledge different from śūnyatā. The present translation 
rather understands the term to mean people with a different understanding of emptiness. This is 
because Bhāviveka has been attempting to refute other notions of emptiness since Objection 11. This 
understanding is similar to the one in Sastri 1949, p. 13.   
332 The source of this passage has not yet been identified. It is possibly from a Yogācāra source – in 
the doctrine of the three natures, conditioned things that have arisen from causes and conditions, as 
real things (vastu), are distinguished from the illusory things, as false concepts. Illusory things, while 
possessing the imagined nature (parikalpita-svabhāva, lit. the inherent nature of being imagined), are 
said to be empty in the sense of being essentially non-existent. See also discussion under Objection 14.    
333 KR: Á;µ	>A50¥¤Ö+;O(OYiUOe
./1O:Ba­F'%§¥§, 
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“arisen from conditions” and “empty” which was supposed to be exemplified by the 
positive example, “illusions”, is unestablished. This example has failed to establish 
the property to be inferred “empty” in the thesis, and has become illegitimate.  
 
It should be noted that Bhāviveka admits conditioned things as existent inherently in 
the conventional sense. The objection would not present a problem for his inference 
if the opponents only supported illusions for having an inherent existence in the 
conventional sense. However, the above objection claims that illusions are not empty 
ultimately as they have a substantial existence. To this, Bhāviveka responds:        
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271b1-b5) 
[Response:] Now we should ask them, “is the substantial 
existence of their appearances as falsely manifested men not 
arisen from conditions?” They give this answer, “It arises 
from conditions.” If so, why are [these illusory men] still 
designated as false? It is because [although they] are 
manifested as such, they do not exist as such. Is it not the 
same that eyes, etc. are also arisen from conditions, and do not 
exist [in the way which] they are manifested? As the positive 
examples are established, so is the emptiness of inherent 
existence [that is to be inferred in the thesis]. You should be 
convinced.334 
 
Bhāviveka’s response to this objection is simple. Supposing there really is a 
substantial existence in the illusory men, does this substantial existence also possess 
the property that infers, “arisen from conditions”, like eyes and other conditioned 
things?  
 
The illusory men arise with the presence of the conditions, and falsely appear as 
ultimate existents. They cease with the absence of the conditions, and then people 
understand their false nature. This shows that, without the conditions of arising, the 

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illusory men would not arise and be considered as having a substantial existence. 
Hence, this “substantial existence” of the illusory men is also dependent on 
conditions. It appears to be an unchanging, permanent inherent existence of the 
illusory things, but it ceases when the illusory things cease. Therefore, this 
“substantial existence” in fact does not qualify as such ultimately. It is also false in 
the ultimate sense. If the opponents accept such a “substantial existence” as 
impermanent, then their standpoint would be consistent with what Bhāviveka admits 
regarding the false conventional truth: i.e. that conditioned things are mistaken to 
have an inherent existence. For this reason, the opponents’ claim that illusory men 
have a substantial existence in the ultimate sense is untenable.        
 
While the substantial existence of illusory men is refuted, illusions are demonstrated 
as only having a conventional existence. They are both “arisen from conditions” and 
“empty” in the ultimate sense. Eyes and other conditioned things, which are arisen 
from conditions, are then inferred to also be empty in the same sense. Therefore, the 
opponents should be convinced that taking “illusions” as a positive example is not 
illegitimate.  
 
Still, the opponents defend their understanding of emptiness and counter-argue that 
illusory men are empty only when they are contrasted with real men: 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271b5-b9) 
[Objection 12 cont.:] They respond by saying, “we should not 
be convinced, as illusionary men are not like real men. With 
careful examination, these [illusionary men] are [considered] 
false in contrast to335 those real men, and therefore they are 
designated as empty. It is not like you who establish separate 
eyes, etc. apart from the aforesaid eyes and other conditioned 
things.336 With careful examination, [one would say that] this 

335 “In contrast to”, in the sense of contra-distinction (anyonya), is to translate “” in the text 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271b6).   
336 Hsu 2013, p. 203 translates this sentence as “In your case, you did not establish other eyes, etc. 
separated from the conditioned things of eyes” (“(V'ÚFYtV5tV”) (see 
CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271b8). This appears to be mistranslated to my understanding; see 
Commentary. 
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[thing] is designated in contrast to that [thing]; it is convincing 
that eyes, etc. are [designated as] empty [in this way].”337 
 
In their counter-argument, the opponents restate their standpoint that the emptiness 
of the illusory men must be designated in relation to the real men. That is to say, 
there must be some real men so that one can know that the illusory men are illusory. 
This implies that being “empty” is relative to being “not empty”, and therefore it is 
not the case that all conditioned things are empty ultimately as stated in Bhāviveka’s 
thesis. There are at least some conditioned things that are not empty ultimately for 
the emptiness of other things to be designated.   
 
The opponents also criticise Bhāviveka’s treatment of the emptiness of illusory 
things. They accuse him of establishing separate eyes, etc. apart from those real eyes 
and conditioned things mentioned in Objection 11. However, the reason for this 
criticism is not clear. It is possible the opponents consider that Bhāviveka has 
independently established that the empty eyes and other conditioned things as lack of 
a nature in themselves, but not in relation to other real eyes and conditioned things; 
that is to say, these conditioned things are empty even without contrasting with their 
real counterparts. If this is the case, then these opponents have indeed misunderstood 
Bhāviveka’s standpoint. He does not designate conditioned things, such as eyes, etc. 
as illusory or empty relative to the non-empty real eyes, etc. He does not wish to 
establish some conditioned things as empty, or even with “empty” as their inherent 
nature, while leaving other not empty conditioned things untackled. As already 
discussed in Objection 9, he aims to establish the ultimate emptiness of all 
conditioned things. The ultimate reality of emptiness is also to be refuted. In his 
response, Bhāviveka therefore clarifies that he does not commit himself to this view:  
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271b9-b19) 
[Response:] Although there are no separately-established eyes, 
etc. apart from the eyes and other [conditioned things] that are 
discussed here, there are “the emptiness of inherent existence” 
and “arisen from conditions” [so that] the property to be 

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inferred and the property that infers are both established. 
Therefore, this example alone is sufficient to establish [the 
second characteristic of a reason] which it exemplifies.338  
 
Bhāviveka holds that all things (including illusions, the so-called real conditioned 
things and even emptiness) are originally empty of an inherent existence in 
themselves; he will neither separately establish their ultimate reality nor their 
emptiness. Yet, conditioned things do have a conventional reality. Therefore, they 
are taken up as the subject in his inference, which possesses the property “arisen 
from conditions”. “Illusions” are also taken up as the positive example, which 
possesses both the property that infers, i.e. “arisen from conditions”, and the 
property to be inferred, i.e. “empty of an inherent existence ultimately”. As 
“illusions” have exemplified the positive concomitance of these two properties, 
based on this example it is sufficient to infer the ultimate emptiness of the 
conventionally real conditioned things. Hence, “illusions” is a legitimate example.    
 
Bhāviveka further points out that the opponents have fallaciously distinguished the 
property that infers and the property to be inferred in the example from those in the 
subject, by differentiating the particularities of these properties: 
 
Now as you differentiate [the properties of] the example from 
[those of] the subject, you have thereby committed the fallacy 
of differentiating properties which are of the same kind 
(vikalpasamajāti).339 To show the limited wisdom of such 
opponents; for example the Vaiśeṣikas say, “sound is 
impermanent, because it has the nature of being produced, like 
a jar.” One should not object by saying, “jars, etc. are 
produced by lumps of clay, a wheel, etc. They can be burnt, 

338 KR: 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339 Poussin 1933, p. 90, note 1 suggests to understand “E5=¥5” (“differentiating the property 
of the subject and of the example”) in the Chinese text (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271b11) as “E5¥
5” (“differentiating the particularities of the property of the example [from that of the subject]”) 
because the definition of vikalpasamajāti in PS is “to state the particularities of the positive [example]” 
and in Nyāyakośa is “the example certainly possesses the property which is inferred, [but the opposite 
party makes it ambiguous by] stating different peculiarities.” This translation follows Poussin’s 
understanding. 
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they can be seen, and they can be broken with a stick. 
Therefore, they are impermanent. However, these do not apply 
to sound, [therefore sound] should not be impermanent.” As 
[the Vaiśeṣikas’ opponents] here have also differentiated [the 
properties of] the example from [those of] the subject, they 
have committed the fallacy of differentiating properties which 
are of the same kind. Hence, you should be convinced that 
eyes, etc. are empty of an inherent existence because [the 
property to be inferred] “empty of an inherent existence” [in 
the thesis] is not apart from [the property that infers] “arisen 
from conditions” in the reason.  
 
And [as the view regarding] “whenever the forms [of the 
things] manifest, they then have an inherent existence” has 
already been refuted in previous [objection], so should [the 
eyes and other conditioned things discussed] here. Therefore, 
what you have said cannot resolve the faults of your own 
doctrines.340   
 
Bhāviveka gives an example of the Vaiśeṣikas’ opponents to illustrate this fallacy. 
The Vaiśeṣikas hold that sound is impermanent, because they are produced, like a jar. 
However, their opponents claim that the jar is produced by lumps of clay, etc. and it 
can be destroyed by a stick, etc. Although it is reasonable that the jar is impermanent, 
the same does not apply to sound. Sound is not produced by lumps of clay, etc. and 
neither can it be destroyed by a stick, etc. Therefore – argue the opponents – sound 
cannot be impermanent. In fact, being produced by lumps of clay is only one of the 
many ways of being produced; it is a particular way of production. The class of 
“produced” includes “produced by lumps of clay” as well as “produced by the throat” 
and many others. Similarly, being destroyed by a stick is only one of the many 
indications of a thing being impermanent. The class of “impermanent” includes other 

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ways of destruction. As long as sound is produced by one of the many possible 
causes, then it is produced; and as long as sound is destructible, then it is 
impermanent. If the property “being produced by lumps of clay” can infer the 
impermanence of a jar, then the impermanence of sound is also inferable by “being 
produced by the throat.” It is fallacious to take the impermanence to be inferred by 
the production by the throat as different from the impermanence which is inferred by 
the production by lumps of clay.  
 
Bhāviveka’s opponents have also committed the fallacy of differentiating properties 
which are of the same kind, firstly, by distinguishing the property that infers in the 
example from that in the subject. In Objection 11, the opponents mentioned that the 
arising of illusions is different from that of real things. An illusory elephant is 
manifested under the condition when the power of mantras and herbs are added onto 
the flower, etc., while the real elephant is arisen from other real conditioned things, 
such as the elephant mother, etc. Although the ways of arising of the illusory 
elephant and the real elephant are different, they both are arisen from conditions. 
This is because the class of “arisen from conditions” includes both “arising from the 
power of mantras, etc.” and “arising from other conventionally real conditioned 
things”.  
 
Second, the opponents have differentiated the property to be inferred in the example 
from that in the subject. In Objections 11 and 12, the opponents consider both 
illusions and real things as having an inherent existence. Illusions are considered as 
illusory and empty because they lack the nature of a real thing, while the real things 
are empty only because they lack the nature of other real things. While it is not 
disputed that one thing lacks the nature of other things, whether or not all these 
conventionally real things lack an ultimately real inherent existence is still in 
question, and is therefore under examination by Bhāviveka’s inference.   
 
As both the property that infers (“arisen from conditions”) and the property to be 
inferred (“empty of an inherent existence”) occur in “illusions”, this example has 
exemplified the positive concomitance between these two properties, and is therefore 
legitimate. The opponents might wish to take up their argument in the beginning of 
Objection 12 (i.e. whatever manifests, although being a false appearance, should 
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have an inherent existence ultimately) again to support the possession of an inherent 
existence by the conventionally real eyes, etc. However, this objection has already 
been refuted in relation to illusions. As these conventionally real things are also 
arisen from conditions, they are therefore inferred to be “empty of an inherent 
existence” based on the said positive concomitance. The opponents have failed to 
resolve the problem generated by their understanding of emptiness. 
 
B.3 The view that everything is not empty of the existence of everything is 
erroneous 
Bhāviveka presents the Sāṃkhyas in this objection as having a more radical view 
than the opponents in Objections 11 and 12. They hold that all things, including 
illusions, are not empty, in the sense that they are not empty of the existence of all 
things in themselves. Their objection is as follows:  
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271b20-b23) 
[Objection 13:] Some Sāṃkhyas make the following objection, 
“we hold that things of transformation (pari9ama) such as 
mahat,341 etc. are in the nature of being manifested (vyakta). 
[Therefore,] the reason ‘[they] arise from conditions’ has 
committed the fallacy of being unestablished. As everything 
has the existence of everything, [just] as the organs 

341 Mahat refers to the intellect (buddhi), which is one of the twenty-five realities (tattva) in Sāṃkhya 
doctrine. The twenty-five truths include puruAa, prak.ti, the intellect, the ego (aha>kāra), the mind 
(manas), the five subtle elements (tan-mātra), the five sense organs (buddhi-indriya), the five action 
organs (karma-indriya) and the five gross elements (mahā-bhūta). (SS in CBETA, T54, no. 2137, 
1245c3-c6). 
 PuruAa and prak.ti co-exist and are both unproduced. PuruAa is the pure consciousness 
(cetanā), which only has the nature of consciousness. It is the knower and pervades in every living 
being. (SS in CBETA, T54, no. 2137, 1249c5, c12) Prak.ti is the primordial matter, which is only of 
a material nature. It encompasses all existents, except puruAa and prak.ti itself, and therefore is their 
cause, i.e. the pradhāna, meaning the first cause. (SS in CBETA, T54, no. 2137, 1245c11-c12) The 
intellect is responsible for apprehension (adhyavasāya). (SK  23; SS in CBETA, T54, no. 2137, 
1250c18-c19) On the one hand, it is also called mahat (lit. the Great One) and is pervasive because 
from it things in the universe transform. On the other hand, it is also called understanding (sa>vitti), 
knowledge (mati) and wisdom (prajñā) because of its ability to cognise. (SS in CBETA, T54, no. 
2137, 1250c2-c4) The ego is the self-awareness (abhimāna) and self-appropriation. (SS in CBETA, 
T54, no. 2137, 1251b13-b15) The five subtle elements are matter (rūpa), sound (śabda), smell 
(gandha), taste (rasa) and touch (sparśa). The five sense organs include eyes (cakAus), ears (śrotra), 
nose (ghrā9a), tongue (rasana) and skin (tvac). The five action organs are mouth (vāc), hands (pā9i), 
feet (pāda), genitalia (upastha) and the anus (pāyu). The mind, which is both a sense organ and an 
action organ, is the organ that is responsible for discrimination (sa>kalpaka). (SS in CBETA, T54, no. 
2137, 1252a2-a4) The five gross elements are earth (p.thivī), water (ap), fire (tejas), wind (vāyu) and 
space (ākāśa). See also MHK/TJ 6.1. 
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(indriya)342 pervade everywhere,343 there is also this existence 
[of these organs] in those illusionary men.344 [If you wish to] 
establish that these things are empty in nature, then there will 
be no positive example.”345 
 
This objection is based on Sāṃkhya’s doctrines of transformation (pari9amavāda) 
and the pre-existence of effect in cause (satkāryavāda) in relation to the permanent 
existence of puruAa and prak.ti, which are the first two of the twenty-five realities in 
Sāṃkhya. PuruAa is purely consciousness, while prak.ti is purely material. They are 
the all-pervading substances from which all things in the universe transform or 
manifest. Mahat and the organs mentioned in the objection are parts of the twenty-
five realities transformed from prak.ti. From these realities, the rest of things in the 
universe, including the illusory men, manifest.      
 
According to the Sāṃkhya doctrine of transformation, all other things in the universe 
are manifested from prak.ti with the help of puruAa, due to the latter’s desire to see 
the three constituents of the former.346 Prak.ti is identified with its three constituents 
(trigu9a), namely sattva, rajas and tamas, meaning goodness, passion and darkness. 
Sattva is of the nature of pleasure (sukha). Rajas is of the nature of suffering 
(duGkha). Tamas is of the nature of confusion (moha).347 The three constituents are 

342 In Hsu 2013, p. 205, “organs” here are understood as “prak.ti” and translated as “substance”. This 
is unlikely because the character “;” in the Chinese text (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271b22) indicates 
that the noun “#” that follows should be plural. Prak.ti is always singular in Sāṃkhya.  
343 Poussin 1933, p. 91 renders “tout āyatana” for “`qí” (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271b22). It is 
not sure whether or not Poussin understands āyatana as the twelve object spheres, i.e. the six sense 
faculties and their respective objects, in the Buddhist sense. The Buddhist concept of āyatana in the 
sense of the twelve object spheres would rather refers to the five subtle elements (tanmātra) and the 
five sense organs (buddhi-indriya) in Sāṃkhya. The two sets of concepts are not equivalent. In 
Sāṃkhya, subtle elements are not objects of sense perception, while the organs also include the five 
action organs (karma-indriya). Therefore, this translation renders “`qí” in terms of its literal 
meaning as “all (`q) places (í)”, i.e. everywhere, instead of “object spheres” in the Buddhist sense.  
344 To my knowledge, the argument for the organs being also existent in the illusory men, as presented 
by the Sāṃkhyas here, is not found in Bhaviveka’s PP or MHK, or in other works discussing 
Sāṃkhya’s doctrine of transformation or manifestation.   
345 KR: ÞfßÖ+'oV;¦§¨F0§¤`q^
`q;#
`qíUObLa'a¥, 
346 SK 21; see also SS in CBETA, T54, no. 2137, 1250b5-b6. As puruAa only has the nature of 
consciousness and prak.ti only has a material nature, their cooperation to create the universe is 
compared to a lame person (puruAa), who knows the way but cannot walk, and a blind person 
(prak.ti), who can walk but does not know the way; the blind puts the lame on his shoulder and the 
two eventually arrive at where they want to go, i.e. creating the universe. (SS in CBETA, T54, no. 
2137, 1250b14-b20) 
347 SS in CBETA, T54, no. 2137, 1247c15-c19. 
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co-existent and interactive. Before the influence of puruAa, there was the equipoise 
(sāmyāvasthā) between the manifestation of sattva, the activity of rajas and the 
restraint of tamas, and therefore prak.ti did not transform.348 However, with the 
influence of puruAa, the efficacy of one constituent has overpowered the others’, 
then prak.ti starts to transform. Through the constant tension and ever-changing 
balance of the three constituents, prak.ti transforms into different things.349 First it 
transforms into mahat. From mahat, there appears the ego, then the subtle elements, 
the eleven organs, the five gross elements, and eventually all other things in the 
universe are made up by the five gross elements.350 Sāṃkhya holds that all things in 
the universe, except puruAa and prak.ti itself, are transformed from prak.ti, which is 
identified with the three constituents.  Prak.ti is therefore compared to water which 
can transform into rain, steam inter alia in different circumstances, but the 
transformed things in nature are still water.351 While all things have the three 
constituents, of different weights, in their composition, their existence is considered 
ultimately real.   
 
The Sāṃkhya doctrine of the pre-existence of effect in cause is shown in their proof 
for the ultimate existence of prak.ti, which is the first cause of the universe. Even if 
some sandalwood is broken into pieces, the pieces are still in nature sandalwood. 
Likewise, although manifested things are not prak.ti, they are of the same nature as 
prak.ti. This is because both the prak.ti and the manifested things have the three 
constituents.352 As the three constituents are in fact prak.ti, the manifested things are 

348 Sinha 1952, p.15; see also SK13, SS in CBETA, T54, no. 2137, 1248a24-a25 and the TJ following 
MHK 6.25. 
349 SK 16.  
350 HE noted a different sequence of transformation which is recorded in the TJ following MHK 6.1 - 
there is the transformation of prak.ti into mahat, then the ego and the subtle elements; only after the 
subtle elements are transformed, they either transform into the eleven organs or the five gross 
elements. (HE 2011, p. 40, 258) 
351 SS in CBETA, T54, no. 2137, 1249a7-a8, 1249a22-a23; see also SS in CBETA, T54, no. 2137, 
1247b23-b24. 
352 This is the second of the five reasons for the ultimate existence of prak.ti in SS. The same 
argument is found in KR: ;0.+	;+	`q^s©ª
V0.+	 (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 275b18-b20) The five reasons are: 
(1) from the fact that different kinds of manifested things exist with a certain quantity, one can know 
that there must be a cause from which these things are produced. Otherwise, things would not exist 
with a particular quantity and would not exist at all. Like the potter produces certain amount of pots 
from the lumps of clay, one therefore knows that there must be a cause, which is prak.ti, for the 
things in the universe; (2) from the fact that even if some sandalwood is broken in pieces, the pieces 
are still sandalwood, one therefore knows that although manifested things are not prak.ti, they are of 
the same nature as prak.ti; they all have the three constituents; (3) as a potter only has the efficacy to 
produce a pot but not a cloth, the production of the pot is dependent on the specific efficacy which is 
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considered pre-existent in prak.ti, while prak.ti goes on existing in the manifested 
things even after it has transformed into them. This doctrine is understood by the 
Sāṃkhyas in relation to the causation of manifested things as “change”, like milk 
changes into yoghurt.353 It is not like a mother giving birth to a child, in which the 
mother and the child are independent and different entities. In the case of milk 
changing to yoghurt, the milk, as the cause, changes into the yoghurt, as the effect, 
while it goes on existing, although in the form of yoghurt. Hence, in this kind of 
causality, the cause is different from the effect due to their different compositions 
and our perception, but they are not independent and therefore not completely 
different from each other because of the continuation of the cause’s existence in the 
effect. In this way, the constant relationship between a particular cause and its 
particular effects is guaranteed. That is to say, a particular cause is considered as 
only changing into effects that are related and similar to it. Otherwise, it would be 
able to change into anything in the universe. Due to the constant change into yoghurt 
from milk, there is the pre-existence of yoghurt in milk.  
 
In their objection, the Sāṃkhyas claim that since all manifested things, including 
mahat, are transformed from prak.ti, they pre-exist in prak.ti and are as permanent 
and all-pervading as prak.ti. Thus, the appearance of any manifested things should 
only be due to manifestation instead of production by the conditions. Hence, they do 
not recognise Bhāviveka’s reason, “because they arise from conditions”, in the sense 
that conditioned things are produced. The first characteristic of a reason, i.e. the 
pervasion of “conditioned things” by “arisen from conditions”, is violated. As this 
reason is not recognised by all parties in debate, it has committed the fallacy of being 
unestablished.  
 

in turn dependent on the potter; from this one knows that the efficacy to produce the manifested 
things in the universe is dependent on prak.ti; (4) there is a cause which is different from its effect, 
just like the lump of clay, as cause, cannot hold water, but its effect, the pot can. Hence, one knows 
that there must a cause, i.e. prak.ti, which is different from its effects, i.e. the manifested things; (5) 
as all things before manifestation are without difference, there must be something which is different 
from them that produces them. From this one knows that the gross elements, the eleven organs, the 
subtle elements, the ego and the intellect are not different from each other before they are transformed 
from prak.ti and hence, without prak.ti there would not appear any things, which are different from 
each other, in the universe. (SK15; SS in CBETA, T54, no. 2137, 1248c4-1249a3) Similar reasons 
can be found in MHK/TJ 6.25-6.26; see also discussion in HE 2011, p. 41-43.  
353 SS in CBETA, T54, n. 2137, 1249a13-a17. 
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Neither do the Sāṃkhyas recognise Bhāviveka’s thesis, “all conditioned things are 
empty”, in the sense that these things do not exist in the ultimate sense. The 
Sāṃkhyas give the reason “everything has the existence of everything” to support 
their objection. Based on this reason, all the organs should exist in all places, and 
therefore these organs should also exist in the illusory men, granted that illusory men 
are also manifested things. Hence, the property “empty” to be inferred for the subject 
(i.e. conditioned things) is in fact contradictory to the implication of this subject 
(dharmi-viśeAa), i.e. being “permanent” or “all-pervading”.  
 
Under the Sāṃkhya doctrine, the manifested things thus neither possess the property 
that infers (“arisen from conditions”) nor the property to be inferred (“empty of 
inherent existence”). If they were to be established as empty of inherent existence in 
the ultimate sense by Bhāviveka, then Bhāviveka would be unable to give any 
positive example that possesses both properties to establish his inference.  
   
But what do the Sāṃkhyas mean by “everything has the existence of everything”? 
This standpoint is rare in Sāṃkhya literature. In YB, Sāṃkhya’s doctrine of the pre-
existence of effect in cause is understood as a doctrine of manifestation of effect by 
conditions.354 The Sāṃkhyas hold that all things in nature are existent. As they have 
already existed entirely, they need not be produced again. Therefore, their 
appearance is only due to the manifestation instead of the production by 
conditions.355 The efficacy of a cause is only to manifest an effect. Following this 

354 YB: M0ÇÞA`À«2À¬­2 s'ÞÖ+`q;®
M0M,Êb¡ÞA¯(°Ö+ðb¡
ÞAs;b¡M0±ð,Ö+BÍZ¯U\Ö¡ÁM
ª­i( ±§¡UÁG± ð(0Ç¡±ðU
/E5¦'0ÇÞ,(CBETA, T30, no. 1579, 304a12-a22); see also Yang 1995, p. 218-
219.  
355 Obstruction is one of the eight circumstances where existent things cannot be perceived: when (1) 
they are too far away (atidūrāt); (2) they are too close (sāmīpyāt); (3) the organs are deficient 
(indriya-ghātāt); (4) the mind is distracted from the object (mano ’navasthānāt); (5) they are too 
small (sankAmyāt); (6) they are obstructed by other things (vyava-dhānāt); (7) they are overpowered 
by other things (abhibhavāt); (8) they are mixed with similar things (samāna-abhihārāt). (SK 7; SS in 
CBETA, T54, no. 2137, 1246b10-b17) 
Under the doctrine of manifestation by conditions, the cause can at the same time be the 
cause to manifest the effect and be the obstruction to the manifestation of this effect. The cause thus 
has a contradictory nature, i.e. being manifesting and obstructive to its effect. Indeed, right after 
Asa[ga’s introduction of the doctrine of manifestation by conditions in YB, the consequence of this 
doctrine is criticised. Asa[ga asks whether there is the obstruction to the manifestation of the effect in 
relation to whether or not the cause as the obstruction is existent. If the cause as the obstruction does 
not exist while there is the obstruction to the manifestation of the effect, then it is not reasonable that 
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logic, the effect which is the perception of the yoghurt should have already existed in 
mahat and also be permanent. Mahat, the ego, the mind, the eyes, the yoghurt are 
only to manifest the perception of the yoghurt. Hence, the perception of the yoghurt 
should pre-exist alongside all other perceptual cognitions and manifested things in 
mahat. This understanding would mean that all manifested things, as effects of 
prak.ti, have pre-existed in prak.ti entirely and as ultimately real and permanent as 
prak.ti. Further, as prak.ti is all-pervading and has the efficacy to transform into any 
manifested thing, all manifested things, as particular states of prak.ti,356 can also 

there is the obstruction to the manifestation of the effect. Neither is it reasonable if the cause as the 
obstruction exists at the same time while there is the obstruction to the manifestation of the effect 
because this cause, which is also an effect, should also be obstructed. Like the darkness can conceal 
the water in the pot, it can also conceal the pot. However, if the cause, which is an effect, is also 
obstructed by the cause as the obstruction, then the cause that manifests the effect should also be 
obstructed. In this case, it is not reasonable to say that there is the pre-existence of effect in the cause 
that manifests this effect because the cause cannot be manifested at all. Therefore, if there is the 
obstruction to the manifestation of the effect, then it would become absurd for the cause to both 
obstructs and manifests its effect, regardless of whether the cause is existent or not. Hence, the notion 
of obstruction is refuted.    
After this, Asa[ga further examines the nature of obstruction: whether the nature of 
existence, i.e. the pre-existence of effect in cause, or the nature of the effect itself is the obstruction to 
the manifestation of the effect. It is not reasonable that the pre-existence of the effect in the cause is 
the obstruction to the manifestation of the effect because this pre-existence is permanent and the 
effect would never be manifested. The cause, which is also an effect, should not be manifested either. 
Neither is it reasonable that the nature of the effect itself is the obstruction to the manifestation of the 
effect, otherwise the same thing would be the cause, which has an obstructive nature, and the effect at 
the same time. Then, the sprout would at the same time be the seed, and the fruit would at the same 
time be the stem, etc. It is not reasonable also because the effect would at the same time be manifested 
and not manifested. Therefore, the effect, regardless of whether it is pre-existent or manifested, is not 
the obstruction to the manifestation of itself. To conclude, no reasonable explanation to obstruction 
can be obtained regardless of whether it is considered in relation to the cause or to the effect. Hence, 
Sāṃkhya’s notion of causation in terms of obstruction and manifestation is refuted.  
See YB: ªe°UÖ+FkðmGmðm±ðÀmA
mGmª­ÀmA²¡3mðª­
·³m´bµLom´À°mLmALª0E_mG°0b¡
0Aª­,Áª°UÖ+mð¡±ðÀmA
ÊÙ0Çª­LmðÀ°¡mA-`LL¡
¶+=¡·VÊ`L0=0ª­ (CBETA, T30, no. 1579, 304a22-
b5); see also Mikogami 1969, p. 443-444.  
Bhāviveka’s response in the following discussion of the absurdity of “everything has the 
existence of everything” in terms of manifestation may be compared with the second option of the 
first argument by Asa[ga. While both of them show the absurd consequence that neither the cause nor 
the effect could be manifested, instead of considering the problem based on the contradictory nature 
of the cause, Bhāviveka considers it in terms of the effect to show the problem when everything can 
be manifested from everything. See Commentary.  
356 This commentary generally understands all manifested things as different states of prak.ti, the 
substance that transforms into or manifests itself through different states. Watanabe points out that as 
recorded in Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa-bhāAya, the Sāṃkhyas explain the process of 
manifestation in terms of dharma and dharmin, property and substance. While as recorded in 
Dharmakīrti’s works, they understand the manifested things as “states” (avasthā) so that the 
disappearance of one state does not affect the continuous existence of prak.ti. Watanabe seems to 
consider the second understanding a better explanation of the impermanence of things. (Watanabe 
2011, pp. 559-560) It is not clear whether or not the Sāṃkhyas understand manifestation as “states” in 
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transform into anything else, being some other states of prak.ti. Hence, milk does 
not only possess the existence of yoghurt, but also the existence of a cow and a pot. 
By its own disappearance, milk can let the yoghurt, the cow or the pot manifest. In 
this case, manifested things, being permanent and pre-existent effects, should all 
manifest at the same time in all places and all times (see [2] below). Consequently, 
the universe should be static.357  
 
The ultimate unreality of prak.ti and puruAa as unconditioned things will be dealt 
with in relation to the second inference in the proof of emptiness,358 which is not 
included in this Commentary. In his response, Bhāviveka attempts to establish the 
ultimate emptiness of the manifested things in three parts: [1] these things are 

Bhāviveka’s time. While Bhāviveka is not going to criticise the Sāṃkhya doctrine of manifestation 
the same way as Vasubandhu and Dharmakīrti do in Watanabe 2011, to give a more favourable 
reading of this doctrine, this commentary follows Dharmakīrti in taking manifested things as states of 
prak.ti. 
357 However, it will be problematic for the Sāṃkhyas to hold this extreme form of the pre-existence of 
effect in cause. This is because “everything has the existence of everything” in this sense would mean 
the effect also has the existence of its cause and things unrelated in the causal chain. It will lead to 
arbitrariness in causation, which is not acceptable to the Sāṃkhyas. Thus, the Sāṃkhya doctrine of 
the pre-existence of effect in cause may have been misrepresented in YB or even in KR. 
 There is an alternative interpretation of “everything has the existence of everything”: while 
all manifested things are in nature prak.ti and particular states of prak.ti, it can also mean that these 
manifested things all consist of the three constituents, which are identified with prak.ti. In this way, 
every manifested thing is pervaded by it and they all pervade each other in a weak sense. Then, 
manifested things, as effects of prak.ti, are not required to pre-exist in prak.ti in entirety, or be as 
ultimately real and permanent as prak.ti. As effects, they are only required to pre-exist in their causes 
to the extent that there is some guaranteed continuity between the causes and the effects. They are 
transformed from their causes so that they are conditioned by the limited efficacy or peculiar 
composition of the causes. Thus, one state of prak.ti, as cause, has a composition similar to the next, 
as effect. Hence, in their objection the Sāṃkhyas mean nothing more than “all places, including the 
organs and illusory men, which are all transformed from and pervaded by prak.ti, consist of the three 
constituents” by “everything has the existence of everything”. In this sense, they have the existence of 
each other.  
The ultimate emptiness of manifested things discussed above is provable to Bhāviveka, as 
now “being manifested” means to be conditioned by and similar to the cause, which is also true of 
other conditioned things. The ultimate emptiness of things in Bhāviveka’s system of the two truths 
does not refute the common knowledge which is recognised by the world. In terms of the false 
conventional truth, it is acceptable for the Sāṃkhyas to claim that the manifested things are in nature 
prak.ti (or the three constituents), provided that these things are not taken as ultimate existents. If 
they also agreed with the reason that manifested things are produced by conditions, then Bhāviveka’s 
inference is established.  
Sāṃkhya holds that manifested things, as certain states, appear due to the transformation of 
the cause, which is ultimately the permanent and all-pervading substance, prak.ti. This shows that the 
real conflict between the Sāṃkhyas and Bhāviveka lies in whether there is such a permanent and all-
pervading prak.ti that transforms into the manifested things. Bhāviveka did not discuss this reading of 
the doctrine of the pre-existence of effect in cause in KR perhaps because of his intention to discuss 
the first characteristic of a reason in the first inference in his proof of emptiness. It may also be 
because manifested things in this sense are not so much in conflict with the ultimate emptiness of 
conditioned things to become an object of refutation in the discussion here. If he can refute the 
existence of prak.ti, then the Sāṃkhyas will lose the reason for their doctrine of transformation, 
which is established hand-in-hand with the pre-existence of effect in cause. 
358 See KR in CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 275b1-b15, b16-c9.  
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conditioned by the conditions from which they manifest; [2] the standpoint regarding 
everything having the existence of everything will lead to an absurd consequence 
that only one thing is perceivable; and [3] Sāṃkhyas’ view that the real men do not 
manifest where the illusory men manifest is compatible to the latter’s ultimate 
emptiness of inherent existence. Bhāviveka starts his response as follows: 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271b23-c3) 
[Response:] [1] Let us examine [our reason “because 
conditioned things arise from conditions”] in terms of the 
cognitions of matter. We would say that the cognitions of 
matter are not manifested by conditions because they change 
according to those other conditions. For example, jars, pots, 
etc., be they large or small, come into existence according to 
numerous different conditions such as lumps of clay, wheels, 
sticks, the preferences in the potter’s mind, etc. Thus, different 
cognitions of matter [that arise from] numerous conditions 
such as eyes, etc. change according to those various [different 
conditions]; because according to whether the eyes are clear or 
unclear, the cognitions are then sharp or dull; because 
according to the different objects of cognition such as the 
colour blue, etc., there appear different cognitions such as the 
blue-like cognition, etc. [The Sāṃkhyas may hold that] 
“things presently seen in the world are manifested things, 
which do not change according to differences in those 
conditions, like the round bracelets and various other things 
that are manifested by bright lamps, herbs, gems, the sun, etc.” 
But it is not true of the cognitions of matter. The same 
[conclusion can be reached] regarding eyes, etc. if one 
examines the cognitions of matter. This meaning is established 
as true and is commonly recognised by [people in] the world. 
Therefore, the reason which is given [by us] does not commit 
the fallacy of being unestablished.359   

359 KR: abôÑ9âw¢;9â(F0WU5¦	W ¡=¢==¸
f<k0V45*=´Vo¹tV459âWU++¦	W
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Supposing manifested things pre-exist entirely in their causes – their causes’ only 
efficacy being to manifest them – these things will be manifested in exactly the way 
they exist in their causes. This means that their causes would not make any 
difference to their effects. These manifested things are therefore considered as 
having an unconditioned existence. Thus, round bracelets and various other things 
that are manifested by bright lamps, etc. are perceived by the Sāṃkhyas as not 
changing regardless of the change in conditions. In [1], Bhāviveka attempts to clarify 
that these manifested things, as effects, are indeed conditioned by the conditions 
from which they manifest. Their pre-existence in causes and permanent existence are 
not justified by the seemingly unchanging perception of them.  
 
Although the existence of manifested things, as effects, is established by perception, 
their being perceived as unchanging does not exclude the possibility that they have 
gone through a causal process before they are perceived. In reality, particular effects 
can only be manifested by particular causes. For example, there might be a pot, some 
yoghurt, a cloth and all other things pre-existing in the lump of clay, according to the 
Sāṃkhya doctrine. If there is a potter working on the lump of clay, then only a pot 
can manifest as the effect. If there is a weaver working on some thread, then a cloth 
will manifest as the effect instead. The appearances of the pot resulting from each 
production by the potter also differ. If the potter prefers to make a larger pot with 
blue decorations, then he will require additional tools and materials compared with 
the previous time when he made a small, plain pot. Although causes under the 
Sāṃkhya doctrine cannot make any difference in the effects they are going to 
manifest, this at least has shown that they can determine which effect to manifest. 
Hence, Bhāviveka claims that effects change according to conditions, in the sense 
that different effects will result, with different conditions as their causes. This should 
be agreed by the Sāṃkhyas because they support the pre-existence of yoghurt in 
milk with the reason that only milk can turn into yoghurt.  
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The same can also be said regarding the cognitions of matter – i.e. perceptions of the 
manifested things – and the visual organs. With reference to the Sāṃkhya doctrines 
discussed above, eyes and perception have already existed entirely in mahat. They 
are the same before and after they are manifested. However, people in the world 
commonly agree that whether the perception is sharp or dull is determined by the 
conditions of the eyes, e.g. whether the eyes are clear or unclear. The blue pot-like 
object in perception is determined by the actual object, i.e. the blue pot, which the 
eyes have made contact with. This is also true of the perceptions of round bracelets, 
etc. They are also effects and their manifestations are conditioned by the conditions 
of one’s eyes, the bright lamp, etc. and the actual objects perceived. This shows that 
the content of perception changes whenever the conditions involved in the perceptual 
process change. A particular perception can only be manifested by particular 
conditions. Thus, these particular conditions are the fundamental factors that 
contribute to the manifestation of a particular perception.   
 
Hence, the effect which is going to manifest is not determined by what is pre-
existent in the cause but by the conditions that are present in the causal process. 
These conditions have conditioned the manifestation of the effects so that no 
arbitrary effects can manifest. As these manifested things are conditioned by the 
conditions from which they manifest, they do not have an unconditional existence. 
Manifestation in this sense is not incompatible with Bhāviveka’s notion of being 
“arisen from conditions”. Bhāviveka indeed takes it as one kind of arising from 
conditions.360 In this way, the Sāṃkhyas cannot regard his reason “because they 
arise from conditions” as illegitimate based on their doctrine of manifestation. As 
shown, the change in conditions alone is sufficient for different effects to manifest. It 
can further be concluded that the pre-existence of any effect entirely in any cause is 
redundant.  
 
If the Sāṃkhyas deny that the manifestation of things is conditioned, then the pre-
existence of the manifested things will be all-pervading and permanent. In [2], 
Bhāviveka goes on to show the absurd consequence if “everything has the existence 
of everything”, in the sense that all manifested things, as effects, inhere in all 
manifested things in all places and all times: 

360 See Section 1.3.2 in Part I for the definition of “arisen from conditions”. 
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(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271c4-c14) 
[2] And as you have said that “everything has the existence of 
everything,” etc., is it [2a] in terms of the things manifested? 
or [2b] in terms of their latent efficacy?361  
 
[2a] If you maintain “everything has the existence of 
everything” in terms of the things manifested; like there is a 
manifested jar in the place where the jar [which is smaller in 
size] is located, in places where a pot, etc. [which are bigger in 
size] are located, this manifested jar should also pervade 
because [the pot, etc.] are pervaded by the existence [of 
everything]. In this way, [the existence of] one jar should then 
pervade in everywhere within infinite yojanas.362 While in 
places where the jar, etc. are located, there should also be the 
manifested pot, etc. It is not because the manifested jar is 
concealed363 that the manifested pot, etc. are also concealed; it 
is because of [other things which have a] larger size. Large 
things are in turn concealed by [other things which are] even 
larger in size. [As] the manifested jar, etc. are concealed by 
the manifested pot, etc., they [i.e. the former, the smaller 
things] are not obtainable in all places and at all times. 
Therefore, it is not reasonable for your doctrine [to hold] that 
“everything has the existence of everything” based on those 
manifested things.364          

361 Hsu 2013, p. 207 gives the translation of “non-manifested matters”, instead of “latent efficacy” as 
in the present translation, for the Chinese term “| ” in the text (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271c4). 
Sastri 1949, p. 55 renders the Sanskrit *tirohita-k.tyā for the term, which he translates as 
“unmanifesting” in ibid., p. 15. Poussin 1933, p. 92 renders the term as “l'énergie secrète”, although 
he is also unsure about it. As the meaning of the term cannot be determined, a literal translation of 
this term, i.e. “latent efficacy”, is given here.  
362 Yojana is a measurement of distance. (MW, p. 958, 1) 
363 Hsu 2013, p. 207 translates the Chinese term “|}” (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271c8) as “reflected” 
instead of “concealed” here. The present Commentary understands Bhāviveka’s argument as being 
based on the problem of concealment in the doctrine of manifestation; see discussion below.  
364 KR: F°+`q^`q,VÃ0.ðÃ| ð 
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“Everything has the existence of everything” can be understood [2a] in terms of the 
manifestation of things. All manifested things, as effects, can be manifested by all 
manifested things, as causes, in any place and at any time. It can also be understood 
[2b] in terms of the latent efficacy of things (see below). All unmanifested things, as 
effects, inhere in all manifested things, as causes. These unmanifested things can 
manifest in any place and at any time. In Bhāviveka’s response, the doctrine of the 
pre-existence of effect in cause is refuted in terms of [2a], while he neither refutes 
nor accepts [2b].         
 
Regarding [2a], all manifested things, as possible effects, are permanent, pre-existent 
entirely and pervading in their causes, which are also manifested things. The causes, 
which were previous pre-existent effects now being manifested, have the pre-
existence of all possible effects to be manifested in the future. Hence, in the locus 
where a manifested thing exists, there is also the existence of all other manifested 
things. According to SK, obstruction, i.e. being concealed by something else, is one 
of the circumstances where certain existent manifested things cannot be perceived.365 
Causes in this context are therefore considered obstructions to the manifestation or 
the perception of the effects and have to disappear to let them manifest. However, 
due to obstruction, Bhāviveka points out that nothing, including the causes 
themselves, can be manifested in the present locus, except one thing.  
 
Suppose that there is one manifested thing existent and all other possible manifested 
things pre-existent in the present locus. While a small object, say, a jar, is manifested 
here, this locus also has the pre-existence of bigger objects, say, a pot and all other 
objects. While the jar is manifesting here, in all other loci it remains pre-existent, 
unmanifested and unseen. The same applies to the pot and indeed all other objects. 
In terms of [2a], everything can be manifested in any place and at any time, even 
though the thing that is presently manifested is unrelated to the previous thing 
manifested in the same locus. While the manifestation of effect has become arbitrary, 
what determines which effect manifests? To Bhāviveka, the size of the object is the 

|}´V0.L_|}É8oÉ8oAª¦oÉ8|}*V0.´V0.
F|}`qí£ªÛD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365 See footnote 355 in Part II. 
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only factor. Imagine that we can put all possible effects on a single locus, say, a 
paper. We can only see the biggest object we have put on that particular spot on the 
paper. All the smaller objects are concealed by this biggest object. The same happens 
to all the possible effects to be manifested on a particular locus. As the perception of 
the smaller thing, the jar, is obstructed by a bigger object, the pot, the jar can never 
be seen and be manifested. The perception of the pot, however, is obstructed by yet 
another bigger object, say, a tree. The pot cannot be manifested either. As a forest is 
bigger than a tree, neither can the tree be manifested. While we can always imagine 
the existence of a bigger thing, the chain of obstruction to manifestation can continue 
forever. As all manifested things have a permanent and all-pervading existence, the 
biggest thing on earth should hence manifest in all places and in all times. As a result, 
nothing in our experience, e.g. the jar, the pot, can manifest, except the biggest thing 
on earth. This is against our experience and is not acceptable to the Sāṃkhyas as 
they hold that there is the manifestation of different things in the universe. This 
results in an absurd consequence; therefore the Sāṃkhyas have to give up their 
doctrine understood in terms of manifestation in this sense.         
 
[2b] If you maintain “everything has the existence of 
everything” in terms of [manifested things’] latent efficacy, 
this [which is] maintained [by you] should be examined 
extensively before one can correctly know whether it is real or 
not. [We are] afraid that the speech would become too tedious, 
[so] we will not examine it at length.366    
 
Regarding [2b], all unmanifested things, as effects, inhere in all manifested things, as 
causes, and can manifest in all places and in all times. Bhāviveka neither refutes nor 
accepts this understanding. The reason is not clear because he only says that this 
understanding should be examined at length to determine whether or not it is true, 
and the present response to the Sāṃkhyas’ objection is getting tedious.  
However, Bhāviveka is against the notion that everything has the existence of 
everything. This is due to the reason that all things have a conditioned existence. 
They cannot produce all things or be produced by everything. Fundamentally, it is 

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not the manifested things but prak.ti which the Sāṃkhyas claim is inhered in by all 
possible unmanifested things or has the latent efficacy to manifest everything. 
Prak.ti is considered an unconditioned thing, which is to be discussed in relation to 
the second inference in the proof of emptiness, and therefore out of the scope of this 
Commentary. This is perhaps the reason why Bhāviveka did not discuss [2b] in this 
context. 
 
In terms of [2a], Bhāviveka has already refuted the Sāṃkhyas’ notion that 
“everything has the existence of everything”. The view that all things can manifest 
anywhere and at any time is found to be absurd. An effect must be conditioned by its 
cause. Taking the previously existent manifested thing as cause, and the 
subsequently manifested thing as effect, the latter cannot be completely different 
from the former. As the natures of illusory men and real men are mutually exclusive, 
if the cause will manifest an illusory man, then it will not manifest a real man. That 
is to say, illusory men and real men cannot be manifested in the same location in 
space and time. Therefore in [3], Bhāviveka points out that the Sāṃkhyas should 
also agree that the real men do not manifest where the illusory men manifest:  
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271c14-c16) 
[3] Your doctrine also admits that where the illusionary men 
manifest is empty of the manifestation of the real men. 
[Therefore,] the example established by us did not commit the 
fallacy of being unestablished. For this reason, the property 
“empty of an inherent existence” which is to be inferred is 
established. You Sāṃkhyas have committed [yourselves] to a 
wrong basis.367 
 
In other words, illusory men lack the existence of real men in themselves. While all 
manifested things have already been shown to have a conditioned existence, this is 
thus compatible to Bhāviveka’s ultimate emptiness of an inherent existence in 
conditioned things. His positive example, “illusions”, is now agreed by the 
Sāṃkhyas, as being “manifested by conditions” is included in “arisen from 

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conditions”, and “lacking the existence of the real things” has already been 
demonstrated as compatible with “empty of an inherent existence” in the discussion 
of Objection 11. It possesses both the property that infers and the property to be 
inferred. And through the positive concomitance of the two properties it exemplifies, 
it is able to prove the ultimate emptiness of all conditioned things. Therefore, it is not 
unestablished. The Sāṃkhyas’ criticism is unfounded because their doctrines, on 
which their criticism is based on, are problematic to start with.    
 
After refuting the notions of “everything has the existence of everything” and 
unconditioned existence in the Sāṃkhya doctrines of manifestation and the pre-
existence of effect in cause, Bhāviveka proceeds to refute an inference that may be 
supported by the Sāṃkhyas:      
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271c17-c21) 
Neither is it the case that “the organs pervade everywhere, 
because they have a cause, like the place on which these 
organs depend”. Thus, many kinds of reasons such as 
“because they can be the causes to produce the cognitions of 
pleasure, suffering and confusion” and others should also be 
explained at length. From the refutation of “the organs 
pervading everywhere”, therefore [one should know that] 
there is no existence of the organs in the illusionary men. 
[Also,] it is not the case that there is no positive example for 
the property to be inferred “empty”. For this reason, you have 
made false discriminations. [You must be] misled by evil 
spirits to conceptualise in this way.368 
 
The Sāṃkhyas’ inference is this: 
 
Thesis:  The organs pervade everywhere, 
Reason: because they have a cause; because they can cause the cognitions of 
pleasure, suffering and confusion,   

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Positive Example:  like the place on which these organs depend. 
  
With the reasons that all organs, as manifested things, have a cause and can cause the 
cognitions of pleasure, etc., the Sāṃkhyas’ wish to prove that these organs pervade 
everywhere, in the sense of manifesting or pre-existing entirely in all places and at 
all times. This is exemplified by the place on which these organs depend, i.e. mahat, 
which has a cause, can cause the cognitions of pleasure, etc. and pervades 
everywhere. However, the notion of “everything has the existence of everything” has 
already been shown to be absurd. To say that things have a cause means that their 
existence is conditioned. They pass their conditions onto the effects they produce. As 
both causes and effects manifested have a conditioned existence, they cannot 
pervade all places. By the same logic, the inference constructed here to prove the all-
pervasion of the organs, which is supported by the reasons just discussed, should be 
refuted. These organs do not have a permanent or unconditioned existence.  
 
From this, the Samkhyas’ claim that “the organs pervade everywhere, there is also 
this existence of these organs in those illusionary men” at the beginning of their 
objection should also be refuted. This is because such permanent or unconditioned 
organs do not exist in illusory men. Illusions that are manifested by conditions are 
empty ultimately, in the sense that they lack an ultimate existence and the existence 
of other real things. Thus, Bhāviveka concludes that his positive example, “illusions”, 
is not unestablished. It can prove the ultimate emptiness of other manifested things. 
 
B.4 The view that emptiness is the non-existence of the imagined nature in the 
existent dependent nature is erroneous 
In this objection, Bhāviveka presents the Yogācāras369 as having a different 
understanding of emptiness, based on their doctrine of the three natures (tri-
svabhāva),370 which is introduced below:  

369 In the TJ of MHK 5.1, Bhāviveka refers to the Yogācāras as “Asa[ga, Vasubandhu and others”. 
(Eckel 2008, pp. 214-215) Although in MHK 5.2 and following verses Bhāviveka refers to 
Madhyāntavibhāga to define the Yogācāra position – for example MHK 5.2 quoting 
Madhyāntavibhāga 1.13ab to define emptiness as “the absence of duality and the existence of this 
absence” (Eckel 2008, pp. 215-216, note 4) – KR discusses a similar notion of emptiness with a 
quotation of the Buddha’s teaching from YB.  
370 As introductions of Yogācāra and its doctrine of the three natures have already been provided in 
works, such as Tola and Dragonetti 2004, Siderits 2007, pp. 146-179, Williams 2009, pp. 84-102, 
Thakchöe 2015, etc., I will not go into details below. Only texts that are directly related to the present 
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Yogācāra holds that the objects of cognisation do not exist part from our 
consciousness (vijñāna). From the store-consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna), the subject-
object duality of cognition arises. By false conceptualisation (abhūta-parikalpa), the 
subjective aspect mistakes that itself has a permanent Self, and holds onto the 
objective aspect as if the latter has an independent external existence apart from 
consciousness. The notions of a permanent Self and the independent existence of 
things are false concepts imposed on the dependently-arisen subjective and objective 
aspects of consciousness. These false concepts are, however, the objects of 
cognisation of our mind, to be eliminated for one to realise emptiness.  
 
The doctrine of the three natures is about the different states of the consciousness. 
The Yogācāras take consciousness (vijñāna), which arises from causes and 
conditions, as the ultimate reality. It is said to have a dependent nature (paratantra-
svabhāva), affirming the reality of its dependent arising. When false concepts are 
present in the consciousness, it is said to be in the defiled state of dependent nature, 
i.e. the imagined nature (parikalpita-svabhāva). When they are eliminated, the 
consciousness returns to its original non-dual, non-conceptual and ineffable state. It 
is said to have a perfected nature (pariniApanna-svabhāva), i.e. the purified state of 
dependent nature. Emptiness is therefore thought to be realised with the absence of 
the imagined nature in the purified state of dependent nature. In this doctrine, the 
dependent nature is explained to be the basis for both false conceptualization and 
perfection. 
 
It cannot be ascertained whether Bhāviveka is dealing with the whole Yogācāra 
school,371 or a particular Yogācāra scholar in his discussion, as no name is specified. 
While Dharmapāla and Sthiramati are contemporaries of Bhāviveka, they both agree 
on the ultimate reality of consciousness and the perfected nature, and also that the 
subject-object duality does not exist in the purified dependent nature. However, they 
disagree on whether there is the objective aspect of the consciousness in the 

objection (which is from mainly YB) will be discussed. For the analyses of other Yogācāra texts, see 
also Anacker 2005, Tola and Dragonetti 2004 and Wood 1994.  

Eckel points out that Bhāviveka may have taken the word “Yogācāra” from the title of Yogācāra-
bhūmi to name this particular group of Mahāyāna opponents. Thus by “Yogācāra”, Bhāviveka is first 
referring to the text YB, then to the teaching derived from this text and the scholars of this teaching. 
(Eckel 2008, pp. 64-65)
207 

dependent nature, resulting in different views as to how perfected nature is achieved. 
When the consciousness is in the dependent nature, Dharmapāla holds that there are 
both subjective and objective aspects, while Sthiramati holds that there is only the 
subjective aspect because objects of cognition pertain to the imagined nature. Thus, 
to Dharmapāla, to attain the perfected nature means to get rid of the false concepts 
imposed on the dependently-arisen things. While the non-discriminating wisdom 
takes emptiness as its object, it is devoid of duality in the perfected nature. To 
Sthiramati, to attain the perfected nature means to get rid of the object so that the 
consciousness has nothing to cognise apart from itself. As there is no object, the 
consciousness ceases to be the subject. In this way, it is devoid of duality in the 
perfected nature. Dharmapāla considers the dependent and the perfected natures 
individually real, while Sthiramati considers the dependent nature empty and the 
three natures actually one, i.e. the perfected nature.372 From the Yogācāras’ objection 
portrayed by Bhāviveka below, however, it can be observed that their notion of the 
three natures is more in line with Dharmapāla’s understanding.  
 
In comparison, both the Yogācāras (as portrayed in this objection) and Bhāviveka 
deny absolute non-existents even conventionally and agree that conditioned things 
are free from false concepts when they are empty. However, the Yogācāras hold that 
the dependently-arisen things, the consciousness, must exist as the basis for the 
arising of all other phenomena; the reality of the perfected nature and the dependent 
nature corresponds to the reality of the existence of such a basis and the dependent 
origination of these phenomena. By contrast, according to Bhāviveka’s system of the 
two truths, these realities are understood as ultimate realities, being both true and 
exist in the ultimate sense. Bhāviveka rejects such realist views of dependent 
origination; on his conception, things arise inter-dependently without a basis, i.e. 
without the consciousness, dependent origination or their natures being taken as 
ultimately real. From the discussion below, based on Bhāviveka’s presentation, their 
standpoints differ in that: (1) the Yogācāras take both the dependently-arisen things 
(which are not empty of the dependent nature) and the dependent nature to be 
ultimately real. Bhāviveka, in contrast, admits their reality in the conventional sense, 

372 See Chen’s Preface in Ueda 2002 and Ueda 1980. Nagao, however, objects this view and holds 
that Dharmapāla and Sthiramati explain the same notion of emptiness. For the discussion of the 
Nagao-Ueda dispute and Dharmapāla’s and Sthiramati’s notions of emptiness, see Chen’s Preface in 
Ueda 2002 and Kitano 2008; see also Nagao 1968 and various articles in Nagao 1992; Ueda’s articles 
such as Ueda 1971, 1972, 1973, 1980. 
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while considering them empty in the ultimate sense. (2) The Yogācāras take the 
imagined nature to be equivalent to Bhāviveka’s notions of inherent nature, ultimate 
existents and absolute non-existents, considering it unreal even conventionally. 
Bhāviveka admits the inherent nature or the ultimate existence of things – thus, part 
of the imagined nature – conventionally, and only denies them in terms of the 
ultimate truth.        
 
As Bhāviveka has different ontological commitments from the Yogācāras, in his 
presentation of the Yogācāra doctrine, both in the objection and his response, he 
always interprets it according to his notions of the two truths and emptiness. From 
this, he questions the Yogācāras’ claims about the reality of the dependently-arisen 
things and the dependent nature. In Bhāviveka’s view, they could be either real 
ultimately or real conventionally. He considers both options problematic in the 
debating context. His criticisms will certaininly yield counter-arguments from the 
Yogācāras. However, an actual Yogācāra interlocutor is missing. Counter-arguments 
are therefore not available. Below I offer a charitable reading of Bhāviveka’s 
arguments. Further exploration of the Yogācāra counter-arguments373 is outside the 
scope of this commentary.   
 
Bhāviveka presents the Yogācāras’ objection as follows:       
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271c22-272a10) 
[Objection 14:] The Yogācāras374 say, “in terms of ‘the 
ultimate truth’, you establish that ‘conditioned things are 
empty, because they arise from conditions’; if this means that 
‘conditioned things, which arise from numerous conditions, 
are not existent spontaneously (svaya>bhāva) [and that] they 
are established as empty in terms of “the naturelessness of 

373 See, for example, Dharmapāla’s criticism of Madhyamaka in Chapter 8 of Dacheng Guang Bai 
Lun Shilun () in Keenan 1997.  
374 “The Yogācāras” translates the term “:ªÞf” in the Chinese text (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 
271c22). “Yoga” means “joining” or “union” which corresponds to the Chinese characters “:ª”; 
“acāra” means “practice” which corresponds to “Þ”. Hence, “Yogācāra” means the practice of the 
union of mind and body, i.e. “:ªÞ”. The “people who practice” corresponds to “f”. The 
Yogācāras who practice the union of mind and body, or those who belong to the school of this 
practice, are therefore “:ªÞf”. 
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arising” (utpatti-niGsvabhāvatā),’375 then it does state and 
establish the Yogācāras’ doctrine and conforms to the right 
reasoning. 
 
“It is also said, ‘[this] is empty of that, because that does not 
exist; [this] is empty, because this does exist.’376 This 
emptiness is explained by the teacher of deities and men [i.e. 
the Buddha] according to reality.377 This teaching means that 
the inherent nature of ‘the imagined’ is essentially non-
existent in ‘the dependently-arisen’ because [‘the 
dependently-arisen’] is not of the nature of that [i.e. ‘the 
imagined’]. For it is neither the case that there is the nature of 
that which is expressed (abhidheya) with regard to that which 
expresses (abhidhāna) nor that there is the nature of that 
which expresses with regard to that which is expressed.378 
Therefore, ‘the imagined nature’ is essentially non-existent in 
the existent ‘dependent nature’. ‘[This] is empty of that’ 
means the inherent nature of ‘that’, [i.e. the ‘imagined nature’ 

375 A similar definition of the naturelessness of arising is found in the MHK 5.72ab: 
utpattiniGsvabhāvatva> sadbhūtājātito yadi |. (Eckel 2008, p. 426) See also YB: +e
,ð`qDF(eiY+e,(CBETA, T30, 
no. 1579, 702b21-b23); and similar passages in Chapter 5 of SNS in CBETA, T16, no. 676, 694a18-
a20; Chapter 7 of XYSJL in CBETA, T31, no. 1602, 557b19-b20. Poussin 1933, p. 93 suggests the 
Sanskrit equivalent “svaya>bhāva” for “ei”. 
376 This quotation and the following discussion of emptiness by the Yogācāras in the same paragraph 
are based on the Tattvārtha Section of the Bodhisattvabhūmi in YB: yena hi śūnya> tadasadbhāvāt 
yac ca śūnya> tatsadbhāvāc chūnyatā yujyeta || sarvābhāvāc ca kutra ki> kena śūnya> bhaviAyati || 
na ca tena tasyaiva śūnyatā yujyate || tasmād eva> durg.hītā śūnyatā bhavati || katha> ca punaG 
sug.hītā śūnyatā bhavati || yataś ca yad yatra na bhavati tat tena śūnyam iti samanupaśyati | yat 
punar atrāvaśiA@a> bhavati tat sad ihāstīti yathābhūta> prajānāti || iyam ucyate śūnyatāvakrāntir 
yathābhūtā aviparītā. (Takahashi 2005, p. 101) See also CBETA, T30, no. 1579, 488c25-489a2: BU
UaGaBa­ÛYÀY`qKFí=
A=ðLª°Ba=aÊYÑCAÁCAð
BaUFÊBUwÁBaµÊBµ«
ÒÓv; Yao 2014, p. 328.  

See MN, III, 104, CūOasuññata Sutta: iti ya> hi kho tattha na hoti, tena ta> suñña> 
samanupassati, ya> pana tattha avasi@@ha> hoti, ta> santa> ida> atthīti pajānāti. (quoted in Yao 
2014, p. 329; see also Nagao 1992, pp. 209-210) This passage is translatedin Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli and 
Bhikkhu Bodhi 1995, p.966ff as “Thus he regards it as void of what is not there, but as to what 
remains there he understands that which is present thus: ‘This is present.’”
378 The source of the correspondence of that which expresses and that which is expressed is perhaps 
YB: aP:ª:AF=o´G:ªÊ
(FeFÑ(CBETA, T30, no. 
1579, 751b2-b3); see also XYSJL in CBETA, T31, no. 1602, 559b20-b27. Poussin 1933, p. 94 
suggests the Sanskrit equivalents “abhidheya” and “abhidhāna” for “F” and “o”. 
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of] the falsely conceptualised things, is non-existent. ‘[This] is 
empty’ means the inherent nature of ‘this’, [i.e. the ‘dependent 
nature’ of] the real things (vastu) that exist through dependent 
arising, is existent. If ‘this’ [i.e. the real things that exist 
through dependent arising] is not existent, then this is nihilism. 
Depending on what is emptiness said? and what is said to be 
empty?379 The real things that exist through dependent arising 
are thus designated as [having] ‘the dependent nature’. Based 
on ‘this’ [i.e. ‘the real things that exist through dependent 
arising’], the process of the designation of the inherent nature 
of, and the difference between matter, sensation (vedanā), 
conception (saṃjñā), etc. is possible. If ‘this’ is non-existent, 
so are the things designated (prajñāpti-dharma). This view 
then becomes a nihilistic (nāstika) view. One should neither 
speak to nor stay with [people who adopt this view. This is 
because they] make not only themselves but also the others 
fall into bad rebirths.380 Thus, establishing ‘the imagined 

379 It should be noted that the third question on “why”, “with what” or “what is it empty of” is missing 
comparing with the text “kutra ki> kena śūnya> bhaviAyati” in the Tattvārtha Section of the 
Bodhisattvabhūmi (Takahashi 2005, p.101); See also CBETA, T30, no. 1579, 488c27: í=A=
ð.  
380 The passage “Based on ‘this’ [‘the reality of dependent arising’], the process of the designation 
of….make not only themselves but also the others fall into bad rebirths” in the present translation is 
also based on the Tattvārtha Section of the Bodhisattvabhūmi: evam eva sati rūpādīnā> dharmā9ā> 
vastumātre sa rūpādidharmaprajñaptivādopacāro yujyate nāsati nirvastukaG prajñaptivādopacāraG 
|| tatra prajñapter vastu nāstīti niradhiA@hānā prajñaptir api nāsti || (Takahashi 2005, pp. 98-99) and 
also: ato ya ekatyā durvijñeyān sūtrāntān mahāyānapratisa>yuktā> gambhīrā> 
śūnyatāpratisa>yuktān ābhiprāyikārthanirūpitā> śrutvā yathābhūta> bhāAitasyārtham 
avijñāyāyoniśo vikalpayitvāyogavihitena tarkamātrake9aiva>d.A@ayo bhavanty eva>vādinaG 
prajñaptimātram eva sarvam etac ca tattva> yaś caiva> paśyati sa samyak paśyatīti teAā> 
prajñaptyadhiA@hānasya vastumātrasyābhāvāt saiva prajñaptiG sarve9a sarva> na bhavati || kutaG 
punaG prajñaptimātra> tattva> bhaviAyati || tad anena paryāye9a tais tattvam api prajñaptir api 
tadubhayam apodita> bhavati || prajñaptitattvāpavādāc ca pradhāno nāstiko veditavyaG || sa evan 
nāstikaG sann akathyo bhavaty asa>vāsyo bhavati vijñānā> sabrahmacāri9ām || sa ātmānam api 
vipādayati | lokam api yo 'sya d.A@yanumatam āpadyate. (ibid., pp. 99-100) See also CBETA, T30, no. 
1579, 488b24-27: k9V;.ÛD9V;YF¶(.G9
VYF¶À.ÑíL-p;Aand CBETA, 
T30, no. 1579, 488b29-c10: `	[YßJoÔ:ª=:ª0ÇÕÌÖ%×ØÙÚ
oJFY% ./E5BÛÜFÜÝ\ s'ÞÖ+`q
Àww,U.FÑíF.æ(-`q.
^çD`qðBa­UZ.P+ELKFBL
Z.ç«CAA`q@UDAª6Þ=ª6ì
AoeßpLp)cWUsA; see also MHK 5.82 and 5.83ab in Eckel 2008, p. 281. 
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nature’ as empty and ‘the dependent nature’ as existent does 
agree with right reasoning.  
 
“If it [i.e. the inference ‘in terms of the ultimate truth, 
conditioned things are empty, because they arise from 
conditions’] means ‘[conditioned things] are established as 
empty because “the dependent nature” is also non-existent,’ 
then you have fallen into the abyss of fault as said above, and 
have also succeeded in committing the fault of slandering the 
sacred teachings of the Blessed One.”381   
 
The basic doctrine of Buddhism states that things arise dependently on causes and 
conditions. In this sense, they do not exist spontaneously. Therefore, things and their 
arising do not have an inherent existence, and are empty. Thus in the middle way, 
they should neither be taken as ultimately existent nor as absolutely non-existent. 
Based on this, Bhāviveka presents the Yogācāras as regarding the dependently-arisen 
things as the real things (vastu). In Bhāviveka’s presentation, this is because the 
Yogācāras hold that these things have arisen from conditions and their existence 
cannot be denied. Due to one’s false conceptualisation, the Yogācāras (as Bhāviveka 
presents them) hold that the real things are reified to become the duality of that 
which expresses and that which is expressed – i.e. the permanent Self and its 
independent object – by means of designation through speech. Designations that are 
originally non-existent, as inherent natures and differences, are imposed onto these 
real things to be the five aggregates, i.e. the physical and mental factors that 
constitute the universe, and thus all things in conventional knowledge.  
 

381 KR: :ªÞfYÖ+#'AÀa%°;
M(ei#+,'U-à§:ªf%áâ, 
+YÖBUUÑaaPÆf
FYaÍÌ°
(FÑñ Ëe®(U(oF
L(FoÑñ eË
(Fe®BUÊ/
(.UeÑaÊ.aeaÀA-p.ËY
7ða.ÊYÑñ ÑaD9="=Ve=45'¦
aÀALÜ§sª-°ª6ìeMÑÖLñM§'

(FeZÑñ eãç, 
+Àa%°+Ññ ,LF'ÜMäËFY¤¼ØåL
Á§#æL)WçÍ¤¼, 
212 

Based on the Buddha’s teaching on emptiness from YB (which states that “this is 
empty of that, because that does not exist; this is empty, because this does exist,”) 
the Yogācāras in Bhāviveka’s presentation explain that emptiness is achieved when 
the thing present (“this”) is empty of other non-existent things (“that”). Because the 
dependent nature of the real things is not of the imagined nature of the designations, 
what is existent is the dependent nature and what is essentially non-existent is the 
imagined nature. The real thing and the dependent nature (being the inherent nature 
of the real things) must be real ultimately to be the basis for the existence and 
emptiness of the designations and the imagined nature.  
 
The dependent nature is also understood in relation to the naturelessness of arising; 
they are two sides of the same coin. While things that exist through dependent 
origination do not exist spontaneously or independently, they do not arise with a 
permanent existence or an unchanging nature, and hence there is the naturelessness 
of arising in regard to these dependently-arisen things.382  
 
Thus in Bhāviveka’s presentation, the Yogācāras claim that: if Bhāviveka is 
attempting to prove that the dependently-arisen things are empty due to the 
naturelessness of arising or the dependent nature, then he is merely establishing what 
they have already established. But knowing Bhāviveka indeed denies the ultimate 
reality of these natures and holds that things are empty because they do not have any 
such natures, the Yogācāras point out that if the dependent nature were unreal or 
non-existent, then the dependent origination of the conditioned things (which are the 
real things in their understanding) would be denied. This means that things would 
not arise at all and become non-existent even conventionally. Designations and 
conventional knowledge would also become impossible. There would be no 

382 There are also the naturelessness of characteristics (lakAa9a-niGsvabhāvatā) and the naturelessness 
of the ultimate truth (paramārtha-niGsvabhāvatā) in the doctrine of three non-natures (tri-vidhā 
niGsvabhāvatā). The former is understood in relation to the imagined nature, which refers to the 
designation of false concepts, i.e. characteristics, onto the dependently-arisen real things by speech 
and thought. As the ultimate reality of the characteristics of the subjective and objective aspects arisen 
from the store-consciousness (as that which expresses and that which is expressed) are falsely 
conceptualised and originally non-existent, so there is the naturelessness of characteristics in regard to 
these falsely conceptualised things. The latter is understood in relation to the perfected nature, which 
refers to the suchness (tathatā), i.e. the nature (dharmatā) of the real things that is ineffable when they 
are free from the imposition of false concepts. As nothing exists with a nature in the ultimate truth, 
there is the naturelessness of the ultimate truth. See also discussions on the three non-natures and their 
relation to the three natures in the TJ of MHK 5.5 in Eckel 2008, p. 223; see also Vol. 73 of YB in 
CBETA, T30, no. 1579, 702b17ff.; Chapter 5 of SNS in CBETA, T16, no. 676, 694a2ff.; Chapter 7 
of XYSJL in CBETA, T31, no. 1602, 557b19-b23; and also Nagao 1992, pp. 181-187.   
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causation as there would be neither cause nor effect. As there would nor be karmic 
fruit (phala) from skilful or unskilful actions (karma), there would be no spiritual 
attainment for enlightenment or liberation.383 The denial of the ultimate reality of the 
dependent nature is therefore the same as nihilism. Nothing could be empty of 
anything else or be emptied, and emptiness would become inconceivable. Bhāviveka 
would have contradicted his own doctrine, i.e. the middle way, and the Buddha’s 
teaching on emptiness discussed above. On this basis, the Yogācāras criticise 
Bhāviveka of having an erroneous view of emptiness. 
 
To this, Bhāviveka replies:  
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 272a11-a14) 
[Response:] We even gladly seek for skilful explanation with 
other vehicles which set out to pursue [enlightenment] and 
with the heretics, without greed and envy; we debate 
extensively [with them], not to mention the followers of the 
same One Vehicle384 who are going towards the same 
destination as we are.385 As the opportunity presents itself, 
together we shall briefly discern this matter in this discussion. 
As this matter has already been analysed extensively like in 
*Tattvām.tāvatāra,386 it will not be explained [at length] again, 

383 Cf. MMK 24.1-24.6. 
384 There are three vehicles (triyāna). The Vehicle of the Hearers (śrāvaka-yāna) is followed by the 
arhats. The Vehicle of the Privately-enlightened Buddhas (pratyeka-buddha-yāna) is concerned with 
the Buddhas who practise and attain enlightenment by themselves and do not teach to the others. The 
One Vehicle (eka-yāna) refers to the Vehicle of the Bodhisattvas (bodhisattva-yāna), which is 
generally known as Mahā-yāna. It is considered the most excellent among the three by practitioners of 
Mahāyāna; for details, see the entry of “`Ô” in DDB. The followers of the One Vehicle mentioned 
here refer to the Yogācāras. 
385 Poussin 1933, p. 95 seems to understand this sentence as said by the Yogācāras. However, this 
translation considers it as Bhāviveka’s response, explaining why he is going to discuss with the 
Yogācāras although a long discussion has already been done in *Tattvām.tāvatāra; see also Zangyao, 
p.9 and Hatani 1976, p. 114.      
386 There is another occasion in KR where Bhāviveka’s earlier work *Tattvām.tāvatāra (	
) is 
mentioned. In the discussion of unconditioned things after Yogācāra’s notion of the ultimate reality of 
suchness has been refuted, Bhāviveka comments that this subject has already been treated in 
*Tattvām.tāvatāra. (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 275a12)  
*Tattvām.tāvatāra is recognised to include at least the first three chapters of MHK. Eckel 
comments that Bhāviveka in KR refers his discussion on Yogācāra to these three chapters. His 
discussion is also a preview to the Chapter 5 of MHK on the reality of Yogācāra. (Eckel 2008, p. 23) 
Ejima and Saito point out that *Tattvām.tāvatāra refers to Chapters 1 to 5 of MHK (Ejima 1987, p. 
201-214, Saito 2005, p. 67-173); see also Iida 1980, p. 52ff; Ejima 1980, 15-16. Zangyao, p. 9 notes 
that *Tattvām.tāvatāra refers to the Chapter 5 of MHK.  
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as people who are afraid of long speech will not be 
delighted.387     
 
YB is one of the foundational texts that define the identity of the Yogācāras. The 
teaching of emptiness in the Yogācāras’ objection, which is a direct quotation from 
the CūOasuññata Sutta, did not attract much attention to Madhyamaka, but had a 
great influence on the formation of Yogācāra’s notion of other-emptiness,388 i.e. the 
emptiness of the imagined nature in the dependent nature. Although Bhāviveka has 
already discussed the problems of Yogācāra doctrine in his earlier work, 
*Tattvām.tāvatāra, it may be reasonable to assume that he intentionally includes the 
discussion of YB in order to clarify the meaning of dependent origination and 
emptiness, as an important step to establish the self-emptiness of all conditioned 
things.  
 
As Bhāviveka considers the lack of an inherent existence or nature in the 
dependently-arisen things the fundamental reason for their emptiness, he attempts to 
refute both the ultimate existence of the dependent nature and the absolute non-
existence of the imagined nature. There are four parts to Bhāviveka’s response: [1] if 
things do not arise with an ultimate existence, then they should not possess the 
naturelessness of arising or the dependent nature; [2] the Buddha’s teaching on 
emptiness from YB has been misinterpreted by the Yogācāras; [3] the ultimate 
reality of the dependent nature as an ineffable real nature is untenable, regardless of 
whether it is established independently or in terms of reasoning; [4] the defilements 
of all sentient beings will not be eliminated with the non-existence of the imagined 
nature. Hence, the Yogācāras’ doctrine regarding the emptiness of the imagined 
nature in the dependent nature of things, as he has presented above, is superfluous.389       
 
Regarding [1], Bhāviveka denies that his inference has committed the fallacy of 
establishing what has already been established by the Yogācāras. This is because he 
does not agree with those who take the naturelessness of arising or the dependent 

387 KR: abè-8ÖµÔZ;é­~4YÚêëA
þìÞíÖ`Ô;fðÞ
£¾,6Ha.
îÓïðñ¦ÈE5Ýò
ËA~0 
388 See “‘What remains’ in śūnyatā: a Yogācāra interpretation of emptiness” in Nagao 1992, pp. 51-60.   
	
The discussions of the dependent nature and the imagined nature have also been taken up in 
MHK/TJ 5.55-5.84. (Eckel 2008, pp. 261-283) See also Bhāviveka’s refutation of the three natures in 
the Chapter 5 of MHK summarised in Thakchöe 2015.
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nature to be ultimately real, while claiming that the dependently-arisen things, which 
are taken to be possessing the two, do not arise with an ultimate existence. On his 
interpretation, this should contradict the Yogācāras’ own doctrine of emptiness. His 
demonstrates this as follows:                       
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 272a15-a26)  
[1] You say that “conditioned things that arise from numerous 
conditions are not existent spontaneously [and that] they are 
explained as empty in terms of ‘the naturelessness of arising’.” 
What does this mean? [1a] If it means “the eyes and other 
conditioned things that are permanent and indestructible do 
not arise from causes in ‘the dependently-arisen’ [things]; as 
[such] eyes and other inherent existents are absolutely non-
existent, they are designated as empty,” then it is establishing 
what has already been established. This is because this is 
commonly admitted by our own kind [i.e. the Buddhists], the 
Sāṃkhyas, the Vaiśeṣikas and all other doctrines.  
 
However, [if] it [meansto] say that “eyes, etc. are not empty as 
they are produced, [but] because they are empty in their own 
nature,”390 [then] you should say that “they are ‘non-arisen’ 
and ‘without an inherent existence’ [and] therefore empty.” 
You should not say that “they are explained as empty in terms 
of ‘the naturelessness of arising’.” If, when they [eyes, etc.] 
arise, so does their inherent existence in terms of the ultimate 
truth, [then] why are they explained as “arising without an 
inherent existence” [i.e. “the naturelessness of arising”]? If 
[their inherent existence] in fact does not arise, then there is no 
such a substantial existence. So you should not say that there 

390 Sastri 1949, p. 16 understands this sentence as Bhāviveka’s quoting of the Yogācāras’ response. 
But this Commentary understands it as Bhāviveka’s interpretation of the meaning of their notion of 
the naturelessness of arising. Hsu 2013, p. 213 gives a different translation: However, eyes, etc. are 
not caused to be empty instead they are empty in their own nature; cf. the similar translation in 
Poussin 1933, p. 96. 
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exists “the reality of consciousness-only (vijñapti-mātratā)”.391 
Otherwise, you would commit the fallacy of contradicting your 
own doctrine.392 
 
Bhāviveka starts by questioning what the Yogācāras actually mean when they claim 
that things that have arisen dependently – such as eyes, etc., which have the 
dependent nature and do not exist spontaneously – are empty due to the 
naturelessness of arising. On his interpretation, there are two possible meanings: [1a] 
some permanent eyes do not arise and are therefore absolutely non-existent in the 
dependently-arisen eyes and hence, the dependently-arisen eyes are empty of the 
former; [1b] these dependently-arisen eyes are empty because their nature of being 
existent spontaneously is empty and non-existent (see below). However, both 
meanings are problematic. 
 
Regarding [1a], Bhāviveka points out that the Yogācāras have committed the fallacy 
of establishing what has already been established. This is because other Buddhists 
and the heretics, such as the Sāṃkhyas and the Vaiśeṣikas, do not dispute it. 
Buddhists in general, including Bhāviveka himself, hold that conditioned things, e.g. 
eyes, are impermanent, and lack an ultimate existence or a permanent and 
unchanging nature. Therefore, they can accept the Yogācāras’ claim that some 
permanent and indestructible existence is not present in these things. This is also 
compatible with the Sāṃkhyas’ doctrine of manifestation. As already discussed 
under Objection 13, it is unacceptable to the Sāṃkhyas that two things can manifest 
at the same time in the same locus. Hence, if the dependently-arisen eyes are 

391 See verse 25 of Vasubandhu’s Tri>śikā-vijñapti-kārikā (Anacker 2005, p. 423) and Xuanzang’s 
translation on CBETA, T31, no. 1586, 61a27. To the Yogācāras, the real nature of things, or the 
suchness of the real things in their understanding, is consciousness-only. It is emptiness understood as 
the non-existence of the imagined nature in the dependent nature, i.e. the perfected nature, or as the 
non-existence of false concepts in the real things, which have arisen from consciousness. Without the 
imagined nature or the false concepts, consciousness in the perfected nature is non-dual and ineffable. 
The Yogācāras take it as their ultimate reality.  
392 KR: °+M(ei#YU,a%ðÀa%°
+tVÑñ ËMÙ=ptVe56Y,Ü'¦
§	=Þ=$ÞV~^6d 
iY+tV(Fe,ª°+=,ªY°
+#YU,ÀU £#$%&eY+e,ðÀ
aªY+',ÀZ-ge~¤ 
Poussin 1933, p. 96 understands “” and “” as a single term “absence de nature 
proper du fait de non-production” (anutpatti-niGsvabhāvatas), i.e. “”. As the term 
“anutpatti-niGsvabhāvatas” is rare, my translation did not follow his understanding. 
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manifesting, then the permanent eyes will not be able to manifest. As for the 
Vaiśeṣikas, since Bhāviveka did not offer any discussion of their doctrine before the 
present objection, it is unclear why he would think that they agree with the 
Yogācāras’ claim. The Vaiśeṣikas hold that no produced things are empty. This is 
because they are inhered in by universals, which are non-produced and unchanging, 
so that things are qualified as what they are.393 These universals are considered 
ultimate existents to Bhāviveka. While the produced things are existent, i.e. not 
empty, to the Vaiśeṣikas, the Vaiśeṣikas may consider things to be empty (in the 
sense of non-existent) if they are not inhered in by such universals. Since both the 
Buddhists and the heretics agree on this meaning of the Yogācāras’ claim, there is no 
need to propose it again in the debate involving these parties.    
 
As explained above, the naturelessness of arising (i.e. not arising with a spontaneous 
existence or an ultimate existence) refers to the dependent nature (i.e. arising 
dependently on conditions) of things. Hence, on Bhāviveka’s interpretation, the 
Yogācāras’ claim understood in terms of [1a] may actually mean that these things 
are empty in their own nature, and are therefore not produced in the ultimate sense. 
Based on this meaning, Bhāviveka then considers that it is inappropriate to explain 
the emptiness of conditioned things in terms of the naturelessness of arising. The 
emptiness of these things is not that they are not produced with the inherence of an 
ultimate existence. It is rather that they do not have an inherent existence to start 
with. As they arise inter-dependently, taking each other as conditions, they cannot 
have a permanent or indestructible existence; they do not arise or be produced to 
exist ultimately. For this reason, conditioned things are considered as empty (i.e., in 
the Yogācāras’ understanding, as not arisen to be inhered in by some permanent or 
indestructible existence). Therefore, instead of taking conditioned things as empty 
due to their arising in a natureless way, they should be considered empty as they do 
not arise independently and are without an inherent existence in the ultimate sense.  
 
Further, in Bhāviveka’s presentation, the Yogācāras have created a dilemma for 
themselves if they take either the naturelessness of arising or the dependent nature as 
ultimately real. The dependent nature refers to the inherent nature of the real things 
being dependently-arisen, while the naturelessness of arising refers to things arisen 

393 See details in Potter 1977, pp. 133-140. 
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without an ultimate existence or nature. Although the two notions are employed to 
explain the emptiness of conditioned things, how can a conditioned thing be inhered 
in by them, both of which are ultimately real, and be empty at the same time? 
Possessing them and being empty of them are mutually exclusive. Hence, Bhāviveka 
points out that, on the one hand, if an inherent nature, as an ultimate reality, of the 
dependently-arisen things could arise together with these things, then the Yogācāras’ 
explanation of dependently-arisen things in terms of the naturelessness of arising 
would be unreasonable. On the other hand, if these things do not arise with an 
inherent nature at all, then neither is it reasonable for the Yogācāras to take the 
naturelessness of arising or the dependent nature as ultimately real.  
 
The Yogācāras regard consciousness as the ultimate reality because it is the only 
dependently-arisen thing that remains existent after all false concepts are emptied. It 
possesses the perfected nature, i.e. the purified dependent nature emptied of the 
imagined nature, or the naturelessness of arising. Based on the discussion here, 
Bhāviveka claims that this “reality of consciousness-only” is untenable.394 This is 
because consciousness, as a dependently-arisen thing, cannot be empty of an 
ultimate existence while at the same time possessing the purified dependent nature, 
which nature is indeed not different from any other ultimate existence. In this way, 
the Yogācāras, as portrayed by Bhāviveka, have contradicted their own doctrine, 
which holds that all conditioned things are essentially not inhered in by any ultimate 
existence.   
 
Bhāviveka goes on to evaluate meaning [1b], which indicates that conditioned things 
are empty because their nature of being existent spontaneously is empty and non-
existent: 
 
[1b] If [it means that] “the dependently-arisen” [things] are 
designated as empty because their nature of spontaneous 
arising [i.e. of being existent spontaneously] is empty and 
non-existent, then you are still establishing what has already 
been established. Since you admit “the dependent [nature]”, 

394 See also MHK/TJ 5.17-5.54 to see Bhāviveka’s arguments against the Yogācāras’ notion that no 
object exists outside consciousness, in Eckel 2008, pp. 232-261. 
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things that arise from conditions should in fact be not empty. 
Therefore, they should not be designated as empty. [As] this is 
not the way we understand it, why do [you say that] we state 
and establish the Yogācāras’ doctrine?395 
 
In terms of [1b], the Yogācāras have again committed the fallacy of establishing 
what has already been established (in Bhāviveka’s understanding), for Bhāviveka 
also agrees that conditioned things which cannot arise independently are empty of 
the nature of spontaneous arising (although he holds that their lack of an inherent 
existence is the more fundamental reason for their emptiness).  
 
From this, Bhāviveka points out that as long as the Yogācāras in his portrayal admit 
the ultimate reality of the dependent nature, they should not take the dependently-
arisen things that possess this nature to be empty, and designate these things as such. 
If the Yogācāras really adhere to their doctrine of the emptiness of conditioned 
things, then they should discard their notions of dependent nature and the 
naturelessness of arising altogether. Since Bhāviveka has a different understanding 
of emptiness than the Yogācāras, he concludes this argument by denying that he is 
stating or establishing the Yogācāras’ doctrine.  
 
After demonstrating the conflict between the ultimate reality of the dependent nature 
or the naturelessness arising and emptiness in Yogācāra, Bhāviveka further argues 
that the Buddha’s teaching from YB is misinterpreted by the Yogācāras. In his 
response [2], the correct understanding of this teaching is clarified to be that the 
ultimate existence of conditioned things is refuted to avoid the extreme of eternalism, 
and their conventional existence affirmed to avoid the extreme of nihilism:  
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 272a26-b15) 
[2] Again, according to what is said, “[this] is empty of that, 
because that does not exist; [this] is empty, because this does 
exist,” etc.; all [things] that are commonly recognised by the 
world as real, like eyes, etc. that are produced by the efficacy 

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of causes and conditions, are those which are cognised by the 
fools’intellect. Conventionally, it appears as if there is the 
manifestation of their inherent existence; [but when we] 
investigate [the nature of these things] by means of the 
intellect of the ultimate truth, [these things,] just like the 
illusory men, do not have any reality at all. For this reason, it 
is said that “[this] is empty of that, because that does not exist” 
for the sake of avoiding the fault of falling into the extreme of 
eternalism.  
 
In order to get rid of the fault of falling into the extreme of 
eternalism, we say “that” is “non-existent”; also in order to get 
rid of the fault of falling into the extreme of nihilism, we say 
“this” is “existent”: eyes, etc., which are produced by the 
efficacy of causes and conditions, are included in the 
conventional truth, [and] there is their inherent existence, 
unlike a sky-flower which is non-existent absolutely. But in 
terms of the ultimate truth, they are established as empty. For 
this reason, it is said that “[this] is empty, because this does 
exist.” This emptiness is explained by the teacher of deities 
and men according to reality. If you explain “the dependent 
nature” as existent based on this meaning [of emptiness as 
understood by us], then [your explanation] is a skilful 
explanation [of the Buddha’s teaching].396  
 
According to Bhāviveka, the Buddha actually refers “that” to the existence of the 
conditioned things in terms of the ultimate truth in his teaching, and “this” to the 
existence of these things in terms of the conventional truth. Hence, the correct 
understanding of this teaching is: the conventional existence of conditioned things is 
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empty of their ultimate existence because their ultimate existence does not exist; 
their conventional existence is empty because it does exist. Or simply as: 
conditioned things are empty of an inherent existence, because their inherent 
existence does not exist in the ultimate sense; conditioned things are empty because 
they do exist in the conventional sense.  
 
In order to avoid the extreme of eternalism, the ultimate existence of conditioned 
things is refuted. Also to avoid the extreme of nihilism, their conventional existence 
is affirmed. Bhāvivekaexplains that it is only through ordinary people’s intellect that 
conditioned things are commonly recognised to have an inherent existence. If these 
things are examined in terms of the ultimate truth, then their existence is like an 
illusory man; he was believed to be real, but is now revealed to be unreal. Thus, 
conditioned things should not be granted ultimate existence (“that”). However, 
conditioned things are indeed produced by causes and conditions. They are not 
absolutely non-existent, unlike a sky-flower which does not arise. Thus, their 
conventional existence (“this”) should be granted.      
 
While the Buddha’s teaching on emptiness in YB is quoted from the CūOasuññata 
Sutta, it would contribute to the present discussion by noting the circumstance where 
this teaching is delivered. When every time a meditative object is realised to be 
empty, the Buddha says, “thus he regards it as void of what is not there, but as to 
what remains there he understands that which is present thus: ‘This is present’.” 
After the perceptions of village and people up to the defilements from sensual desire, 
life and ignorance have all been realised as empty, the things that remain present are 
the six sense faculties that are dependent on the Buddha’s body and conditioned by 
his present life. Nonetheless, the sense faculties, the Buddha’s body and his present 
life are conditioned and impermanent.397 The subject matter of the CūOasuññata 
Sutta is the method of meditation that takes emptiness as its object, so that things 
that have become empty during the process are realised as not existent ultimately. 
But this method does not therefore affirm the remaining sense faculties, etc. as 
ultimately real, as they can remain present in a conventional sense.398 If the 
Yogācāras, on Bhāviveka’s interpretation, have indeed developed the notion of 

397 See Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi 1995, pp. 969-970. 
398 See further discussion in Anālayo 2012, pp. 347-349. 
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other-emptiness and the reality of consciousness-only from this passage, then they 
may have misunderstood its meaning as they have reified the existence of 
consciousness and its dependent nature. In view of this, Bhāviveka considers that 
their teaching on the ultimate reality of the dependent nature is not a skilful 
explanation of the teaching of the Buddha. Unless they can understand the dependent 
nature according to the meaning just explained by him and only take it as a 
conventional reality, they would be the ones who hold a wrong view of emptiness 
instead of him.   
 
Then, Bhāviveka refutes the Yogācāras’ accusation that he has committed the fault 
of nihilism in relation to the conventional existence of the dependent nature:  
 
As we also accept this kind of inherent nature, as this 
conforms to the two kinds of accumulation, [namely] merit 
and knowledge, that are included in the conventional speech 
in the world,399 and as those on which the conventional 
designations depend are existent, so are the things 
designated.400 But then you say, “if ‘this’ [i.e. ‘the real things 
that exist through dependent arising’] is non-existent, so are 
the things designated. This view then becomes a nihilistic 
view. One should neither speak to [nor stay with people who 
adopt this view].” These faults [which you attribute to us] are 
all unestablished.  
 
Again, if you establish that “‘the dependent nature’ is 
conventional therefore it is existent”, then you are establishing 
what has already been established. If you establish that “this 
‘[dependent] nature’ is existent in terms of the ultimate truth”, 
there will be no positive example. As those who attach to 

399 See footnotes 118 and 127.     
400 In his translation, Poussin only takes the second reason in the present translation, i.e. 
“conformation to the two kinds of accumulation” and the third reason, i.e. “the existence of those on 
which the conventional designations depend” as the reasons for “the existence of the things 
designated”. He understands the first reason, i.e. “the conventional existence of inherent nature”, in 
relation to the dependent nature as a good speech, if such a nature is existent based on the meaning of 
emptiness explained by Bhāviveka. (Poussin 1933, p. 97) 
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“ultimate existence” (lit. the notion that things definitely have 
an inherent existence) have already been refuted, those who 
attach to “absolute non-existence” (lit. the notion that things 
definitely lack an inherent existence) should also be refuted. 
For this reason, one should neither reject (apavadati), add to 
(adhika>karoti) nor subtract (nyūnīkaroti)401 the discussed 
“dependent nature”.402   
     
The Yogācāras, in Bhāviveka’s presentation, have accused Bhāviveka of being a 
nihilist in their objection. This is because they think that he has denied the dependent 
nature, and thus the existence of, the real things that exist through dependent arising. 
As a result, the designations of their inherent natures and differences, which are 
necessary for everyday life, would lose their basis and become impossible. From this, 
they determine that Bhāviveka has denied the existence of everything. But the 
discussion above shows that Bhāviveka in fact does not deny dependent origination. 
Neither does he deny the existence of designated things as conditioned things, as 
they are admitted as having an inherent existence in the conventional sense. While a 
practitioner is required to accumulate merit and knowledge early on her path to 
liberation, she has to achieve this with conventional practices and speech that would 
be otherwise impossible without the designation of conventional existents. As 
conventional existence is not denied, the designations of things, conventional speech 
and practices are not denied either. These accumulations are therefore possible. As 
both conditioned things and their designations are existent according to Bhāviveka’s 
understanding of emptiness, and as spiritual practice in general is also possible with 
this understanding, from his standpoint, it is unreasonable for the Yogācāras to 
accuse him of holding nihilistic views.     
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401 Poussin 1933, p. 98 suggests the Sanskrit equivalents “apavadati”, “adhika>karoti”, “nyūnīkaroti” 
for “L°”, “÷ø”, “?ù” (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 272b15). “Reject” translates the Chinese term 
“L°”, following the translation in ibid. and note 2. Hsu, p. 216 understands it as “accuse” (hence 
rendering the translation: you should not accuse us of increasing or decreasing other-dependence.)  
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With the above discussion, the Yogācāras in Bhāviveka’s presentation can no longer 
establish the reality of the dependent nature in the debate because it is problematic 
both conventionally and ultimately. In MHK/TJ 5.71, Bhāviveka has already pointed 
out that if the Yogācāras respond that the dependent nature is existent because it is 
conventional, i.e. it is a conventional existent, then they are merely establishing what 
has already been established by him. This is because he also accepts the inherent 
existence of things in the conventional sense, and he does take the dependent nature 
as conventional. In contrast, if the Yogācāras insist on the ultimate reality of the 
dependent nature, then they would be unable to provide any positive example to 
support this. This is because, as already discussed in relation to [1], if they hold that 
all things are empty of a permanent and indestructible existence, then these things 
should also be empty of the dependent nature, which is ultimately real and not 
different from such ultimate existence in his understanding. A thing which is empty 
and at the same time inhered in by an ultimate existence, i.e. not empty, is absurd. 
The real nature of consciousness is refuted for the same reason. Hence, he thinks that 
it is unreasonable to take consciousness as the positive example.   
 
Thus, Bhāviveka concludes that the dependent nature regarding the existence of 
conditioned things should be understood in terms of the middle way as neither 
ultimately existent nor absolutely non-existent. Things that have arisen dependently 
from causes and conditions should not be taken as either (i.) having an inherent 
nature ultimately or (ii.) not having one even conventionally. This sense of the 
middle way should also be applied to the notion of dependent nature itself, meaning 
that it should only be taken as a conventional reality. For this reason, Bhāviveka 
comments that it is equally erroneous to reject the dependent nature as absolutely 
non-existent, to add to it to become ultimately existent, or to subtract it to become 
merely an imaginary existence.  
 
In [3], the dependent nature in its purified state (i.e. when it is free from the dualistic 
concepts), which is added to or reified to become an ineffable true nature, will be 
refuted. In [4], the dependent nature in its defiled state (i.e. with the presence of 
these concepts), which is subtracted to become the imagined nature, will also be 
refuted. In [3a], Bhāviveka refutes the Yogācāras’ claim, as portrayed by him, that 
the purified state of the dependent nature, as an ineffable real nature, is established 
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outside reasoning, because such a nature would be not different from the ineffable 
realities in the heretics’ doctrines. Then, in [3b] he points out that the ultimate reality 
of the dependent nature, according to his interpretation, will make illusions not 
different from the real things, thus making the designations of things impossible. 
This cancels the difference between the perfected, dependent and imagined natures 
of things. Regarding [3a], Bhāviveka says:  
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 272b16-b28) 
[3a] If you say that “our thesis establishes that there is an 
ineffable reality of illusions, etc. Because there is no positive 
example, this is not something that can be proved. As the 
reasoning for this ineffable reality cannot be established, 
therefore we do not commit any fault;”403 if so, who can refute 
the ineffable realities such as the Self,404 etc., to which the 
heretics attach themselves? They also claim that “there are 
realities such as the Self, etc., because [these realities] are not 
cognised by intellect (buddhi) or by speech.”405  
 
Bhāviveka has previously demonstrated that the Yogācāras cannot provide a positive 
example to support the ultimate existence of the dependent nature due to the 
absurdity of conditioned things, which do not arise with an ultimate existence, being 
inhered in by such an ultimately existent nature. To this, he anticipates the 
Yogācāras to counter-argue that the purified state of this dependent nature (i.e. the 
perfected nature of consciousness), which is free from false conceptualisations, is the 
ineffable reality of the dependently-arisen things such as illusions, etc. As this reality 
is non-conceptual to start with, he anticipates the Yogācāras to counter-argue that it 

403 Cf. MHK/TJ 5.104, where the Yogācāras argue for a reality of things which cannot be known by 
logical reasoning. This is followed by Bhāviveka’s response in MHK/TJ 5.107ff. While admitting that 
the reality of things is not an object knowable by logical reasoning, he emphasises the importance of 
logical reasoning, i.e. to eliminate false views. As this reality is indeed not an object to be known, 
therefore the reality (i.e. the object “suchness”) that the Yogācāras argue for is not the true reality of 
things either. (Eckel 2008, pp. 295-298)  
404 “Self, etc.” translates the Chinese term “V” (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 272b18), which is 
understood as “us” or “our” in Hsu 2003, p. 216.   
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is not to be established by logical reasoning. Therefore, it is not fallacious if it does 
not have a positive example in order to be proved.  
 
However, the proposal that dependently-arisen things exist ultimately in some 
ineffable way is untenable because, in Bhāviveka’s understanding, it amounts to 
admitting the ultimate reality of consciousness. For Yogācāra regards the subjective 
aspect of consciousness as ultimately real when the consciousness is in the perfected 
nature; to Bhāviveka, this ineffable reality is therefore not different from the 
ineffable and non-conceptual realities such as the Self, etc. in the heretics’ doctrines. 
Buddhism generally sets out to refute such ultimate realities through its doctrine of 
no-Self. If the Yogācāras’ ineffable perfected nature of consciousness were accepted, 
then there would be a double-standard regarding the ultimate existence of the Self, 
and the Yogācāras would no longer be in the position to refute the heretics. In view 
of this, the Yogācāras may justify themselves by clarifying that this ineffable real 
nature is different from the Self because the latter is the subjective aspect of the 
consciousness that is reified by false conceptualisation. However, they are still not in 
the position to refute the equally ineffable realities of the heretics by reasoning, for 
they cannot justify why their ineffable reality is established while other ineffable 
realities are not. The justifications and refutations involved here, although outside 
the scope of discussion, exactly require the use of logical reasoning, which the 
Yogācāras deny.   
 
In [3b], Bhāviveka further points out the problems that arise if the dependent nature 
is established as an ultimate reality: 
 
[3b] If all things produced by the efficacy of numerous 
conditions, which are in a “dependent nature”, had an inherent 
nature in terms of the ultimate truth, then the illusory men 
should also have the inherent existence of the real men. 
Neither is it reasonable [for these things] to have the natures 
of other things, as the nature of a donkey should not exist in a 
cow. [These natures] also include the dualities of the natures 
of production and non-production, ultimate existence and 
absolute non-existence, and possession of an inherent nature 
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and non-possession of an inherent nature. This which is 
established [by the Yogācāras] is either without a positive 
example or establishes what have already been established. 
Having these two faults, it is therefore not reasonable.406   
 
Bhāviveka admits that the dependently-arisen things have a dependent nature in the 
conventional sense. Here, on his interpretation, he argues that if these things also 
possess such a nature in the ultimate sense in the form of an ineffable reality, then 
the illusory men would have the same nature as the real men. Conventionally, 
illusory men are distinguished from the real men based on the common conception 
that they lack the reality of the latter. To Bhāviveka, the real men, who have arisen 
from conditions, may be compared with the real things that have the dependent 
nature in the Yogācāras’ understanding. However, illusions also arise from 
conditions. In this way, on Bhāviveka’s interpretation, the illusory men should also 
be taken as real and as possessing the dependent nature, like the real men. While 
they both are real and have the dependent nature in the ultimate sense, they would no 
longer be distinguishable from each other. While the Yogācāras could instead regard 
the real men and the illusory men as equally unreal; either way, their treatment of the 
ultimate reality of the dependent nature would contradict conventional knowledge.   
 
Also because the dependently-arisen things are inhered in by this ineffable reality, 
based on Bhāviveka’s interpretation, the designations of these things have become 
impossible. The Yogācāras hold that false concepts do not originally pertain to the 
dependently-arisen things, i.e. that the imagined nature is essentially non-existent in 
the existent dependent nature. But due to the defiled state of the dependent nature, 
the dependently-arisen things in their doctrine are also allowed to be imposed upon 
with false concepts and acquire an imagined nature. However, when a thing is 
inhered in by a nature in the ultimate sense, it should possess this nature in all places 
and at all times, and will not possess any other nature. Otherwise, this nature would 
either be not real in the ultimate sense or not the inherent nature of the thing. Thus, 
as the dependently-arisen things have already inhered in by such an ineffable reality 
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in the ultimate sense, they cannot be inhered by another nature, being the unreal 
imagined nature in the present context. This is because real and unreal are mutually 
exclusive. In Bhāviveka’s word, donkey-ness does not inhere in a cow, which is 
already inhered in by cowness.  
 
In addition, the Yogācāras hold that this ultimate reality is ineffable. If things have 
such a reality in the ultimate sense, then based on Bhāviveka’s interpretation again, 
they cannot at the same time be inhered by a contradictory effable nature, which is 
indeed of an imagined nature. Therefore, having an ineffable reality, that which was 
designated as an illusory man can no longer be designated as such. As a result of 
everything being real and ineffable, speech and thought cannot function to 
discriminate. Eventually, designations of concepts, such as being produced or non-
produced, ultimately existent or absolutely non-existent and having an inherent 
nature or not having one, are denied altogether. The differences between things 
having a perfected nature, a dependent nature and an imagined nature have also been 
denied. If nothing has an imagined nature and everything has the perfected nature – 
i.e. the ineffable reality that is the purified state of the dependent nature – then it is 
no longer necessary to have the three natures; the dependent nature and imagined 
nature can be cancelled. On Bhāviveka’s interpretation, thus, the legitimacy of the 
Yogācāra doctrine, which builds upon the notions of dependent origination, of the 
absolute non-existence of the imagined nature in the ultimately existent dependent 
nature and of emptiness, is also harmed.  
 
Such a nature is untenable, further, because in Bhāviveka’s understanding it cannot 
be supported by any positive example. If any similar instance possessed such an 
ineffable reality, it would be non-conceptual and ineffable, and therefore fail to be an 
example.  
 
The Yogācāras in Bhāviveka’s portrayal claim that the designation of things is 
possible only if there is the dependent nature because this nature guarantees the 
existence of the dependently-arisen real things that are the bases for designation to 
take place. Such a nature must be ultimately real for this reason. However, 
Bhāviveka has shown that it is exactly because of the ultimate reality of this nature 
that the designations of things have become impossible. This consequence suggests 
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that the Yogācāras in Bhāviveka’s presentation should discard the notion of the 
ultimate reality of the dependent nature and admit its conventional reality. But if 
they do so, they still have committed the fallacy of establishing what has already 
been established because Bhāviveka does admit the conventional reality of the 
dependent nature. 
 
This problem of the ultimate reality of the dependent nature, according to Bhāviveka, 
is shown more precisely through the fallacious thesis of the Yogācāras, which 
invalidates their inference: 
 
Again, if conditioned things, which are arisen from conditions, 
are accepted as having a [dependent] nature in terms of the 
ultimate truth – with the reason “because they are produced” 
that proves them as empty of a nature and refutes such a 
nature as existent – this thesis [that you have stated] therefore 
has the fallacy of invalidating the inference.407 Things arisen 
from conditions are commonly recognised by all as having a 
nature conventionally. If there are some who attach to [the 
notion of] these things having a nature in terms of the ultimate 
truth, then their thesis should be refuted by this reasoning. 
Also, they [i.e. the Yogācāras] should not hold this doctrine 
[either], as the twofold discriminations, [such as the dualities 
of ultimate existence and absolute non-existence, etc., that are 
established] in terms of the ultimate truth do not conform to 
[their] reasoning.408          
 

407 Poussin 1933, p. 99 and HE 2012, p. 14 indicate that this is the fallacy committed when the 
property to be inferred in relation to the subject in the thesis is contradicted by another inference 
(anumāna-viruddha). NP gives the example of the thesis “jars are permanent” to illustrate this 
(CBETA, T32, no. 1630, 11b28; Section 3.1 [2] in Tachikawa 1971, pp. 122, 141), because it is 
contradicted by an established inference which can prove the impermanence of jars. However, the 
Yogācāras may not have committed this fallacy here. Their thesis is faulty not because it is 
contradicted by another inference, but because it is contradicted by their own reason. Cf. MHK/TJ 
5.71, where their reason is said to be contradictory. (Eckel 2008, p. 274 and note 89) 
408 KR: 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In Bhāviveka’s presentation, the Yogācāras’ argument can be structured as an 
inference: 
 
Thesis: In terms of the ultimate truth, conditioned things possess the 
dependent nature, 
Reason: because they are produced.   
 
The fallacy of invalidating the inference is committed because the property, 
“possessing the dependent nature in the ultimate sense”, to be inferred in relation to 
the conditioned things can be contradicted by an inference by Bhaviveka which 
infers the opposite of this property, with the same property that infers, i.e. “being 
produced”. Referring to previous discussions, in Bhāviveka’s portrayal the 
Yogācāras also hold that produced things lack an ultimate existence. For this reason, 
conditioned things, which are produced, should not possess the dependent nature, as 
an ultimate reality, in the ultimate sense. Hence, their reason is establishing the 
contrary of what it is meant to establish in the thesis. Besides, Bhāviveka thinks that 
the Yogācāras’ cannot provide a positive example in their inference. As they deny all 
dualities in the ultimate sense, ultimately, there is no similar instance that possesses 
any properties (including “being produced” and “possessing the dependent nature in 
the ultimate sense”). The thesis “conditioned things possess the dependent nature in 
the conventional sense” would also be fallacious for establishing what has already 
been established. Thus, proposing the reality of the dependent nature is untenable 
both ultimately and conventionally in the debate.     
 
Indeed, on Bhāviveka’s interpretation, the ultimate reality of the dependent nature or 
the ineffable reality of conditioned things already involves the notion of ultimate 
existence, and the imagined nature involves the notion of absolute non-existence. 
The Yogācāras, in Bhāviveka’s understanding, have never thoroughly eliminated the 
dualities, i.e. the imagined nature of the things they have claimed to eliminate to 
achieve the perfected nature. If they are consistent with their doctrine, in 
Bhāviveka’s opinion, they should also give up the notions of the three natures 
(which are understood in relation of ultimate existence and absolute non-existence).   
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Lastly in [4], Bhāviveka goes on to point out the problems of establishing the 
imagined nature as non-existent: 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 272c1-c10) 
[4] Again, referring to what you have said, [i.e.] “it is neither 
the case that there is the nature of that which is expressed with 
regard to that which expresses nor that there is the nature of 
that which expresses with regard to that which is expressed,” 
[your] opponents [i.e. us] have no doubt about it, therefore we 
refute it by pointing out409 that you have committed the fallacy 
of establishing what has already been established. And as you 
have also said, “therefore the ‘imagined nature’ is essentially 
non-existent in the existent ‘dependent nature’”; this is also 
beyond doubt to the other doctrines therefore we refute it by 
stating that you have committed the fallacy of establishing 
what has already been established.  
 
If you say that “by attaching to the ‘imagined nature’, i.e. to 
that which expresses and that which is expressed, there is the 
efficacy to generate defilements, therefore [the ‘imagined 
nature’] should be negated”; this is not true either. This is 
because animals, etc., which do not know the correspondence 
of that which expresses and that which is expressed, without 
following the reasoning [that you have explained] also attach 
to their object spheres and generate defilements.410      
 
[Although] the teaching on the emptiness of “the imagined 
nature” possesses various capacities and joys, and also various 
profound sacred words, it only benefits a few, but not all. 
Therefore, we do not only establish it as empty. We also put 

409 Poussin 1933, p. 99 renders “négation” (pratiAedha-vacana) for the Chinese term “°” in the 
text (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 272c1). This translation instead understands it in a general sense as 
“refute by pointing out”. 
410 Cf. MHK/TJ 5.57, where Bhāviveka argues for the existence of external objects as the source of 
defilement for animals. This is because animals do not use words to designate things but they still 
have objects and defilements (Eckel 2008, p. 263); see also Hoornaert 2001b, pp. 40-41, note 10. 
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an end to this topic which has been discussed only due to the 
present opportunity (prasaHga); we should discuss the main 
topic.411   
 
First, Bhāviveka holds that the Yogācāras’ claim regarding the non-existence of the 
imagined nature (i.e. the nature of the correspondence of that which is expressed and 
that which expresses), has committed the fallacy of establishing what has already 
been established. This is because Bhāviveka also holds that concepts due to false 
conceptualisation – such as the dualities of that which is expressed and that which 
expresses, object and subject, etc. – do not apply in the ultimate truth. Referring to 
the discussion in [2], he also accepts that conventional existents take the dependent 
nature as their inherent nature. In the ultimate sense, these things are indeed empty 
of an ultimate existence (i.e. the imagined nature in the Yogācāras’ understanding in 
his portrayal).  
 
Second, the negation of the imagined nature does not therefore eliminate the 
defilements of all sentient beings. To the above, the Yogācāras, on Bhāviveka’s 
interpretation, may reply that the negation of imagined nature, which they refer to as 
the duality of that which expresses and that which is expressed in language, is to 
eliminate defilements. But Bhāviveka considers this theory of the imagined nature as 
not being able to fundamentally address the issue of the arising of defilements. To 
him, it cannot explain the generation of defilements in animals. Although animals 
cannot refer to things by words and therefore do not have the duality of that which 
expresses and that which is expressed in language, they still generate defilements 
because they attach to external objects. Negating this theoretical imagined nature 
would not help to eliminate their defilements. As the generation of their defilements 
is not related to the existence or non-existence of such a nature, there must be a more 
fundamental cause. It may be assumed that this fundamental cause of the defilements 
of all sentient beings, human and non-human, is that they hold onto the dependently-

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arisen things and take them as ultimately real. Therefore, the thorough way to 
eliminate their defilements would be to assist them to understand that objects in their 
perception do not have an ultimate existence in themselves because these objects 
arise dependently on conditions. However, there is still the question as to how this 
can be conveyed to sentient beings other than humans. Thus, Bhāviveka’s theory is 
not better than the Yogācāras’ in the sense that it also cannot apply to animals to 
eliminate their defilements, although it could explain the fundamental cause for the 
arising of those defilements. 
 
From the above, Bhāviveka concludes his discussion by stating that the Yogācāra 
doctrine of other-emptiness as portrayed by him – i.e. that conditioned things are 
empty when they are empty of the imagined nature while possessing the dependent 
nature – is not applicable universally. It can benefit those human beings whose 
defilements are partly generated due to the reification of the subject-object duality in 
relation to language, and who can understand this doctrine. However, as shown in 
the above, it cannot benefit other sentient beings, whose defilements are not related 
to language. While this doctrine finds support in the Buddha’s teaching in YB, 
Bhāviveka holds that the Yogācāras’ understanding is problematic because it 
contradicts the notion of emptiness they intended to explicate, thus resulting in the 
fallacies in their argument. These make their dependent nature and imagined nature 
at best conventionally real, but not ultimately. As all things, including these natures, 
are empty ultimately, only the realisation of this can eliminate all defilements.412 As 
Bhāviveka considers his discussion sufficient to refute this doctrine, he ends his 
discussion here.  

412 This discussion may also be related to the topic of whether or not the Buddha’s teaching should be 
taken literally. The Yogācāras, as presented by Bhāviveka, can be considered as understanding the 
Buddha’s teaching in YB or the CūOasuññata Sutta in a more literal way. In relation to meditative 
practices, they take what remains as not empty and ultimately real, and eventually develop this notion 
into the doctrines of the three natures and of consciousness-only. Bhāviveka can be considered as 
engaging in a more interpretive approach to understand it, while he explains it in terms of the two-
truths. Hence, this teaching may be regarded as having explicit and fully explicated meaning (nītārtha) 
to the Yogācāras, but implicit meaning that requires further explication (neyārtha) to Bhāviveka.  
From this, there may be an alternative reading of Bhāviveka’s comment that the Yogācāra 
doctrine of other-emptiness cannot benefit all: although this doctrine is sophisticated and effective to 
a certain extent, as it is not the final interpretation of the Buddha’s teaching, it can only facilitate 
limited attainment for practitioners throughout their spiritual progress, and cannot lead them to 
achieve the ultimate liberation. To Bhāviveka, the things that remain of the Yogācāra doctrine – i.e. in 
his understanding, the real things and the consciousness, the dependent and perfected natures, and 
emptiness – should also be empty of ultimate reality. And the ultimate liberation is achieved by the 
refutation of the inherent existence or nature of all things.   
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B.5 The view that the inherent existence of conditioned things is emptied by the 
reasonings that refute it is erroneous  
After refuting various notions of non-emptiness and other-emptiness in relation to 
previous objections, Bhāviveka claims that he has already established the ultimate 
emptiness of the inherent existence of all conditioned things such as eyes, etc. by the 
reasonings discussed. However, some other opponents might still not understand that 
conditioned things are originally without an inherent existence. They might think 
that these things are empty only because their inherent existence is refuted by 
Bhāviveka’s reasonings. To them, however, the inherent existence of any particular 
thing can only be refuted by another thing that has an inherent existence, i.e. by 
another thing that is ultimately real.413 Thus, to these opponents, Bhāviveka’s 
reasonings must be ultimately real, as must his claim that he has established the 
ultimate emptiness of all conditioned things through those reasonings. These 
opponents therefore contend that both Bhāviveka’s claim and that to which it refers 
(i.e. his reasonings) involve mistakes, regardless of whether either is ultimately real 
or not:   
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 272c11-c14) 
[Objection 15:] Thus, the reasonings discussed above are 
already sufficient to establish that eyes are empty of an 
inherent existence. Yet, there are some other opponents who 
make the following objection, “if this claim ‘[the reasonings 
discussed above] can refute the inherent existence [of all 
conditioned things]’ is really existent, [then] you refute the 
thesis you yourself have established, and your reason has 
become indeterminate. If this claim is not really existent, then 
it is without an inherent existence, [and therefore] not 
qualified to be that which refutes.”414   
 

413 It should be noted that the notions of truth and existence are not distinguished in Indian philosophy; 
see discussion concerning satya under Section 1.1 in Part I.  
414 KR: 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If the claim (“Bhāviveka’s reasonings can refute the inherent existence of all 
conditioned things”) itself were ultimately real, then Bhāviveka would have 
committed the fallacy of refuting his own thesis. Bhāviveka’s thesis states that all 
conditioned things are empty of an inherent existence, or false, in the ultimate sense. 
Now this claim is a conditioned thing. If Bhāviveka admitted that it is ultimately real, 
then it would not be false in the ultimate sense, and there would be at least one thing 
which is conditioned but not empty. Thus, his standpoint would have contradicted 
and refuted his own thesis. Further, if Bhāviveka accepted the ultimate reality of the 
claim, then his reason “because conditioned things arise from conditions” would be 
able to infer both the ultimate emptiness and ultimate reality of conditioned things; it 
would become indeterminate.415   
 
However, if this claim were not ultimately real, then it would not have an inherent 
existence, and what is referred to by it – i.e. Bhāviveka’s reasonings can refute the 
inherent existence of all conditioned things – would not be ultimately real either. As 
Bhāviveka’s claim is denied of its ultimate reality, his reasonings cannot refute the 
inherent existence of conditioned things and cease to be that which refutes.          
 
Bhāviveka responds by denying that this claim represents his standpoint as it is made 
based on the opponents’ misunderstanding. In Objection 4 he has already refuted the 
view that conditioned things, which are empty of an inherent existence in the 
ultimate sense, have no causal efficacy even conventionally. Here, he is not denying 
the efficacy of this claim or his reasonings (i.e. the referent of this claim) in refuting 
inherent existence on the conventional level. As he holds that all conditioned things 
are empty of a nature in themselves in terms of the ultimate truth, these things are 
considered devoid of inherent existence to start with. Thus, it is not as if Bhāviveka’s 
refutation or anything other than the things themselves destroys their inherent 
existence; ultimately, inherent existence never arises. Hence, what Bhāviveka is 
denying here is the ultimate reality of this claim or his reasonings, and also their 
efficacy in refuting things’ inherent existence on the ultimate level. For this reason, 
on the same level, he denies the claim about his reasonings as that which refutes and 
about inherent existence as that which is refuted. Neither does he admit the fallacies 

415 Cf. VV 1-2. 
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from taking this claim as either ultimately real or not ultimately real, as attributed to 
him by the opponents. He responds as follows:  
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 272c14-c28) 
[Response:] This is not true either. Just as the Blessed One has 
said, “Brahmin, you should know that for all sayings 
regarding reality and unreality that have been said, I would 
say that they are neither true nor false.”416 From this sacred 
teaching and the reasonings that have been said and should be 
said, neither reality nor unreality can be established in terms 
of the ultimate truth. For this reason, I did not commit the 
fallacies that the opponents accused me of committing.417  
 
Bhāviveka firstly clarifies that there is neither reality nor unreality in terms of the 
ultimate truth, and therefore the opponents’ understanding of the claim, his 
reasonings and the inherent existence of things is erroneous. This is in accordance 
with the Buddha’s teaching, which explains that for whatever he says, be it about 
reality or unreality, it is neither true nor false in the ultimate sense. He taught about 
realities such as the Self to inspire people to virtuous deeds in order to attain better 
rebirths. He also taught about unrealities such as no-Self to inspire people to 
abandon their attachments. There are other examples – such as his teachings on 
death and rebirth, nirvana, etc. – but these are all skilful means (upāya). In terms of 
the ultimate truth, when all conceptual proliferations have ceased, the realities and 
unrealities, which were once taught or known by speech and thought through 
conceptualisation, have become undistinguishable and are no longer known as they 
were. As the nature of things has become ineffable, neither inherent nature nor any 
other nature is established. Hence, the Buddha, who has reached enlightenment, does 
not take things to be real or unreal, and neither does he take his teachings to be either 
true or false in the ultimate sense.418 The problem with the opponents’ argument is 

416 The Buddha’s saying that his teachings are neither true nor false is found in The Diamond Sutra 
(Vajracchedikā), in 14g, where it is said in relation to the things (dharmas) known and demonstrated 
by the Tathāgata, and in 17c, where it is explained that the Tathāgata does not achieve enlightenment 
through anything (dharma) (Conze 2002, p. 157-158, 161); see also Poussin 1933, p. 100, note 3. 
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418 See also MMK 18.6-18.8. 
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that they are still conceiving and therefore discriminating the nature of things in 
terms of ultimate reality or unreality. However, reality and unreality are only some 
forms of inherent nature to be eliminated on one’s path to enlightenment. For this 
reason, the opponents hold an erroneous understanding of the nature of things.        
 
Analysing the opponents’ argument, it seems that the way out of the dilemma is to 
give up postulating the ultimate reality or unreality of the claim, and of Bhāviveka’s 
reasonings and the inherent existence of things which this claim is about. The 
discussion above shows that this is indeed Bhāviveka’s recommendation: 
 
And it is just as what you mean, because the negatum 
(niAedhya) of the reasonings discussed above [i.e. the inherent 
existence of all conditioned things] does not exist, neither 
does the negation (niAedha) [i.e. the reasonings discussed 
above];419 it is not the case that the negation does not exist, 
then the negatum would [really] exist. It is rather that because 
the negatum in its nature does not exist, neither does the 
negation. The negation can only explicate that the negatum 
originally does not have an inherent existence, [but] it cannot 
destroy the inherent existence of the negatum. Like it is said, 
“the Bodhisattva cannot empty all things by emptiness, but all 
things themselves are originally empty in nature,”420 etc. And 
like when that which illuminates illuminates that which is 
illuminated, one should not say, “as the illuminated things 
such as jars, clothes, etc. do not exist, neither does that which 
illuminates.”421 Neither should one say, “the inherent 

419 See a similar comment by Nāgārjuna in Section LXXIII in Vaidalyaprakara9a and commentary in 
Tola and Dragonetti 1995, pp. 94-95, 155-156. Poussin 1933, p. 100 suggests the Sanskrit equivalents 
“niAedhya” and “niAedha” for “F” and “o” (CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 272c18). 
420 Staël-Holstein 1926, p. 94; see also Poussin 1933, p. 100, note 6. 
421 This quotation seems to refer to the fire analogy, in which the fire’s ability to illuminate itself and 
others is refuted. It does not illuminate itself because wherever there is light there is no darkness; it 
never illuminates itself because its distinctive characteristic is light. It does not illuminate other things 
because light and darkness are mutually exclusive; it cannot contact darkness in order to illuminate it. 
The ability of fire to illuminate things is compared with the instruments of knowledge’s ability to 
know things, i.e. a subject’s ability to act on its object. Since the fire’s ability is refuted, the ability of 
these instruments to know should also be refuted; see VV 34-39, MMK 7.8-7.11. 
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existence of that which is illuminated was originally non-
existent but now existent.”422   
 
Bhāviveka explains that the inherent existence of all conditioned things, i.e. the 
negatum, which is to be refuted by his reasonings, i.e. the negation, would not 
therefore remain existent if the negation did not exist. The understanding “without 
the negation to negate the negatum, then the negatum would exist” is still based on 
the inherent existence of things. While both the opponents and Bhāviveka agree that 
this would lead to fallacies in the inference, Bhāviveka rather considers that there 
neither is the negatum nor the negation. This means that as there is no inherent 
existence, i.e. the negatum, in all conditioned things in the ultimate sense, the 
negation, as a conditioned thing, also lacks an inherent existence and is 
unestablished in the same sense. Thus, ultimately, there is nothing that negates and 
nothing to be negated. Although the negation does not exist ultimately, as already 
discussed in Objection 4, it still has the efficacy to refute the inherent existence of 
things on a conventional level. As the negation is only real conventionally, it cannot 
destroy the inherent existence, i.e. the negatum, like one tangible thing destroying 
another. It can only point out that the negatum is originally empty of an inherent 
existence.423 For the same reason, Bhāviveka has quoted the Buddha’s teaching that 
all things are empty in themselves, instead of being emptied by the Bodhisattva by 
means of emptiness. This is because the Bodhisattva, her teachings on emptiness and 
emptiness itself are originally empty of an inherent existence. The same is true of 
Bhāviveka’s reasonings for the ultimate emptiness of all conditioned things.  
 
With this understanding, Bhāviveka further clarifies that in the ultimate sense, it is 
also erroneous to say that the object does not exist therefore the subject does not 
exist either, as in the case of that which illuminates being non-existent due to the 
non-existence of that which is illuminated. It is true that explanations of subject-
object duality or interdependence are often given to establish the emptiness of 

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423 See a similar response by Nāgārjuna in VV 23, 24, 27 and also discussions in VV 11-12, 61-64. 
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things,424 but Bhāviveka considers even these conventional designations. As things 
do not have an inherent existence to start with, no subject or object is established in 
the ultimate sense, and nothing can be established as interdependent. Neither is it 
right to say that the inherent existence of that which is illuminated was originally 
non-existent but now has become existent. Buddhists generally agree that something 
absolutely non-existent cannot become existent. An originally non-existent inherent 
existence cannot be created, like the voice of the son of a barren woman cannot be 
produced. Since no inherent existence arises together when a thing arises, this thing 
is empty of inherent existence originally.         
 
Nevertheless, Bhāviveka does not deny the conventional reality of the claim 
concerned:             
 
Also the negation, the negatum, that which proves (sādhana), 
that which refutes (dūAa9a),425 that which is perverted 
(viparīta) and that which is unperverted established by us are 
all conventional existents. If you refute that which is to be 
proved or that which proves, then you contradict your own 
thesis. [You may support this inference:] this claim, [i.e.] “[the 
reasonings discussed above] can refute [the inherent existence 
of all conditioned things]” should not be that which proves, 
because its nature is not real, like the voice emitted by the son 
of a barren woman. Since you accept that there is such an 
inference, [which is] that which proves, so should we, because 
it is conventionally existent.426 
 

424 For example, in various occasions in Madhyamaka literature, both subject and object are 
considered empty in the ultimate sense because one cannot exist without the other, e.g. MMK 3.6, 
18.4. In Yogācāra, the perfected nature, i.e. emptiness, is defined as the non-existence of subject-
object duality (see Objection 14). See also the teaching on dependent origination, which explains that 
when this arises, that arises; when this ceases, that ceases. Each limb in the chain of dependent 
origination arises and ceases consequently and interdependently. (SN 12.61 in Bhikkhu Bodhi 2005, 
pp. 595-596) This notion of interdependence is considered conventional in MMK 1.10. 
425 See Section 1 in Tachikawa 1971, pp. 120, 140; CBETA, T32, no. 1630, 11a28. 
426 KR: F'o=F=o'=o=v=v^)*ÀF'=o'Ê
ge~+ao°ª(o'($%&F8)Ø,do'78
LªZ)* 
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He clarifies that the terms he employs in his discussion to establish the emptiness of 
things – such as the negation, the negatum, that which proves, that which refutes, 
that which is perverted and that which is unperverted – are all designations that have 
an inherent existence conventionally. Although they do not exist ultimately, their 
existence on the conventional level should not be denied. If the opponents think that 
denying the ultimate existence of these things amounts to denying these terms even 
conventionally, then they will have to take that which is to be proved and that which 
proves, which are admitted as existent conventionally by Bhāviveka, as non-existent 
absolutely. They would therefore have contradicted their own thesis. This is shown 
in their objection regarding the ultimate unreality of the claim, which is presented in 
the following inference: 
 
Thesis:  The claim, which states that Bhāviveka’s reasonings can refute the 
inherent existence of all conditioned things, is not that which proves 
[the ultimate emptiness of these things], 
Reason: because its nature is not real, [i.e. it is not ultimately real,]  
Positive Example: like the voice emitted by the son of a barren woman.  
 
Based on the reason that the claim, which concerns Bhāviveka’s reasonings, is not 
real ultimately, the opponents wish to establish that it cannot prove the ultimate 
emptiness of conditioned things. Following their logic, whatever is not real 
ultimately is not able to prove anything; it is devoid of efficacy even conventionally, 
like the voice emitted by the son of a barren woman. Although they wish to press 
Bhāviveka to admit the ultimate reality of the claim concerned, Bhāviveka has 
already denied it above. It is not a problem for him to admit that the claim is not real 
in the ultimate sense and not able to prove the emptiness of conditioned things in the 
same sense, because this is meant to be achieved only conventionally. The positive 
example, “the voice emitted by the son of a barren woman”, which is absolutely non-
existent, has become illegitimate. This is because Bhāviveka considers that the 
property that infers, i.e. “being not ultimately real”, means “existent only 
conventionally”, instead of “non-existent even conventionally”, as in the case of this 
positive example. To him, things that are “existent only conventionally” are indeed 
causally efficacious.    
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More importantly, the opponents’ thesis (i.e. that a claim being not real ultimately 
cannot prove anything) will be refuted if these opponents apply their logic to their 
own inference. Granted that their inference is established, as it is also unreal (i.e. 
“non-existent even conventionally”), it would be unable to prove anything. The 
thesis would be refuting itself at the same time when it is established, thus failing to 
establish that a claim being not real ultimately cannot prove anything, which it was 
meant to establish. Therefore, if these opponents support their inference and hold 
that it can prove the thesis, i.e. that there are that which proves and that which is to 
be proved, then they have to admit that their inference is not absolutely unreal, 
although it lacks an inherent existence. As Bhāviveka accepts that things are not real 
ultimately, and he has also demonstrated that they are causally efficacious 
conventionally, the reasonable choice for these opponents to solve the problem in 
their inference is to admit that it is real only conventionally.  
 
C. Conclusion 
At this point, Bhāviveka has refuted all the objections that he regards as in various 
ways supporting the non-emptiness of conditioned things in the ultimate sense. He 
proposes to end the dispute here:   
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 272c28-273a5) 
Like what has already been said before, we would rather stop 
the long dispute, as it will be difficult for those, who are 
agitated about the meaning of extensive discussion, to accept 
and remember. 
 
Thus the inference discussed above is free from objections. 
Therefore, the reasoning of the stated thesis, “in terms of the 
ultimate truth, the eye faculty is empty of an inherent 
existence,” is established. Further, the stated reason, “because 
it arises from conditions,” only gives a typical reason; in order 
to negate the inherent existence of the discussed eyes, etc., 
there are other reasons such as “because they are destructible”, 
“because they change according to conditions”, “because they 
can be produced” and “because sometimes they can produce 
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false or correct knowledge”. Based on these reasons, as 
appropriate, one should correctly refute that which is 
counteracted by these reasons.427 
 
While considering his thesis, “in terms of the ultimate truth, all conditioned things, 
including the eye faculty, are empty of an inherent existence” proved, Bhāviveka 
adds that the reason he has given in his inference, “because they arise from 
conditions”, is only a typical reason to support the proof of this thesis. There are 
other reasons, such as “because it is destructible” that, for example, can be applied to 
prove the impermanence of a jar, which was mistakenly considered as permanent by 
ordinary people; “because it changes according to conditions” to prove the 
dependent existence of the sun, which they mistakenly considered as unchanging; 
“because it can be produced” to prove the limited nature of sound, which they 
mistakenly considered as all-pervading; and “because sometimes it can produce false 
or correct knowledge” to prove the non-absolute nature of the means of knowledge, 
which other doctrines mistakenly considered as necessarily valid. Things that are 
impermanent, dependently existent, limited in nature or non-absolute are also 
considered to lack an inherent existence. These reasons are equally applicable in 
proving the ultimate emptiness of eyes. Hence, Bhāviveka lastly comments that they 
should be used in appropriate circumstances to refute the objections to which they 
apply. Therefore, they can also prove the ultimate emptiness of all other conditioned 
things.   

427 KR: 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Ë%Aß"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,=+W5,=
+Û ,=+£o r=@,BaVÎFªWF	
ª
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APPENDIX – THE CHINESE TEXT 
A.1 The thesis regarding the ultimate emptiness of conditioned things does not 
contradict direct perception, common knowledge, or Bhāviveka’s own doctrine, 
nor is it self-contradictory   
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269a13-a18) 
 !"#$%&'()*+,!"-.$/0123456789
:;<#=>/?125@89ABC#;3DE-FGHI3JKLMN
OPQ/0-RS89TUV-RSWXTU3Y!"Z[\2]^_X`
2aK3b 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269a18-a29) 
@-:%cdefghij/kl m/CWnop^,M.dRSq 
^;89r.dRSsq ^;89r 
 
+(RSq ^;89/@89A>tuvQ$/w5;K/4xy
 @89A/89/JKpMz#RSq ^;893 
 
+(RSsq ^;89/{`%|Ew}`~
%^#

2/J8/RS89/C</JKpMB#RSsq ^;893 
 
+42!"^;89/c#/-K/RS3 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269b1-b11) 
(-RSWXTU/B#D3+(RSWX/#C</K3&
R/JRM/JRSWXTU3 
 
+(RSsWX/B#C</!".esWXK3 
 
+(RSZ[\2W^_X/B#C<3@,!"/@P
p/B-3@t%)*12-23b@%)*Aan/
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;J-3b4J2 |M/^-<C¡RSWX/D
#C3¢£ >tuv¤¥@P/¦Z[\2WX3 
     
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269b12) 
§,M ¢tuv¨G^,/K©4RS/ªBRMT3 
 
A.2 Although conditioned things are empty of an inherent existence ultimately, 
it is not fallacious for them to be taken up as the subject of an inference 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269b13-b14) 
-«¬()*Q$%/>tuv`2l$/0--P#=MT/B-^­#
=®T3b 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269b15-b17) 
#C<3Z[\2W^_X¯=`2.MK/°EP¢.®K/?-
P#=MT/B?^­#=®T3 
 
A.3 The property that infers, i.e. “arisen from conditions” does not contradict 
the property to be inferred, i.e. “empty” 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269b18-269b21) 
-@#<%±J'()*+²>³Q/`2$/w5;K´/`2µ
²$´/¶·²5;´r+²5;´%/¶·²a$´r4JM®¸RK/
0=¹MRTU3b 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269b21-b27) 
+º»,MTU/¼0|®]P½¾#=T/4*¿JÀ/!"À
Kb/¼0|*!"bK/#Á_®/-#=T/¢*¿bÂÃ*!"b
 K3B]½/4·J*Àb/Ä*!"br#C<3*5;Kb®V
*4Åb½WX/K®½Æ=/JKL'Ç#ÈÉ:%ÊË3 
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A.3.1 It cannot be established logically that whatever is causally efficacious has 
inherent existence 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269b27-269c1) 
-Q%¬±J()*LCÌÍ`Î-Q/-^±K3@Q%/-^±/
4ÏÐÑ3`-^±/Ò;`Ó34^®/-ÔÕK/`©-Q3b 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269c1-c7) 
+>E/Ö^=3Z[2m^XQ/­3=,`2-.-Q/0
,=3+>tu/]P½3×Ø/^Ùu=/#C<34ÚÛ¿/
Àk%*¿JÀ/^ÜQK3Ý2À/^ÜQ3¿µ^Ü/JKQ
À3b§­ÞWX]½/*-^±Kb=R®/È,*`2bJ(
^Â/Q-K3 
 
A.3.2 The inference can be established even it is a conditioned thing and empty 
due to the reflexivity of its thesis  
 
A.3.2.1 The inference is not deficient, although the reason and the example are 
also conditioned things and included in the subject  
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269c8-269c9) 
«¬'()*²-.$´%/+®+½ÂÃ 3ß]K/àá9T3b 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269c9-c15) 
câ 9ã3£¤¥äV,9ä/`2!!G,.M/KT3,
!"-..M/BT3*5;Kb®åM/#=K3+*`$/
æQ$Kb/^®ç-JT3B½/Å2-K3+,^½ Å2¢
.M%/0-è,=TK3 
 
A.3.2.2 The reason is not illegitimate, although it is included in the subject and 
proved to be empty, should the thesis be established 
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(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269c15-c16) 
-é:%±J'()*+,²!"-.Q$´/®-.K/æQB$/Jê
®-#=T3b 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269c17-c26) 
?#=³#=34,*!"-p/ª-®Kb3-'*®
@ Â/BpK/-#=Tb3§%,*@|ë¢ìíî.æ
Q/¹nGKb3-'*®|ë Â/B¢í2.æQK/-#=Tb3§
t%,*¿À/^±QKb3-'*®Õ¿.a/BÀK/-#=
Tb34J2@ï%ð ñò,%T/4^<óÈôs3+
-</·lõÈö,á9ôp^í^<r 
 
A.3.2.3 It is fallacious to take the reason, which is empty of a self-nature, to be 
absolutely non-existent 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269c27-c28) 
¬-'()*²5;K´®Ç#È,^C,u/¢Q$K/4ÏÐÑ^÷Û
¿3b 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 269c29-270a12) 
®£-#=T3+sM^.®/B#C<3¢>sM²Q$K´/
æu_3+²-´u/J®u%/®#=/²-´K3+J²
|8-´
428
u/J®u%/²ÏÐÑ¿´óK/½êÈ,øP3§ª
ù¿-#©T/EÈ=ú9-ûíëK3 



For this second meaning of “” (“empty”), instead of “./01” (“existing [in form of] a 
false appearance”) in CBETA (T30, no. 1578, 270a2), in Poussin 1933, p.81 and in Hatani 1976, p. 
106, it is rendered differently in the Zangyao, p. 5 as “.01” meaning “space that appears as 
existent”.  
 The voice emitted by the son of a barren woman is non-existent absolutely. The present 
context intends to convey that it cannot be a positive example because of its absolute non-existence. 
Therefore, what “empty” actually means here should not be “absolutely non-existent”, otherwise the 
voice emitted by the son of a barren woman would be able to be a positive example. To Bhaviveka, 
space is an unconditioned thing that does not arise from conditions and is to be proved to be unreal 
ultimately. It is considered the same as the voice emitted by the son of a barren woman. Hence, it is 
unlikely that “empty” means “space that appears as existent” in this context. While a “false 
appearance” is arisen from conditions, the term “existing [in form of] a false appearance” is consistent 
with Bhāviveka’s understanding of the middle way. This term also appears in Yogācāra literature 
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§sMü^
429
®È,^,/!#=K/ý4sM^#=®þRá9^
SK-TU^K34,*m2C/ÂK/4¡2b,
*$2JÀ/^­K/ý4	2b,*pn/|ëK/ý4

tb34J2ô!"M/TU3K©CÌåMW/¼¡.®3ª
</4^T/-3 
 
A.3.2.4 The thesis regarding the ultimate emptiness of all conditioned things is 
reflexive but not fallacious 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270a13-a17) 
-«#<%.|MT/¬±J()*+Q$/^,È,#=>/
4ÏÐÑ^÷Û¿3È,ÂÃ-. /K]E^,/æQB$3¢$K/^
,È,Æ#=>3Ee^,È,Pa/°Je£-P/|,MT3b 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270 a18-a20) 
E®s#=K/#©K/½-TK/4/B#C<3ð&/
Ç#ÈMTU3 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270a20-a28) 
-«¬&G¼0MT/±4J()*^²³Q-.$´%/,M(
æu_3+²>³Q/!"-.-´J,Mu/^(B¬ÂÃ-
. /K]@-./BC3+^(%/-.BC3(
^,uK/¡R(,MTU/4,!"(3+²>³Q/!"-
.^-´J,Mu/°!"^-34J^,/03b 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270a28-b3) 

relating to designations and the imagined nature. As the rendering of the term “.01” is rare, 
this translation follows Poussin’s understanding as “./01”.    

	
The character “F” is rendered as “” (“not”) on CBETA (T30, no. 1578, 270a5). It is edited back 
to “F” (which is a variant from the earlier editions of the Chinese canon; see note 1 under [269c27] 
on CBETA) in this translation with reference to Poussin 1933, p. 81, Zangyao, p. 5 and Hatani 1976, 
p. 107. Otherwise, the subject (i.e. “ñ~>d”) of the inference would be the same as the 
positive example (i.e. “ñ~F§”) as they refer to the same thing in this context.
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 4)*p©­£p/õ(sJ­r:%p/Kí3bE>
.p/>tuv,.p/R(,MTU3B4J3J>
Q-`2/>tuv,E$/KTU3 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270b3-b25) 
¬4-)*!";P/£3b^(/©/µ;/BC
/#K3E^,MðÈIB£/J^K/R(,MTU3
B4J3>³Q-.$/w5;K/^,M(µw5;/BCQ$/#
K3,M(ðÈI(Q$/J^K/-^,uU3 
 
4 ()*!/!"p#"3b()* /"ë#rb  
#"ë/Ä(²!"p#"´/E(R^ëK/ç-RS^(T3
!"l-U3 
 
!«l)*!"-p3b§«l)*@À/-;P3b+
#$%/µ@pÀ/BC-4^T/DEU34@pQ
ÀQ/,M(B]EpÀK3B4J3*-.$b/^,M(B
Q$3ê%=^u3JKL*(^,uKb/®#=3 
 
§4,@|ëí2.Q/ð-'()*|ë+¢í2.Q/^,M(BC
ÕEí2.Q3^,M(+EQ/|ëBCE.Q3bD^,M4JT3
4,-.Àp/B4E^MU3B4J/^T/Ê^K3 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270b25-b27) 
§E%#&^,/Ä''()*+²>³Q-.´/^²-.´
ø(/BC3b 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270b27-c1) 
'#È(MT3sM]E-U/4î)µ*+,#È-/Ä,
<./s()*LBJ)3b0¥^1(23 
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(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270c1-c5) 
§E^()*+²>³Q/!"-.^-´J,Mu/°!"^-/
4J^,b%/ Mu/4 /Ò²$´²Q´|83
ø4G/!"ß.3KL#C±4J'3 
 
A.3.2.5 Establishing conditioned things as empty of self-nature is not a nihilistic 
view 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270c6-c8) 
¬-«56789/±J'()*+@-.>tuvý4Å2/$Q/°
J-3i-K/0.3b 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270c8-c23) 
E:;<MT'/º&(3=-T/>$%^,9=/tuvTU
?K3*-b(/J@u3Li(AB.t/p(C.t3
*-b(×*-Qb/DÈEF/-ÔG¸@«u34Þ*HIb
(/#ç°i(@*Jb/¹È%±,MT3*HIb(×*HIb/
DÈEF/¸«G@A*JIb*KIb*LIb3 
 
c />tuv£-.MNÀO/z*-Qb34J«l/NPO/
£*Qb3QNåO/*-Qb3.N^«iTU/RS!"
ø^/TC3^+/3 
 
§£«l)*U'V/+i-Q/°ÀO3+iQ/°PO3b4J
«l)*WXY/-J!O/JZå3b 
 
ª4J2U[\K/Vd^@<K/p^,M]4^TU3 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270c25-c27) 
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-#"M<T'^_/.:`a/¬±J()*Q$%ðÀbòc
Gm/ÄdcG!"-..$Q/°J=,eÚ^icG/Uí
M3b 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270c27) 
4JB/KT3 
 
A.4 The general quality, instead the particularities, of the subject should be 
taken up as the property that infers 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270c28-c29) 
-«¬()*^$®/+>/¾>tu/££s/®u#=3b 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 270c29-271a9) 
åMW/#|4G3P3Á<%.®K/L^,'/?#=T/
³#=34t%,*¿À/^±QK3b¿À%ET()*cG®u/
fg2±/¾h2±/4JcG/®u#=3b4%,*ÈÜ2i-Î
^j1/JÎQK/ý4ÊÎ3b`2iÎj1%ET()*ÎQK®/
+?jQ/¾í2Q/££s/4JcG/®u#=3bEåß/?#
=T/³#=/K#C<3B4J3 
 
B. Conditioned things themselves are originally empty of a self-nature  
 
B.1 The view that an illusion is not empty of a self-nature, but empty of the 
nature of a real thing is erroneous 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271a9-a16) 
¬-«5¢7Á9/kMÙ/lmmn/#È¤¥opqU
4G/|^,r½T()*stuGv*wãxy2z/Éæßß{
|621|83pM#EQ$/]½0à/^,K3+(²4Å{
|2/-s{|2Q/¡.$/`2B$/sQK/,.$´%/
0-MT/,=K3b 
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(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271a16-a26) 
E'#D3stuGv*wãxy2z/w5^;{|2/{2Q
$/.½K/^,u=3 
 
+L¬Ò*Åt^±{|2ë/ðs{|2Q/D#çEQ$K/
QB$b/}4E~|8/°-4J@zQ/4L^wã2zr
+$°CÅt^±{|2ë/-4J{|2Q/D-3KX!"Å
t^±{|2ë/Q$3JK-4^½/^,u=3B=,=
TU/>Q$=,`2-.$K3 
 
B.2 The view that an illusion is not empty of a substantial existence, but empty 
in contrast with a real thing is erroneous 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271a27-271b1) 
¬-@«$m%/G|½T)*ð@Å/K¡.$/DEÅ
Q#$/-8aK3ª</4^,/u#=/½#=K3b 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271b1-b5) 
cCE)*8Åa5;#rbE±J)*5;3b+$/
·K¬¡r¢4^|8/#4J-K3}`2B5;/4^|8#4
J-r]½=K/Q$u=3LCÌÍ3 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271b5-b9) 
E±J()*#CÌÍ/¢@Å430¤¥/EK/
¡.$3L2,^`2-./G-`230¤¥/E/`
2Q$/çÉÌÍ3b 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271b9-b19) 
ð^`2G-`2/D-4J*Q$b*5;b/^,È,åP
=>3ª½/ÈI=^½uK3 
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LccGP½GK/0=cG?T3|ï%m/4t%)
*¿À/^±QK/r4Ý23b#C'()*Ý22^=/ç
ç^/çJÀ3¿µ#$/CÀ3bBcGP½GK/
K=cG?T3KCÌÍ`2Q$/*Q$b#*5;b®K3 
 
§4*8°-QbK/BC$3KL2(#È-MT'3 
 
B.3 The view that everything is not empty of the existence of everything is 
erroneous 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271b20-b23) 
-5±4J')*p,?2@J^|Q/²5;K´®-#=T3
!"-!"aK/@ÎeÃ!"lK/EÅ B-a3,Q$/]
P½3b 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271b23-c3) 
 z­1A¤¥3Ò@1A5^|/EG5-K34
h5:í24Gw5/-Ý2/¾?¾34J`2w54G1A/
Eßß
430
þ`Á/AûKþ21M4G/A?2|
8K3*Þ8J^|z/#E54G/ý4Áu2
^|ßß2z3b1A#$34¤1A/`2BD3u=ÞW_/
K^®#=T3 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271c4-c14) 


The characters “WU” (“according to those”) on CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271b27 are rendered as 
“UW” (“they are according to”) in Zangyao, p. 8. With this understanding, the text would be 
changed from “tV459âWU++¦	” (“Thus, different cognitions of matter 
[that arise from] numerous conditions such as eyes, etc. change according to those various [different 
conditions]”) to “tV459âUW++¦	” (“Thus, [regarding] the cognitions of 
matter of different numerous conditions such as eyes, etc.; they change according to those various 
changes in conditions”); hence resulting in the difference in the referent of “U” as “those various 
[different conditions]” in the former and as “they” which are “the cognitions of matter” in the latter. 
Since there is no difference in the overall meaning in either case, i.e. the cognitions of matter change 
according to the differences or changes in conditions, this translation follows the former.
253 

§L^(*!"-!"ab2/. |ër. `Õr 
 
+ |ëi*!"-!"ab%/4£Ýl-Ý|ë/£2lBCe-Ý
|ë/e-aK/4J!Ý°Ce¡9¢£¤¥l3£Ý2lBC¦-
2|ë3Ý|ë*`aK/2|ëB*`a/§9?K3§9?%/C.
?§9`a3Ý2|ë2|ë^`aK/!"läC#ç3JKLM 
æ|ë*!"-!"ab%/#C<3 
 
+ `Õi*!"-!"ab%/4J^i¨ ¤¥/¼çXJ/©
ªT# ¤¥3 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271c14-c16) 
LMBÅ|l/|$/p^,½#=T/JK^,Q$u=3L
5l«¬3 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271c17-c21) 
B*@Îe!"l/-^®K/4Î­lb34J*È.íìîA;®
Kb2}ßI®/BC 3ª*@Îe!"lbK/Å @Îa/
^,*$b]P½3JKL=cG/­®^¯±4JÚ3 
 
B.4 The view that emptiness is the non-existence of the imagined nature in the 
existent dependent nature is erroneous 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 271c22-272a10) 
C5-±J)*L>²³Q´,²-.$/5;K´%/+u(²@
-.Pw5;/D-/>*;Qb,E.$´/Jê°=C5u/
±²<3b 
 
*§4J)²ªEK$/EJ3­K$/J-3´4J$QJ
\54^3³Ê(²eÚ^i´²­s´´µQ¶/EQK3¢
4È@-^@Q/B4^@-È@Q/K²­s´Q´-µ²eÚ^i
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Q´¶3²ªEK$´/°Úë/EQþ²­K$´/°5;ë/
Q-3+%/ê.P/£·ëµõ.$r5;ë/°¡.
²­s´Q´3­-1Í·2Q4G¸,Q3+%/¸P
B/0=3#C¹(/#CWk3¹º/BÉs34J=,²e
Ú^iQ´.$V²­s´Q´.-/»d<3b 
 
*+u(²*­s´QbB^-/K,.$´/L0¼4µ^TU½
¾/B¬=>¿!À³TU3b 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 272a11-a14) 
 Á¹÷º«ÂV@Ãbò/ÄÅ%/ Æ/·Ç]º!Â@
5räSK/éWÈë3 4ÉÊ³ËÌÍ¦cG/K#èÎ/Ï 
%#bíK3 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 272a15-a26) 
(*-.Pw5;/D-/>²;Q´E.$b/-·ur+
u(*`2-.²­s´´µ#®;/Àô3`2QóK/
¡.$b/0,=/]t2MWK3 
 
D*`2^±$
431
/Q$Kb/C(*²;´²Q´K$b/#
C(*>²;Q´E.$b3+E´ä/>tuv-Q;/¶·.
*;Qbr+;/aK/#C-*×ÓQb/+$ê-R
MT3 
 
+*­s´bD;Q$-K/ø.$/JêÐ-,=T3µ*­
sb/w5Ä;#$K/C#¡$3pê#$3¶·°
432
=C5ur 


The characters “F” are rendered as “F~” on CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 272a19. They are 
edited back to “F” (which is a variant from the earlier editions of the Chinese canon; see note 1 
under [271c22] on CBETA) according to Zangyao, p. 9, and with reference to Hatani 1976, p.115 and 
Poussin 1933, p. 96. 


Zangyao, p. 9 renders the character “à” (which is a variant from the earlier editions of the 
Chinese canon; see note 2 under [271c22]), instead of “” on CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 272a26. The 
sentence “à§:ªf%” then means “why do [you say that] we state and establish the 
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(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 272a26-b15) 
§4^*ªEK$/EJ3­K$/-b2/+®5G^;`2
!"ÞW-J@Am^3?-Q|8/¢tuvAmÑò/
ý4Å/Q/JK(*ªEK$/EJb/.:ÀOTK3 
 
4.ÒÓÀOT/E.*bþB.ÒÓPOT/.*-b3Ò®
5G^;`2vÂ/QJ-/#]$wÔ-z/>³Q,ø.$/
JK(*­K$/J-b34J$QJ\54^3+>u
*­s´QbJ-/ê.3 
 
4JQpBK/%Þ(^ÂÕ:måÖ×K/¸,^­-
K/¸PB-3D¬(*+%/¸PB/0=3#C¹Ø…b/
4J2T#=>3 
 
§+ö,*²­s´Q´K-b/0,=3+,*Qtuv-b/
]P½34ei*©-Qb/Bdei*©Qb/JK#C(Ù
ÚÛ^*­s´Qb3 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 272b16-b28) 
+(*pM,-Å2(Q/]½K/È,%/(Q<#=/K
-Tbþ+$/Ã^i(Qp2/õÈrEB*-Qp2/
m(ø^Kb3 
 
+w5G^;!"*­s´Qb>tuv-Q%/ÅC-Q3+-
sQ/B#C</[µ#C-ÜQK3±±Q--QQ
åÂÍ34^,/]P½/¾,=3åT^Ý/K#C<3 
 

Yogācāras’ doctrine?” as in my translation. This resembles a similar phrase “-à§:ªf%” in 
the first paragraph of the Yogācāras’ objection. As the term “§” on CBETA is rare and the 
meaning it renders “why do [you say that] we have mistakenly established the Yogācāras’ doctrine?” 
can be confusing, this translation follows Zangyao and has edited “” to “à”.
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§5;@-.P>tuv+-Q/*^±Kb®IEQ$eEQ-/K
^,MRá9T3@5;W_X-Q3+-©ituv-/C¢<
EM3§E#CÂÍ/>tuvåßcG/#C<K3 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 272c1-c10) 
§4^*4È@-^@Q/4^@-È@Qb/@ï%£Þ/K
C(*,=Tb3§4^*K²­s´´Q-µ/²eÚ^i´Q
¶b/Bs£JÞ/KC(*,=Tb3 
 
+(*ªiÈ@^@²eÚ^iQ´/-G;@ªß/KàCb/B
#D/@áâ2#_È@^@C/B£M#4<i/;ªßK3 
 
¦-ßßÈÊí/B-ßßãÀ(/*eÚ^iQb$³×Úéc/
#e!"3Kp#ü,ø.$/zCä/CÎ3 
 
B.5 The view that the self-natures of conditioned things are emptied by the 
reasonings that refute them is erroneous  
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 272c11-c14) 
4J4^</¦=,`Q$3¬-«5±4J')*²È-
Q´(+J-/U^,M/®=#©3+-/°Q/#=È3b 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 272c14-c28) 
B#D34!)* /dX!"^(/p.
3bªÀ³V@d</>tuv¹##ö,/JK-
4^T3 
 
§4LÊ/^<^K/ÈB/È/^0-3ª^¶
QK/ÈB3È×ÈÎ_^¶Q/Èô^Q34
*åæ#È¢$/$!"P/D!"P¶Q$b/RS 3§4Èçç^
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çä/#C(*Ýè2z^çK/ÈçBb/B#C(*^çzQ¶
c-b3 
 
§p^,È^È,È-éé-3+L^,È
,/°RM3*²È´(CÈ,/QK/4ÏÐÑ^÷Û¿3b
Lµ-È,á9/pBC$/-K3 
 
C. Conclusion 
 
(CBETA, T30, no. 1578, 272c28-273a5) 
4/C Æ/@-êÏ u%/'ÍëK3 
 
4J4^á9@<'/K^,MÒ*>³Q`lQ$b<=>3§^
,®*5;Kb%/ì»¡3.^`2Q/¬-«®Ò*çôKb
*5GKb*ç;´Kb*-äÈ´:Kb3ª2®/4æ^
C/^íî/C3 
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